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ABSTRACT 
VALERIE CLARK 
BEREAVEMENT AND MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT: 
AN EXPLORATION OF THE EXPERIENCES OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG 
PEOPLE 
This thesis, which is in two parts, attempts to interpret in moTa\ and spiritual temns 
those responses to bereavement that are often described as psychological. In 
part one human development is considered comparing religious, philosophical, 
scientific and psychological theories and a model of the 'core self is proposed 
(body, mind and emotions) which responds to social and cultural influences in 
ways that can be considered moral and spiritual. Theories of duty, consequence 
and virtue are considered as well as Kohlberg's theory of justice reasoning and 
Gilligan's views about caring. Within spirituality notions of dualism and continuity-
discontinuity are noted and a tripartite view of spirituality as human, devotional 
and practical is proposed. The notion of stages in both moral and spiritual 
development is dismissed in favour of a model of inter-relatedness and inter-
connectedness, and a bereavement model of adaptation is also suggested to 
describe the process of grieving which is likened to development. 
Part two describes the research methods used to obtain data from 169 
respondents: 28 children (5-11 years), 99 young people (11-18 years) and 42 
adults, including key interviews with four 16/17 year old girls whose parent and/or 
sibling had died. Respondents discuss traditional religious beliefs and practices; 
the concept of a loving and/or just God; having a sense of the presence of the 
deceased; spiritualism and near-death experiences; 'living for the moment'; 
increased awareness of and empathy with other grieving people; constraints on 
hurting or harming people; valuing of life itself; funeral attendance, and the 
response of school staff to bereaved pupils. 
This study highlights the need for initial teacher training and ongoing INSET on 
bereavement issues and suggests that research is needed conceming pupil and 
staff opinions and experiences, and evaluation of school policies. The 
establishment of an educational centre for resources and information on loss, 
death and bereavement is also proposed. 
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When I went back to school after my father died I found it very upsetting that 
no one actually came out with it and asked how I was, neither teachers nor 
pupils. No one mentioned that I had been off school for a week. Some 
people clearly avoided me, and if that was not possible, evaded any form of 
conversation that might bring up the dreaded topic of death. 
(Abrams, 1992,p94) 
My interest in bereaved young people began while teaching in a secondary school 
in Leicestershire from 1986 to 1988 when three 15-16 year old pupils, whom I 
taught or had pastoral responsibility for, experienced the death of their mothers 
while studying for exams. I began to be aware of how the school handled these 
events and what difficulties arose for those pupils at that stage in their academic 
life and went on to research for an MA dissertation entitled 'Death education for 
adolescents: an education for life?' This PhD thesis, which attempts to interpret 
as moral or spiritual those responses to bereavement which are usually described 
as psychological or behavioural, is a further stage in my exploration of this area. 
I find it timely that during the course of this research the impact of bereavement 
within the school population has been highlighted by the following media-reported 
deaths: four pupils from Southway Community College while canoesing in Lyme 
Bay (March 1993), eleven pupils and a teacher from Hagley High School in an 
accident on the M40 (November 1993), Nicola Conroy at Hall Garth School 
(March 1994), headteacher Philip Lawrence outside St George's Roman Catholic 
School (December 1995) and 16 pupilsxat Dunblane Primary School (March 
1996). 
After the M40 accident, The Daily Mirror (19/11/93) led its front page account with 
the question "Why?" and I am aware that it is this kind of question - with its moral 
and spiritual overtones - that teachers often have to face when pupils in their class 
are bereaved. Although society may use explanations of cause and effect and 
blame and responsibility there is seldom any easy answer as to why people die, 
especially when they are young. However well prepared we think we are, the 
unexpected and final nature of death always surprises us and questions about 
one's own significance, life's meaning and purpose and wrtiat, if anything, happens 
after death are seldom far from articulation. 
iriTRODUCTION 
Surprisingly little is written on the idea of development itself. Or perhaps it is 
not surprising that a notion so central to a whole era is simply taken for 
granted, tt is an idea that shows up in almost every field of study today, one 
of those optimistic modem terms that nearly everyone wants a share of. 
(Moran. 1987. p165) 
Like Moran. I believe it is important to carefully examine the concept of 
development since, as it is basically a biological one frequently applied in a variety 
of non-biological settings, commonly held views are that development, like 
physical maturation, is 'natural' and 'nornial' - although 'unnatural* and 'abnormal' 
forms are recognized to exist. Such an examination of the concept will enable me 
to explore what specific forms of development - such as 'moral' and 'spiritual' -
might mean, particularly within education since educational ideas have been 
influenced by other fields with their own particular notions of natural and normal 
development. 
In order to undertake the examination mentioned above I have divided this thesis 
into two parts. In Part One 1 conduct a philosophical analysis of the concept of 
human development, moral development, spiritual development and stages of 
development before considering ideas of moral and spiritual development within 
bereavement. In Part Two I explain my research approaches and present my 
findings in terms of concepts of and ideas about development explored earlier. 
Part One 
In chapter one I explore notions of development within religious, philosophical, 
scientific and psychological theories in order to note commonalities and 
differences, particularly between the two main psychological viewpoints, 
mechanism and organicism. regarding leading developmental characteristics: 
reductionism or anti reductionism. continuity or discontinuity, additive or 
multiplicative, and quantitative or qualitative. I show that psychological theories 
hold differing views as to whether the agent/organism is active, passive or 
conflicted in the developmental process, whether there is an end-state towards 
which development moves and whether human development involves critical ages 
or psychosocial stages, and that issues of cause (nature-nurture) and direction 
(continuity-discontinuity) are frequently debated. However. I also suggest that 
views of development cannot ignore socio-cultural influences, particularly 
regarding notions of 'childhood' and children's legal rights, responsibilities and 
innocence which, in their tum. influence ideas of morality and spirituality. 
I continue in chapter one by comparing such specialist views of development with 
everyday usage, noting that it is often a synonym for 'increase', 'expand*, 'evolve', 
'conversion' and 'effect*, and that it is usually perceived to involve change and 
growth. Depending upon whether 'development' is viewed as an end-state or an 
ongoing process I suggest that it is often perceived - particularly within education -
from one of three viewpoints: 
• the part completed so far 
« the part happening now 
o the predictable future outcome 
and that any of these views may involve making judgements regarding the 
'present' ever-changing state, differences between present and previous states, 
and future situations. 
After noting influential definitions from developmental psychology and educational 
philosophy which repeat some themes previously mentioned (maturation, growth, 
temporary process, end-state, change) as well as suggesting new ones ('trace 
effects' or impressions, self-stimulation, self-regulation). I experiment with a 
synthesized definition of development to see how far it covers both human and 
non-human forms. Next I trace Aristotelian 'causes' in five further definitions in 
order to arrive more closely at ideas of development pertinent to morality and 
spirituality: 
• a series of changes but not necessarily an increase in size 
• a principle of unity linking the identity of the thing in question through the 
whole process of development 
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• intentional intervention rather than inevitable maturation 
• an end-state as the rationale for development and a measure of improvement 
• generative change. 
I contend throughout this thesis that the basic building blocks of our 'core self are 
the body, mind and emotions and, accordingly, that physical, intellectual and 
emotional development are the only true forms of development. I argue that 
spiritual, moral, social and cultural development do not exist in their own right but 
depend upon the body, mind and emotions responding to social and cultural 
influences, including religious beliefs. Therefore, when I discuss moral 
development and spiritual development I do so with the idea that such 
developmental forms involve the body for expression, the mind for thinking and 
the emotions for feeling but that no tangible forms of development called moral or 
spiritual independently exist. 
In chapters two and three I explore religious, philosophical and psychosocial 
theories of both moral and spiritual development in order to compare these two 
particular forms with human development itself - just as the Office for Standards in 
Education (OFSTED. 1994a) tried to do: 
In what ways, if any, does the term 'development* differ when used in 
conjunction with each of the four adjectives (spiritual, moral, social, cultural)? 
(The concept of devetopmenf, question 4) 
I also discuss how far it is appropriate and possible for OFSTED to inspect such 
provision in schools. 
In chapter two I discuss moral theories of duty, consequence and virtue before 
exploring Piaget's ideas and Kohlberg's theory of moral development. I note that 
Kohlberg focused on justice reasoning in contrast to Gilligan's concern for caring, 
and that Kohlberg finally changed stage 6 of his theory into a philosophical end-
point and stage 7 into a metaphorical or hypothetical soft stage - which 
disappears from later versions (see Appendix 1). I discuss the role of schools (as 
institutions), teachers (as individuals), family and other aspects of society in the 
development of morality and show that personal intention, educational 
intervention, end-state and process are particularly important issues when 
considering moral development. 
In chapter three I show that a key concept in spiritual development has been that 
of dualism (spirit-mind, spirit-body, spiritual-material, spiritual-sexual) with 
associated notions of continuity-discontinuity within the spiritual life in terms of 
religious/secular lifestyles and. within religious institutions, the 
active/contemplative life. I also suggest that the monotheistic religions of 
Judaism. Christianity and Islam offer a particular form of nurture designed to 
counteract the imperfect human nature that they perceive humanity possesses 
and that age-old beliefs of spirituality as the essence or motive of a person are 
recurring in recent psychological views. 
In chapter four I consider the notion of stages of human development in more 
detail: ages, critical periods or eras, and psychosocial roles. I explore moral 
development regarding Piagetian notions of hierarchical stages. Kohlbergian hard 
and soft stages, the use of hypothetical or real-life dilemmas and the principles of 
caring and justice in plotting moral development. Finally. I use a view of 
Kohlberg's hypothetical soft stage 7 as a means of showing the inter-relatedness 
of all living things in both moral and spiritual terms, replacing traditional 'stages' of 
dualism or discontinuity in spiritual development with a metaphor of ripples of 
increased consciousness and awareness. Where appropriate throughout these 
four chapters. I relate my ideas to bereavement in children and young people in 
order to contextualize the analysis. 
In chapter five I apply the notions of natural-unnatural and normal-abnormal, 
previously considered regarding development, to the process and experience of 
bereavement. I contend that both development and bereavement are natural, 
adaptive processes which humans generally respond to according to nomothetic 
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laws, although 'unnatural* or 'abnormal' development and grieving can occur 
according to idiographic laws which recognize individual differences. I relate four 
well-known grieving tasks to moral and spiritual themes arising from the model of 
Kohlberg's seven areas of inter-connectedness: self development, awareness and 
appreciation of other people, and enhanced existential awareness. I also suggest 
that developmental concepts of discontinuity-continuity are evident In all views of 
death. 
Part Two 
In chapter six I explain how I devised an ethics protocol, questionnaires and 
Interview questions. I describe the first phase of my research (working in schools) 
and the second phase (working in other contexts), particularly Interviews with four 
16/17 year old girls bereaved of a parent and/or sibling whose stories form the 
heart of my data. 
In chapter seven I present my findings in terms of aspects of development 
explored earlier: 
• personal development over time (relationships with family, friends and other 
people, emotional development, changes in personality, behaviour, creativity, 
and cognitive development, particularly regarding views of life) 
• interaction between bereavement and school events (significant life events 
and significant deaths, funeral attendance, exams, school work, teacher 
responses) 
• moral and spiritual development (traditional religious beliefs and practices, 
belief In God or a divine power, having a sense of God or the deceased, moral 
and spiritual explanations and support, formulation of new beliefs, moral 
principles, socio-conventional laws and expressions of practical spirituality). 
In chapter eight I review the limitations of my research, draw implications from my 
findings and suggest future areas for research. I relate my implications to 
0 the core self and stages of development (particularly cognitive development, 
emotional development and sex differences) 
• theories of moral and spiritual development (traditional religion and views of 
God. moral laws and principles, and the impact of the research itself on these 
forms of development) 
• bereaved pupils, schools and OFSTED (particularly pupil-teacher relationships 
and absence from school). 
1 consider that future research needs to balance the naturalness of death itself 
with the individual significance of each particular death for children and young 
people. I specifically note that it is always difficult to obtain typical findings from 
such a self-selected population; that males are under-represented in all the 
literature; that working in schools presents a dilemma in temns of a researcher-
teacher-counsetlor rote and that researchers require appropriate training in 
bereavement issues. I suggest that future work needs to consider both pupils and 
staff regarding what schools have done, are doing and could do in order to better 
support all bereaved members of their population, that initial teacher training and 
INSET need improving in this area, and that it would be helpful to establish an 
educational centre for resources and information on loss, death and bereavement, 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this study I have adopted a working definition of 'children' as 
attending primary school (5-11 years) and 'young people' as attending secondary 
school (11-16) or further education (16-18). Those over 18 years are termed 
'adult.' I have not looked at the bereavement experiences of pre-school age 
children (birth-5 years) but only of those children and young people in compulsory 
schooling (5-16 years) and further education (16-18 years) since I am trying to 
explore the role of schools/colleges in the spiritual and moral development of their 
pupils. 
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within western culture the causes of death are commonly defined as: 
« natural and anticipated (gradual, usually in old age) 
« natural and unanticipated (sudden, at any age) 
e by accident (unexpected, sudden at any age) 
« by suicide (unexpected, sudden at any age) 
o by murder (unexpected, sudden at any age). 
Bearing these definitions in mind, a taxonomy of the significance of specific 
deaths is proposed below in order to understand the possible responses by 
children and young people. 
Rgure 1.1 Deaths that are usually not significant 
animals humans 
wild / \ pets 
family 
grandparent ^ \ ^ non-
farm other 
people's 
pQ^g great-grandparent, distant 
and other relations 
I suggest that the deaths of elderly people (eg: grandparents) are not so 
significant because they are usually anticipated and, unless special circumstances 
prevail (as suggested below), they seem timely and do not challenge the belief 
that older things die first. The death of distant family members and non-family 
members is usually less distressing because they are not so well known. 
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I suggest that sudden or violent death (perhaps by accident, murder or suicide) 
and the death of a peer are usually considered significant because of their 
untimeliness. People with whom one has a special relationship (whether family or 
not) are often greatly missed and a teacher's death may be particularly distressing 
because of the close or regular nature of the relationship. The first death in a 
family may be a shock and the clustering of several together is also likely to seem 
significant. 
Deaths that are nearly always significant, whatever one's age. are those of 
parents and siblings, as this research will show. 
A note on gender influences on literature of human development 
This study notes that the reality of the world in which we live is socially and 
culturally constructed and that male perspectives, through their greater access to 
education and public life, have long dominated such constructing. The influential 
literature on philosophy, education, child development and psychology is mainly 
written by males while the new and growing literature concerning death and 
bereavement contains an increasing number of women (eg: Kubler-Ross, 1969; 
Raphael, 1984; Sanders. 1989; Black. 1995) - perhaps because the private world 
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of caring for the dying and attending to the bereaved has traditionally been 
assigned to females. In bereavement counselling, women outnumber men as 
both counsellors and clients often because they seem more willing to talk about 
their own feelings and to listen to other people doing so (Bennett, 1995). 
Although I consider it important to recognize the sources and potential biases of 
influential literature, this study may be able to do no more than draw attention to 
this imbalance as it explores the experiences of bereaved children and young 
people within the constructions of 'normal' and 'natural' of our present society. 
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CHAPTER ONE : HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE 
... I do not believe that there ever will be or can be one sole and unitary way of 
understanding human nature, its variations, its settings, or its growth. No 
theory can ever be the true theory; it can only be more or less right In the light 
of certain criteria, and it is always crucial to be as explicit as possible about 
these criteria. (Bruner, 1990, p 344) 
Commonsense, religious, philosophical and scientific theories 
Theories of human development are not new. Everyday views about how human 
nature usually develops are implicit in common-sense thinking which is displayed 
in the social and cultural assumptions that people make about themselves, other 
people and the world in which they live and expressed in customs, codes of 
ethics, folklore and proverbs. Views about how human nature should develop are 
also implicit in philosophical and religious traditions, many of which are ancient in 
origin, and Christianity and Islam, for example, prescribe development of a 
particular aspect of human nature - morality - and the relationship between 
humanity and God. Most theories, including recently formulated psychological 
ones, tend to focus on individual development although the influence of society on 
the individual is recognized by social psychology. 
In contrast to religious prescriptive theories, secular scientific theories tend to be 
both descriptive and explicit. For example, Piaget's theory of genetic 
epistemology is a general theory using integrated principles to explain several 
aspects of development such as physical, mental, moral and social. It has a 
narrow scope - childhood - and describes, rather than prescribes, how knowledge 
is acquired. 
Religious theories of human development address the issue of death through 
theology and funeral customs. In these ways death is legitimated as an 
acceptable event within our social existence through explanations of its nature 
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and purpose and recognition of its irreversible and inevitable nature. Such 
theories allow people to grieve over the loss of those they love and to continue 
living, without fear of their own death, in a world that may be significantly 
changed. Ritual and ceremony are more explicitly used at such times in order to 
counter the lack of a solution to death and the potential breakdown of the 
everyday reality in which humans normally live. Religious theories vary in their 
explicit explanations of death's purpose and meaning and what happens 
aftenvards although belief in some kind of continuity, expressed as resurrection, 
rebirth, reincarnation or transmigration is widespread, as are prescriptions 
regarding appropriate behaviour and treatment of bereaved family members. 
However, Berger and Luckman (1967) suggest humans have a taken-for-granted 
belief about the way the world is and how people behave in it which is 
perpetuated through such things as language, symbols and institutions. Issues of 
social constructivism are also evident in personal construct therapy which holds 
that we construct meanings by differentiating patterns out of chaos and 
communicating the meanings we construct through language (Rowe, 1989). and 
in so-called radical theology, epitomized by Cupitt (1994, p 277): 
The suggestion that the idea of God is man-made would only seem startling if 
we could point by contrast to something that has not been made by humans. 
But since our language shapes every topic raised in rt, we cannot. In an 
innocuous sense, all our normative ideas have been posited by ourselves, 
including all the truths of bgic and mathematics as well as all our ideals and 
values. 
Models of psychological development 
According to Dixon (1990) five models of developmental psychology - mechanism, 
organicism, psychoanalysis, contextualism and dialecticism - have their origins in 
Darwinian thinking and these will be discussed below. The first three are well 
known in the fields of education, child-rearing and counselling and interest in a 
sixth, known as life-span development, has extended the scope of enquiry 
prompted by the increased number of people surviving into middle and old age 
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(Kastenbaum. 1990). It is interesting to recognize that developmental psychology 
has largely addressed three of the four 'causes' or explanations postulated by 
Aristotle for why and how things exist (material cause: the substance from which a 
thing is made; efficient cause: what brought the thing into being; and formal 
cause: the form or structure of the thing itself) and that explanations of the final 
cause (what its significance, meaning or purpose is) are mainly addressed by 
philosophy and religion. 
The mechanistic model of human development, which is traditionally seen as the 
origin of the science of developmental psychology, includes behaviourism and 
social learning theories. Hall, an ardent evolutionist to whom the \U.^,c. of the 
r£n-?z/o/"adolescent' can be traced (1904) was also a leading exponent of 
recapitulation theory. 
Mechanism views the organism as a machine composed of discrete parts 
operating in time and space, a relatively passive participant in a more active 
environment. This model is in line with the unity-of-science position, which holds 
that a cause must always precede its effect and that the laws of the basic natural 
sciences, physics and chemistry, are the fundamental laws governing the natural 
world. An understanding of the mechanisms whereby atoms and molecules 
combine and function within these sciences is considered to lead to an 
understanding of the laws of everything else. Five characteristics of the unity-of-
sclence viewpoint are that all phenomena, whether living or non living, conform to 
the same laws (reductlonism), are constellations of greater or lesser biological 
and chemical complexity (continuity), are comprised of the basic building blocks of 
atoms and molecules, and are analogous to a machine (mechanism). Movement 
to a higher level consists of adding more molecular elements to a lower one 
(additive) while difference between levels is of amount, magnitude or size 
(quantitative) (Lemer, 1976). 
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By contrast, the organismic viewpoint, patterned after the biological view of growth 
and including growth and cognitive theories, sees development as qualitative, 
unidirectional, irreversible and displaying apparently universal stage patterns. It 
sees development as goal directed and, therefore, teleological. Organicism 
embraces the epigenetic viewpoint that new phenomena emerge at each new 
level of analysis which cannot be reduced to the laws of the lower level. It 
considers that it is impossible to reduce new qualitative change - which comprise 
change in type and kind - to a previous fomn since what has emerged was not 
present at the lower organizational level and could not have emerged until its 
present level. It holds, therefore, that because (a) the nature of what exists 
changes from level to level and (b) a qualitative change occurs from level to level, 
there cannot be continuity between the levels. It further asserts that the parts of 
the organism do not merely add up but multiply, producing a new complexity, so 
that the whole organism is more than the sum of just its parts. Characteristics of 
this viewpoint are the opposite of those of the unity-of-science position: anti-
reductionism. discontinuity, interactionist. multiplicative and qualitative (Lerner, 
1976). 
An understanding that the integrity of the whole organism depends not only upon 
the regular division but also the programmed death of some of its cells - either 
because they have served their purpose or because over-production is an 
inevitable feature of the evolutionary process (Hor izon. 1996) - enables elements 
of both these principal ways of viewing development to be 'right.' There is 
ongoing continuity of the whole at the expense of the systematic discontinuity of a 
few parts. Multiplication, addition and subtraction are all involved since, if they 
were not, growth would be mere increase in size without shape and detail caused 
by cell death. 
Mechanism and organicism also parallel commonly held beliefs about what 
happens to us after we die. Some people reflect mechanistic thinking in their 
belief that our bodies are reduced to atoms and molecules which disperse through 
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earth, air, fire and water and feed other organisms. In parts of India the 
Zoroastrian (or Parsee) belief that contact with human death will defile the four 
elements means that a corpse cannot be buried, cremated or immersed in water. 
The other view, particularly held by those brought up within Judaeo-Christlan and 
Islamic cultures, and in line with organismic developmental theory, is that 
qualitative discontinuous change occurs whereby another invisible part of us, 
termed our spirit or soul, 'lives on' in another place or dimension, although our 
body is buried or burnt. 
Psychoanalytic theory, which focuses on personality development particularly of a 
pathological kind, views development as qualitative. It proceeds towards an end-
state by moving adequately through critical life stages created by conflict between 
internal drives and the external mores of society, although regression to or fixation 
upon an earlier stage may occur if such movement is not achieved. 
Contextualism. which includes role theory, focuses on the interaction between the 
individual and the social and cultural context. It sees development as continuous, 
although composed of quantitative differences, with the human being actively 
involved in the process of adaptation to a changing environment. The theory of 
dialecticism in human development arose from the nineteenth century model of 
dialectical materialism in society. It focuses on the interaction between changing 
individuals and their changing environment, and views human development, both 
individually and collectively, as a continuous process of thesis (continuity), 
antithesis (discontinuity) and synthesis in response to contradiction and conflict. 
Soviet theories of development embrace dialecticism and aspects of 
contextualism and like psychoanalysis, consider that critical periods arise in 
childhood as well as across the entire span of human development. Furthermore, 
they suggest that there is a correlation between the ontogenetic development of 
intellectual processes and historical development (Davidov, 1990). This last 
insight is significant because, although theorizing about human development has 
always occurred, it should be recognized that many widely accepted theories 
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including those of morality and spirituality, were formulated at a particular point In 
an Individual's life or in a country's or society's history. 
Debates regarding nature-nurture and continuity-discontinuity In human 
development 
Two particular debates, evident in many theories about development, concern 
questions of cause and direction. They are respectively: (a) whether genetic 
Inheritance (nature) or environmental stimulation (nurture) is most significant in 
development and (b) whether development itself is continuous or discontinuous 
(Lerner. 1976). While mechanistic theorists typically explain development in 
terms of a single set of factors - either nature or nurture - some organismic 
theorists maintain that development is predetermined through inheritance. 
Others, such as Schneirla. however, hold a 'probabilistic' epigenetic viewpoint that 
experience and maturation are both involved but. since the timing of these 
Interactions cannot always be the same for all members of a species, it is only 
possible to say that certain changes will probably occur "given fairly typical timing 
of maturation-experience Interactions" (Lerner. 1976. p 36). 
Cause of development: nature or nurture 
The first debate, which has its origins within philosophical and religious traditions, 
considers whether development is caused by preceding effects or is goal directed, 
and what part human will and supernatural powers play in this. Except in 
mechanistic theories, human will is generally considered to be active in making 
choices - thereby enabling humans to have some measure of control over their 
destinies - while supernatural intervention is considered to occur either 
Independently or through human solicitations of offering, prayer or ritual (Thomas. 
1990a). 
The genetic 'norm of reaction' concept appears to resolve this controversy by 
proposing that hereditary not only offers a range of potential but also sets the 
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limits for the development of characteristics which the environment determines by 
interacting within these set limits (Lemer, 1976). The idea of two continuums -
one of indirectness regarding hereditary factors and the other of breadth regarding 
environmental factors - expressing how the influences of both hereditj^. , and 
environment are dispersed among individuals (Anastasi. 1958) can also be used 
to describe contemporary attitudes to death. 
Rgure 1. 3 Nature continuum regarding attitudes to death 
we may suddenly 
become ill and die 
we will all 
die one day 
At one end of the nature continuum is the broad perspective that it is our pre-
determined end eventually to die. while at the narrow end is the recognition that 
genetic impairment may hasten the event before it is expected. 
Rgure 1.4 Nurture continuum regarding attitudes to death 
we will live long lives 
because of healthcare, diet 
and lifestyle 
we may suddenly 
die in accidents or 
be murdered or 
commit suicide 
At one end of the nurture continuum is the broad perspective that death is 
continually postponed through improved medical care, diet or lifestyle while at the 
narrow end is the recognition that improved technology can go out of control or 
humans themselves may cause their own or another's death. 
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Direction of development: continuity and discontinuity 
The second debate deals with the direction of development, or from what earlier 
to what later conditions it passes. While theorists of physical development have 
suggested that growth moves in two major directions (from the centre of the body 
towards the extremities and from the head towards the tail), others have talked in 
terms of stages of development from conception, through the cell dying process 
involving maturation, to final death. Non-physical views of development, by 
comparison, maintain that a prime feature is increasing differentiation (Thomas, 
1990a). The continuity-discontinuity debate often asks whether the laws 
goveming development stay the same or change, either within the life span of an 
individual of a species (ontogenesis), or throughout the species (phylogenesis). 
Models of sociological and cultural development 
The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less 
integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of 
awareness, emotion, judgement and action, organized into a distinctive 
whole and set contrastively against other such wholes and against a social 
and natural background is ... a rather peculiar idea within the context of the 
world's cultures. (Geertz, 1979. p 229) 
Through its talk of 'the child', 'the mother' or 'the mother-infant relationship', 
psychology has for long described all children, mothers and mother-child 
relationships as if they are the same with the result that cultural values have been 
presented as if they are facts of nature. By focusing on 'individual development,' 
psychology also tends to emphasize the properties of the individual as the only 
significant variables - thereby implying that culture stays constant. Such individual 
descriptions appear to deny that important social and political tensions often exist 
between children, their parents and the state and that schools, as institutionized 
agents of the state, often play a part in this. Furthermore, because of the 
suppression of psychoanalytic contributions in early work, much developmental 
psychology concentrates on cognitive development abstracted from affect or 
motivation (Ingleby, 1986). 
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Social cons^ctionism recognizes that the world into which we are born is 
structured to maintain social order among men and women, children and adults. 
Such order depends upon rules and conventions acquired through public and 
private, individual and collective interactions and experiences rather than through 
private individual cognition alone (Harre. 1986a). Since children play a limited 
part in the world's production and cannot choose what to respond to or whovto 
choose as their socializing agents, they tend to accept as absolute how things are 
done. For example, children cannot appreciate the complex origins of their 
parents' response to the death of a family member formulated over the years in 
response to other losses and they are likely to use their parents as role models 
until they perceive that other people respond differently. Then they may use more 
specific forms of 'generalized others' (Mead, 1934) from school, the media or the 
local community to broaden their thinking and behaviour. 
The social construction of chlldtiood 
During the course of human history, the timing and significance of physiological 
maturity as an indication of the level of human development has changed. When 
infant mortality was higher than it is now and before the advent of near-universal 
education (at least in the developed world), 'childhood' was shorter and puberty 
usually marked entry into the adult world of employment, marriage and 
parenthood. 
In developed countries nowadays, puberty occurs during the period a young 
person spends at school - and. in addition to this physiological form of individual 
maturation, psychosocial forms exist v r^fiich mark gradual entry at different ages 
into adult life. Such forms include being legally old enough to vote, have sexual 
intercourse, marry, drive most vehicles, or buy cigarettes and alcohol (see also 
chapter 4). Improved medical care for all in developed industrialized countries 
also means that children's exposure to death is increasingly seen as untimely, 
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inappropriate or distressing because of the implicit insistence that they are 
innocent and in need of protection from such harsh realities. 
However, in socioeconomic 'backward' or Third World countries the end of 
psychosocial development may be forced on children well before the time of 
puberty. The discrepancy between British and other norms of childhood is 
exposed when western media depicts the exposure of such children to sudden 
and often violent death from civil war. famine, earthquake or other disasters (see 
also chapter 7). 
Children and young people: time, innocence and responsibility 
It has been observed that primary school teachers often consider young children 
to be in a natural amoral state in which they are not fully responsible for their 
actions (King. 1978) and parallels between such a timeless, innocent state and 
spiritual experiences have been frequently made (see also chapter 3). Robinson 
(1977. p 16) asserts that • the original vision' of childhood is no mere imaginative 
fantasy but a form of knowledge" or type of mystical experience which is self-
authenticating. Such a view is adumbrated by Lewis (1940) who. in descriptions 
reminiscent of recapitulation theory, suggests that the experience of 'Paradisal 
man' - the creature who was "all consciousness" (p 65) and totally reposed in his 
Creator before The Fall - is to be found in children because: 
... from our own childhood we remember that before our elders thought us 
capable of 'understarKilng' anything, we already had spiritual experiences as 
pure and momentous as any we have undergone since... (p 67) 
However, the paradox of childhood is that, in social terms, it is seen as an 
important preparation for the future life of the nation while, in individual 
psychological terms, it is considered a dangerous time because any traumas 
suffered might encourage adult neuroses. These two attitudes produce the 
apparent contradiction that children and young people (aged 5 to 16 or 18) are 
deemed to be (i) preparing themselves for the world of work by studying for and 
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passing national exams and (ii) minors in most legal respects. Although preparing 
"for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life" (Education 
Reform Act (ERA) 2 b). pupils are frequently assumed to be unaware of or 
unexposed to the pain and grief of life and death. 
As Bruner (1990) states cMcVe^, description of human development depends on 
how theorists regard human nature. No developmental theory can be neutral in 
describing what it sees because it directs its attention to what the theory believes 
is there to be seen. British educational theory and practice, for example, have 
been influenced at different times by the ideas of Christianity, (which tends to see 
humans as inclined towards immoral behaviour and requiring to be directed 
towards God), psychoanalysis (which focuses on the power of unconscious, 
hidden motives to affect behaviour and belief) and humanistic theory (which 
believes in the human capacity to bring forth or actualize potentialities). It is 
important to bear these influences in mind when comparing what has been written 
about spiritual and moral development from educational and religious 
perspectives and about bereavement in children and young people from medical, 
psychoanalytic and educational perspectives. 
THEMES IN THEORIES AND BEUEFS ABOUT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
Contributions from everyday language: common sense thinking 
Although the word 'development' is usually used in a positive sense in an 
educational context - comparable to growth, opening, increase, progress, 
advance - it is not certain whether 'development' is always so perceived, its use 
to delineate one section of the world (the 'First') from another, Ihird' part of itself 
implies that the former possess a better - and hence, preferable - standard of 
living than the latter and that these standards are universally prized and emulated. 
Even within our own 'developed' society, however, there is often outcry when 
'development' is planned in green belts, areas of outstanding natural beauty and 
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historical interest or when further road 'development' such as bypasses and 
motorways infringe upon notions of conservation. This seems to indicate that 
some people consider there are limits to certain kinds of 'development' and that 
certain forms of it are unacceptable. Similarly, the development in an individual of 
so-called criminal tendencies, drug or alcohol habits, or certain personality or 
behavioural characteristics are deemed by many people to be 'development' of 
the wrong kind. 
Everyday synonyms for the verb 'to develop' are: Increase, expand and evolve, 
and for the noun 'development' words such as conversion and effect are often 
used. This highlights two common assumptions: (1) that development is to do 
with growth (increase, expand, evolve) and (2) that some kind of change is 
involved (conversion and effect). Furthermore, broad overviews describing 
development in and of other things as welt as nature and humanity - such as 
historical events, maths, music and land - suggest that development is both an 
ongoing and a completed activity. The New Shorter Oxford Pictionary (1993) lists 
uses of the word as: 
« an action or process of developing; evolution; growth; maturation; a gradual 
unfolding; a fuller working out 
o a developed form or product; a result of developing; a change in a course of 
action or events or in conditions; a stage of advancement 
» the state of being developed; a developed condition; a full-grown state. 
'Development' and 'evolution' both contain similar notions of unrolling, laying open 
by degrees, and unfolding. There is a sense of something which is already 
present being exposed, of becoming bigger, or clear enough to be seen, and even 
of something long (like a carpet) being gradually undone in order to expose and/or 
use the surface inside. Although the act of unfolding and unrolling implies forward 
progress - bringing out from within that which was previously small, unshaped or 
unclear but now is bigger, shaped and clear - it is necessary to consider whether 
sideways or backwards movement are also possible. 
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If *to develop' means 'to unfold', the inference is of 'opening out' rather than of 
'closing up', even if that 'opening' temporarily returns to a 'closed' state as part of 
its cycle (as flowers do at the end of the day). Development - at least in human 
physical form - may be understood as something which, when once begun, 
cannot be stopped. It may mark time or take a detour but it is relentless in its 
ageing progress. Whether this picture of 'development' remains the same when it 
is qualified by the adjectives 'spiritual' and 'moral' will be discussed later. 
Developnnent: completed so far, happening now or in the future? 
We have constructed the concept of time to include 'the present' but it can be 
argued that there is no such thing, and that only past and future exist sinceMhe 
present' Is only the most recently remembered 'past' and is so brief it can hardly 
be apprehended. However, the concept of 'ongoing' development includes ideas 
of an act of doing something in the period we describe as 'the present'; the notion 
of process; a state; and gradual growth. Ideas of 'completed' development 
include an act which has been done; a state of having been developed; and, in 
the evolutionary sense, a gradual, imperceptible working towards a distant end-
state. Even though the act of development may (as far as we know) be eternal 
or continuous, the finitude of our lives forces us to describe and focus on either 
• the part completed so far. or 
« the part we can see happening before our eyes, or 
« the predictable future outcome. 
Thus, this movement or progress, which we call development, may be measured 
by how long, how far, or how much can be measured between two fixed points -
such as last year and this year, today and tomorrow, and before and after a 
specific event. Furthermore, such measuring activities may consist of examining 
time, quantity, quality, distance, and size, and even of comparing things of the 
same size, circumstances and age. 
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The part completed so far (for example from birth to now) considers: an act of 
development (in the sense of something having been done) which is apparent in 
the completed state so far - that is to say, the state of having been developed that 
now exists, even though this development is in a state of flux because 'now' is 
never static. 
The part we can see happening before our eyes considers: a process, a 
continuous state, a gradual unfolding and an act (in the sense of something being 
done now). Only the slowly changing state is evident, but what it means or 
implies cannot be decided until comparisons have been made with what existed 
before - even if only a few minutes ago. 
The part we can predict or expect to occur in future anticipates either 
maintenance of or change in the speed or standard already observed, in either the 
part completed so far or the part happening now. 
It is easy to recognize that death finally arrests all living organisms but not so easy 
to see that programmed cell death is an ongoing necessity of such life, nor yet to 
identify initial, subsequent and complete - or most mature - stages of an 
organism's life. Normallj{,finaL or most mature stages of human development do 
not occur just before death in old age although, by that stage of life, 'development' 
tends to mean any change that occurs rather than the more predictable move 
towards greater complexity and cognition that earlier development entails. How 
these everyday views about development compare with the more specialized 
opinions of contemporary developmental psychologists and philosophers will be 
considered next. 
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Contributions from psychology and phllosopiiy: cause and direction in 
development 
Schneiria (1957). a developmental psychologist, suggests that two concepts, 
maturation and experience, represent the complex factors of development and 
that maturation, in its tum. connotes both growth and differentiation. Growth 
refers to changes in an organism through tissue accretion or enlargement and 
differentiation refers to changes in the interrelations of tissues, organs or other 
parts with age (Lerner, 1976). This description of development as growth 
conforms, as I have shown, with popular understanding. Experience, according to 
Schneiria. refers to all stimulus influences that act on the organism throughout the 
course of its life until death leaving trace effects' of which early experiences, 
although more diffuse and general than those that occur later in life, "may be 
fundamental to behavioural development" (p 103). The death of a significant 
person during a person's childhood may be considered to leave the trace effects' 
that Schneiria mentions. According to Schneiria. these two concepts, maturation 
and experience - which respectively represent both nature and nurture - are 
closely integrated at all stages of development. 
He also proposes that the organism itself, by performing certain behaviour to 
which a response is given and to which response it further responds, plays a 
significant role in its own development which he terms circular functions and self-
stimulation. This idea has been further developed in ipsative theory which takes 
account of the role that the individual's attributes play In her or his own 
development both within and across time (Garduque et al. 1990). 
Werner (1957) focuses on the continuity-discontinuity issue and posits that 
developmental psychology's one regulating principle is the orthogenetic one which 
states that: 
wherever development occurs it proceeds from a state of relative globality and 
lack of differentiation to a state of increased differentiation, articulation, and 
hierarchical integration (p 126). 
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This principle leads to an understanding of how discontinuity and continuity are 
synthesized in development: discontinuity occurs as the earlier global organization 
becomes differentiated, and continuity occurs as the later differentiated 
organization becomes hierarchically organized. However, since the concept of 
'development' is "fundamentally biological" (Harris. 1957, p 3), this principle could 
suggest that those features of it that change, grow or die either by design, with 
age or according to seasons may be readily learnt by observation while more 
abstract and sophisticated concepts such as 'spiritual' and 'moral' development 
are difficult to observe and must be learnt or understood by different methods. 
Werner also clarifies the difference between quantitative and qualitative change 
with regard to continuity-discontinuity, explaining that the former refers to changes 
in amount, magnitude and frequency while the latter refers to emergent changes 
(what it is that exists) and whether or not a new quality has come into being to 
characterize the organism. Thus, qualitative changes are, by their very nature, 
always examples of discontinuity, characterized by 'emergence' (inability to be 
reduced from a later to an earlier stage) and 'gappiness' (lack of an intermediate 
level between earlier and later forms). Quantitative discontinuity, according to 
Werner, can be sufficiently defined by the second characteristic of 'gappiness' or 
abruptness alone. Here, again, a common understanding of the term 
development - this time as change - is used. 
Nagel (1957), an educational philosopher, states that the term 'development' can 
signify both a temporal process as well as its end-product which, as I have 
already shown, is a popular definition. He says that in current usage the term 
carries the suggestion that developmental processes make progressively manifest 
something hidden or latent - such as in the development of a photographic plate 
where a sequence of continuous changes brings about an outcome which was 
potentially present in an earlier stage of the process. The term. Nagel suggests, 
also has a teleological flavour (without assuming either the operation of purposes 
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or final causes) by its imputation that the sequence of change described as 
development "contributes to the generation of some more or less specifically 
characterized system of things ..." (p 16). 
A further notion of development is its application to repetitive change which 
induces wear and, perhaps, stoppage (eg: wearing away of cogs in a clock) but 
Naget stresses that if this use of the term 'development' is to be correct, it must 
refer to changes that are cumulative and irreversible. Moreover, he states that the 
term refers to changes eventuating in modes of organization not previously 
evident in the organism "such that the system acquires an increased capacity for 
self-regulation ... [and]... independence from environmental fluctuations" (p 16). 
Thus. Nagel concludes, the concept of development involves two essential 
components: 
the notion of a system possessing a definite structure and a definite set of pre-
existing capacities; and the notion of a sequential set of changes in the 
system, yielding relatively permanent but novel increments not only in its 
structure but in its modes of operation as well (p 17). 
Overview of development from philosophy and psychology 
The following description is synthesized from the different philosophical and 
psychological standpoints previously mentioned, i want to discuss how far it 
provides an accurate account of development per se, in both human and non-
human terms and in non-physical forms in humans. 
Development is both a temporary process and an end product which is 
cumulative, irreversible, self-regulating and independent. It brings into being 
hidden or latent capacities and contributes to the generation of specifically 
characterized things. It has a definite structure which proceeds from non-
differentiation and globality to differentiation and hierarchy, and it possesses pre-
existing capacities, it changes sequentially to produce increments in both 
structure and function, while making both qualitative and quantitative changes In 
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terms of emergent features and increases in amount, size, magnitude and 
frequency. Development is a complex interaction between (a) the physical growth 
and differentiation of the organism itself as it undergoes maturation, (b) the 
physical, intellectual and emotional stimulation it gives to and receives from itself 
and its environment and (c) the life-long influences of all external physical, 
intellectual, emotional, social and cultural experiences. 
This apparently comprehensive description has a potential flaw if applied 
uncritically to human development because it contains ideas which apply to 
human development but not to the development of a photograph or an oak tree, 
and vice versa. For example, because the process of development of a 
photograph passes very quickly through to its end-state, more attention is paid to 
the product (the end-state) than to the stages of the process and it may be difficult 
to believe that the development of a photograph is a temporary process. People, 
on the other hand, pass slowly through each fempora/y process of development 
and their end-state is much harder to identify. Furthermore, a person may 
through practice, develop skills in piano playing or sport but, by negligence, fail to 
keep up that standard and thus halt such process, but an oak tree cannot, except 
through disease or death, lose its ability to produce leaves and fruit. 
Peters (1972b) makes this unwitting shift from non-human to human examples in 
order to examine the links between mental development and the "more 
specialized forms of development" (p 501) in subject areas such as mathematics 
and says he is adopting Nagel's 
much tighter criteria for the use of 'development* which are taken from a range 
of cases In which what is potential becomes actual (p 502). 
He dismisses the first criterion (pre-existing structure), stating that "few would now 
support this inner ripening or unfolding type of theory" (p 503) since it applies 
mainly to biology and botany, and adds that the third criterion (an end-state) is 
problematic because, in contrast to the maturity of an oak tree, "it would be rash 
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to say that within any [person]... a final stage had been reached" (p 510). Thus 
Peters dismisses two criteria which Nagel had not applied to humanity alone. He 
concludes that only the second criterion (sequential changes of an irreversible 
sort) "seems much more central to the concept of 'development' " (p 503). 
particularly in respect of Kohlberg's cognitive theory of moral development -
apparently unaware that Nagel's example for this criterion had been a clock. 
Contributions from educational philosophy: reflections of Aristotle's four 
causes 
In what follows I want to take the discussion of non-biological human development 
further by analysing descriptions of development in general use (Wright, 1986) in 
the light of earlier debates (Elliott. 1975; Hamlyn. 1975). I hope that this 
approach, together with my earlier description, will begin to clarify features of 
human development in the context of education as well as intimate what moral 
and spiritual development might mean in that setting. 
In general discourse 'development' refers to. or is used as. one of the following. 
« A series of changes, such as the stages of a journey. 
• An increase of some kind, such as developing housing estates. 
« As a transitive verb in order to say that "she developed in her children a love of 
the countryside" or "the photographs are being developed." 
« A series of stages leading to an end-state, which are assessed as 
developmental by the extent to which they come up to the end-state or fulfil the 
criteria it demands, such as the realization of a plan. 
« A synonym for changes for the better where, because the end-state is valued. 
the movement towards it is also valued to the extent to which it comes up to it. 
Thus, telling someone she is developing as a teacher is to congratulate her. 
• A series of generative changes which are dependent on human intention to 
enable the development to take place, such as the development of electronic 
technology. 
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• A series of generative changes dependent on a pre-determined causal 
process and not on human intention, such as the development of the fruit fly 
(Wright, 1986). 
In the first two examples development refers to a series of changes and shows 
that a principle of unity is needed in order to define the thing that is being 
developed. This description is reminiscent of Aristotle's material cause dealing 
with the substance from which a thing is made. The third example suggests that 
development is by someone and is not simply development per se, and I find 
Aristotle's efficient cause (what brought the thing into being) evident here, which 
may imply a belief in God or first cause. The fourth and fifth examples depend on 
the notion of an end -state and are often considered to be the only legitimate uses 
of the word outside of a biological context. Such a description, which suggests a 
final cause with its implication of purpose and meaning, is the traditional area of 
religion and philosophy. The last two examples include notions of the generative 
nature of development and seem to come closest to a central and universal 
meaning of development (Wright. 1986). This broad description of development 
involving both human intention and maturation implies Aristotle's formal cause, 
dealing with the form or structure of the thing itself. 
A series of changes 
This is a common view of development, implying both increase and growth, but 
Hamlyn (1975. p 27) asserts that development cannot be simply equated with 
growth since the mere growth of an organ - as in the case of the growth of a 
cancer - may be the result of malfunctioning so that talk of 'development' (which 
implies normal and healthy development) would be out of place because cancer 
has its own development plan which conflicts with this idea. He suggests that 
development "is at the least a species of growth but not growth itself" since mere 
increase in size is not part of a pattern which can be seen in functional or 
organizational terms. 
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Thus, as Schneiria has already shown, to equate 'development' merely with 
'getting bigger' shows a lack of understanding of the principle of function, 
organization and synchronized change which development must entail. 
Development has not occurred unless increased size also includes fulfilment of a 
useful function, increased complexity and subtlety of differentiation, in line with 
this view, it also seems inappropriate to equate moral and spiritual development 
with change, growth, increased physical size or age. 
The principle of unity 
Hamlyn (1975. pp 29-30) says that there ought to be "some principle of identity to 
the series of events or states." and notes that 
in nwsl ordinary cases there will be a single thing that develops and there will 
be a similar progression in a given direction. 
In response to this. Elliott (1975) feels that any suggestion that it is usually a 
single thing which develops is misleading as. in the case of an embryo, what we 
call 'development' is actually "development of an initial multiplicity of separate 
objects into a unity and then the further development of this object" (p 43. my 
italics). This distinction is actually the essence of Werner's definition of 
quantitative and qualitative change. 
Wright's (1986) examples of journeys and housing estates represent both 
quantitative and qualitative change and continuity and discontinuity. The 
components of a train journey (eg: a person ieojtihg, stowing luggage, finding a 
seat) represent quantitative discontinuity - abruptness - a series of unconnected 
events unified only by the agent experiencing them. However, development of a 
housing estate (watching the ground being levelled, travelling along a new road) 
represent both quantitative and qualitative change - 'gappiness' and emergence -
since the end product (housing estate) is far more than the sum of its houses, 
roads, bus routes and shops. 
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It is therefore necessary to have an awareness of the identity of the thing that has 
developed, is developing or will develop, especially when there is a multiplicity of 
substances or component parts and/or an apparent discontinuity between 
development of these substances and parts. Thus, I suggest later in this chapter 
that moral and spiritual development are dependent upon physical, cognitive and 
emotional development and, while not developing at the same rate or in the same 
way, are integrally related to these other developmental forms. 
Development by someone and not simply development per se 
This description raises the distinction between: 
(i) the intentional development of an object or item by someone (eg: of a 
photograph); 
(ii) the intentional development of a person in some respect (eg: through 
education); 
(iii) the development of something unaffected by human inten/ention or intention 
(eg: a tree); 
(iv) the development of a person, according to maturation, without human 
intention. 
Hamlyn (1975) raises the distinction between the first and last forms and says that 
comparing human development with the development of a photograph is 
unsatisfactory since what is in question in Nagel's (1957) examples "is the 
development of something by someone and not the development of something 
per se " and that the latter example is. in his opinion, what constitutes human 
development for, he tersely asserts: "Industry does not. I hope, just develop ... but 
organisms may do so" (p 33. my italics). This point reflects the ongoing debate as 
to whether development is natural (maturational) or nurtured by the environment 
and points, yet again, to the dilemma of using non-human examples as paradigms 
for human development. In fact. Nagel's analogy of developing a photograph also 
implies a developer - someone who knows how to bring the photograph into being 
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and acts upon it in order to do so - an idea strongly reminiscent of Aristotle's 
'efficient cause.' 
There is. then, a further distinction to be made between: 
(a) the intentional action of a human upon something else in order to develop it. 
whether it is human (see (ii) above) or non-human (see (i) above); 
(b) the apparently natural maturational process of development that the growth of 
an embryo into a baby and an acom into an oak tree suggest; 
and (c) the development of human characteristics, qualities and powers. 
Too rigidly equating one kind of development with another may not be helpful, 
particularly in education, as children are social beings who interact with other 
people besides their teachers, take an active part in their development and 
choose or resist ideas presented to them - unlike plants or photographs which 
cannot do this (Darling, 1982). 
Whether development is caused by someone or something, or is intentional or 
maturational. is an ancient question concerning efficient causes. Although it is 
apparent that a human being almost always grows from a baby into an adult, it 
may be fallacious to assume that all other forms of human development - usually 
described as intellectual, emotional, spiritual, moral, cultural and social - < r^^  
likewise inevitable because notions of 'inevitability.' particularly of moral and 
spiritual development, are further affected by our interpretations of intentional 
human intervention or the role of supematural powers. 
An end-state 
End-states, which are important in psychoanalytic theory, can be realizations of 
plans or the fulfilment of specific criteria (Wright. 1986) but Elliott (1975. p 41) 
comments that the realization of a plan seems to be development 
in the primitive sense of a gradual unfolding which is the becoming manifest of 
something already existing in some manner but as yet unrevealed or not fully 
revealed. 
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We tend to view the events of history or our lives as unfolding before us in this 
way and the temporal structure of everyday life forces us to construct a 
perspective that takes account of the clock we daily live by and the calendar of 
time that has passed and is yet to come. Such thinking is in line with Aristotle's 
premise that all the objects in our existence consist of matter moving or changing 
in a purposeful pattern towards the achievement of some goal, usually the survival 
and reproduction of themselves. Nagel (1957, p 16) defers to this teleological 
suggestion when acknowledging that development often refers to "an explicitly or 
tacitly assumed consequence," and Hamlyn (1975. p 32) also claims that we must 
be able to see an essential connection between the state of a thing and its end-
state "which, in some way is the rationale of the thing itself." 
Wright (1986) however, considers that in non-biological development the rationale 
is in the process which is provided by the purpose of the action working in 
accordance with the principles that govern it and the methods it employs. Such 
rationales are often fulfilled when an unpredictable outcome emerges (eg: certain 
Olympic gymnastic standards are reached) or when we recognize that something 
has imperceptibly changed (eg: a few shops have now become the heart of a 
town). Elliott (1975. p 42) also comments that we deem it 'development' if the 
process is "sufficiently complex ... and chancy and difficult" and the product is 
"sufficiently substantial or striking". It is for these reasons that Wright considers 
that a belief in the end-state as a criterion for assessment of development is 
mistaken 
because the subject of development develops through ail the different stages 
of development Including the last one, but this does not mean that it cannot be 
seen until the end (p 41, my italics). 
However, talk about development often involves tacit moral judgements because 
to say. for example, that children are intellectually, emotionally or morally 
undeveloped or immature is not to make a "straightfonward factual statement" but 
to indicate a lack of conformity with socially accepted standards (Hamlyn. 1975. p 
36), and Wright (1986) also indicates this moral attitude in suggesting that 
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development is often used as a synonym for changes for the better. Perhaps this 
attitude indicates a subliminal correlation between the beliefs of 'growth' theorists 
that perfect manhood (sic) is present in the new-born child (Dearden, 1972) and 
an expectation that such innate perfection will come to fruition with no anticipated 
discrepancy between 'self-concept' and 'ideal self (see later in this chapter). 
Certainly the justification of education in terms of self-realization or self-
actualization, as Wright (1986. p 49) points out, assumes certain values (the 
importance of a balanced all-round self or an autonomous, evaluative self or a 
higher self with particular talents and intellectual or moral qualities) which, unlike 
the development of a biological organism, is always development of "an ideal 
self. 
There may, therefore, be a danger of failing to make clear what kind of 
development is being discussed. Acceptance of the once popular notion of 
education nurturing the all-round development of the individual - in physical, 
intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual terms - with its focus on development 
itself as a natural process, tends to overiook the need to justify development of 
these values in the directions specified (Wright, 1986). Thus, an explication of the 
purpose and meaning of the so-called 'final cause' or end-state is needed. 
Generative change 
The scope of generative change spans both natural and non-natural development 
(Wright, 1986) and this view seems to accord with Wemer's (1957) clarification of 
how both continuity and discontinuity are synthesized In development. 
Undifferentiation leads to differentiation, and globality to hierarchy, while 
quantitative change characterizes amount and frequency^and qualitative change 
characterizes novelty, and emergence. Both quantitative and qualitative changes 
are being generated during the development of any organism and, in its turn, this 
organism ultimately becomes differentiated. 
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Elliott (1975). though, discounts this proposition when responding to Hamlyn's 
(1975) suggestion that it is necessary for each stage to grow out of the earlier 
one. by retorting that the development of the genital organs of an embryo are not 
necessary for the development of the legs. He does not recognize that, although 
legs clearly do not grow from genitals, each one of these organs grows in close 
proximity to the others so that although the development of each one constitutes 
specific discontinuity, it leads to continuity in the general area in which they are all 
situated. Programmed cell death of excess cells (discontinuity) triggers growth 
(continuity) elsewhere and. ultimately, on a wider scale overall. 
This debate highlights yet again the significant differences between development 
dependent on human intention and development dependent on a pre-determined 
causal or maturational process which must be understood if. as Wright suggests, 
both are to be taken as "a central and universal meaning of development" (p 40) . 
Elliott (1975) states that where there is human intention it is only the concept of 
development in biological, maturational terms that is challenged and that there is 
no reason for supposing that biological development is the only central case of 
development. In support of the case for non-biological development. Wright (pp 
44-45) suggests that: 
Development which is the result of human intention is only possible because 
the nature of its subject allows the possibility of its own development. ... For 
example ... human intention did not specrfy what science was or is to become, 
because these lie in the nature of science itself. 
This idea links with the notion of potentiality which Hamlyn (1975) says must be 
taken seriously, whether the instance is of a plant's growth or the sculpting of a 
statue from marble, since the principles for development are already present in 
the thing itself. Elliott (1975) considers that potentiality is different from possibility, 
the former being connected to the nature of the thing in question, the latter being 
neither vital nor inevitable. He declares that "a potentiality is a possibility which, 
granted normal and suitable conditions, is actualized" (p 46) and that "since a 
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potentiality is definable solely in temis of that to which it is a potentiality" (p 47) it 
is associated almost exclusively with the end-state. 
A similar dilemma regarding end-state may also arise, however, should it be 
argued that the potentiality for 'spiritual' and 'moral' development within education 
is °a possibility which, granted normal and suitable conditions, is actualized" 
(Elliott, 1975. p 46). Since education does not have a monopoly on concepts of 
morality and spirituality, it needs to be explained what 'normal' and 'suitable' 
conditions are. Their form and significance at home or in the local community (eg: 
at a place of worship) may differ so greatly from those found in school that the 
•normality* and 'suitability of one context may challenge that of the other. 
It may be indisputable that the generative nature of development - whether from 
human intention or pre-determined causal processes - requires both 'normal' and 
'suitable' conditions to support it. In human development, however, the essential 
nature of these conditions - for example their form and structure - will vary from 
person to person, depending upon level of maturation, experiences and 'trace 
effects', quality and quantity of self-stimulation (Schneiria, 1957) and social and 
cultural norms (Bronfenbrenner, 1974). For example, 'normal* and 'suitable' 
conditions for the moral or spiritual development of a child recently bereaved of a 
parent are likely to be different from 'normal' and 'suitable' conditions for a child 
not bereaved in this way. Furthermore, classroom discussions of how trees and 
plants 'die' in autumn or how differently Christians and Hindus think of God may 
have very different resonances for two bereaved children of the same age. sex 
and intellectual ability since their understanding of biological explanations and 
theological beliefs will depend upon, and may even affect, their physical 
maturation and emotional states. 
Recognition that development of humans and fruit-flies involves over-production 
of cells that die and are absorbed by others begs the question whether moral and 
spiritual qualities in humans can be similarly over-produced in order to be refined 
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or assimilated. Physical development proceeds in this way because the boot-
strapping process of evolution has no overall end-stage plan. Can moral and 
spiritual qualities, likewise, arise in response to short-term situations or be 
discarded as new situations arise? 
Human development and education 
The changing shape of society has shifted to schools or other agencies many of 
the responsibilities which family members previously met. For example, rural 
families dependent on agriculture or fishing once provided health care, protection 
from attack, help In disaster, support in emotional distress, religious and spiritual 
guidance, educational and vocational training, employment, financial backing and 
even selection of a marriage partner in addition to love, companionship and 
entertainment (Thomas. 1990c). Nowadays urban families, as well as many rural 
ones, look outside themselves for this kind of support and. with increasing 
specialization in society, it may be said that the role of family members has been 
weakened. The funeral industry has taken away from bereaved people many of 
the tasks that often assist grieving, and schools and the media rather than the 
family, are Increasingly expected to provide guidance on moral and spiritual 
issues. 
The imbalance In the literature on the scope of human development - focusing 
largely on infants and children and less on young adults, older adults and the 
elderly - tends to highlight the view that the early years are most significant for 
development, whether from genetic or environmental influences. Such theories 
are often concerned with the role of education, which, as I have suggested, is an 
intentional inten/ention in human (particularly cognitive) development, or a form of 
"cultural nurturance" (Gardner. 1991, p 115). However, the apparently 
harmonious relationship between development and education - with varying 
emphasis placed on either one or the other - may be inaccurate because of lack 
of harmony between the three ways of representing knowledge which children 
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and young people encounter: universal accomplishments, non-universal 
scholastic knowledge and culturally valued skills (Gardner, 1991). 
Some of this conflict may arise from the early attitudes of education which "threw 
aside the child's 'knowledge' derived from parents, community, and personal 
experience" and "demanded a state of ignorance" instead (Hendrick, 1990, p 47). 
Hamlyn (1975. p 38) considers that education "has little to do with development 
except as something that may make it (development) possible by providing the 
right conditions" because a person has to learn how to do certain things within the 
educational context and knowing how to do these tasks does not come naturally 
in the same way that one's body grows naturally. In fact. Piaget categorized the 
child's involvement with the environment into two forms: direct and generally 
unguided experience, and guided transmission of knowledge through education 
(Thomas. 1990b). 
Gardner (1991, p 117) describes as "universal accomplishments" such things as 
moral reasoning, graphic skill, language competence and social negotiation which 
children acquire in pre-school years and in out of school activities through 
symbolic knowledge and sensory-motor skills which enable them to build up basic 
theories of the world, of matter, of life and of self. "Scholastic knowledge" (p 119). 
however, which is encountered on entering institutional schooling and is not 
universally available to everyone, requires such things as concepts, facts and 
dates to be learnt. "Culturally valued skills" (p 119) are represented by the people 
who hold certain roles within the community such as parent, doctor or priest and 
Gardner contends that the greater robustness of universal ways of knowing and 
culturally valued skills often hinder intemalization of scholastic forms of knowing. 
This conflict between scholastic and universal forms of knowledge and cultural 
roles and skills may be further evident when I compare the provision that schools 
make for the spiritual and moral development of their pupils and what they do in 
response to bereavement within the school population, with the opportunities for 
41 
all forms of development that children and young people encounter outside of the 
school context. 
COMPONENTS OF A HUMAN BEING 
Through the centuries the most common division in the west of the human being 
has been into mind and body - although many religious traditions have suggested 
three components (mind, body and spirit/soul) whereby emotional development 
was associated with spirit/soul. It is not within the scope of this thesis to consider 
physical development except to note its fundamental link with intellectual and 
emotional development and to briefly explore those links before arguing later in 
this chapter that, taken together, these three forms of personal development 
comprise what I shall term the 'core self.' 
INTELLECTUAL OR COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 
Of the many traditional subjects of intellectual enquiry, some that seem pertinent 
to an analysis of the links between bereavement and moral and spiritual 
development and are reflected in chapters 5 and 7 are: memory, attitude 
formation, motivation, creativity and self-actualization. 
Memory 
Memory may be equated with teaming since people can only be said to have 
learnt something when they have remembered it. Although some items stored in 
the long-term memory are described as 'flashbulb' memories because of the 
emotional nature of the events (Salovey and Singer. 1989). most memories are 
eroded or altered with the passing of time or with successive repetition (Brewer. 
1986). Therefore, some details of an event may be lost while other details of it 
are vividly retained. Memories of several events may merge together, and 
recalled memories may become embellished with new interpretations in the light 
of subsequent experiences. Difficulties in retrieval from long-term memory may 
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arise from ^childhood amnesia' (Wetzler and Sweeney, 1986) or unused memories 
decaying or being eroded because of unpleasant associations (Thomas and 
Thomas. 1990). These are important points to bear in mind when examining the 
stories respondents of different ages tell of their bereavement experiences (see 
chapters 7 and 8). 
Attitude formation 
Attitudes are positive or negative feelings that a person holds about ideas, people 
or objects. They are normally regarded as enduring, although subject to 
modification by experience and persuasion, and likely to be predispositions to 
action. 'Information* dependence and 'affect' dependence in parent-chitd 
interactions may enable parental attitudes to influence children's viewpoints (Keil. 
1990). For example, the way In which parents present information about the 
world, people and events (such as a death) influences the way the child structures 
and processes subsequent information, and the child's dependence upon his or 
her parents to meet physical and emotional needs (such as grief reactions) also 
maximizes the potential for parental Ideas to dominate. 
l\/lotivatlon 
Motivation theory, which assumes that every action is directed towards a goal, 
focuses on the causes for the initiation, continuation or cessation and direction of 
behaviour. A common view taken in analysing motivation is that two opposing 
forces, equilibrium and disequilibrium, interact to motivate a person. The force 
towards equilibrium is towards constancy and balance while that towards 
disequilibrium is towards uncertainty, excitement, activity and change. Theories 
of motivation consider that behaviour is either initiated outward from within people 
(proactive) or in response to extemal forces that disturb their equilibrium (reactive) 
(Day, 1990). The response of a child or young person to the death of someone 
they know is initially reactive but. over time, it may develop into proactivity. 
Several writers have linked outstanding deeds and activities to a motivation to 
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achieve learned in the face of loss (Albert, 1971; Eisenstadt, 1978; Storr. 1989; 
Suedfield and Bluck. 1993). 
Creativity, self-actualization and se/f-concepf 
While Koestler (1975) describes the three domains of creativity as humour, 
discovery (science) and art, creativity itself is one of the twelve traits that Maslow 
(1970) identifies in people whom he considers to be self-actualized. Such people 
are original and energetic and less inhibited by convention and culture than 
ordinary people, which means that they often encounter society's disapproval 
also. Two other noteworthy traits Maslow names are: (a) an appreciation of the 
good and simple things of life characterized by reactions of awe. wonder, 
pleasure, ecstasy and freshness and (b) mystic experiences manifest in visions of 
being transformed into a more meaningful, appreciative person and of pleasure, 
expansiveness and momentary loss of self-consciousness (see also chapter 3). 
Self-concept develops as children become more aware of their own being and 
functioning. However, as they recognize that significant others such as family 
members and 'generalized others' such as peers and teachers (Mead, 1934) 
ascribe worth to some but not all experiences, they also learn a sense of self 
based on such valuing - and, perhaps, an 'ideal self to which to aspire. Children 
may come to perceive their self-actualizing tendencies as 'bad' because they do 
not conform to the expectations of others (Meador and Rogers, 1984). It is 
interesting that depression and suicide ideation in childhood or adulthood are 
often attributed to low self-concept resulting from the death of a significant other, 
especially a parent during childhood (Berlinsky and Biller, 1982). 
Children learn to recognize their abilities through being effective agents of change 
in their environment but a sense of learned helplessness or guilt may develop if 
events seem to happen to them without any cause and without their involvement. 
This is particularly pertinent to a child's experience of death and the opportunities 
to attend the funeral or say good-bye to the deceased. Feeling that the deceased 
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left suddenly or without reason, or because of something the child did, may 
exacerbate a sense of lack of self-control or challenge self-concept. 
Development of cognition or intellect is not isolated from physical and emotional 
development. Although the topics mentioned above may be analysable as 
intellectual activities, they are manifest through bodily actions and involve 
emotions. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any situation in which a human being is 
not. in some way, feeling or expressing an emotion and an inability to do so would 
be perceived as distinctly non-human. 
EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMErTT 
The components of emotion have been similarly defined as complexes of three 
parts: thought, feeling and wish (Kagan, 1978) or cognition, desire and affect 
(Oakley. 1992). Thoughts or cognition (intellectual development) are the beliefs 
that people hold about themselves, other people and events - whether correct or 
not. Desires and wishes are the motives - whether noble or not - that drive people 
to action - and mainly depend on physical development for expression. Feelings 
and affectivity (emotional development) are the responses people feel - without 
any biological or psychological analysis of the connections between them. Such a 
definition may explain why emotions are variously seen as either motives for 
actions (desires and wishes), or having the ability to touch, affect, arouse or stir 
(affect and feelings) or subject to assessments of rationality (thoughts and 
cognition). 
This view can be used to enlighten Dunlop's (1984) definition of affective 
experiences as comprising either emotions or moods. 
o Experiences of surrender of agency, loss of control, being ovenwhelmed. 
taken over, and being completely knocked off course (eg: in rage, love, grief 
and pain) are predominantly affective but must include an element of cognition 
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for the loss of control to be identified. The desire present may be mainly active 
(although in the case of grief, it is unsuccessful activity) such as wanting to 
attack, be with, recover or remove someone or something. 
• Being moved, stirred or excited by an object (eg: in joy. wonder, delight, 
indignation, pity, admiration and disgust) whether perceived, remembered or 
imagined involves cognition of something or someone and affective responses 
which may be calm rather than violent. The desire present may be more 
passive than active such as wanting to share something with another person, 
to remain in or move from a place, and to speak to or assist another person in 
some, as yet undefined, way. 
• Experiences of wants, needs and impulses and seeking satisfaction or 
completion which take us out of ourselves' and may be either self-related or 
other-related are less easy to define by named emotions. Although cognition 
is less specific, it must be present in order to drive the desire towards action 
(eg: wanting to give money to a charity - whether out of a sense of guilt, 
pleasure or good fortune - but not knowing which one to choose) while the 
affective response present may be predominantly passive or calm. 
• Moods, which are subjective colouring of experiences, have a wide range and 
may be defined stereotypically as depression, cheerfulness, anxiety, or feeling 
'blue'. Cognition strongly dominates affectivity which, in its turn, impels or 
hinders the desire to act. 
However, a distinction can be made between emotions and moods. Emotions 
have an identifiable cause, are relatively short lasting and have a specific effect 
on judgement, while moods have no identifiable cause, last longer and have an 
indiscriminate effect on judgement. 
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Grief and other emotions as paradigms 
The perception that grief involves a loss of control, is intractable and accompanied 
by helpless or passive feelings may explain the difference between this 'emotion' 
and others. This perception may also indicate why dealing with grief following the 
death of a loved one is such a significant achievement in human development 
since death is an event that cannot be changed or undone. 
Peters (1972a) comments that the tendency to take fear and anger as paradigms 
has maintained the conceptual connection that both philosophers and 
psychologists perceive to exist between 'emotion' and 'action' rather than - as he 
posits - between 'motive' and 'action.' and 'emotion' and 'passivity*. He argues: 
If sorrow, grief and wonder were taken as paradigms, this connection would 
surely be most implausible, for as Koestler puts it: 'The purely self-
transcending emotions do not tend towards action, but towards quiescence, 
tranquillity and catharsis' (p 471). 
However, sorrow and grief share certain important common characteristics which 
wonder and awe do not. 'Grief can be seen as consisting of two aspects: the 
emotion of grief and the process of grieving (Attig, 1991). Grief may be a 
debilitating response made to the intellectual recognition that a loved person, 
animal or precious object has been irretrievably lost (although reactions to loss of 
an object tend to be less severe and enduring than to loss of an animal or 
human), the desire that it not have occurred and the feelings of pain at the 
impossibility of fulfilling that desire. The coping process of grieving and learning 
to live with the loss is complex, challenging and spread over a period of time. 
Kubler-Ross (1969) posited five stages through which dying people pass and 
Bowlby (1980/1981) adapted this notion to describe the experience of 
bereavement also. Although such firm 'stage' thinking has been superseded by 
the softer category of 'phases' (Saunders, 1989) and tasks (Worden, 1991), the 
following list, while not definitive, includes the most frequent and obvious 
47 
cognitive-emotional manifestations of grief and grieving: numbness, shock, 
disbelief, denial, confusion, restlessness, searching, helplessness, yearning, 
conflict, anger, hostility, guilt, frustration, shame, fear of death, withdrawal, 
disorganization, despair, bargaining, relief, forgiveness, hope, self-awareness, 
calmness, loneliness, empathy and compassion. Accordingly it can be seen that 
paradigmatic emotions such as anger, fear and guilt, are only a few of the many 
emotional responses that constitute the broader umbrella term 'grief. Although 
these thoughts, emotions, sensations and behaviours are not desired and 
bereaved people expect to 'get over' them and to return to a more settled 
emotional lifestyle in time, the experience of grief and the process of grieving are 
likely to occur to everyone at some point in their lives. 
By contrast, awe and wonder are short lived or occurrent emotional responses, 
lasting for minutes rather than hours, made to the intellectual recognition that 
something or someone - a person, animal, object or even an event - is 
inexplicable, dreadful and fearful, or new. unexpected and extraordinary. Since 
these emotions are often "inspired by the natural world, mystery, or human 
achievement" (National Curriculum Council (NCC), 1993. p 2), such things as 
snov^rflakes. stars, autumn leaves, sunsets, animals, music, forms of art and items 
of intricacy may prompt them. There are no particular physical sensations 
associated with these emotions (although it is possible that some of those 
mentioned for grief might briefly occur) and a response to them may be expressed 
through art or music, contemplation or silence or simply thinking about them. 
Although many people experience these emotions only rarely, they may desire 
their return and consider them to be highlights in their lives (see also chapter 3). 
Thus, although it is evident that grief is a more appropriate paradigm than wonder 
- since it is a common human experience - its obstinate nature, variety of 
cognitive-emotional responses, longer duration and Inevitable non-active outcome 
makes it harder to analyse. Fear and anger, on the other hand, are more 
frequently experienced than wonder, more reliably recognized In occurrent facial 
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expressions and bodily behaviours, are of shorter duration and tend towards 
observable action. 
Oakley (1992) argues that grief is an emotion which promotes interpersonal 
qualities while wonder is one that does not. After describing grief as 
an appropriate indication of the depth of one's love and attachment to one's 
beloved, which are theniselves Important human goods (p 84) 
he notes that, "from a moral point of view" there is an important difference 
between compassion and resentment, and embarrassment. While compassion, 
like grief, "plays an important role in promoting love and friendship", resentment 
only "undermines interpersonal relationships and one's sense of self-worth", and 
embarrassment "seems neither essentially involved in. nor a serious threat to 
such human relationships." 
Therefore. Oakley argues, compassion and resentment are morally significant 
emotions because they contribute to or detract from human flourishing while 
embarrassment and other emotions like it - such as awe, nostalgia and intrigue -
are not morally significant because they "do not figure importantly in relation to 
human virtues and vices" (p 79). In this way 'grief can be seen as a manifestation 
of involvement in and commitment to other people through love and friendship 
which are some of the highest forms of human achievement. 
The social construction of emotion 
The view that emotions are cognition-based and involve forming and holding 
attitudes also provides a basis for the constructionist principle that emotions are 
socioculturally acquired responses (Armon-Jones. 1986a). From this additional 
perspective a view may be obtained of the part that emotions play in language, 
moral order and social functioning in the lives of individuals, their society and 
culture. 
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As I have shown, a variety of words are often used (especially in English) in order 
to discriminate between fine shades of emotional quality (eg: numb, shocked, 
confused) and although one person may say that she is 'numb' in response to a 
death and another that he is 'confused', there is no way of knowing that their 
feeling is not the same. Language also enables descriptions of how people 
usually feel and respond in certain situations to be perpetuated through written 
and oral forms in sayings, proverbs, myths, stories and in sacred texts (Bible. 
Qu'ran, Torah etc). Children are taught them and thereby learn what is the 
appropriate social and cultural response. This learning, in tum. perpetuates the 
moral order of a society, by encouraging broadly similar interpretations of 
linguistic terminology and behaviour since emotion words can be understood as 
interpreting, rather than describing, behaviour. For example. "You ought to be 
sorry that your grandmother has died" may imply: "You should cry or show your 
sorrow." An examination of many emotion words (eg: remorse, shame, regret, 
guilt) reveals that they presuppose moral concepts, the meaning of which children 
learn by the explanations their parents and other significant people give them. 
Philosophical analysis of emotion into cognition, affect/feeling and desire/wish 
does not dispute the social constructivist view that emotions are characterized by 
learned attitudes such as beliefs and judgements and that their contents are 
determined by the systems of cultural belief and moral values of specific 
communities (Armon-Jones. 1986a). Emotional behaviour, which is often a set of 
socially prescribed responses operating in a particular situation, indicates the 
present commitment of individuals to the values of their culture as well as likely 
future regulation of behaviour in the same culturally appropriate way. Children 
may learn that condolences made to the bereaved express the speaker's feelings 
while affirming the approved social response, and. similarly, the absence of such 
condolences may confirm them in the belief that not speaking about feelings at 
such a time is an acceptable social response. Hence, systems of rules regarding 
behaviour are evolved - usually involving language and social conventions (eg: 
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Jewish Shiva) - which support specific beliefs and judgements, reinforce feelings 
and wishes, and develop moral and spiritual attitudes. The expression of grief is 
regulated in different cultures and societies according to such rules and beliefs. 
As beliefs concerning maturation and moral development are firmly linked to 
theories of human development, a tacit assumption prevails that a young child will 
behave differently (more tmmaturely) than an older one and that there are a range 
of emotions that are not applicable to childhood because they presume an adult 
level of intellectual maturity, self-control and social sensibility. Western society 
relates virtues to age and expects children to be 'sulky* rather than 'angry*, 'kind' 
rather than 'compassionate', 'innocent* rather than 'prudent', and 'sad' rather than 
'grieved' (Armon-Jones, 1986b). 
Emotional development and education 
Emotional development is neither named nor implied in the Education Reform Act 
(1988, 2 (a)) which intends that the education that children and young people 
receive "promotes the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development 
of pupils at the school and of societ/'. Emotional development was neither in the 
1944 Act which was concerned with "the spiritual, moral, mental and physical 
development of the community" (Part 11.7) nor in the list of eight broad areas of 
experience considered to be important to all pupils in Curriculum: 11-16 (1977). 
although it was specifically named, together with social development, as a 
contributing factor to moral development in The Plowden Report (1967, para 73): 
The child forms his [sic] sense of personal worth and his moral sense from 
early experiences of acceptance, approval and disapproval. 
Its omission in 1988 is surprising since, in 1970, Hirst and Peters suggested that 
the then standard works on child development classified studies under four 
headings, physical, intellectual, social and emotional, with the latter frequently 
separated out to construct a fifth dimension, moral development. 
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The absence of 'emotional' in the present list may be due to historical 
developments as the ^traditional view* concerning emotions was replaced in the 
1970s by a 'new orthodoxy*. The former traditional view maintained that, since 
emotions are not rational and sway people from their objective purpose and 
outlook, education must be concerned with inculcating habits of control and 
developing strategies which prevent emotions from interfering with learning. The 
latter view held that emotions are rational, cognitive, related to logic and 
understanding, with no sharp distinction between emotion and thought (Griffiths, 
1984). Hirst and Peters (1970. p 50). for example, argued that: 
One of the main features of emotional development is the leaming of the 
countless different ways of appraising other people and ourselves in terms of 
a conceptual scheme which is mainly social in character. 
Although the attitudes of Hirst and Peters helped to reassess emotional 
responses as rational rather than non rational, their belief that reasoning itself is 
the means whereby emotions are formed not only perpetuated the kind of 
cognitive bias that Gilligan (1982) decries in Kohlberg's (1981) work but also 
lacked the balance of cognition, affect and desire that Kagan (1978) and Oakley 
(1992) propose. Furthermore, even if they are right that emotional responses are 
appraisals of other people and ourselves. Hirst and Peters seem to overlook the 
fact that society has constructed and imposed the meanings that individuals 
subsequently accept. 
Although the 'new orthodoxy* introduced a view that emotions are a part of the 
process of developing rationality, use of the adjective 'emotional' in educational 
legislation, may still be related to the older traditionalist view that emotions are not 
influenced by understanding, are only controllable with difficulty, or even that they 
are not a part of education's remit. 
Griffiths (1984). who holds that emotions are both irrational and rational, suggests 
that there must be room for internal conflict and vacillation since never to 
52 
reassess a situation or to change one's mind is itself irrational. She believes that 
describing children as 'emotional' because they sometimes respond intensely to 
small events and then seem to forget them - as is often seen in responses to a 
death - shows how society judges as irrational (and hence as 'emotional') any 
deviance from a 'normal' view of the constraint of feelings. 
In the light of such ambiguity, the government may have considered it 
inappropriate to add such a dubious aspect of development to a list designed to 
prepare "pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of adult life" 
(ERA, 1988.2(a)). 
COMPONENTS OF THE CORE SELF 
It is my belief that physical, intellectual and emotional development proceed in 
tandem in an individual human being when 'normal' and 'suitable' (although 
idiographlcally varying) social and cultural conditions prevail which involve 
stimulation by self, other people, events and things. Humans develop physically 
according to cumulative, irreversible, self-regulating laws of maturation which 
conform to the orthogenetic principle (Werner. 1957) and the mind and emotions 
develop in accordance with the maturation of these organs of the body. All three 
forms of development, in their turn, reflect the "regularities and idiosyncrasies" of 
the culture in which they take place (Gardner, 1991. p 115). 
Physical development is the foundation upon which both Intellectual and 
emotional development depend since, unless organs and muscles develop, 
thinking and feeling have no location in which to occur. It is the most apparent 
form of development and can be easily measured or assessed numerically. 
Intellectual development may also be assessed in common sense terms regarding 
universal accomplishments and/or cultural skills but specific forms of assessment 
are required to measure scholastic knowledge. Emotional development, however, 
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is the hardest of the three forms to measure and. even more than the other two, 
may be subject to value judgements in terms of appropriateness and quality. 
Thus I suggest that our bodies, our minds and our emotions contribute to the 
development of our *core self and that these three fundamental components are 
the means whereby the kind of development that is described as 'social', 'cultural', 
'spiritual' and 'moral' is expressed. 




By proposing this analysis I am not adopting a rigidly reductionist stance but 
attempting to further explore the levels-of-organization hypothesis (Schneiria, 
1957) which suggests that although there are different levels of organic 
organization, the laws of the higher, psychological level cannot be reduced to or 
predicted from the laws of the lower, physical, chemical level because such 
reductions fail to understand the emergent quality of each higher level. For 
example, people have unique idiographic characteristics such as being able to 
love or being governed by ethical constraints which are qualitatively discontinuous 
and cannot be understood by mere reduction to neural, hormonal and muscular 
processes or basic constituent parts. 
Therefore, physical development is insufficient in itself to explain either intellectual 
or emotional development; intellectual development is insufficient in itself to 
explain either physical or emotional development; and emotional development is 
insufficient in itself to explain either physical or intellectual development. 
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The environment and the 'core self inter-react to produce responses which have 
come to be termed 'social' and 'cultural' and 'moral' and 'spiritual' (see chapters 2 
and 3). Social, cultural and moral responses tend to be perceived in terms of 
relationships with other people while spiritual responses tend to be viewed as 
personal ones - although, this is not a definitive definition. Such responses - to 
the environment, experience, society and culture - comprise inter-relating forms of 
behaviour, modes of thinking and patterns of feeling which are subsequently 
construed as either spontaneous or coercive - according to v^ether the individual 
views its own nature as active or passive, its development as goal-directed or 
cause related, and the extent to which human will and supernatural powers are 
considered to play a part. 






I do not think that moral and spiritual responses exist in their own right, as 
components of our 'core self.' but rather depend on the mind, the body and the 
emotions for expression. However, because they function through those core 
components, they sometimes seem as if they are 'part' of us. 
The expression of responses that are termed 'moral' and 'spiritual' depend upon 
such things as cognitive acquisition of knowledge, socially constructed attitudes 
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and opinions, subjective and objective interpretations of the meaning and cause of 
emotions, feelings and moods, as well as use of the limbs and the five senses of 
the body. Morality, for example, may be expressed through thinking which 
considers such concepts as justice, compassion or retribution, or feelings which 
can be described as love, compassion or guilt, or displayed in actions such as 
sharing something with or helping another person. Spirituality, also, may be 
expressed through thinking which considers concepts of holiness, reverence or 
respect, orjeelings of adoration, transcendence or awe. or displayed in actions 
such as fasting, prayer or creative activity. 
A sense of wonder at the intricacies of the composition of flowers or snow flakes 
arises naturally, and whether or not it is considered to be a 'spiritual' response 
depends upon an understanding and acceptance of ideas about a creator God or 
life force. Wonder and awe and the belief that God or a divine power has caused 
such compositions can, I suppose, be termed 'religious spirituality' while wonder 
and no such beliefs can be temied 'secular spirituality' (King. 1985a. 1985b; 
Bakewell. 1993; Newby. 1994). However, the feeling of wonder itself is a purely 
natural and neutral one. caused by the mind's cognizance of the thing perceived. 
James (1960. p 47) who. I believe, used 'religious' in the 1900s in the same way 
that I use 'spiritual' here, similarly observed: 
There is religious fear, religious love, religious awe, religious joy ... But 
religious love is only man's [sic] natural emotion of love directed to a religious 
object... religious awe is the same organic thrill which we feel in a forest at 
twilight, or in a mountain gorge; only this time it comes over us at the thought 
of our supernatural relations... 
Accordingly I contend that 'morality' and 'spirituality' have to be interpreted 
through thinking, feeling and doing and are not independent of these components. 
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CHAPTER TWO : MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
This chapter continues to explore human development (body, mind and emotions) 
from the particular standpoint of that area of human experience designated as 
morality. Throughout there is an attempt to examine statements within recent 
British educational documents conceming the moral (and sometimes spiritual) 
development of pupils against ancient and universal ideas concerning the nature 
and form of morality. A critique of the former is offered in the light of the latter and 
Kohlberg's work is examined in detail. The chapter ends by exploring the type of 
thinking, feeling and behaviour - commonly designated as 'moral' - which may 
arise from the experience of bereavement. 
Universal ideas about morality 
... moral maturing Involves a lifetime of activity. We endlessly reshape our moral 
lives in a process of continuing progress. (Moran, 1987, p 16) 
The 1988 Education Reform Act. like the 1944 Education Act, requires schools to 
provide for and promote the moral development of their pupils. This assumption, 
however, needs examining since it lays particular emphasis upon a limited part of 
a person's life (5-16 or 18 years) and the special influence of certain adults 
(teachers). This may lead to a focus on development from the perspective of 
'what is happening now' under rather specific circumstances (behaviour, feelings 
and learning In school) and to a neglect of what has been completed so far (from 
all experiences of life including school) as well as what is likely to occur in the 
future (from all experiences of life beyond compulsory schooling). Certainly the 
school years are important for establishing the foundation for all aspects of 
development but, since development must be a life long process, I suggest that 
the role played by schools may be rather less than is commonly assumed and 
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that, for bereaved pupils at least, factors other than school may be more 
significant in their 'moral development.' 
Beliefs about morality seem to be derived from at least three origins. The most 
ancient is probably the belief that a supernatural being/principle exists which 
embodies goodness and reveals to humanity the right way to live. Allied with this 
belief is the second notion that natural laws govern both nature and human 
behaviour which can be rationally comprehended. From a more human viewpoint 
is a third idea which recognizes that harmonious social behaviour and agreement 
on codes of conduct are necessary foundations for peace and security. It can be 
argued that only the third idea gives rise to questions of moral urgency since the 
first two merely require obedience to pre-existing powers or structures. 
The first approach to morality is particularly reflected in philosophical, religious 
and common-sense theories of human development which are ancient in origin. 
Classical ethical theories such as Platohism believed that moral judgements 
reflect the moral entities Qustice, beauty, good) that exist in the world, while 
Stoicism held that good or evil depends upon an individual's ability to respond to 
the environment and that indifference reduces the power other things can 
exercise. Some religious theories (Judaism. Christianity. Islam) contain moral 
codes considered to be the expression of God's will for humanity's conduct and. 
since the giver of these codes is deemed omniscient and omnipotent, what they 
contain is held to be good and right - whether revealed through sacred text, the 
life of its prophets or founder, the tradition's pronouncements or individual insight. 
Religious philosophies have mainly been concerned with the kind of relationships 
individuals have with God (or a divine or life force) and other people, as well as 
how they prepare for death and what, whether through transmigration, 
reincamation. rebirth or resurrection, is believed to lie beyond that event. The role 
of cause and effect, human free-will and supernatural intervention are explained 
through such beliefs as karma, pre-destination, election, and the will of God. 
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Since important features of religious theories are to seek what is good for oneself 
and other people and to live in the right way (and, within Hinduism and Buddhism 
particularly, to die in the right way), they can also be seen as theories of moral 
development. These approaches to morality will be discussed more fully later in 
this chapter. 
The second approach spans both philosophy and psychology while the third 
approach seem to be best exemplified by more recently evolved social and 
psychological theories. Both approaches are evident in Piagefs and Kohlberg's 
investigations of moral development which, largely influenced by the biological 
model of development, focus on cognitive understanding of natural principles. 
Piaget (1932) investigated the moral thinking of children regarding the formulation 
of rules, the relation of intention to the attribution of culpability and the concepts of 
distributive and retributive justice and Kohlberg (1958) followed Piaget in 
comparing moral development to leaming the rules of a game. Both men 
considered that an understanding of simple, externally imposed rules precedes an 
understanding of complex ones and that game-playing itself encourages a respect 
for rules and an understanding of how they can be made and changed. These 
approaches to morality will also be discussed more fully later in this chapter. 
I think that morality cannot easily be separated from social behaviour which, in its 
turn, is influenced by the emotional factors which affect relationships between 
people. Morality can be broadly defined as that area of human behaviour that is 
concerned with judgements of right and wrong and good and bad, behaviour to be 
avoided or undertaken, relationships between people, other living organisms and 
the environment, and the interplay between thinking, action and feelings in both 
self and others. It will, however, never be easy to establish how far we are what 
we are and think and behave as we do because of our phylogeny. Although 
humanity has become differentiated from the animal world through language, laws 
and technology, the kind of order we create may never be perfect and will always 
be dominated by the knowledge of our own finitude. It is because we are as we 
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are in our environment - with particular physical characteristics, needs, feelings, 
sensations, interests and forms of consciousness - that the form of morality that 
we have arises. If we were otherwise, morality might be different but. since our 
morality is limited by our nature, I think it is not unreasonable to argue as Hirst 
(1974) does that what we are unable to achieve cannot be described as v\^at 
ought to be. 
It is interesting to see that some modem philosophers consider classical ethical 
theories such as Christianity and utilitarianism to have attempted the impossible 
by describing and prescribing moral behaviour since it has been argued that only 
an analysis of the language defining moral judgements is really possible. It now 
seems evident to many twentieth century scientific thinkers that deducing moral 
precepts from theological premises is. as Hume and Moore both suggested, 
fallacious, since metaphysical beliefs about the will of God or humanity's 
relationship with God cannot be used to prescribe concrete human behaviour. 
Certainly beliefs about the origin, nature and purpose of the world and of our 
place in it may greatly influence behaviour but, since they can never, in any 
logical sense, be proved true or false, they must remain only beliefs. 
Present day views regarding the moral development of people - and of children 
and young people in particular - seem to be influenced by ideas from four, 
sometimes conflicting, sources developed from those ways of thinking described 
above: 
• religious (usually theistic) frameworks which underpin a society 
• philosophical theories which often express non-theistic beliefs about moral 
behaviour 
• social conventions (such as gender roles) that have evolved in a society; and 
• scientific and psychological theories of cognitive growth and learning that 
education, particularly, has adopted. 
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The interplay between these four sources is apparent in moral development 
theories such as Kohlberg's which claims that universal, natural principles of 
justice can be rationally known, and in govemment documents relating to the 
inspection of moral and spiritual development which subscribe to Platonic notions 
of moral entities and. like the Ten Commandments, stress avoidance of harm. 
RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF MORALITY 
A traditional link between religion and morality is apparent in the ancient debate 
whether God wills something because it is good or whether it is good because 
God wills it. Because belief in God is a matter of faith and intemal commitment, it 
also becomes a matter of internal constraint and conscience to keep laws 
believed to be God's. In this way a difference may become apparent between 
believers and non-believers. Wright and Cox (1967) found that both groups 
generally subscribe to a social morality which affects other people as well as 
themselves (not cheating, bullying) but those who believe that their whole life is in 
God's hands tend to pass stricter judgements on issues of both social morality 
and private morality (sexual behaviour, drinking alcohol) in terms of "wrong-ness" 
and to see little distinction between the two areas. In addition to the belief that a 
moral code has been given by a supernatural being, other common 
characteristics of many religions which affect moral thinking are the beliefs that 
such a supernatural being/power knows what we think and do. that our lives have 
significance and purpose, and that we continue to live in some form after death 
when our deeds and motives will be judged or used to decide our future. 
Christianity, the main religious tradition of the British Isles, particularly stresses 
these beliefs in its doctrine of a saviour who died to save humanity from the result 
of its sin in both this life and the afterlife. 
The decline in religious influence in British society has been displayed in doubt at 
the existence of God and despair at the futility of human existence but there 
seems to be a renewed interest, through accounts of people's near-death 
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experiences, in what happens to humans while dying and after death 
(Kastenbaum. 1995). Although not directly contradicting Christian teaching, these 
popular accounts may have alleviated much of the fear that once surround)^ the 
dying process since they describe encounters with warmth and light, colourful, 
pleasant surroundings and deceased loved ones. It is difficult to say how far 
these accounts - which imply that the experience of dying and ultimate destination 
is the same for all people - have affected belief in an afterlife, whether containing 
judgement or not. It is reasonable to suggest that, as the notion of being called to 
account for our deeds after death is dispelled, there will be a trend within moral 
thinking to maintain positive human interaction for its own sake - which is in line 
with the third, socially derived belief about why we should be moral. 
An outcome of the recognition in the Education Reform Act (1988. 8 [3]) that "the 
religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main Christian" is that Religious 
Education in schools "should seek to develop pupils' knowledge, understanding 
and awareness of Christianity, as the predominant religion in Great Britain," (DfE 
1/94. 16) and that the daily act of collective worship is to be "wholly or mainly of a 
broadly Christian character" (DfE. 60). The reasoning behind this legislation 
seems to be that, if they do not regularly attend a Christian place of worship or 
belong to one of the other religious groups represented in Great Britain, young 
people can be made aware of Christianity's influence upon this country's culture, 
traditions and morality through schooling. It is not clear whether education about 
Christianity - as well as "the other principal religions represented in Great Britain" 
(DfE 1/94, 16) - and broadly Christian acts of collective worship are expected to 
contribute to pupils' understanding of their cultural inheritance or the development 
of a specifically Christian moral attitude. Patten (1992. p 10) certainly prefers 
development of the latter because he believes that: 
the loss of [the fear of eternal damnation] has meant a critical nK>tfve has been 
lost to young people when they decide whether to try to be good citizens or to be 
criminals. 
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The removal of the confessional approach to the teaching of religion in schools 
means that acceptance of or conformity to Christian doctrine or moral codes 
dependent on them can no longer be expected but it is useful to examine the 
implicit influence of Judaeo-Christian thought on British culture and education. 
While Christianity generally interprets Judaic scripture as 'old testament' 
prophecy, teaching and history related to the 'new testament' life of Jesus, closer 
inspection of the Torah reveals development in the moral thinking and lifestyles of 
a nation and a travelling people which relates to the development of moral 
thinking today. 
Genesis asserts that the world and its people are formed by, accountable to, and 
destined for God's purpose and that humans are recalcitrant especially in 
response to the God-given knowledge of good and evil. Exodus contains a God-
given moral code mainly exemplified by restraint from harm ("Thou shalt not") and 
reciprocal punishments (21:24: "eye for eye. tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot 
for foot" KJV) but sets a higher value on human life than the comparable 
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi. Leviticus details how to make sacrifices to God 
to atone for sin and guilt and to encourage peace, and Deuteronomy (1:16-17) 
introduces the concepts of justice and equity in settling disputes, which are later 
seen as fundamental characteristics of God (Jeremiah 9: 23-24) and inevitable 
human responses to God's revelation of himself (Micah 6: 6-8). 
Although the shema's original admonition to love God with all one's heart, soul 
and might (Deuteronomy 6: 3-5) was to encourage, in this life, well-being, 
prosperity ("that it may be well with thee" KJV) and the birth of future generations, 
the context of Jesus's reply regarding this law in Luke (10: 25-28) and Matthew 
(19: 16-22) suggests that keeping it leads to eternal life - although in both cases 
Jesus' advice is ambiguous: "if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" 
(KJV) and "this do, and thou shalt live" (KJV). In Luke's account Jesus accepts, 
in addition to the shema, the principle, described in Leviticus 19:18. of loving 
one's neighbour as oneself. This principle has become the Christian Golden Rule 
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of reciprocal caring behaviour towards others (Luke 6: 31; Matthew 7:12). 
although it should be noted that, In its original context, such care and concern for 
others was a result of one's relationship with God. 
Two moral principles have thus emerged from Judaeo-Christian thinking: (1) the 
use of justice in dealing with others as a manifestation of God's character and 
presence In one's life, and (2) the practice of loving other people, as well as God. 
in order both to prosper in this life and inherit eternal life. St Paul's formulation of 
the concept that Jesus' death atoned for the sins of the worid may be an example 
of the principle of either justice (one perfect man acting on behalf of all sinful 
people in order to save them from God's inevitable damning eternal judgement) or 
care and benevolence (despite his Innocence, one man willingly died because of 
his love for humanity and in obedience to God's loving plan that such a sacrifice 
was the only way). Imitating Jesus' selflessness - driven either by the incentive of 
reward in the next life or of personal satisfaction in this one - has become a 
characteristic of Christian living related to self-discipline and relationships with 
others, but the desire for deliverance from human frailty or sinfulness has 
expressed itself in many forms beside the Christian search for salvation. Socratic 
belief In self-knowledge and the existential quest for wholeness and authenticity 
are two examples. 
Several bereaved respondents In this study (see chapter 7) have debated the 
qualities of God in terms of justice and/or loving care and I shall show later in this 
chapter how these two principles pen/ade some of the debate about the form and 
content of morality. 
Morality, however, may be grounded in faith related to religious or non-religious 
terms. Fowler (1981) makes the distinction between faith, belief and religion and 
relates his work to Piaget*s logical thinking, Selman's (1980) social perspective 
taking and Kohlberg' justice reasoning. He describes faith as setting one's heart 
on something and of living in loyalty to that commitment. 
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If we set aside the nature of the relationship between humanity and the divine, the 
most obvious point at which religion and morality relate - and thereby also link 
with an understanding of morality from social and psychological viewpoints - is in 
the experience of the other person as a person. Buber's assertion that the other 
person must be seen as 'Thou' rather than 'It' combines religious notions of God's 
immanence with moral notions of justice, care and respect for people. "It is this 
sense of being transcended in relationships which generates respect for the other 
as an equal" (Wright, 1983. p 115) and I believe it is through this sense, also, that 
the significance of the loss of such a relationship through death can be morally 
understood. After death a transition must be made between knowing the other as 
Thou.' a living, responding human, and sensing the inanimate *lt-ness' of the 
corpse or the absence of an interactive 'l-Thou' relationship. Thinking about why 
the death occurred or where the deceased now is may involve value judgements 
about purpose and quality of life which previously have been unexplored. Loss of 
the other 'Thou' - whether much loved or not - may even affect one's experience 
of the 'Eternal Thou' and change, although temporarily, relationships with other 
humans from 'l-Thou' to 'l-lt' as grief manifests itself in anger, disbelief, fear or 
shock. 
The main differences between religious-philosophical and social or psychological 
approaches to morality seem to be in the source of their authority. The former 
approach considers that its values and standards reflect the nature of an external 
divine source or ultimate principle while the latter approaches look to the 
reasoning, behavioural and emotive aspects of humanity itself for reasons why 
morality is the way it is. An examination of morality from the latter viewpoint now 
follows. 
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SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF MORALITY 
Morality: its nature, forms of expression and use of the term 
Moral considerations are present in our thinking, feeling and behaving but it is 
obviously easier to assess external forms (behaviour) rather than internal forms 
(thinking and emotions) and to consider - whether correctly or not - that behaviour 
is the final expression of what an individual thinks and feels. I also think there is a 
distinction to be made between a moral action and a moral person since some 
approaches to analysing 'morality' speak in terms of duties and consequences 
while others speak in terms of qualities of human character. While publicly 
observable conduct and verbal behaviour is popularly deemed to be 'moral' if it 
conforms to social expectations, rules and norms, there are few philosophical 
theories of ethics which consider such behaviour to be a sufficient condition for 
either an action or a person to be deemed moral. Since the reasons for overt 
conformity to rules and laws may include simple respect for rules as rules, 
anticipated disapproval or advantage, or altruism, such behaviour is merely a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for morality. Instead, a consideration is 
usually made of either people's motives, intentions and reasons for action or the 
goodness of the predictable consequences of an action for other people and 
society in general. 
Ethical analysis of the kind that Socrates and the utilitarians undertook considered 
what is right or good or necessary in life and made normative judgements, all 
things being equal, about what kind of behaviour is best. This approach works 
reasonably well within a homogenous society but falters when different standards 
co-exist within the same society because individuals inevitably compare their 
standards and rules with those of others and may conclude that morality is 
relative. By contrast, empirical analysis of morality by anthropologists, 
sociologists, historians and psychologists tries to describe the phenomena of 
morality in terms of theories of human nature related to ethical questions. 
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Although this approach may lay itself open to the charge of accepting or 
promoting moral relativism, it recognizes the variety of influences that impinge 
upon any society's moral code and also notes broad similarities between 
societies. 
Another approach to understanding morality comes from metaethical analysis 
which, avoiding both normative and empirical questions, tries to answer logical, 
semantic and epistemological questions instead such as 'What is the meaning of 
the expression morally right or good?' and 'How can ethical judgements be 
justified?' This approach tries to stand outside the practical situation in order to 
philosophically postulate a form of morality that logically moves towards a higher 
fomfi or end-point, such as Kohlberg's stages 6 and 7 (see later in this chapter). 
In asking 'What is x?' we may be asking about either the meaning of the word 
under analysis or the nature of the thing being analysed and, in the case of the 
question 'What is moral?' it is much easier to describe agreed examples of moral 
behaviour and moral thinking than to describe what 'moral' means (Wilson. 1973). 
Wilson suggests that an understanding of morality should entail analysing what 
concepts people have (eg: of honesty) and what concepts or principles they think 
they ought to use in their behaviour. He says it is also important to know what 
feelings and emotions people have under normal circumstances which support 
their belief that they should use these concepts and principles, and what 
knowledge or awareness they have of the relevant surrounding circumstances 
and of their own and other people's feelings. Also important are what social skills 
people have and whether they bring any of the above named factors to bear on 
situations in real life. Such an analysis of 'what is moral' may start to reveal the 
content of people's thinking regarding their concepts and principles, the form of 
that expression under both 'normal' and 'conflicted' circumstances and the inter-
relatedness of content and form with emotions, specific circumstances and 
prevailing social conditions. 
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A focus on the meaning of morality as having a particular content has led to 
studies and definitions of 'moral' in terms of not cheating (Hartshorne and May, 
1928-30), valuing life, reciprocity, not cheating, stealing and lying (Bull, 1969), 
justice (Kohlberg. 1984) and caring and responsibility (Gilligan. 1982) - some of 
which are likely to be culturally specific. For example, many Saudi Arabian 
adolescents express a desire to be honest and reliable and to uphold religious 
(Islamic) principles, while English adolescents seem more concerned with 
personal physical appearance and the impact of other people on them (Simmons 
and Simmons. 1994). The principles of equality and collective happiness are 
considered important by Israeli kibbutzniks while unity and sanctity of life are 
important for Indians (Richards and Davison, 1992) and when I lived in Japan i 
was aware of the importance in that culture of honour and responsibility, often 
linked to seniority and age. A study of British children's morality in terms of those 
concepts (or Japanese children in terms of justice or empathy) would probably 
reveal the extent of implicit cultural assumptions in definitions of morality. 
Wilson (1973) observes that the term 'moral' is used in English in a variety of 
ways. It is often contrasted with 'immoral,' usually in the context of approval or 
disapproval; used as a description of action or belief to indicate a matter of taste 
or opinion; or in a sociological sense to describe the particular code or set of 
morals of a society. It is also used as a conceptual classification of ways of 
thinking and behaving which express such things as social and religious beliefs. 
These examples clearly indicate how its use can range from explicit personal 
disapproval of specific behaviour to broad and general descriptions of socio-
religious beliefs and practices. 
Because of the linguistic similarities in English between moral judgements 
("Suicide is wrong") and factual statements ("Ice cream is sweet") a mistaken 
belief can arise that moral statements are 'true' in the same way that factual 
statements are. and that 'wrongness' exists as an entity in much the same way 
that 'sweetness' does. As Stevenson (1944) noted, moral language may also 
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express feelings or personal approval covertly designed to influence other people 
("It^ s good to see pupils sharing their possessions with each other") or overt 
imperatives to conform ("Don t^ shout out in class"). In fact, because description 
and evaluation are often so entangled it is difficult to separate them. 'Murder* and 
'suicide,' for example, describe death but also give society's or the speaker's 
opinion about how or why it occurred. 
Confusion may also arise when the same word is used in normative, empirical 
and moral contexts. For example, *right' or 'wrong' may be used to describe both 
the answer to an arithmetical question and the acceptable way to dress for 
school, and 'good' and 'bad' may be used to describe both an action that 
practically harms another person and the flavour of food. Although children's 
cognitive development usually enables them to identify the different concepts 
being used, both children and adults may use such words indiscriminately and 
interchangeably. 
Approaches to analysing morality 
Three main philosophical approaches (consequential, deontological and virtue-
based) which are often used to define the term 'moral' focus on either behaviour 
(What ought I to do?) or character and personality (What kind of person ought I to 
be?) (Kahn. 1991). These descriptions identify.the conflicting need always to look 
at both the individual who thinks, feels and acts In a certain way with how this 
affects other people. 
Moral behaviour can be defined by either the consequences of an action or a 
person's duty or necessary behaviour in a situation. While both definitions 
recognize that the individual is related to others in a social context, the former 
approach tends to stress the larger group containing self and other people while 
the latter focuses rather more on the Individual decision-maker. Consequential 
theory proposes that a person should always act in order to produce the best 
69 
possible outcome and its most common form, utilitarianism, advocates principles 
such as prudence, benevolence and justice in order to bring about a utility (such 
as happiness) for the greatest number of people. This approach can be 
described as an ethic of the good. Deontological (or duty) theory maintains that 
there are some moral actions that a person must or must not do. Kant's 
categorical imperative (which, if followed, should ensure that a person is always 
acting morally) advocates that people should only act on a maxim which they 
would will to become a universal law and this approach, which is often described 
as an ethic of the right, has been adopted by Kohlberg. However, both 
consequential and deontological approaches have tended to stress the 
importance of action (behaviour) more than attitude (thinking and feeling) and 
such an emphasis is one which I believe NCC and O F S T E D need to take account 
of when compiling lists of behaviour to promote or avoid. 
In contrast to deontological and consequential theories, virtue-based approaches 
advocate character traits such as courage, temperance and wisdom (Aristotle); 
sympathy (Hume); empathy and consideration (Wilson et al, 1967); pro-social 
behaviour (Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg, 1977); and powers, dispositions and 
rational thinking (Dunlop, 1981). Dunlop (p 8) suggests that since a person's 
moral character may be comprised of both conscious moral choices (eg: 
conscientiousness) and natural dispositions (eg: goodheartedness), the former, 
rather than the latter, constitute "the 'deposit' of moral character" because the 
prevalence of positive rather than negative impulses is a result of self-discipline. 
Although this approach appears to give importance to thinking and feeling, it may 
also tend to reinforce previously discussed cultural assumptions. 
The role of feeling and emotion in morality, however, needs to be recognized 
since it is an indication of thinking and can also act as an impulse to action. For 
example, a person's experience of sorrow indicates a belief that someone or 
something of value has been lost (whether permanently or temporarily) and is 
likely to prompt actions (eg: searching) or other feelings (eg: regret) in order to 
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alleviate that loss. Both searching and regret may. in their turn, lead to beliefs of 
guilt and blame and further actions or emotions denoting anger at other people 
(eg: arguments, law suits) at oneself (eg: depression, self-harm) or God (ieg:/oss 
of faith). In the case of bereavement these are certainly common reactions 
(Stedeford. 1984). For example, feeling guilty may have a natural root in our 
psychology but how we attribute that guilt is a result of the way we structure our 
lives. The belief that either a doctor, oneself or God is responsible for the death 
of a loved one reveals part of our fundamental outlook on life. 
Requirements for morality 
Within the approaches to analysing morality outlined above there is the perception 
that explicit behaviour (What ought I to do?) and feelings and thinking related to 
behaviour (What kind of person ought I to be?) are intentionally cultivated and 
improved. IHirst (1974) and Wilson et al (1967) believe that in order to define 
actions as fully moral the individual responsible must be able both to give a 
reason for them and to consider them voluntarily undertaken. Hirst also suggests 
that autonomy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral behaviour 
because of the restricting nature of inter-personal and social relationships. Hare 
(1963). whose definitions shaped Kohlberg's work, considers that a moral 
judgement must be both prescriptive (containing a categorical imperative to 
action) and universalizable (containing a point of view that any human being could 
or should adopt). 
Philosophy, religion, sociology and psychology seem united in considering that 
development in 'morality' is best encouraged through or can be identified by 
reflection and analysis rather than unconsidered thinking, feeling and behaviour. 
Such a definition of requirements raises the question whether such 'moral 
development' can ever be considered to occur without intentional human 
intervention, whether by self or another person, since we are not always aware of 
making daily moral choices. However, to have a reason for doing something -
71 
whether consciously expressed or done from habit because such thinking, feeling 
or acting is well established - does indicate that a form of rationalization or 
reflection has occurred, even if such thinking is erroneous (eg: my absence did 
not cause my grandmother to die). Since this rationalizing is our way of making 
sense of the world, of linking cause and effect and of giving meaning to what 
happens to us. it is evidence of our attribution of intention and the giving of 
reasons to our own and others' actions. 
Definitions of moral development 
As for moral development, I do rK>t think there is any such thing. People may 
devek)p in personality and character, as well as in their mode of thinking, but 
how to be moral is something that we have to learn. (Hamlyn, 1975, p 38, my 
italics) 
In moving from discussions of morality per se to those of moral development. 
Hamlyn voices a fundamental criticism of approaches to moral development 
through education in schools. He believes that morality, like creativity, has a 
function in relation to other things and that education can only encourage 
development by providing the right conditions. Like him. I consider that learning 
how to be moral is a process of evaluating reasons, circumstances and situations 
as well as oneself and other people. While 'development' in its broadest sense 
may be seen as the outcome of such leaming, it is not a full or accurate 
description of the various everyday practical expressions of morality such as 
upholding principles, recognizing and meeting obligations, acting virtuously, 
identifying and pursuing worthwhile activities, responding through our emotions to 
beliefs about ourselves and other people, and undertaking social roles. 
There are four broad approaches to the analysis of moral development which, 
taken together, reflect this complexity. Endogenous theorists (Plato. Neill and 
Rousseau) hold that moral development occurs mainly through internal 
mechanisms such as maturation and innatism while exogenous theories 
(behaviourism and social learning) propose that moral development is the result 
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of external factors. Interactionist theories (such as psychoanalysis which is 
particularly concerned with the development of conscience and guilt) holds that 
both external and internal factors play a necessary although sometimes conflicting 
part in moral development and structural interaction theorists (Piaget and 
Kohlberg) propose that moral development occurs through mental equilibrium 
created by the interaction between individual and environment (Kahn. 1991). This 
delineation of four approaches (and there may be others) simply shows that 
people have adopted different and specific perspectives in an attempt to 
understand the inter-related nature of development within morality in both 
personal, inter-personal and social contexts. 
O F S T E D (1994a. p 10. my italics) describes moral development as "pupils' 
knowledge, understanding, intentions, attitudes and behaviour in relation to what 
is right and wrong." Despite the overview of all aspects of moral development 
(eg: knowledge, intention and behaviour), this is really a description of moral 
epistemology (whether moral behaviour and statements are right or wrong, good 
or bad. tnje or false), rather than moral ontogeny because using phrases such as 
•right' and 'wrong* reflects the Platonic belief that objective realities such as 
tightness' and 'wrongness' (like cold and heat) really exist, and the assumption 
that everyone agrees upon the meaning of these words. This ambiguity continues 
in The Framework for Inspection of Schools (OFSTED. 1994b. p 21. my italics) 
which states that: 
moral development is to be judged by how well the school promotes an 
understanding of the moral principles which albw pupils to tell right from wrong, 
and to respect other people, truth, justice and property, and how well they 
respond, through their behaviour and the views they express. 
Here, also, since respect is encouraged for both tangible objects (other people 
and property) and intangible ones (truth and justice) there is an implication that 
both forms are readily identifiable. Indeed, how far is 'respect for property* to be 
applied indiscriminately • to pencil sharpeners and clothing and houses? 
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The theories of Piaget and Kohlberg have significantly influenced research 
concerning morality and moral development through their examination of people's 
thoughts and attitudes in situations of social morality. This form of morality is 
recognized to be regulated by systems of rules and expectation and Kohlberg's 
research, in particular, has analysed the thinking of individuals in hypothetical 
situations regarding conflicting rules or interests of society, institutions, family, 
peer group and self. Kohlberg's original focus on 'ideal types' (1984) led him to 
propose 'stages' of justice reasoning, which, ultimately, have come to be 
generically termed 'stages' of moral development. It is important to bear in mind 
therefore that (i) Kohlberg deems justice to be the fundamental principle of 
morality and (ii) he is more interested in ways of reasoning (thinking) than feelings 
or behaviour. 
Kohlberg's moral development theory 
Since Kohlberg's theory of moral judgement is the most coherent and well-known 
approach to analysing moral development through justice reasoning, I shall use it 
as a basis for much of my explorations (see Appendix 1). 
The application of Darwin's theory of evolution to individual human development 
led to a perception that forms of behaviour evolve from each other by the 
mechanism of adaptation, and theories of embryological development also led to 
a belief that change in human development is regulated and organized 
hierarchically. Piaget's theory of cognitive development originated within the 
prevailing thinking of embryology and evolution and his conception of specific 
structural stages in development derive from both biology and logic. He 
considered that a hierarchy exists since an evolved form of development cannot 
return to a genetically earlier form because each form is itself qualitatively 
different, more integrated and differentiated than the form from which it has 
developed (see also chapter 1). His theories of moral development based upon 
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reasoning about principles of justice derive from his ideas about stages of logic 
within cognitive development. 
Kohlberg's well-known cognitive-developmental model continues Piagetian 
definitions and analyses of stages. First, Kohlberg proposes "structured wholes" 
- a total way of thinking about, rather than attitudes towards, particular situations -
which, because such ways of thinking may be used to support either side of an 
action choice, can help to distinguish between form (the way of thinking) and 
content (the action choice itself). Kohlberg suggests that analysing the meaning 
of differences in cultural customs regarding forms of judgement reveals that, 
despite different content, the form of the argument is often the same. He says 
that "we can define a moral judgement as 'moral' without considering its content" 
or "whether it agrees with our own judgements or standards" (1980a, pp 55-56) 
and, in terms of analyzing the content of moral statements, I think his claim is true 
since "we" (the test analysers at a higher stage) can see that replies conform, for 
example to Stage 2 or 3 descriptions, in every day life, however, it may be less 
easy to accept the thinking of another person as 'moral' if it is substantially 
different from one*s own because, according to Kohlberg's theory, those at pre-
conventional and conventional levels cannot understand the reasoning of stages 
more than one above their own and only people at the post-conventional stage 
are able to have such a perspective. 
The second Piagetian definition implies an invariant sequence, although Kohlberg 
allows that it is possible for an individual to move at varying speeds, to be half in 
and half out of a particular stage, and even to stop at any stage. However, when 
apparent regression in longitudinal respondents appeared to contradict belief in 
this invariant sequence, bootstrapping measures were applied in order to formally 
reclassify stages 4, 5 and 6. This way of re-assessing the facts in order to fit 
theory must create doubt in such an invariant sequence (see chapter 4). 
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The theory also displays hierarchical integration of moral values which. Kohlberg 
argues, are not relative to a culture but reflect developmental stages in moral 
thought since even a young child understands the value of a parent's or an 
animal's life because of empathy with other living things. I think that the 
development of the concept of death also influences such emotional development 
because children's ability to have respect, to care for other living things, and to 
empathise will be enhanced by their understand that all living things die. that 
death cannot be reversed, and that all life-defining functions cease at death 
(Speece and Brent. 1987) 
Kohlberg's theory is concerned with consequences and driven by the principle of 
justice. It describes moral development as orientations at different stages 
towards certain broad bands of reasoning, with movement to the next stage 
caused by internal cognitive reorganization when difficult decisions challenge the 
limits of current reasoning. Although he originally subdivided Piaget's three 
stages of justice reasoning into six. Kohlberg later designated stage six as a 
philosophical rather than an empirical endpoint and proposed the existence of a 
metaphorical or "soft hypothetical seventh stage" which "appears after the 
attainment of post-conventional justice reasoning" (1984. p 249). Stage 7 offers 
a cosmic perspective on life, dealing with questions of meaning in the face of 
injustice, pain and death (see also chapter four) and the development of such a 
viewpoint is pertinent to the focus of this thesis. Hiwever. stage 7 does not 
appear in later versions of Kohlberg's theory (see Appendix 1). 
Kohlberg (1974) claims that his work is in line with the Christian tradition's 
philosophical basis of principles derived from natural laws. These laws, which 
hold that there are universal or natural principles of justice which should guide all 
societies, are known to people by reason independent of religious revelation. 
Thus, the sense of justice in a child can be encouraged because it is innate. 
Kohlberg claims that justice, rather than benevolence, is the only true moral 
principle because its concept of equity can resolve competing claims which the 
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concept of maximization rooted in benevolence cannot. When benevolence is 
manifested as love, empathy, sympathy, human concern, and humanism though. 
Kohlberg deems it to be mainly a stage 3 virtue, "not a guide to action" (1980a, p 
63). 
Kohlberg (1980a) suggests that moral judgements tend to be consistent, 
inclusive, universal, and grounded on objective, impersonal bases. He says that 
a moral principle is a universal mode of choosing which is applicable to people in 
all situations (eg: everyone has a right to live) unlike rules such as the Ten 
Commandments (stage 4) which are prescriptions for action and cannot be 
universalized (eg: not everyone has a living parent or a wife). Conventional 
morality (stages 3 and 4) defines good behaviour for a person in one situation but 
not another and. since such definitions are not fully universal and prescriptive, 
continual self-contradiction arises. He believes that all principles are present in 
one form or another from stage 1 onwards, although authority and prudence 
disappear by stage 6 and benevolence and justice do not become genuine moral 
principles (as opposed to virtue descriptions) until stages 5 and 6. 
According to Kohlberg. school pupils are either pre-conventional or conventional 
in their moral judgements, with stage 4 thinking expected from some but not all 
school-leavers. If this is the case, and post-conventional thinking cannot be 
expected from school pupils, it may be appropriate to suggest that NCC's (1993) 
list of school values should only contain social conventional notions of good and 
right behaviour such as truth-telling, promise-keeping, and respecting other 
people's rights and property. (See later in this chapter) 
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Critiques of Kohlberg's theory 
Criticisms of Kohlberg's theory which I consider significant and relevant to this 
thesis fall into three broad areas: methodology and analysis of data, the use of 
justice as the over-riding principle and the theory's general applicability. 
Methodology 
With regard to methodology and analysis, the following five criticisms need 
raising. First. Kohlberg says that he views 'cognition' and 'affect' as "different 
aspects of. or perspectives on. the same mental events' (1980a. p 40) so that, for 
example, the same kind of anxiety felt by two children at different stages who are 
planning to steal something may be differently interpreted as 'being chicken' 
(stage 2) or the waming of conscience (stage 4). However I think this explanation 
is a weak attempt to mask the focus on cognition at the expense of affect which 
Fowler (1981) also deplores and that, because of this focus on cognition, a 
second criticism becomes clearer, namely that respondents with good linguistic 
skills are advantaged by the exclusive use of verbal reasoning to assess such 
thinking (Gates, 1986). It is interesting to note that Hirst (1993), who once 
endorsed such a cognitive approach as Kohlberg's, now places greater emphasis 
on action and experience in the practice of morality. Hirst's reflection over time on 
the balance between cognition and behaviour - and perhaps affect - may indicate 
that O F S T E D and NCC, similarly, need to reassess the weight they give to these 
components. 
Third, Kohlberg (1984, p 340, my italics) justifies the exclusion of girls from his 
original 1950s sample as a decision "not to add the complicating issue of sex 
differences" to his work. Forty years later this explanation is unacceptable. 
Because of this, I believe that Gilligan (1982) is right to consider that his theory is 
gender blind since the thinking of many women is often scored at stage 3 (which 
may be the result of social and cultural conventions but that is not the point) 
making their 'progress' to higher stages difficult because at stage 4 they must 
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subordinate relationships to rules and, at stages 5 and 6. subordinate rules to 
universal principles of justice. Gilligan suggests that men and women - perhaps 
influenced by those same socio-culturat norms - often have different senses of 
their being in the world, with men founding their identity on their separateness 
from other people and women on their closeness to them. I think this distinction 
has particular relevance to a study of bereavement in which the loss of a 
relationship is patently evident. 
Fourth, there is validity in the complaint that likening moral decision-making to 
game-playing fails to recognize that a game is usually played voluntarily for 
recreation or amusement, with the focus often on winning rather than merely 
participating, and that each game has its own particular rules. Gilligan (1982) 
notes that traditional young girls' games such as hopscotch and skipping involve 
turn-taking - with less need for arbitration over rule disputes than in traditional 
young boys' games of marbles - and that, among girls, the continuation of a game 
is often subordinated to the continuation of a friendship. Overall, I think that 
comparing adult moral judgements to children's game-playing judgements fails to 
recognize the complexity of adult moral decision making (see also chapter 4). 
Finally and ironically, Kohlberg seems to commit the naturalistic fallacy he claims 
to avoid (1971) by drawing philosophical conclusions from empirical research and 
declaring that higher stages are only claims for the greater adequacy of forms of 
thinking, not of individual moral worth. He first says there is a logical "requirement 
that a higher moral stage be a philosophically more adequate way of reasoning 
about moral dilemmas than a lower stage" (1984. p 194) and then asserts that 
anyone who interviewed children about mora\ dilemmas and who followed them 
longitudinally in time would come to our six stages and no others (1984, p 195). 
These statements once led him to conclude that morally right preferences can 
logically be derived from a natural order of things, although he later disclaimed the 
moral superiority of later stages over earlier ones suggesting that "personal 
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endorsement of the philosophical adequacy claims of higher stages is a matter of 
choice" (1984, p 276). However, the links between cognitive development and 
age imply that reasoning improves with maturity, and since his examples of 
thinking at higher stages include Martin Luther King there can be little doubt that 
'higher* is also deemed to be 'better'. 
Justice 
Regarding the over-riding use of the principle of justice it is necessary, first, to 
recognize that the rating of social justice as morally more adequate than any other 
moral consideration is actually a theological and philosophical value position 
(Richards and Davison, 1992) which, even if supported by Judaic and Islamic 
thinking (Smith, 1986), does not necessarily prove justice to be paramount. 
Waterman (1988. p 292) notes that "each psychologist starts his or her analysis 
from different assumptions about what constitutes morality" and Kohiberg may be 
unwittingly reflecting the dominant Judaeo-Christian thinking of his culture. 
Second is the observation that "if everyone were to respond wholeheartedly to the 
need for care and love, justice would be unnecessary" (Moran, 1987, p 80) 
because the need to settle disputes mostly arises when inter-personal 
relationships fail. Although this is a criticism based upon an ideal which it may be 
impossible to live up to. it is useful to recognize that justice is often used as the 
ultimate arbitrator in order to settle, in impersonal, legalistic ways, matters which 
really require personal involvement and commitment. A third objection, arising 
from the first, is that the linking of justice with the notion of individual rights has 
encouraged "individualistic, rationalistic, and male biases in modern traditions" 
(Moran. 1987, p 81) so that moral ideals such as patriotism and loyalty have 
become reified. Although this is a criticism of the outcomes of justice rather than 
of Kohlberg's theory per se. since justice is the theory's raison d'etre, it is possible 
to argue that ignoble as well as noble attitudes and behaviour may be encouraged 
by Kohlberg's theory. 
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Finally, as Dunlop (1981) observes, many people would claim that they make 
moral decisions based on their general allegiance to *the good as a v^ole' rather 
than to certain of its essential manifestations such as the principle of justice or 
character traits of loving-kindness and conscientiousness. Although such ways of 
thinking may incorporate notions of justice, they are not solely driven by it and 
justice may be only one of several ways of thinking morally. In fact, moral 
concepts of benevolence, compassion, duty, honour, liberty and self-realization 
are neither explored nor acknowledged within Kohlberg's theory (Richards and 
Davison. 1992). 
Application of the theory 
Kohlberg (1984) accepts that, because of its original focus on young males, the 
theory may have limited application to adult life (Moran. 1987; Kitwood. 1990) but 
he does not acknowledge the impact of society's rules and expectations 
governing what children, young people or adults are permitted to do (Harre. 
1986). I think that a theory exploring the development of individual understanding 
of rules, consequences and duties should not ignore the ways in which the social 
context both encourages and restricts the growth of such understanding. 
Second. Gilligan et al (1990) argue that in real-life dilemmas adults find the voices 
of justice and care in complex dialogues as they increasingly recognize that a 
focus on justice alone can blind to relationship issues (see also chapter 4). 
Caring, compassion and empathy are active forms of benevolence - requiring 
time, energy and sometimes material cost - while not bullying, injuring or imposing 
one's will upon another person are negative forms, taking little time or energy and 
making few demands. In this respect caring may be more strenuous than justice 
since the latter could, on occasions, choose non-involvement in an attempt at 
impartiality. 
Third, I agree with Gilligan (1982) that there is a need to move on discussions of 
moral development from cognitive reasoning about the principles of justice to 
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recognizing that care, responsibility, relationships and compassion are involved in 
living morally. However, Kohlberg (1984) asserts that, in this respect, her sense 
of 'moral' is different to his. His sense includes impartiality, universalizability and 
the willingness to come to an agreement while Gilligan's implies concern, 
responsibility and a willingness to communicate. Most people, he suggests, 
define the spheres of kinship, love, friendship and sex - particularly divorce and 
marriage - as personal decisions to be made rather than moral issues to be 
resolved. Her dilemmas, he argues, deal with "special obligations to family and 
friends" (p 231) and his do not. I think, therefore, that Kohlberg would not 
consider the real-life situation of responding to the death of a significant person to 
be a moral dilemma because (a) it involves inter-personal relationships and (b) 
issues of equity, equality and reciprocity are absent as one of the people to be 
considered (the deceased) cannot take part. 
Virtues, vices and social convention 
Kuhmerker (1975) separates a person's capacity to feel, reason and respond into 
the development of empathy, moral reasoning and problem-solving strategies. 
Since role-taking involves problem-solving as well as empathy, she suggests it 
may be both the link between these two processes as well as its common social 
manifestation. Hoffman (1979) also sees empathy as a vicarious affective 
response to others and a source of moral motivation. Carr (1991) offers a four-
fold classification of virtues but recognises that it is impossible "merely by 
reference to the name of a virtue" (p 197) to assign it to a particular category 
since, for example, courage may be either self-denying or not self-denying 
depending on the circumstances. 
Kohlberg. however, describes character traits such as honesty, service and self-
control as "a bag of virtues" (1980a. p 77) since he considers that virtues and 
vices are merely labels used by people to award praise or blame to others and 
are often not the way in which the labellers themselves think when making moral 
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decisions. This 'bag of virtues' approach, Kohlberg suggests, assumes that a 
virtue exists for every rule (eg: 'honesty' for rules of cheating and stealing). 
According to his theory, vices and virtues are only important at the conventional 
level (stages 3 and 4) where praise or blame enable identification of what is 
considered right and good. At the preconventional level (stages 1 and 2), they 
have no significance because intention is not important and, at the principled 
level, 'being honest' is less significant than action which creates a moral state of 
affairs. Turiel (1983) also distinguishes between convention and morality, 
describing 'convention' as arbitrary action which is relative to social contexts, such 
as family, school and peer groups, whereby children construct ideas about and 
recognize the expectations of the social world they live in (eg: dressing 
appropriately, being polite). 'Morality* refers to prescriptive judgements of welfare, 
rights and justice which are neither relative to nor defined by social contexts, and 
describe how people ought to relate to each other (eg: not bullying or doing harm 
to others). 
These distinctions may assist in clarifying the values that NCC (1993. p 4) says 
schools should include or reject. The document lists "moral absolutes" as: 
• telling the truth 
• keeping promises 
• respecting the rights and property of others 
• acting considerately towards others 
• helping those less fortunate and weaker than oneself 
• taking personal responsibility for one's actions 
• self-discipline. 
The document says that "school values should reject: bullying, cheating, deceit, 
cruelty, irresponsibility" and "dishonesty." 
Since these values are prescribed for the whole pupil age range some of the 
apparent ambiguities mentioned below may be due to writing a document aimed 
at both 5 and 18 year olds. For younger pupils acquiring and displaying such 
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moral behaviour may be likened to an initiation into useful habits (Peters, 1963), 
while for older pupils it should involve practical role-taking, increased autonomy 
and opportunities to experience conflict between relativism and absolutism in 
morality (Perry, 1970). The implementation of Hirst's (1974) suggestion, that the 
over-all framework of authority in school must provide firm external control at one 
end and opportunities for autonomy at the other, may explain some of the 
difficulties experienced by pupils transferring from primary to secondary schools 
because they usually move from an atmosphere of autonomy in a small school 
where they are the seniors to fimi control in a large school where they become 
the juniors again and are treated as such. Overall the NCC document seems to 
aim for the achievement of stage 4 by the age of 16 which, as I shalUlater. also 
conforms with Kohlberg's (1980b) own aims for the same age group. 
However, the 'moral absolutes* and preferred behaviour in the NCC document 
involve differing issues in definitions of morality. Truth-telling and promise-
keeping may be seen as virtues, or as examples of prescribed types of behaviour 
within deontological theory, or as significant according to the outcome that they 
promote from a consequential viewpoint. In any case they depend on specific 
situations for validity because to refrain from telling the truth or keeping a promise 
may sometimes avoid embarrassment and pain or even give pleasure to those 
involved. They are therefore only prima facie obligatory and may be over-ridden 
by another moral rule with a higher priority. Acting considerately towards others 
and helping those less fortunate and weaker than oneself are virtues of character 
which advocate good or right behaviour without describing its content. While 
'acting consideratel/ may be an example of active benevolence, if prescribed (as 
in this document) it may become more a matter of appropriate behaviour without 
any commitment to an ideal or feeling towards the person concerned. Self-
discipline could be a character trait requiring constant vigilance but, since it relies 
on internal interpretation, one person may perceive it to be a mere social 
convention (not to be late for lessons) while another may regard it as a binding 
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religious obligation (to fast through Lent/Ramadan). Neither examples are moral 
absolutes in the same sense as the categorical imperative. 
Although respect for people's rights and property are both principles, property-
respect implies negative benevolence (not stealing or breaking something) while 
respect for a person's rights is ambiguous. Although it implies Kohlberg's stage 6 
perspective of equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human 
beings, it may mean avoiding conflict rather than furthering their well-being. 
Taking responsibility for one's actions reflects, likewise, Kohlberg's stage 6 
perspective and is active self-appraisal. Finally, the vices (bullying, cheating, 
deceit, cruelty, irresponsibility and dishonesty) describe negative duties regarding 
behaviour although they seem to express a range of values such as respect for 
rules, authority, trust, contract, people - and perhaps animals. 
This list of virtues and principles recognizes the humanity of everyone we meet in 
prescribing respect and courtesies due or owed to them but it is not a coherent 
scheme of moral development. By focusing on behaviour to adopt or avoid -
which may seem necessary because, in practice, this is usually what causes 
offence - the concepts and beliefs that pupils hold and their feelings and reasons 
for holding them are overshadowed. While it is certainly easier to control pupils' 
behaviour than their feelings and thoughts, if the emphasis remains only on 
behaviour the broader principle of education will be lost. Happily The Framework 
for Inspection of Schools (OFSTED. 1994b, p 86). although ambiguous 
elsewhere, seems to recognize this difficulty in its amplification of evaluation 
criteria: 
Moral development is concerned with pupils' ability to make judgements about 
how to behave and act and the reasons for such behaviour. It requires 
knowledge and understanding and includes questions of intention, motive and 
attitude. 
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The role of schools in moral development: moral atmosphere and individual 
development 
Most teachers are not fully aware that they must deal with issues of moral 
education, that they have no clear views on the subject, and that they have never 
had any training or education in it. (Kohlberg, 1980a. p 18) 
Kohlberg (1980b) sees schools as agents of social change because they are 
intermediaries, as stage 4 or 5 societies, between the family and society. 
Although they resemble families in their personal focus, schools are also complex, 
rule-governed and democratic, like society and government. They are really 
impersonal organizations stressing competition and achievement, teaching 
respect for general and impartial rules and encouraging the pursuit of collective 
goals. Schools also offer an opportunity to learn the language, symbols and 
information not so easily encountered elsewhere that are necessary for an 
understanding of objects, ideas, situations, hypothetical dilemmas, laws, customs, 
and socio-cultural knowledge. In 1980 Kohlberg expressed a retrenchment to 
stage 4 goals as the end of American civic education since he believed that 
unless people leave high school (aged 17) with the interests and motivations of 
stage 4 present, they are unlikely to undertake positions of participation and 
public responsibility later in life. What schools and schooling offer is intentional 
intervention by certain adults in the lives of children and young people in order to 
promote and encourage certain skills, knowledge and behaviour. 
The hidden curriculum of a school often indicates its 'moral atmosphere' 
(Kohlberg, 1986) which includes its governing moral norms and its sense of 
solidarity, care or community. A positive moral atmosphere which provides pupils 
with conditions for discussion, consideration of other people's viewpoints, a sense 
of power and participation in making rules and the feeling that existing rules are 
fair can have a significant effect on determining moral behaviour (Kohlberg. 
1984). However, little congruity exists in many schools between teacher and pupil 
norms on, for example, such issues as cheating. Pupils often hold counter-norms 
which are unacknowledged - although implicitly supported by teachers - and 
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perceive these to be the natural consequences of teacher emphasis on 
competitive achievement. Since at stages 5 and 6 people recognize that 
cheating breaks the social contract and that justice requires that everyone should 
be allowed to cheat if one person can do so, Kohlberg (1980a) suggests that it 
should not be treated as a genuine moral issue among young children until they 
have developed their own values on the matter. 
Teachers who are conventional in their moral reasoning (stages 3 and 4) often 
focus on conforming behaviour in children and use virtues to describe social 
conventions (being clean, polite or tidy) which are not moral issues. Since 
Kohlberg argues that the precondition for moral conflict is the human capacity for 
role-taking or being empathic, most social situations are not moral ones "because 
there is no conflict in role-taking between the expectations of one person and 
another" (1980a, p 49). I endorse this view and believe that pupils' sense of 
moral value will be demeaned if teachers force them into behavioural conformity 
(wearing school uniform) while failing to show moral concern for matters of 
personal importance (death of a pet) or events in society (local bank raid). 
Most schools do not encourage equal liberty and consent of the governed 
(Kohlberg. 1980b) but rather expect academic competition and rule conformity. 
Kohlberg advocates a 'just community* (1986) alternative school to counter this 
whereby, through role-taking, pupils have responsible social participation in the 
running of their institutions. Since it has been found that pupils with extensive 
peer-group participation advance more quickly through Kohlberg's moral stages 
than do those who are isolated from such activities (ig80a). this approach could 
encourage moral development. The social isolation that many schools 
encourage, often by omission because of their protectiveness and cultural 
selectivity (Hirst, 1974). could be addressed through pupil role-taking and 
involvement in the local and national community. 
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Gardner, Hendrick, Hamlyn and Piaget have already acknowledged (see chapter 
1) that there is a distinction to be made between unguided experience and guided 
transmission of knowledge, between the accomplishments of pre-school years 
and out-of-school experience and fomnal school work. In the case of secondary 
school pupils, for example, attendance at school (without considering holidays) 
may involve 35 out of 168 hours in a week and if 56 hours on average are spent 
in sleep, 77 hours are still available for other 'learning' activities involving family, 
friends, peer and social groups, books, magazines, newspapers, television, films, 
videos, games and sport, hobbies, travel, youth clubs, discos and places of 
worship. Many social conventions of etiquette, table manners and appropriate 
dress are unconsciously learnt at home or elsewhere by observation of role 
models and. even if such conventions are affected by teachers who according to 
NCC (1993. p 8) "imply values by the way they ... dress, [and] the language they 
use," since these are arbitrary rather than prescribed morality, they should not be 
considered important examples of moral development. 
Moran (1987. p 11) argues that we need a clear distinction between schooling 
and education "otherwise the schoolteacher is asked to carry an impossible 
burden of moral education" and Kohlberg (1980b) even suggests that the ability of 
educators to promote participation on moral issues depends upon them reaching 
a principled level of moral judgement themselves (stage 5). Although Moran is 
referring to American schooling, his critique also holds true for the British 
educational system since schools - and teachers by implication - are usually 
blamed when young people fail to meet certain standards in employment or moral 
behaviour - as if parents (to name the most apparent influence in a young 
person's life) have no input at all. 
The move by government to have O F S T E D inspect the moral and spiritual 
development of pupils reflects an optimistic view that schools can significantly 
'promote' this kind of development. Moran (1987, p 11) observes that "other kinds 
of teaching, such as parental teaching or job apprenticing or friendly counsel. 
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must ... be judged as strange or lesser forms of teaching" in comparison with 
schooling although "teaching is something every human being can do for 
another." O F S T E D (1994c, 6) records educators' recognition of the balance 
between school and non-school influences and states that spiritual, moral, social 
and cultural development "is influenced by the home and wider society, both of 
which could negate all the good that a school does." It also suggests that schools 
might get credit for what they had not done as well as "get little credit for having 
achieved a great deal." and Tritter's (1992) conclusion that religious schools 
produce students with stronger and more uniform attitudes towards religion and 
morality than non-religious schools. Is significant in this respect. 
Provision for morai and spiritual deveiopment in schools 
Inspecting the provision that schools make for the promotion of moral 
development of pupils places a burden upon teachers that no other profession 
faces. O F S T E D (1994c, 9) notes that: 
a society which Is overly critical of teachers ... cannot then expect those same 
teachers and their schools to exert huge influence over behaviour and morality. 
Since it is evident that schools (buildings or institutions) cannot teach people, it 
must be teachers (people) that do so. whether individually or jointly, and through 
both the visible and the hidden curriculum. Not even parents are inspected 
regarding how they promote the moral and spiritual development of their children, 
and neither are religious institutions nor places of worship. The two related 
assumptions are (a) that schooling is about moral development and (b) that 
teachers (as adults in charge of children) can reasonably be expected to teach -
or promote - the development of pupils at school, whether through acts of 
collective worship, pastoral care. Religious Education or the ethos of the school. 
Their provision of such experiences are then, by implication, assessed as 'better* 
or 'worse' than some other standard by colleagues, parents and O F S T E D 
inspectors. 
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Forms of assessment reflect several of the ways of viewing development 
discussed in chapter one. Evaluative assessment, by considering the extent to 
which leaming opportunities are effective, focuses on the process of development 
as well as its content. Formative assessment, by viewing the achievement made 
so far with a view to encouraging further leaming. focuses on the present situation 
in the light of the (recent) past. Diagnostic assessment, through examining 
exactly what has or has not been learned, focuses on specific details of 
development such as whether or not certain intellectual learning has occurred and 
generally pays less attention to physical development (as this is considered to 
constitute maturation) or emotional development - except in the context of 
discussions of morality where, for example, feelings of guilt or responsibility may 
be expected. Summative assessment, which considers overall achievement at 
the end of a period of time, focuses on the end-state of development. 
Furthermore, development may be assessed according to criteria set for everyone 
(which is how religious theories view moral development) or according to the 
norm reached by most people (which is in line with psychological and social 
thinking). Criteria assessment may be seen as having higher standards than 
norm assessment since an ideal, rather than reality, is described. In matters of 
moral development teachers are often caught in a dilemma of expecting criteria-
set standards (keeping promises, telling the truth, respecting people and property) 
while acknowledging the normal standards that people, including pupils, regularly 
display. 
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Morai development of teachers, pupils and society 
... no teacher trained in any established academic discipline, and skilled in 
teaching it, is thereby knowledgeable about either the nature of nnoraJ problems 
and their solution or the best ways of carrying out nrwral education. 
(Hirst. 1974, p 112) 
Teachers' own moral development is not, of course, measured or assessed since, 
like the assessment of pupils' moral development, this would be considered 
"intrusive" (NCC. 1993, p 9). However the assumption that teachers can 
'promote' moral development in their pupils - either because they are older, wiser 
or better educated - seems to imply that moral development is a natural thing 
which, given 'normal and suitable conditions' will flourish (see chapter 1). There is 
a conflict of attitude here, then, not often recognized. If schools (and of course by 
this we mean teachers) are considered to be merely providing the right or natural 
conditions to promote moral development, there cannot be any dispute whether 
those conditions are 'better' or 'worse' because what is 'natural' cannot also be 
assessed as 'better* than another. 
If teachers do not need to be assessed for their standard of moral development, it 
must be because their standard is tacitly deemed acceptable for promoting 
development in those younger than themselves. This assumption probably 
derives from the traditional model prevailing in most areas of the curriculum 
whereby knowledge is transmitted from the 'knowledgeable' (the teacher) to the 
'unknowledgeable (pupils). However, this model does not work so well regarding 
personal behaviour and moral attitudes because teachers and pupils probably 
have different notions of goals in life and acceptable risk (Leaman. 1995). 
Teachers mainly aspire to middle class attitudes - at least with regard to delaying 
gratification and planning for the future because that is what their job is concerned 
with - while pupils struggle with concepts of who they will become and how they 
will become employed in a society (and world) in which previously held markers of 
apprenticeship, employment and status are no longer reliable. Pupils can often 
distinguish between areas of knowledge in which teachers are experts and those 
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in which they are not. and while liking and respecting them, they recognise that 
teachers are not specialists in moral attitudes and behaviour - merely holders of 
opinions which are not absolute (Leaman. 1995). 
The present government would be well-advised to take note of this. It would not 
then insist that teachers seek to reinforce conventtonal morality as part of the 
traditional cuniculum as though it were just another subject which could be 
taught... in the same way as the subjects in the National Curriculum. 
(Leaman, p 46) 
Following on from this, we must ask whether the standards of behaviour 
described in government documents (truth-telling, keeping promises) are criteria 
or norm descriptions for both - or either? - private and public behaviour. Do all 
people, particularly adults, habitually behave in these ways or are they ideals that 
government (and other authority figures) would have all members of society 
aspire to since, it should be noted, ERA (1988. my italics) refers to education that 
promotes the development of "pupils at the school and ofsociet/l 
Moral values In the school setting 
... it is no straightforward factual statement to say of someone that he or she is 
immature or undeveloped ... morally. It may, though it need not necessarily do 
so, be a way of signifying a lack of conformity with socially accepted standards. 
(Hamlyn, 1975, pp 36-7) 
Although there is a distinction between social convention and morality, it is not 
always apparent in the way teachers and pupils talk and behave. While ways of 
eating, speaking and dressing and of treating classmates may all be ternied 'bad' 
or 'wrong' by a teacher, there is a great difference between eating with one's 
mouth open and causing another person sorrow or harm. Even when behaviour 
such as bullying is correctly identified as not moral, there is a hesitancy to name a 
pupil (or adult) as immoral or morally immature since, in other areas of life, he or 
she may behave according to different (and better) standards. 
It is obvious that all teachers at all times do not tel! the truth or keep their 
promises: it is an impossible expectation. End of term reports often use 
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educational euphemisms ("could do better") to obscure the reality of lack of 
progress in diagnostic terms and methods of 'maintaining order* or 'discipline' in 
classrooms may involve sarcasm, threats or punishment which do not respect 
people or keep promises. Furthermore, within teaching, the unnatural ratio of one 
adult to an average of thirty young people also implicitly conveys a moral 
message of superiority-inferiority: the thirty must obey the one; the teacher-adult 
knows more-better than pupils-children. Even in class discussions ostensibly 
designed to enable young people to give their opinions, teachers may be more 
concemed with encouraging everyone to speak than with addressing any of the 
points raised. This may give pupils the impression that their opinions are not 
worthwhile or important (Leaman, 1995). 
Since school attendance is not voluntary for pupils between 5 and 16. they must, 
morally speaking, be attending by force a place which purports to care for their 
(mostly future) welfare and good by reinforcing (in the ongoing present) concepts 
of hierarchy and power. For example, a successful or good teacher can never, by 
popular definition, be one who cannot 'keep control' although she or he may know 
certain subjects thoroughly and have a care and concern for young people. Thus, 
teaching reveals itself to be implicitly about 'keeping order' by maintaining a 
hierarchy of adult power over children and young people which must convey 
moral values. Schools are institutions that ostensibly provide trained young 
people for junior employment roles in society but they are slow to change in 
response to social trends, and society mainly expects its schools to produce 
young people who respect authority and abide by existing codes of public morality 
- not ones who question and challenge the status quo. 
In reviewing its approach to the inspection of the provision for moral development. 
O F S T E O (1994c. 3) admits that it is aware of research such as Kohlberg's but 
believes: 
... there is no workable basis for a hierarchy in the evaluation of attitudes and 
values and that relatively little is known about how children leam and develop 
values, attitudes and personal qualities. This lack of knowledge gives greater 
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credibility to the present pragmatic approach in which inspection and dialogue 
are used as a basis for going fonvard. 
In Britain any need for such a theory as Kohlberg's may be disputed since the 
segregation of religion and ethics in American schools - which probably helped to 
rationalize Kohlberg's theory of moral development - does not exist. However, 
educators frequently use classroom discussion of ethics in subjects such as R E , 
English literature, history and science to promote the kind of cognitive conflict that 
Kohlberg believes promotes movement to higher stages by improving justice-
focused reasoning. Furthermore, even a very general acceptance of the 
existence of stages of justice reasoning means we must re-evaluate the role of 
teachers in the moral development of their pupils since Kohlberg's studies reveal 
that, on average, longitudinal subjects take more than five years to move one 
stage, and that many adults do not reach the highest levels of moral judgement 
and even 'stay* at stages 2 or 3 (Rest. 1979). It seems unreasonable, therefore, 
to expect teachers to promote 'higher' forms of moral reasoning, feeling or 
behaviour in children and young people which they have not reached themselves. 
This difficulty may be even greater when pupils encounter an experience which 
teachers have yet to go through, such as the death of a parent or sibling - and 
Kohlberg's stage 7 hints at the magnitude of this kind of experience. However, 
the perceived need to hide one's feelings within the teaching profession in order 
to cope with the pace and stress of the work often prevents teachers from being 
as helpful as they can when death occurs - particularly through disaster or crisis 
(Leaman, 1995). 
Bereaved people are likely to think about the cause and effect of death, to 
attribute meaning to such events and to respond to the emotional challenge of 
bereavement with altered (although usually temporary) behaviour (Parkes. 1987; 
Worden, 1991). A child of ten may have thought more about the meaning of 
death and the feelings aroused by it than an adult of forty. In wishing its parent 
were still alive, a pupil may come to value life and the enjoyment of people's 
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company more than keeping social conventional rules (eg: wearing school 
uniform). When death occurs to their peers, young people may even revise their 
notions of acceptable risk in life, since in the case of traffic accidents particularly, 
safety rules and taking care may have proved useless. 
Having a changed perspective on the frailty of life may provoke in a teenager a 
reaction against the apparent meaningless of education which requires eleven 
years to be devoted to scholastic study with the stated aim of improving adult 
employment prospects since the event of death is so unpredictable. Feeling 
angry, confused, depressed, guilty, lonely or sad and not knowing how long these 
feelings will last, or realizing they recur at anniversaries or certain times of the 
year, may make it difficult for a pupil to do schoolwork. study for exams or 
respond in socially appropriate ways to peers and teachers. And whether or not 
peers and teachers talk about any event which causes a pupil distress is itself a 
covert moral decision. Since sensitivity may be fostered by exposure to normal 
experiences such as bereavement, many educators and counsellors recognize 
that it is undesirable to shield children and young people from emotional situations 
- although, of course, it is impossible to force teachers to talk about traumatic 
events that affect pupils, even if they were present themselves (eg: Hillsborough 
football disaster). 
The essence of Kohlberg's theory of moral development is that an appreciation of 
moral principles such as the value of life ultimately prevails over all other values 
and that dissatisfaction with the adequacy of one stage initiates movement to a 
higher one. While not endorsing Kohlberg's (1984) *hard' stage analysis (see 
chapter 4) and recognizing the very real criticism of a model based, initially, upon 
the thinking of males and its stress on justice rather than care in relationships 
(Gilligan. 1982). I believe that more refined, complex and internalized thinking is a 
feature of moral maturity, often described as the "superficial-to-profound 
progression" (Gibbs, 1991, p 91). I suggest that the experience of bereavement 
for a child or young person can be one source of the cognitive conflict which 
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Kohlberg espouses as central to moral development, and that this dissonance 
occurs when the death itself and/or the ensuing feelings are explained or 
perceived in terms v^ i^ch challenge current levels of reasoning. 
I propose the following forms of thinking, feeling and behaving as indicative of 
individual moral development related to death and bereavement, whether in or out 
of school. 
« Moving beyond socio-conventional beliefs concerning one's own and other 
people's morality. Acting in ways that are moral but not necessarily 
conventional; not only refraining from harm but also being actively benevolent 
and taking time and effort to help others. 
« Recognizing that some values (eg: keeping promises) may be situation 
specific while others (eg: respecting living things) are not. 
• Asking not only 'What should I do?' but also 'What sort of person should I be?'; 
realizing that not only actions but beliefs, intentions, feelings and qualities of 
character also constitute morality. Developing and holding to one's own ideas 
of 'right' and 'good' even if they are unconventional (eg: euthanasia). 
« Questioning the moral values of religious traditions, including one's own. in 
order to clarify the links between moral thinking, feeling and action and belief 
in a divine power, and beliefs and practices of institutional religion (eg: 
heaven, judgement). 
• Understanding and/or reconciling conflicts in moral situations between the 
principles of justice and care, and the variance in one's own life between 
broadly held beliefs and concepts and situation-specific action. 
« Balancing the personal perspective (own feelings, beliefs and actions, 
personal qualities) with the inter-personal, social and global one; seeing 
oneself in a broader context and responding to this bigger picture. 
In Part Two I shall explore how far these forms are apparent in any of my 
respondents. 
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CHAPTER THREE: SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMEMT 
Introduction 
This chapter continues to explore human development from the perspective 
described as 'spiritual'. I compare well-established and specifically religious 
meanings of the concept 'spirituality' with more recent psychological ones, and 
note that spirituality has long been seen as both the essence of humanity and the 
motive for its action. The particular thinking of Christianity regarding the event of 
death and some commonalities between religious-spiritual and bereavement 
experiences are suggested, and four interlinked concepts of 'spirituality' are 
outlined and then further explored within a model of three elements related to 
school life. 
The chapter reinforces the recognition already made in chapter two that although 
schools can promote spirituality (and morality) as fundamental self-exploration 
through the arts, attitudes to work and life, and practical activities to help other 
people, unexpected life experiences of illness and bereavement may be more 
devastating and enduring means of spiritual and moral development for some 
pupils. 
Development of concepts of spirit In religion, history, psychology and 
education 
Spirituality, as an area of study, must be capable of definition. If it has no 
conceptual limits, effectively it means nothing. ... a cursory glance at the 
different kinds of writing which appear under the label 'spirituality', whether 
popular or more scholarly, reveals that it may cover history, psychology and 
theology as well as devotional works. It appears that spirituality is one of those 
subjects whose meaning everyone claims to know until they have to define it. 
(Sheldrake, 1991. p 32) 
It is difficult to exactly capture the sense or meaning of concepts used in previous 
centuries - whether or not the word is the same today or can be easily translated -
since ideas are shaped in response to events of the time and language changes 
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in response to new ideas. Today it may be difficult to understand the beliefs and 
ideas of people of previous eras because of such things as different perspectives 
on community-individual life and views about the world and the place of men and 
women in it. In addition, we cannot know how far the concept we think we have 
understood and assigned to a particular time and place was firmly established or 
still evolving then. Although naming concepts and dating events enables writers 
to impose an order on the past, things cannot have been seen in the same way by 
people of the time and I have been more aware of these difficulties when 
discussing the development of ideas about spirituality than about morality. 
One particular difficulty lies in the fact that morality is more readily identified 
through forms of behaviour while spirituality is concerned with exploring the inner 
nature and resources of a human being and their potential or actual relationship to 
other or higher forms and forces. This nature and these resources have the ability 
to transcend, reflect, reason, imagine, empathise and plan, and such abilities 
have enabled individuals to think about the cause and purpose of all being 
including their own lives, the significance of certain experiences, places and 
events, their relationship with all other life forms and the purpose and meaning of 
living, suffering and death. Many of these forms of reflection have evolved within 
philosophy and religion and, within western thinking, Christianity has had a 
dominant influence upon the development of the concept and use of the word 
'spiritual.' 
Despite these difficulties, having a sense of how notions of spirituality have 
developed enables us to understand the complexity of the word today and to see 
that our present thinking is part of an ongoing re-definition of the concept. Recent 
analysis of British uses of the word 'spirituality' (Hull. 1993) shows that the term is 
no longer exclusively associated with religion. In Hull's sample of 252 written 
examples on 3rd August 1993 the greatest number (about 111) are contained 
within definitions that reflect a psychological perspective and the next greatest 
(about 84) have a religious association. 
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• Psychological: quality of an individual or an aspect of personality; way of 
perceiving nature and life; characteristic of a tribe, people or nation; intuitive 
or mysterious. 
• Religious: characteristic of a particular theological emphasis within Christianity; 
a particular sect or movement; equivalent to religion or the essence of religion; 
contrary to secular; linked with morality; private or inward; out of the ordinary, 
not mundane, unworldly, not materialistic or physical; linked or contrasted with 
sexuality; transcendent; related to or different from the occult, witchcraft and 
astrology. 
These perspectives are two of six I have compiled from the 19 categories Hull 
creates and the other four, in decreasing size, are: 
• Social (a trend in society or culture) 
«Artistic (art. music, literature; vitality, vivacity and creativity) 
«Secular (of this world, political) 
«Unusual (luxury, spicy, exotic). 
Within education, also, a similar redefining of the word 'spiritual' is evident today. 
Whether or not the Education Act of 1944 used the term 'spiritual' to carefully 
indicate the priorities that should pervade the whole educational process or simply 
to avoid dissension (Priestley. 1985b). its use became established in The 
Newsom Report (1963) and Curriculum: 11-16 (1977) before reiteration in ERA 
(1988). Although the verbs 'contribute' (1944) and 'introduce' (1977) seemed to 
indicate that, along with other areas, education assists in - but does not wholly 
provide for - spiritual development, ERA (1988) adopted a different view by using 
'promote.' a more specific verb, to describe the perceived role of the curriculum in 
this developmental process. This change may be because the demise of 
traditional (Christian) religion in Britain has left education as the main or only 
common form of communication of values and ideas experienced by the pupils 
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who will be tomorrow's adult citizens. In this way education has been elevated as 
the promoter of spiritual development in order to undertake what religious 
institutions were once deemed to do and. later in this chapter. I shall consider how 
far education is able to promote this form of development for all its pupils. 
Within Hull's (1993) analysis two trends emerge regarding contemporary usage of 
the term 'spiritual': the ongoing traditional link with some aspect of religion, 
whether Christianity or not, and a growing tendency to link 'spiritual' with 'human' 
in the broadest sense, expressed through such forms as relationships and 
creativity. The first trend, making up 50 of Hull's examples, is consistent with 
philosophical-religious perspectives while the second trend, containing more than 
half the total number, is in line with more recent psychosocial views of spirituality 
as synonymous with human characteristics and personality, or the intrinsic quality 
or essence of an individual. This broader picture of spirituality and spiritual 
development seems to be reflected in NCC's claim that: 
The term [spiritual development] needs to be seen as applying to something 
fundamental in the human condition which is not necessarily experienced 
through the physical senses and/or expressed through everyday language. It 
has to do with relationships with other people and. for believers, with God. 
(1993. p 2) 
Such a description moves beyond the two views expressed in Curriculum: 11-16 
(1977. p ii) that spirituality is concerned with "the awareness a person has of 
those elements in existence and experience which may be defined in terms of 
inner feelings and beliefs" and/or "with everything in human knowledge or 
experience that is connected with or derives from a sense of God or Gods." Not 
only does NCC (1993. p 2) suggest that spiritual development applies to 
"something fundamental in the human condition" - whether or not this is divinely 
inspired and controlled - but it enlarges the description to include "relationships 
with other people" which, as I shall show below, has always been a hallmark of 
both morality and spirituality. 
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In response to the suggestion that spirituality is mainly concerned with the 
'inwardness' of a person. Thatcher (1991) declares that "children who learn that to 
be religious is to draw into themselves have been sold a profound 
misunderstanding" (p 25) because spirituality is really about the "between-ness of 
persons" (1993. p 215). Hull (1996. p 43) also believes spirituality is evident when 
"people are inspired to live for others." (See later in this chapter for further 
discussion of this issue.) However, the NCC document acknowledges that for 
believers spirituality is mainly concerned with the age-old concept of a relationship 
with, and response to, God. 
Reiigion: theories of duaiism, teleology and social conceptualizations of 
experiences 
Debates about the cause and direction of human development have particularly 
encouraged religious views of human nature as internally divided. Since everyday 
realities of cruelty, suffering and hardship challenge the belief that God or a divine 
power both creates and directs the development of humanity, explanations to 
account for this have tended to view our perfect potential as thwarted by one 
weak part - whether the body, mind or emotions - and monotheistic religions such 
as Judaism, Christianity and Islam have long represented a particular form of 
nurture that can overcome these natural defects. Consequently, it has been easy 
to view a growing awareness of imperfection or the formal entry into a particular 
religion as representing the beginning of a new life and to see continuing in this 
'new' or 'other' way as steps or stages of progress. Thus, debates regarding 
nature-nurture and continuity-discontinuity have also developed within general 
spiritual discourse and. within Christianity, there have also been ongoing attempts 
to resolve theories of dualism and teleology originating within Platonism and 
Aristotelianism. 
Ideas that a mystical union can be achieved by renouncing everyday affairs and 
activities and denying or punishing the body probably derive from Platonic belief in 
101 
the illusory nature of this world and the permanent nature of the word of forms and 
ideas. Judaeo-Christian views of humanity as 'fallen' have enhanced the idea 
that, until freed by death, the spirit arbitrates between the mind's desire to 
contemplate these forms and the body's desire to remain rooted in physical 
affairs. St Paul's distinction between the 'spiritual person' whose mind, will, 
thoughts and body are under the influence of the Spirit of God and the 'natural 
person' who is not - although originally delineating two attitudes to life or two ways 
of living - also helped to formulate a belief that the abstract spirit is separate from 
other things such as the body, the mind, material things and worldly affairs. 
Aristotle, however, reasoned that the natural world is the real one. constructed in 
such a way that all the objects in it move or change in a purposeful, teleological 
pattern. Many of the theories of development mentioned in chapter one derive 
from his argument that acorns always grow in to oak trees and children into adults 
- never Into anything else - because such growth is towards predictable, 
normative results. Even apparent contradictions are examples of a more general 
thesis of purposefulness pervading natural events, whereby failure to develop as 
expected is due to unnatural interference (damage, illness or death). 
Contemporary psychological understanding of the soul in teleological terms of 
function and purpose is evident in this thinking, with the essential quality (or spirit) 
of a person described in 'this-world' rather than Platonic 'other-world' terms. 
In addition to providing a conceptual framework for the resolution of such debates, 
religion can also be seen as a form of social conceptualization of individual 
experiences. Orthodox religious beliefs have been formulated to understand and 
explain as 'religious' the various experiences of life, as well as to give expression 
to common human needs for love, security, affirmation and sharing (Bradford. 
1995). Such feelings and experiences, which have been termed pre-personal 
religion by Elkind (1971), are believed by Hardy (1979) to have developed through 
natural selection in biological evolution because of their useful survival value for 
individuals. Some of these experiences such as feeling somebody or something 
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near at times of sorrow, stress or despair often occur after the death of a loved 
one. although they have not always been accepted as orthodox within traditional 
Christianity (Hay. 1987). 
In the next sections I will explore how some parts of society - and contemporary 
educational documents in particular - have come to describe a term that originally 
had only religious and theological meanings in ways that are also generic, secular 
and psychological. In addition I hope to uncover the fundamental links between 
spirituality and death and to explore the significance of beliefs, feelings and 
experiences about death for spiritual development. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVES WITHIN 
REUGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES OF SPIRmJALITY 
It is indisputable that orthodox Christianity in Britain has suffered a decline in 
popularity (Davie, 1994), but while some see this as fatal to the morality and 
spirituality of the nation, others perceive it to be indicative of rethinking and 
responding to present needs. In Britain today people are more aware than ever 
before of the global religious heritage existing outside as well as within Christianity 
as information about people of other races and religions pervades and influences 
such things as international and national media reports, local community relations 
and R E in schools. However, since Christianity has always been a syncretic 
religion, taking from and adapting to the culture of the indigenous populations it 
encounters and assimilating and restructuring festivals, people and places to its 
purposes - although it would be foolhardy to suggest that this process has always 
been peaceful - it is possible to see how some of the contemporary Christian 
ideas about 'spirit' derive from the dualistic soul ideas preceding the establishment 
of the unitary soul concept in ancient Greece. 
Bremmer (1983) considers that there are similarities between the Vedic soul belief 
in India and the early Greek concepts of psyche, or free soul which, within pre-
103 
Homeric thinking, was part of a widespread belief in a dual soul comprised of a 
free soul and a body soul. The free soul was that vital part without which a person 
cannot survive and, although it represented the whole person, it had no 
psychological attributes, and was only active when it left the body temporarily 
during swoons or forever at death to go to Hades. The body soul, which was 
considered only to be active during an individual's waking life, was further divided 
into a life soul and an ego soul: the former was associated with the verb psychein 
(to blow or to breathe) since the act of breathing was linked with consciousness; 
and the latter was associated with major aspects of the personality (the source of 
emotions; actions of mind, thoughts or purpose; impulses of both mental and 
physical organs). 
By the end of the fifth century B C E this duality seems to have developed into a 
unitary notion of the soul, now widely accepted in western thought. Indivisible in 
itself and representing the real core of a person's being, the soul may 
nevertheless be separated from the body. Although 'soul' or 'spirit' are used 
interchangeably today to describe that part of us which we consider lives on after 
death, it is rare to describe, while we are living, the essential part of us as 'soul.' 
In other words, we more usually refer to the 'spirit' of someone living and to the 
'soul' of someone dead - except when, in evangelical Christian terms, there is an 
attempt to 'save the soul' of a living person in order to rescue them from unbelief. 
A later Platonic description of the soul as tripartite (reason, spirit and appetite) 
introduced two ideas that also have influence today. First, that the 'spirit' is a 
disposition or strength of character which, through the development of wisdom, 
supports reason in ruling appetite. This idea foreshadows the modern 
psychological view that spirituality is an aspect of personality or character, 
embodying upright principles, or is the essence of an individual. The second 
suggestion - already implied by the first - is that desire or appetite, rather than 
reason, may rule people against their will, as St Paul recognized: "I do not 
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understand what I do. For what I want to do I do not do. but what I hate I do" 
(Romans 7:15. NIV). 
There may be some links between aspects of the concept of 'the soul' mentioned 
above and concepts of the spirit* in Christian thinking and writing of the early and 
patristic eras. 'Soul' once conveyed the idea of the essential, active component of 
a person (whether conscious, unconscious or dead), the breath of life, and 
integrated emotions, thoughts and actions. It has gradually become synonymous 
with 'spirit.' the essential part of a person which sustains life and survives death. 
For example, in Matthew 27: 50 the (free) soul leaves the body at death (the word 
is translated as 'ghost' in KJV and 'spirit' in NIV), and in Luke 8: 55 (KJV) the (life) 
soul "came again" when Jesus restored a woman to life. In I Samuel 18: 1(KJV) 
both religious and psychological-holistic notions seem reflected in the belief that 
the (ego) soul is the vital or essential part of a person that can "knit" with that of 
another. 
Christianity is the only world religion concerned more with the death than the life 
of its founder because of St Paul's teaching about the significance of this event. It 
is possible to conjecture that guilt at being involved in Stephen's death led to a 
change in Paul and to his subsequent insistence on a positive outcome to the 
death of Jesus - on whose account Stephen had died - in terms of a changed life 
now and resurrection later both for Jesus and all who believe in him. Through his 
letters Paul also significantly shaped Christianity's doctrine regarding death itself. 
Judaism had moved from believing that nothing survived death to some sort of an 
expectation, probably influenced by the Maccabeean revolt, of resurrection of the 
body. Paul reconciled Judaic and Greek thinking by teaching that: the dead 
Jesus would return soon (1 Thessalonians 4:16); those who contemplate Jesus' 
death are given new life (Galatians 2:20); a link exists between sin and death and 
Jesus' own death (Romans 6:23); and Jesus's resurrection validates Paul's 
preaching and people's faith (1 Corinthians 15:13-14). 
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Whether or not we can accept that Christianity is founded upon Paul's 
bereavement experiences of guilt and resolution, it is impossible to avoid the 
profound effect of his teaching that all human death has been overcome by Jesus' 
death. Christianity's belief that the deceased believer is going to be 'with the Lord' 
may complicate the grieving process, and one of Robinson's (1977, pp 125-6) 
respondents (aged 47). epitomizes this conflict. Her father died when she was 
nearly 5 and she remembers not only her grief as "unutterable black emptiness of 
everything and everywhere" but also the social taboo on any reference to his 
name. 
One part of me found this morbid grief unreasonable, because my father was 
supposed to have gone to be with Jesus in heaven where everybody was 
happy and alt their questions were answered. ... If he was lucky enough to 
have been chosen to go and five with Jesus, I felt we should have been 
pleased for his sake, even though we missed him. 
In chapters 5 and 7 I shall consider in more detail how far Christianity's view of 
death affects the bereavement experience of children and young people brought 
up within its influence. 
Spirituality, religion and morality 
A connection, rather than a distinction, between spirituality and morality has long 
existed because of the belief that spiritual motives underlie moral behaviour. This 
link is first evident within early Christianity in the form of so-called pastoral ethics 
which emphasized morally correct behaviour. Based upon Judaism. Persian 
mystical religions and the teaching of Jesus, such an approach involved keeping 
the Ten Commandments, observing ritualistic practices such as baptism and 
following the divinely inspired teaching of Jesus. As already indicated. St Paul 
suggested that 'new* life in the Spirit of God produced changed attitudes towards 
other people and to life itself expressed in virtues such as love, peace, kindness, 
faithfulness, self-control (Galatians 5: 22-23), humility, gentleness and patience 
(Ephesians 4:2). Paul contrasted the 'new* life with the 'former' or 'other' life 
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containing vices to be avoided such as anger, theft, slander, sexual immorality, 
greed and drunkenness (Ephesians 4-5). 
NCC states (1993, p 2) that "the potential for spiritual development is open to 
everyone and is not confined to the development of religious beliefs or conversion 
to a particular faith" since limiting spiritual development to this kind of description 
would exclude the majority of pupils "who do not come from overtly religious 
backgrounds." This attempt at inclusivism which declares that everyone has a 
spiritual nature may, however, also foster exclusivism by its apparent delimiting of 
religious beliefs and faith. For example, while Christians, Muslims and Jews may 
acknowledge that many people find fulfilment and purpose in life outside a theistic 
framework, nevertheless they hold a belief that God has chosen them as a special 
nation, faith community or as individuals for holiness. Similarly, although the 
Christian pastoral position recognizes that moral behaviour may occur among 
people not committed to a belief in God, it believes that the indwelling spirit of God 
provides the motive and basis for moral behaviour in a regular and systematic 
way. Evangelical Christians (Hughes, 1992) are critical of thinking which denies 
that spiritual development is a transformation by God, while many Muslims 
consider spiritual development to be "a movement of human beings from an 
egocentric fomi of life towards the divine or transcendental perfection" (The 
Islamic Academy. 1993, p 6). 
The British Humanist Association, on the other hand, welcomes both theistic and 
non-theistic interpretations of spirituality and stresses that the school "should not 
be biased" towards one or the other interpretation but concerned instead with the 
"shared reality" of all pupils (BHA, undated, pi). While agreeing with Christians 
that the spiritual dimension is "the highest part of the human personality," 
humanists consider that these qualities evolved naturally and are not the image of 
God implanted in humanity as Christians believe. 
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Hull's (1993. p 3) sample suggests that today people do not link "spirituality with 
morality as basic aspects of human life" any more than, say, with art, music or 
literature. The perception that morality can be driven or prompted by motives and 
beliefs other than religious or spiritual ones certainly reflects much British thinking 
(see chapter 2 and earlier in this one), although it is important to bear in mind that 
such thinking may not represent all faith communities. 
Perfect living and special experiences 
In seventeenth century Roman Catholic circles, particularly in France, so-called 
'spiritual theology* comprising ascetic theology (progress up to the beginning of 
passive contemplation) and mystical theology (subsequent stages up to mystical 
union with God) continued to expound the belief that the Christian life consists of 
stages towards perfection (Sheldrake, 1991) (see also chapter 4). By the early 
decades of the twentieth century however, this dualism seems to have devolved 
into a discontinuity-continuity debate represented by Tanquerey. who continued to 
believe in this division between mystical prayer and ordinary growth in the moral 
life, and Garrigou-Lagrange. who claimed that mystical prayer is available to all 
because the Christian life is united and continuous (Sheldrake, 1991). In time 
supporters of the view espoused by Garrigou-Lagrange used the term 'spiritual' 
instead of 'spiritual theology' as a better description of the study of the whole of 
this life. 
At about the same time there was great emphasis within the Protestant 
evangelical tradition on conversion, with adolescence identified as a significant 
crisis period ripe for this event. In America Starbuck (1901) and James (1901-
2/1960) responded to this phenomenon from a scientific-psychological standpoint, 
significantly contributing to contemporary beliefs that the spiritual realm is the 
essence of or a characteristic part of human beings that is natural and available to 
all. 
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Starbuck attempted to prove that there was "no event in the spiritual life which 
does not occur in accordance with immutable laws" (1901. p 3) and attributed the 
observable changes in behaviour and thinking in spiritual phenomenon to 
concurrent biological growth. Since conversion seemed to occur mainly among 
10-25 year-olds, he concluded that this was "a condensed form of adolescent 
development" (p 405). He considered that the many motives which prompt a 
conversion experience such as fear, remorse and response to teaching or 
example indicate increased social awareness and personal aspirations to improve 
or change, often manifest in depression, restlessness or anxiety. Starbuck 
mentioned cases where an impulse to conversion "dropped out of thought and 
was revived later' (p 46). one example of which was caused by bereavement in a 
girl of 16 who wrote: 
When I was 10 years old mother died. I lost interest in everything; I fett dazed 
and lived in a dream until 16. when I attended revival. I had intense remorse. 
With tears came relief and joy; my whole life was changed from that hour. 
{p47) 
Contrary to Starbuck, however. I suggest that bereavement rather than 
conversion was the most significant early experience in her life. The shock of her 
mother's death prevented her emotions and intellect from being used for any other 
purpose - such as responding to religious teaching - until she had sufficiently 
recovered from her loss, had completed puberty, and was old enough to 
understand the implications of institutional teaching about conversion. 
Starbuck suggested that spiritual phenomena, together with periods of 
carelessness and indifference when the body and mind recuperate from growth 
spurts, are typical of all development up until the age of about twenty-five, and 
that adult beliefs and attitudes of dependence, reverence and a sense of oneness 
with God develop from childhood notions of conformity, unconscious observance 
of religion, and personal rapport with a supernatural world and God. His ideas are 
relevant to Robinson's (1977) views on the experiences of childhood, to be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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James (1960) focused on two types of adult religious geniuses "subject to 
abnormal psychical visitations" (p 29) whose extreme examples, he believed, 
yielded "profounder information" (p 465). The healthy minded 'once born' see 
God as the animating spirit of a beautiful harmonious world, behold no evil in life 
and are content in it. while "sick souls ... who must be twice-born in order to be 
happy" (p 172) are subject to sudden conversion experiences. Although such 
either-or descriptions of people are inappropriate today in educational documents 
and even in many religious circles, I think his attempt to explain the tendency for 
some - but not all - people to be subject to religious-spiritual experiences such as 
conversion and mystical prayer begins to recognize the significance of different 
personalities as well as differing individual experiences such as shock, 
unhappiness and grief. James refers to a 'twice-born' man who, when aged 14, 
felt that his father's response to his brother's death prompted in him the origins of 
a divided spiritual self which, even in adult life, he continued to see as "this terrible 
second me" (p 173). However, the phenomenon of watching oneself as if another 
person is often experienced in the early phases of grief (Sanders, 1989) -
although it does not usually last a lifetime. 
James hypothesized that the 'more' with which we feel ourselves connected in 
religious experience is the subconscious continuation of our conscious life, 
whether existing in a personal God or as a stream of ideal tendency embedded in 
the external structure of the world. This view seems to vindicate the common 
feeling that the external power with which we are moved is both 'higher' and yet 
'linked' to us. both 'beyond' and 'within,' not only existing in its own right but also 
able to act for us when we embrace or unite with it in emotional and cognitive 
terms. 
The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) reinforced the views of Garrigou-
Lagrange and formally removed for Catholics the distinction between ordinary 
growth in the Christian life and the gifts of mystical prayer by declaring that all 
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Christians are called to one and the same holiness. Since the 1960s, both the 
Catholic and the Protestant Churches have been aware of an increasing interest 
in 'spirituality* by their members, with a shift away from reliance on a traditional 
body of knowledge, authority and tradition towards a greater reflection on human 
experience as an authentic source of divine revelation. Schneiders (1989, p 678) 
notes that the term 'spirituality.' once "an almost exclusively Roman Catholic 
term," is now being used to refer to lived experience (see later in this chapter) and 
is being adopted by religious and non-religious movements to refer to something 
that is experienced as similar by them all. although hard to actually define. 
Apart from the established churches, other religio-philosophical sources have also 
contributed to the current idea of holistic, experiential, experimental spirituality. 
The hippy and counter-cultures of the 1960s and 1970s showed a desire for new 
forms of community and relatedness together with a rejection of the status-quo 
and deference for authority. Interest is now being legitimately displayed in the 
occult and magical, and new religious movements have emerged in the west this 
century: Church of Christ Scientist. Spiritualism. Theosophy. Rastafarianism, and 
Jehovah's Witnesses. Notions of religious 'truth' have probably been challenged 
everywhere as increased international travel, communication and immigration 
have brought together unfamiliar cultures and beliefs, and knowledge of eastern 
mystical traditions such as Sufism, Zen and yoga have influenced western 
thinking regarding ways of life, attitudes towards the body and possessions. In 
addition, postmodernism has undoubtedly influenced contemporary views of both 
morality and spirituality with its view of the ephemeral, fragmentary, chaotic and 
discontinuous nature of life (Harvey, 1989). 
The emphasis by James and Starbuck on unusual experiences such as crisis 
conversions and individual mysticism, which influenced much early research into 
religious experiences, led to moves in Europe and America to study everyday 
spiritual experiences, including those of children and young people (eg: Klingberg, 
1959; Elkind and Elkind. 1962; Hardy. 1979; Robinson. 1977; Hay. 1987). Such 
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experiences were sometimes precipitated by a death-related experience which 
both Starbuck and James had briefly mentioned. Klingberg found that 566 of the 
630 essays in her study written by 9-13 year olds contained accounts of personal 
religious experiences, with 4% mentioning an encounter with death as a 
precipitating factor. The Elkinds described six types of recurrent (strengthening 
and maintaining) experiences and five types of acute (testing) religious 
experiences among 144 written accounts by 13-14 year olds, with the 'lamentation 
experience' (bereavement and closeness to death) named by 14 of them. In this 
way - and perhaps for the first time, particularly for children and young people -
experiences of bereavement were explicitly described as religious or spiritual 
experiences. 
Robinson (1977) argues that the clear, 'original vision' of childhood events, 
including those of death and bereavement, which people remember many years 
later but may at the time consider to be imaginative fantasy, are actually valid 
forms of knowledge since they are essential to the development of mature 
understanding. He claims that these experiences are often imprecisely termed 
'mystical experiences' and can only properly be understood when studied over a 
period of time. I think that the sense of timelessness, coherence and immediacy 
in the experiences described by Robinson's respondents reinforces the 
suggestion made by James that the subconscious plays a part in spiritual 
experience, whatever cause or meaning is attributed to the experience itself. 
In America Fowler (1981) Is investigating the development of what he calls 
people's "faith.' He says that making meaning out of life involves feeling, knowing, 
understanding, valuing, experiencing and interpreting. 'Faith' includes all religious 
and non-religious ideologies because growth and development result from life 
crises, challenges and disruptions to everyday existence rather than development 
in cognitive understanding of any ideology or theology. His approach to spiritual-
religious development tries to address the limitation found in the work of Piaget 
and Kohlberg regarding the separation of cognition from emotions but, more 
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significant from the point of view of this thesis, he recognizes the importance of 
life crises such as bereavement in the development of people's 'faith.' 
In the UK, Hay et al (1978. 1987. 1990) continue to investigate ordinary people's 
everyday 'religious' experiences. In 1976 the Religious Experience Research Unit 
at Oxford used the National Opinion Polls to ask: "Have you ever been aware of. 
or influenced by a presence or power, whether referred to as God or not, which is 
different from your everyday self?" to which 63.6% negative and 36.4% positive 
responses were received (Hay and Morisy. 1978). In an analysis of a 1986 Gallup 
sample of British people. 18% described an awareness of the presence of the 
dead as a religious experience (Hay. 1990). The experiences of school children, 
including some who have been bereaved, are now also part of this investigation 
(Nye and Hay, 1995). and the 'Children and Worldviews' project recounts the 
thinking of some children: whether the deceased become angels (Erriker and 
Erriker. 1994a) and how smoke may be a metaphor for death (Erriker and Erriker. 
1994b). 
The next section will discuss how far in the late 1990s these various strands 
relating to the development and use of the concept 'spirituality' are present in the 
British educational situation. 
Modern concepts of spirituality 
Spiritual development relates to that aspect of inner life through which pupils 
acquire insights into their personal existence which are of enduring worth. It is 
characterised by reflection, the attribution of meaning to experience, valuing a 
non-material dimension to life and intimations of an enduring reality. 'SpintuaP 
is not synonynrK)us with 'religious'; all areas of the curriculum may contribute 
to pupils' spiritual development. (OFSTEO, 1994a, p 8) 
This Statement is indicative of the evolving concept of spiritual in the 1990s and 
the gentle but persistent repudiation of 'religious.' characteristic of post-war years, 
which is part of the stream of rejection of church belonging and attendance. The 
changes that have occurred since the same word was used in the Education Act 
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of 1944 could not have been imagined then, some of which not previously 
mentioned are: a merging of religion and nationalism in the coronation and other 
war and memorial events; the changing role of women in society and their 
increased ability to control their own fertility; reform of prayer book services; new 
Bible translations; immigration from both Christian and non-Christian countries; 
introduction of a welfare state and a comprehensive education system; greater 
use of cremation rather than burial; increased consumerism, New Age thinking 
and products including alternative medicine; and an awareness of moving towards 
the new millennium, a so-called golden age. In their various ways, through such 
notions as inclusiveness, accessibility, comprehensiveness, holism and hope, 
each of the above has contributed towards what British people currently consider 
to be 'spiritual.' 
It is interesting to ask what kind of religion OFSTED (1994a. p 8) is setting aside 
as "not synonymous with" spiritual as it will now be different from that in Britain in 
1944. Although most people today are nominal Christians - only attending church 
or a place of worship at moments of crisis of for rites of passage (mostly funerals) 
- "it is equally evident that between two-thirds and three quarters of British people 
indicate fairly consistently that they believe in some sort of God," (Davie. 1994, pp 
74-5), though it is difficult to know what people mean by this term (see also 
chapter 7). Compared with other European countries. British people say they 
believe more in a spirit or life force (41% compared with the European average of 
30% in 1990) and heaven (53% compared with 42%) (Davie, p 78). Non-
attendance at religious institutions has probably enabled British religious belief to 
develop further towards non-conformity through folk belief and hermeneutic 
interpretations, and although orthodoxy is at one end of the continuum, popular or 
"common" religion (p 77), sometimes superstitious in nature, seems to be at the 
other. Current educational documents are part of the expression of this variety 
and they may even become the new religious orthodoxy, representing both 
present citizens (parents) and future ones (pupils) since, with the encouragement 
of choice and diversity, some overall form of unity in today's society may be 
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perceived necessary in order to bind together people of widely different beliefs -
whether orthodox Christian, nominal Christian or non-Christian. A common 
educational doctrine of the spiritual and the moral in education is one way of doing 
this. 
Key themes which emerge from OFSTED's (1994a) description are that the inner 
life, which is related to spiritual development, leads to insight, particularly 
reflection, on existence and experience. A sense of meaning, a valuing of non-
material dimensions and an awareness of an enduring reality may or will result. 
As I have already shown, these are not unorthodox Christian claims and although 
White (1994, p 372) thinks that phrases such as 'attributing meaning to 
experience' and 'intimations of an enduring reality* introduce religious assumptions 
"which not all would accept," the stress by NCC and O F S T E D on the non-religious 
perspective is important - whether as a reaction against traditional Christianity or 
in response to the upsurging presence of other religious groups. Here 
educational legislation is painting a picture of common human qualities and 
abilities that will unite, not divide, present and future British citizens with the 
emphasis on spirituality as the essence of human beings, whatever their belief, 
and less focus on motives for action driven by belief and experience. 
Both ideas - that spirituality refers to the essence of people and also to their 
motives - derive from Judaeo-Christian traditions (Carr, 1995). 'Spiritual' is the 
English translation of the Latin spiritualitas which, in its turn is a translation of the 
Greek word pneumatikos, a neologism coined by St Paul who used pneumatikos 
to describe things concerning the Holy Spirit of God because he perceived the 
spirit of the risen Jesus to be the same spirit or breath {ruah) of God which had 
given life to humanity (Genesis 2:7) (Schneiders, 1986). There is, therefore, a 
fine but important distinction to be drawn between the concept of spirituality which 
relates to essence and that which relates to motive. The first and probably older 
idea is that the spirit or breath of God gives life and. from this, a motive for living 
may also be derived, broadly expressed as: "Do the will of God in order to give 
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thanks for the gift of life." The second and more anthropomorphic concept 
suggests that intentions and motives - usually derived from beliefs - are what drive 
people to action and give purpose to their lives. Accordingly, meaning and 
purpose in life are often to be found in doing the will of God and in keeping moral 
codes which express God's ultimate goodness and truth. 
How similar are theology and education In describing spirituality today? A 
comparison of concepts will be made next using four interlinking perspectives on 
'spirituality' drawn from the work of contemporary Christian thinkers: Alexander 
(1980). Principe (1983), Schneiders (1986. 1989), Sheldrake (1991) and Bradford 
(1995). 
FOUR RELATED BUT INDEPENDENT DEFINITIONS OF THE SPIRITUAL 
... the 'spiritual' is that area of human experience that is not conceptualisable. 
If you conceptualise K. then if s not spiritual. The spiritual has been iosX along 
with the living, moving thing. (Priestley, 1985a p 37) 
I acknowledge that analysing may kill rather than explain such a concept but in 
what follows I shall try to convey, by showing how one idea flows into another, 
something of the complex 'living, moving thing' that constitutes spirituality. 
1. Schneiders (1989. p 678) describes spirituality as "a fundamental dimension of 
the human being" - perhaps comprised of essential human needs for love, peace, 
wonder, joy and relatedness (Bradford, 1995). This description parallels 
educational views of it as 'applying to something fundamental in the human 
condition" (NCC. 1993, p 2). and "the inner life" (OFSTED, 1994a. p 8). NCC 
(1993, p 2) describes the spiritual as having "a sense of awe. wonder and 
mystery" and feelings of transcendence (which seem to correspond to the 
'religious* experiences catalogued by the Religious Experience Research Unit) as 
well as self-knowledge, creativity, and being in touch with, and gaining control, of 
one's feelings and emotions. 
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As this description also deals with 'what is supremely personal and unique to 
each individual" (OFSTED. p 8). spirituality can be seen as both fundamentally 
similar in all humans and yet personal and unique in each one. a foundation to life 
but not a compartment of it. This is because nomothetic laws, which apply to all 
humans, shape the common characteristics which delineate us from other 
animate life while idiographic laws enable each of us to possesses unique 
personal characteristics. Thus OFSTED*s description seems to reinforce both 
Hay's (1987) notion of an inner personal space and James's (1960) suggestion 
that the subconscious continuation of our conscious life, often giving rise to 
religious or spiritual experiences, is both 'higher* and 'beyond,' yet 'linked' and 
'within' us. 
2. Spirituality is also "the lived experience which actualizes that (fundamental) 
dimension" of human experience (Schneiders, 1989, p 678) - "the real or 
existential level" or "the lived quality of a person" (Principe, 1983. p 135). It is 
shown in "how people live their faith" in an affective and personally integrated 
religious way (Alexander p 253) and is a "conscious human response to God", 
both personal and ecclesiastical (Sheldrake. 1991. p 37). Bradford sees one 
aspect of Its manifestation in the faith-style of a person's lived (or practical) 
spirituality and the particular forms of that faith-style such as fellowship and 
service. NCC (p 2) says spirituality "has to do with relationships with other people 
and, for believers, with God." through our responses to "challenging experiences" 
such as beauty, suffering and death, the search for meaning and purpose in life 
as well as values to live by. O F S T E D (1994a. p 10) seems to relate this 
perspective to "behaviour and attitudes ... which show awareness of the 
relationship between belief and action." 
The first two definitions suggest the many practical forms of spirituality's 
expression, whether theological or not. such as qualities or virtues - related mainly 
to moral attitude and behaviour - which indicate the countless ways in which 
people inter-relate in an embodied way to each other (Thatcher. 1993). O F S T E D 
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suggests that spiritual enquiry - 'seeking answers to life's great questions" 
(1994a. p 8) - should be done in such an "open-ended" way that the "process of 
exploration" is assisted, rather than hindered by. human interaction and I would 
suggest that it is often furthered by sharing with those with whom one may 
disagree or feel out of tune. However, since asking such questions may also 
imply that there are answers to be had, an awareness of the conflicts between 
various 'answers.' both religious and otherwise, is needed in order to combat self-
delusion (White. 1994). 
3. Spirituality is "the integration of ultimate concerns and unrestricted values in 
concrete life" in ways that may be "without reference to a particular tradition" but 
take into account affective aspects of religion in general (Alexander, p 253). 
Concrete manifestations of affect can be found in both religious and secular art. 
architecture, music, dance, drama and writing or In aspects of people and the 
world. They may portray beauty, truth and goodness - whether or not one 
accepts such Platonic concepts of perfection - since their manifestation is witness 
to the human desire to create, care and critically appraise. In previous eras, the 
notion of divine or life-giving breath was contained in verbs such as 'aspire' 
(breathe towards) and 'inspire' (breathe in), derived from spirare (to breathe), and 
their use may in some sense convey the idea that something special - perhaps 
the wind or breath of God - can motivate humans into action. This idea is 
subliminally conveyed when 'aspire' and 'inspire' are used to describe activities in 
music, art and literature and. not surprisingly, it can be argued that contemplation 
of the created world and practical involvement in the arts is more accessible 
material for promotion of spirituality than acquiring religious knowledge (White. 
1994). 
4. Spirituality is to be found in those aspects of human life which are not often 
termed 'religious.' but are "seen by their subjects, or interpreted by their 
observers, as intentionally related to that which holds unrestricted value." such as 
the spiritual qualities of communism or atheism (Alexander, 1980, p 254). I think it 
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is in this wider sense of understanding aspects of life relating to spiritual values 
that NCC (p 2) states that spiritual and moral dimensions underpin the curriculum 
and ethos of the school. Fowler (1981. p 92). also, in a similar vein, describes 
laith' development as "people's evolved and evolving ways of experiencing self, 
others and the world." These ways are related to ultimate conditions of existence 
which shape the purpose and loyalties of people's lives. Notions of "spiritual 
quest" (OFSTED. 1994a p 8) asking "Who am I?* 'Why am I here?' and Where am 
I going?' can encourage deeper reflection on many of those aspects of life and 
experiences that we all take for granted. As with the attribution of meaning, 
answers may take both theological and non-theological fomis when the content of 
feelings, emotions and behaviour are critically considered. 
I have already commented on the suggestion that spirituality is to do with valuing 
a non-material dimension, but I need also to add that this dimension may include 
values and aspirations such as health, wealth, happiness, security, success and 
helping others. Although "intimations of an enduring reality" (OFSTED, 1994a p 
8) may refer to God or gods, they could also indicate a sense of continuity, of one-
ness with ancestors and contemporaries, a perspective on one's individual human 
place in the vast scheme of things (eg: as small and insignificant or as special and 
individual) and of humanit/s place in the cosmos (eg: as having evolved or as 
being made in the image of God). 
Overall, the four definitions allow for both specific and broad Interpretations of 
'spiritual' within theology and education. Two holistic themes, essence and 
motive, are explicitly expressed in the first two; the third deals with values and 
concerns that may be affective rather than cognitive and the fourth, still concerned 
with values, is a heuristic, analytic overview. Taken together they represent a 
shift from transcendence to immanence, from traditional to personal revelation 
showing that nowadays spirituality can mean a range of things such as: sensing a 
divine presence or something other than oneself; having a heightened awareness 
of events, encounters and experiences; and emotionally responding to people, 
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places, events and the natural world. An emphasis on spirituality as the 
subjective and individual life, once mainly exercised in cloisters, has developed 
into an interest in self and one's own personal growth (eg: Hammond et al, 1990) -
and away from God and forms of knowledge. 
Although White's (1994) critique is valid that certain phrases in the O F S T E D 
(1994a) document are reminiscent of religious ideas ('intimations of an enduring 
reality*, 'seeking answers to life's great questions*). I think the four descriptions 
help to show the concept in transition. While displaying characteristics of earlier 
thinking, it reshapes them into new forms as '*a protest against all claims to 
finality" (Priestley. 1982. p 16). 
THE SPIRrrUAL DIMENSION OF EDUCATION 
Spiritual development is an important element of a child's education and 
fundamental to other areas of teaming. (NCC, 1993, p 3) 
It is interesting that NCC sees "spiritual development" as "fundamental to other 
areas of learning" (p 3) because of its promotion of curiosity, self-understanding, 
awe and wonder. Is NCC suggesting that only spiritual development can 
encourage such motivating attitudes or does it mean that these attitudes are 
examples of spiritual development in action? In describing spiritual development 
as both an "important element" of education and "fundamental to learning" it 
reinforces the two ideas previously explored: that spirituality is both the essence 
or important element of something (in this case education) and is also its motive 
for action (inspiring and supporting other areas of leaming). 
In the following section I will discuss aspects of the four descriptions which relate 
more specifically to education, using ideas developed from Bradford's (1995) view 
that spirituality has three elements (human, devotional and practical) and King's 
(1985b) parallel vision of an education concerned with interiority (the self). 
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morality (self, others and the world) and spirituality (transcendence). Using these 
views I want to explore spirituality within education as: 
• a fundamental human dimension and/or an inner self explored through 
reflection and insight and often expressed in creativity and art forms 
• how people live their everyday lives and/or work out their personal insights, 
experiences and faith within the school community, through relationships, 
study habits, response to curriculum and contribution to school ethos 
• the practical expression of the fundamental dimension and/or the lived 
experience, both within and outside of the school community through values 
and aspirations, and actions which reflect faith-styles and transcend human 
limitations. 
Human spirituality 
This element refers to the essential human need for and to be able to express 
love, peace, wonder, joy. relatedness (Bradford, 1995). awe, mystery and other 
feelings of transcendence sometimes described as 'numinous* (Otto. 1959). 
Berger (1969) suggests that ordinary 'signals of transcendence' may already be 
evident in: the human desire for order seen, perhaps, as a re-creation of the 
complex orderliness of the universe itself; the human desire to play and to mark 
off time into serious and non-serious aspects and. thereby, to bracket out the 
reality of our journey towards death; the human ability to hope for future things, in 
continued refusal to accept our finitude; and the human ability to laugh at the 
limited and inadequate way we manage our affairs, perhaps sensing that such 
inadequacy is not final - that we will eventually be released from such human 
imprisonment. This kind of spiritual awareness seems to manifest itself first in 
feelings and emotions which are then articulated either in language or creative 
forms (Priestley, 1985b). 
Experiential approaches (Hammond et al, 1990) within R E also attempt to 
investigate and understand the personal, subjective and Insightful nature of such 
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experiences. These ideas enable the exploration of personal awareness and 
discernment through exploration of the senses, emotions and feelings, memory, 
imagination, and interaction with other people. Drama and dance contain similar 
approaches to understanding self and other people and music, art and design 
offer opportunities for self-expression through concrete and semi-concrete forms 
often using movement, space, colour, language, shape, light, sound and silence. 
In this respect, it is interesting to note that the increasingly popular 'Magic Eye* art 
books claim to offer "a hidden dimension that propels the viewer into a secret 
theatre" (N. E. Thing, 1994. cover). 
Since dance, drama and music forms are ephemeral, they indicate the 
unrepeatability of events and of life itself. On the other hand, works of art. 
architecture and literature endure. Indicating humanit/s desire to transcend its 
limits, to create an enduring product, and to impose order. Whether deemed 
religious or secular, art fonns can be concerned with transcendent values or 
involve more intimate and personal beliefs and feelings which affirm and give 
meaning to our human experience (Ye^mans, 1993). Since art is neither right 
nor wrong but a representation of a particular point of view or way of seeing life, 
audiences, viewers and spectators may respond to these forms as they wish and. 
for some people, the artist's view may resound with their own. 
Despite - or perhaps because of - the paradox of humanity's awareness of both its 
uniqueness within the created world and also its inevitable demise (Becker, 1973), 
we seem to try to leave behind something of ourselves, either through progeny, 
writing, works of art or simply ideas and memories. Enabling children and young 
people to 'know thyself and to acquire skills and forms with which to express such 
knowledge is part of fostering fundamental human spirituality. 
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Devotional spirituality 
This element explicitly refers to the meeting of human spiritual needs within the 
culture and language of a particular religion. The need to be loved can be met 
through identity as a member, the need to feel secure can be nurtured through 
tradition, a response to wonder can form the framework for worship, the need to 
be affirmed can empower for service and the need for symbolic sharing can be 
met through the experience of community (Bradford, 1995). 
Palmer (1983) likens schools to religious communities because they encourage 
study of the 'sacred texts' of secular society, disciplines of contemplation in 
reflection, research and analysis, and an awareness of communal life through the 
formal and hidden curriculum. Although teachers may not subscribe to the idea 
prevalent within religious communities that spiritual development involves 
imitation of methods and role-modelling of people, the methods, manner and 
personality of teachers undoubtedly influence pupils' perceptions of themselves. 
It should also be noted that texts, research ideas and the curriculum are not 
value-free. Since they were written or formulated by people with specific 
(although often unacknowledged) points of view, contemporary reflection and 
analysis will be specific to the time and place in which they occur. Opponents of 
the term 'generic spirituality' draw attention to the error of the notion of 'a 
spirituality for all' since any spirituality is rooted in people's particular experiences 
in specific times and places and cannot be reproduced (Alexander. 1980; 
Lonsdale, undated; Schneiders. 1986, 1989; Sheldrake, 1991). Similarly, just as 
a Christian or Muslim place of worship has a distinctive flavour, a school 
community has a particular ethos which will be influenced by the joys and sorrows 
of its members. Like any religious community, it will also need to mark significant 
events such as death, and a school that has suffered the untimely death of 
members of its community is likely to have an ethos that is different from one that 
has not. 
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On the other hand, schools are not isolated from the rest of society like religious 
communities and pupils and teachers leave them daily in order to return to their 
homes. Schools are set within a neighbourhood and. consequently, influence and 
are influenced by the events of their area. For example, the attackers of 
headteacher Philip Lawrence (Charter. 1995) are members of that wider 
community and the fight Lawrence broke up between pupils and non-pupils may 
symbolize the edges of those boundaries. Although it is not possible to physically 
protect pupils from the surrounding community once they leave the school gates, 
schools can be short-term safe havens, enabling pupils to experience 
membership, security, empowerment and commitment to tasks which stand them 
in good stead elsewhere. 
Within both human and devotional spirituality, the expression of ultimacy - infinity, 
absoluteness, transcendence, perfection, completion, inclusivity, supremacy 
(Phenix. 1964) - is vital to spirituality whether it is named as God, a divine or life 
force. The Inner Light or The Other. Since the language of spirituality tries to 
express ideas that 'go beyond' the immediate and to describe experiences that 
are both painful and enriching, forms frequently used to do this are myth, 
metaphor, parable, allegory, koan. story and poetry which convey paradox and 
ambiguity rather than literal meanings. In this way it becomes less important 
whether the story 'is true' than that it should convey 'a truth' (Priestley 1985a). 
Metaphors of journey (King. 1985b; Rudge. 1994) also encourage children and 
young people to see their present position in life as a stage along the way -
although to what final end is not always made explicit. 
Education is a complex of disciplines and ideals communicated in many ways, 
concerned overall with the education of all aspects of the person. The formal 
curriculum which is the practical expression of the theory of education, is mainly a 
classroom activity while the so-called hidden curriculum is comprised of words, 
deeds and actions in the corridor and playground, assemblies and collective 
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worship, and extra-curricular activities. Taken together these two aspects 
contribute to the general ethos of the school which, in its turn, can encourage 
devotional spirituality within education. 
Practical spirituality 
This element refers to the expression of the other two through retatedness. values 
and beliefs (Bradford. 1995) and a concern for others, especially disadvantaged 
people. Although holding a belief in 'the next world' once seemed to inhibit 
expression of values and equality related to 'this world,' religious groups today 
often challenge social and political injustice and ecological threats, arguing that 
there Is no other world but this one. Such practical expressions of deeply held 
beliefs is where the 'between-ness' of things (Thatcher. 1993). both animate and 
inanimate, is to be found and also where the apparent dilemma between 
inwardness (Hay and IHammond, 1992) and between-ness can be resolved. Both 
perspectives on life are necessary because, as individuals, we form our sense of 
identity through our relationships with others. Although we may spend our lives 
relating to many people, we are bom alone and die alone. Coming to terms with 
the fact of each individual's unique beginning and ending may enable us to value 
life, to empathize with the grief of others, to work to prevent premature or sudden 
death and. ultimately, to accept and not fear death. 
Whether or not we accept as valid the aspects of humanity described earlier as 
'signals of transcendence' (Berger, 1969), their undisputed existence offers the 
opportunity for continuous reconstruction of meaning from them (Gobbel, 1980) 
and for contemplation followed by action (Dorr, 1990). Listening to one's Inner 
self and its dialogue with others can lead to feelings and emotions which become 
channelled Into action through formal and improvized opportunities. In other 
words, being moved or affected by the beauty of nature, the quality of a person, 
the perception of God's providence, or the experience of solidarity with powerless, 
grieving or poor people can lead to action to help others, promote peace, care for 
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the planet, or simply to give thanks. The links between contemplative moments 
(human spirituality) and active moments (practical spirituality) become evident 
when children and young people are given the opportunity to express their 
concerns in concrete forms. 
Practical spirituality may be likened to morality since behaviour and activity on 
behalf of others are particularly evident. Individuals start to set themselves aside 
in favour of others - whether through a sense of duty, an awareness of 
consequences, or a feeling of compassion - and begin to be aware that however 
small their place in the broader picture may be, without the support and 
interdependence of such small parts the bigger whole cannot function. They 
recognize that the social construction of the world can be changed, that things are 
not implacable, and that individuals can make a difference. They may have an 
end-state in view and probably expect the route to that end-state to pass through 
a series of changes, each one generating discontinuity, but they perceive overall 
continuity in terms of the unity of the thing under scrutiny. In other words, they 
begin to understand the concept of development and become part of it. 
This realization seems to reflect stage 4 of Kohlberg's theory wherein the right 
thing is defined as doing one's duty in society, upholding the social order, and 
maintaining the welfare of society or the group. People at stage 4 take the 
viewpoint of the system, which defines roles and rules, and consider individual 
relations in terms of their place in the system. This is not to suggest that human 
spirituality and devotional spirituality reflect lower stages in Kohlberg*s theory 
(although there may be parallels in terms of interactions between self and a 
limited number of others), but rather that practical spirituality may consolidate 
previously disparate expressions of care for other people and things. 
When spirituality is seen as neither discontinuous nor dualistic it becomes 
inclusive and leads to acceptance of theological and non-theological meanings 
and religious and non-religious (or secular) beliefs and practices. An 
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understanding of spirituality as both essence and motive derived from religious 
origins may be paralleled in moments of contemplation and action. How far such 
be 
meanings can contribute^'spiritual development* for all pupils will be discussed 
next. 
THE SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE 
Since there is probably no doubt that most schools today reflect the prevailing 
non-religious, even secular mood of the times, it is important to identify which 
ideas they hold about spirituality in order to decide if this form of development is 
possible. I think it unlikely that any school can promote spiritual development if its 
teachers consider that spirituality reflects any of the dualistic theories or 
discontinuous views previously mentioned. In other words, spirituality cannot be 
promoted if it is seen as only. 
• a motive for morally correct behaviour 
• the reflection of the image of God 
• the opposite of sexuality or materiality 
» other-world or ascetic practices 
• the study of scripture and writing about the subject 
« rational debate 
« ecclesiastical artefacts or possessions, or 
« something available to just a few people. 
In the past it has meant all of these things and our current understanding of its 
meaning has been shaped by such thinking, but it is necessary to revise or 
discard out of date, inappropriate historical-cultural arguments and ideas in order 
to clarify current meanings. However, while some dualisms (eg: spiritual-material) 
certainly need abandoning, other dichotomies (eg: of language which uses 
parable and paradox) may usefully express apparently irreconcilable opposites of 
ultimate experience. Such language may also help to combat individual-public 
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attitudes which refuse to acknowledge the social and political inequalities of 'this 
world.' 
If spirituality is seen as holistic and continuous, then schools may be able to 
promote it. Everyday life - especially school life - does not encourage much 
physical separation from other humans in order to contemplate 'other* or 'ideal' 
worlds, values or ways. It leads rather to the acquisition of personal skills and 
attitudes, and concepts of self, other people and the world in order to encourage 
harmonious living. However, the need for contemplation and reflection on the 
affairs of life is ongoingly necessary. Experiences of death may particularly 
encourage this need because the bereaved pupil (and perhaps her or his friends) 
may display changed and new emotions, an overall capacity to cope with change 
and loss, or come to recognize the finitude of human life, the limitations of human 
knowledge and experience, and of time and place. Acknowledging and exploring 
these feelings and ideas when they arise may promote spiritual development. 
Can schools hope to promote spiritual development for all pupils? 
The notion that pupils will develop spiritually raises the expectation that this Is 
an area In which pupils can make progress. (NCC, 1993. p 3) 
If spirituality is deemed to be an integral, holistic and communal search for 
meaning and purpose that all pupils whatever their religious persuasion can 
pursue, this expectation seems correct. NCC is right, therefore, to focus on the 
likelihood that schools will not recognize such development rather than that 
children and young people will not develop. NCC (p 3) describes six "steps" by 
which such progress might be identified and O F S T E D (1994a. pp 9-10) also 
names five "qualities" that pupils may demonstrate as evidence of the provision 
for such development in school. I think this approach is both laudable and short-
sighted, however, because it fails to recognize the long-term nature of such 
development and the limited role of schools in it. 
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For example. Coles (1990) spent more than thirty years trying to understand the 
spiritual life of children and young people. Sometimes he worked In schools -
although never as a full-time teacher - or talked, often over lengthy periods of 
time, to children in their homes or in hospital, about their desires, ambitions, 
hopes, worries, fears and "moments of deep and terrible despair" (p 108). He 
listened to them telling each other that: 
... you have to find something to believe in; you cant just say it's all nothing 
out there. ... there's beauty, there's the ocean ami the waves and the sand 
and the seashells, and there's people, your parents, my folk, our friends, 
(pp 298-9) 
Since such in-depth opportunities are not available to teachers with a curriculum 
to deliver. It is reasonable to assume that a lot of what constitutes spiritual 
development will be unvoiced in school. For example, when Coles experienced 
difficulties in talking with Hopi children he recognized the limitations of relying 
upon responses In structured situations such as schools. A HopI woman told him: 
they wont ever want to talk with you about the private events of their lives in 
this building. They leam how to read and write here ... you are asking them 
about thoughts they put aside when they enter this building (p 24). 
One can argue that the Hopi perception is unusual but pupils in Britain may be 
just as hesitant to explore their private feelings and Insights - even when careful 
attempts are made to allow them to do so (eg: Plant and Stoate, 1989; Hammond 
et al. 1990; Ward and Houghton, 1995). 
However, whether consciously or otherwise, children and young people are 
always trying to understand what is happening to them and why (see Preface). In 
order to do this they employ whatever religious traditions, scientific and popular 
explanations and personal experiences and Insights they have. Everyone at 
some stage in her or his life asks the eternal questions: Where did I come from? 
Why am I here? Why Is this happening to me? Where am I going? but they may 
not do this explicitly during the years at school or even during school time Itself. 
In fact. It Is my contention that the experiences of illness and bereavement - which 
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can never be planned, provided or promoted by school - present unique and 
specific opportunities for just such questioning and development. When people 
become ill or lose a loved one through death they often examine their past life, 
present conditions and future prospects and, whether logical or not, try to work out 
if they have 'deserved' the pain they are experiencing. Such self-examination can 
lead to new views of oneself and one's place in the world. However, the timing of 
such life experiences is unpredictable and schools often do not know (and there is 
no reason why they should) when a pupil is bereaved, unless the death is of 
parents or siblings. 
In theory it is possible for all pupils 'to develop' spiritually in the fundamental 
human sense of self-exploration and self-expression through the arts and other 
areas - although focusing on self may lead to competitiveness and selfishness 
while focusing on other people may better encourage co-operation and care. 
Schools can further encourage and support this fundamental form of development 
through the formal and hidden curriculum and also provide opportunities for 
practical expression of concern and care for others through fund-raising, letter 
writing, visiting and sponsorship. Pain, suffering and death - whether among 
family and friends or seen on television - are part of the human condition, and 
some pupils who meet these experiences earlier rather than later in life may start 
to consider the meaning and purpose of such events In advance of their peers. 
However, even when encountered earlier, pupils may not have the emotional and 
intellectual capacity to respond in ways that can easily be identified as 
'development.' Teachers are not the only significant adults in their pupils' lives 
and see only part of an on-going process and never the end-state - whatever that 
state may look like. Furthermore, since an end-state response to bereavement 
can take years to achieve (see chapter 5), it may be indistinguishable from other 
on-going responses to life events. Therefore I think it is over-optimistic for 
O F S T E D to evaluate spiritual development from what schools provide or promote 
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as other life events can have far more impact than the curriculum, ethos and 
intellectual life of a school. 
Spiritual trends in British society and its young people 
There is increased commitment in the west among people of all ages and walks of 
life to secure social, environmental and political justice (eg: Amnesty. 
Greenpeace. World Development Movement), some of which (eg: liberation 
theology) is explicitly linked to religious ideology. Less explicitly religious are the 
campaigns to protect the planet and its inhabitants - both human, animal and 
vegetable - from damage, disease and death in recognition of what the global 
consequences of such losses could be. This kind of action is the result of factors 
such as improved international communications, applied scientific knowledge and 
the application of broadly religious principles of care and love for others. In Britain 
television has promoted in many children and young people an increased 
awareness of the plight and needs of other living creatures together with the 
opportunity to raise funds to alleviate these situations (eg: Blue Peter. Comic 
Relief), and interpretations of 'love thy neighbour* are increasingly applied to 
people in other nations in ways that transcend original Judaeo-Christian notions. 
Nowadays, British young people are likely to express what is increasingly being 
termed secular spirituality (see chapter 1) in awareness of the sacredness of life 
and the needs of others less fortunate than themselves, commitment to global 
renewal and social justice, and belief in the value and importance of the present 
moment. An adherence to traditional beliefs and religious practices for one's own 
salvation atone appear to be increasingly rare. 
In these ways new ideas of 'spirituality' have emerged. As Hull's (1993) analysis 
shows, it is no longer mainly associated with any one Christian tradition or even 
with Christianity as a whole and a recognition has slowly arisen, reflected even in 
educational documents, of two mutually compatible ideas: that every religion has 
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its own distinctive spirituality and that every human has her or his own particular 
spiritual dimension or quality. Spirituality has also ceased to be the simple 
application of absolute principles to life in accordance with theology (Sheldrake. 
1991). and is moving from an adherence to morally specific ways of life towards 
an exploration of individuality, intuition and subjective experiences. Spirituality is 
now more concerned with understanding the complexity of human growth, 
whether or not in the context of a living relationship with the divine, than with 
defining perfection . 
Furthermore, an understanding of the spiritual life as continuous and united, 
rather than as discontinuous and fragmented, has encouraged a reconsideration 
of the relationship between spirituality and ethics (Sheldrake. 1991). This insight 
has led to interest in dispositions of character rather than quality of actions, to a 
focus on the unity of human beings rather than on the details of human behaviour. 
In this way an understanding of the importance of intention, motivation and affect 
on moral behaviour has developed. A more human, inclusive and experiential 
approach to spirituality now exist with less emphasis on a hierarchical conception 
of the spiritual life, with its attendant language of 'stages', 'ladders' and 
'detachment' achieved by formulae and rules, together with an increased valuing 
of so-called feminine virtues such as nurture, compassion, feelings and 
subjectivity (see chapter 4). 
In the light of these reflections. I propose the following forms of feeling, thinking 
and behaving as indicative of individual spiritual development particularly related 
to experiences of death and bereavement. 
• Being prepared to move into new territory (beliefs, practices, experiences, 
thinking) while recognizing that this 'new territory" may be a familiar one for 
other people. 
• Exploring new language and ways of self-expression; trying to explain 
complicated or previously unexpressed ideas and feelings. 
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• Recognizing the complexity of self, other people and the world; beginning to 
abandon or rethink previously held answers and solutions. 
• Tolerating and/or bearing pain, disappointment, sorrow and loss; realizing that 
life can continue after such experiences. 
• Recognizing, however briefly, one's own finitude and taking that Into account In 
future life plans. 
• Understanding and appreciating the relative truth of one's own religious and 
spiritual beliefs; beginning to see the local, time-restricted context in which 
such ideas evolved. 
• Acquiring and/or fomiulating a philosophy of life for the present period of one's 
life; adapting and/or abandoning it at a later period. 
As with the list at the end of chapter two. I shall explore In Part Two how far these 
forms are apparent in any of my respondents. 
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CHAPTER FOUR : ARE THERE STAGES IN MORAL AND SPIRITUAL 
DEVELOPMENT? 
Introduction 
In exploring the question of 'stages* of development I want to distinguish between 
two views: a general view of human development In terms of growth and change 
usually measured according to age and critical periods, and a specific focus on 
moral and spiritual development, as described by disciplines such as theology, 
philosophy, psychology and sociology, and particularly expounded by Piaget and 
Kohlberg. Since the last approach has significantly influenced educational views 
of stage development, I wish to show how such definitions of Individual moral or 
spiritual development fit Into broader theories of human development within 
creation. 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
Jacques: All the world's a stage 
And all the men and women merely players: 
They have their exits and their entrances; 
And one man in his time plays many parts, 
His acts being seven ages. (Shakespeare, 1963, As You Like It^  
Jacques' description of the parts that people 'play' In life (although only male roles 
are explicit) expresses the notions that development Involves growth, change, 
progression and role versatility. His seven 'ages' - which hint that death follows 
the last - describe two aspects of physical development (infancy and senility) and 
five social and employment roles appropriate for his time (schoolboy, lover, 
soldier, justice and pantaloon). Even today these are the two most common 
means of describing levels or stages of human development and, although 
descriptions of employment roles change, stage theory thinking is chiefly based 
on ideas of physical development according to notions of significant ages, critical 
periods or eras, and social roles in life. 
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stages and specific ages 
Growth and change are so evident in physical fornDs of development that we 
unthinkingly assume that a baby will grow into a child, a child into an adolescent, 
an adolescent into a young adult, and a young adult into an older adult. However, 
even the age of 'old' people is constantly being extended as improved medical 
and health care prolong the lives of all. 
Marking development according to specific ages is a common form of celebration 
and measurement in many cultures, and birthdays are usually celebrated or 
marked in some way. For example, on 15th November Japanese children aged 7, 
5 and 3 are feted in the festival of shichi-go-san and in former Soviet society 
developmental theorists considered that particular changes occur in children at 3. 
7 and 11 years. Many Soviet theorists assumed that humans acquire the 
historical and social features of the species at particular ages and that these 
characteristics are as significant as biological ones (Davidov. 1990). The 
coincidence of concrete stages of social and educational upbringing with these 
theoretical periods probably enabled individuals in Japanese and Soviet societies 
to identify the goals of development set for them by the larger social group. 
Apart from National Curriculum key stages, other forms of age-related stages in 
England and Wales are socio-legal initiations regarding the age at which young 
people can leave school (16 years), have heterosexual intercourse (16), buy 
nicotine (14), a firearm (17). alcohol (18). drive most vehicles (17). or vote (18). 
As well as the confusing complexity of these laws regarding when adulthood is 
achieved (eg: old enough at 17 to buy a gun but not to vote), moral imperatives 
are usually implied regarding involvement in or restraint from such activities and, 
following the death of James Bulger, the legal age of moral responsibility has 
been extended downwards from 14 to 10 years, depending on the circumstances 
of the crime and whether or not children can be deemed to knew the legal and 
moral implications of their actions (Gibb. 1995). 
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Most age-related stages of development depend upon currently prevailing social, 
legal, educational and religious practices for their significance. For example. 
Judaic belief in the prevalence of bad inclinations (yetzer hara) until the age of 12 
or 13 when good inclinations (yetzer hatov) begin to prevail has resulted in a form 
of religious initiation (bat- and bar-mitzvah) which may merely mark biological age 
rather than the emotional and spiritual maturity that the event celebrates. I 
suggest that age alone Is not a good indicator of human development since the 
stages delineated by age depend upon nomothetic rather than idiographic views 
of development. 
Critical periods or eras and psycho-social roles 
Other theorists who have tried to plot stages of development according to periods 
of life or occurrence of particular incidents (which often imply moral and spiritual 
development) tend to use age as a physical or social role indicator. Even when 
the whole of life is envisaged, there is usually greater clarity concerning the earlier 
stages of development - probably because the age of death is always uncertain 
and medical care continues to extend the average life expectancy. 
Freud's (1905) psychosexual theory is often interpreted as describing nomis of 
physical and psychological development and, insofar as these stages of 
maturation must occur in a certain sequence, his theory seems correct. Erikson's 
(1950) psychosocial stages are hierarchical, since he believes that how well the 
task of each stage is resolved affects an individual's ability to deal with 
subsequent tasks. He does not simply equate development with biological 
maturity but suggests an unbroken continuum of adaptation and resolution to the 
physical, emotional and cognitive challenges of life with which view I concur. 
Coleman's (1980) 'focal' theory of adolescent development explains how young 
people cope with so much stressful change in their lives by dealing with one issue 
at a time, and although his theory seems broadly applicable to our present youth 
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culture, such sequences cannot be considered immutable. Levinson's (1990) 
view of the human life cycle divided into four 'eras' of roughly twenty years, with 
significant transition periods, suggests a life expectancy of 80 years that not all 
may attain. 
Jung, who describes life as "an energy process' which is irreversible and directed 
towards an end-point - a state of rest (1959, p 4) - uses the sun as a metaphor for 
the human life course and suggests that a mid-life transition occurs at the sun's 
zenith. Fowler's (1981) six stages of faith, which only roughly correspond with 
ages, may emerge at different times in life in response to life crises, challenges 
and disruptions. Although he says that the synthetic-conventional faith stage 
(stage 3) may continue for the rest of life, he describes universalizing faith (stage 
6) as a "normative endpoinf (p 199) which implies a hierarchy both of structure 
and values. 
Jung's view that conscious life problems dominate the second and third quarters 
reflects Kubler-Ross's (1989, p 106) belief that 
at the end of our days, wtien we have worked and given, enjoyed ourselves and 
suffered, we are going back to the stage that we started out with and the circle of 
life is closed. 
After Bowlby (1981) developed Kubler-Ross's stages of dying into stages of 
bereavement, many people perceived these to be absolutes (rather like Piaget's 
stages) and expected themselves, their clients or people they knew to be 'in' the 
appropriate stage. Sanders (1989) and Worden (1991) have refuted or 
elaborated upon these ideas and it is possible to observe in their theories a move 
from concern with self to an awareness of others and, sometimes, to a broader 
perspective on living as different emotions and attitudes dominate. I do not wish 
to suggest from the diagram below, however, that all the stages, phases or tasks 
are parallel. 
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Table 4.1 Overview of moral and spiritual perspectives in some theories of dying 
and bereavement 
Kubler-Ross: stages of 
dying 
Sanders: phases of 
grieving 
Worden: tasks of grieving 
denial: to comfort self, 
family or conform to 
m e d i c a l / hosp i t a l 
expectations 
shock : d i s b e l i e f , 
confusion, restlessness, 
feelings of unreality and 
isolation 
accept reality of loss 
anger: to ask 'Why me?' 
and remind other people 
of one's existence 
awareness of loss: stress, 
anxiety, conflict, sensing 
deceased's presence 
experience pain of grief 
bargaining: with God, the 
medical profession, 
family and life events to 
delay inevitable event 
withdrawal: despair, 
helplessness, recognizing 
need to either move 
forward in grieving, 
remain stilt or give up 
living 
adjust to environment in 
which deceased is 
missing. 
depression: adjusting to 
loss of life and life's 
opportunities 
healing: sensing a turning 
point, resuming control, 
rest ructur ing one's 
identity 
withdraw emot ional 
energy from deceased to 
allow involvement with 
other^eople 
acceptance: focusing on 
future and gradually 




responsibil i ty, l iving 
without deceased 
withdraw emot ional 
energy from deceased to 
allow involvement with 
other people 
New patterns of lifetime change in feeling, thinking and behaving are continually 
being drawn in line with the late twentieth century expectation, encouraged by 
medical and health care, that death will occur between 60-95 years for most 
people (Reanney, 1991). In the future, physical stages of development (or 
maturation) may remain broadly constant but social and employment roles and 
critical life periods are already changing. 
MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT 
One might go so far as to say that all theories of development are theories of 
moral development. (Moran, 1987, p 166) 
... one does not have to depart from ordinary usage to attach meanings to the 
notion of 'spiritual development' which can be put to work in the context of 
education. (Hill. 1989. p 181) 
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As I explained in chapter 3, spirituality and spiritual development are harder to 
conceptualise and measure than morality and moral development because of a 
focus on inner experience regarding the former and thinking and behaviour 
regarding the latter. For this reason I shall explore notions of stages in moral 
development first and spiritual development second. 
In the industrialized west Piagetian thinking has undoubtedly prompted further 
analysis of 'stages' of development in both cognitive and moral development and, 
as I have shown, as well as Kohlberg, stages, eras or levels are to be found in the 
work of Erikson, Coleman. Fowler. Levinson, Loevinger (1976) and Perry (1970). 
The differences between stages related to physical age or psycho-social eras and 
those considered to possess intemal psychological consistency will be explored 
next with reference to Kohlberg's work since it by far the most influential in moral 
development. 
Hierarchical stages In moral development 
The distinction in Kohlberg's work between stages of moral development and 
stages of justice reasoning has not always been easy for the reader to make, 
perhaps because of the apparent link between physical development and the 
development of cognitive skills of logic, in fact Kohlberg (1984) claims that 
advanced moral reasoning must be advanced logical reasoning because there is 
a corresponding horizontal sequence of movement from logic to social 
perspective and role-taking, and then to making moral judgements and taking 
moral actions as the individual passes from earlier to later stages. Moran (1987, p 
164) makes an interesting suggestion that twentieth century moral development 
theory "functions as the secular substitute for providence, predestination and 
heavenly salvation' - albeit without any divine guiding hand or final reward - and, 
in this light, Kohlberg's stories of hypothetical dilemmas may be seen as modern 
parables. 
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Like Piaget, Kohlberg first described his data as "defining ideal types rather than 
strict sequential stages" (1984, p xxiv). However, after obtaining empirical data 
using cross-cultural, cross-sex and longitudinal methods, and employing a method 
of assessment which he believed revealed invariant sequences regarding three 
characteristics of Piagetian stages (invariant sequence, structured wholeness and 
hierarchical integration), he felt sufficiently confident to define this set of 
developmental types as 'stages.' It is important, though, to remember that these 
'stages' are not of moral development per se but of cognitive thinking about moral 
issues. In recognition of the confusion and, probably in order to gain wider 
acceptance for the particular scope of his theory, Kohlberg (1984 p 224) declares: 
... we now need to eniphasize the nomenclature 'justice reasoning' since the 
Kohlberg stages have more typically been called stages of moral 
development. I have always tried to be clear that my stages are stages of 
justice reasoning, not of emotbns, aspirations or action. 
We can see, therefore, that Kohlberg's stages of justice reasoning are cognitive 
stages that children and young people are likely to pass through if given sufficient 
stimulation for conflict through the presentation of ideas and hypothetical 
situations. At best some young people will reach stage 4 by the time they leave 
school - although many will not - and quite a lot of adults will never reach stage 4 
at all in their lives. When Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) found apparent regression 
In postconventional respondents, the scoring methods and stage theory were 
revised to correct what was considered to be a confusion between form and 
content, and a transitional substage 4.5 was introduced (Appendix 1). Nowadays 
only a few people are expected to reach stage 5 but none can ever reach stage 6, 
once rejected as a theoretical construct suggested by the writing of elite figures 
(Bergling, 1981) and refined as a hypothetical "terminal stage to define the nature 
and endpoint of the kind of development we are studying" (Kohlberg, 1984, p 
271). Stage 7, also, described as a hypothetical stage - but a 'soft' or existential 
rather than 'hard' structural stage - does not appear in later overviews (Kohlberg 
and Ryncarz. 1990). 
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Hard and soft stages 
According to Kohlberg (1984. p 237) 'hard' stages are cognitive ones, involving 
formal Piagetian thinking while 'soft' stages involve a self or ego "consciously 
making meaning for itself," using affective and reflective characteristics "not easily 
assimilated to the Piagetian paradigm.' I think Carter's (1987. p 91) depiction of 
Kohlberg's stages as "the path of increasing awareness of one's own relation to 
another" shows the intensification and multiplication of interaction with others that 
both moral and spiritual development involve. Stages 1-3 deal with face-to-face 
relationships, stages 4-6 with vaster, anonymous groups and stage 7 with a 
'relationship' with the cosmos (eg: people, animals, vegetation, stars and planets) 
which transcends individuality. However, since stage 7 is a soft, hypothetical 
stage, serving as a reason for morality. I believe its perspective is available to all 
in varying degrees - unlike stage 6 which is a cognitive endpoint of justice 
reasoning. 
Figure 4.2 Awareness of inter-connecting human relationships 
mankind the cosmos 
Isic]\ as a totality 
as a _ 
t least 
ne other 
the broadest group nation one's peer 
as described by a bill group or 
of rights, constitution etc equivalent 
A stage 7 perspective enables people to have a higher consciousness of their 
place within creation and to perceive their own death as part of the creative 
process of the universe. In this sense, they perceive a great cosmic truth: that 
nothing ever dies and humans are an integral part of creation (Reanney. 1991). 
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Hypothetical and real-life dilemmas 
Gilligan (1982) interviewed women deciding whether to have a child or to abort 
the pregnancy and, after listening to college students' accounts of the things that 
have Influenced you most during the year/ Perry (1970) postulated nine 'Positions' 
in intellectual and ethical development, some of which overlap with Kohlberg's. 
Murphy and Gilligan (1980) used Perry's (1970) scheme (which progresses from 
formal operations through a transition crisis to a post-formal operational 
equilibrium) to explore the apparent paradox that some of Kohlberg's principled 
respondents had regressed. They found that respondents began to abandon 
absolutist moral judgements and objective truths, seeking 'best fit' strategies 
Instead, in recognition of the 'shades of grey* in real-life moral situations. Murphy 
and Gilligan argue that this necessary transition Into adult moral thinking - which 
Kohlberg's theory of justice reasoning sees as regression from format thinking - is 
the point at which his theory fails to distinguish between the absolutism of teenage 
logic and principled but contextual adult thinking. 
Gllllgan et al (1990) argue that intellectual and ethical development continue 
beyond the teen years in a dialectical rather than a formal mode of reasoning 
when the complicated nature of relationships and situations is better understood 
in adult life. They found that respondents in their 20s, previously scored as post-
conventional, when faced with real-life moral dilemmas were unable to apply the 
single principle of justice in order to treat each individual with equity and 
reciprocity because of conflict with issues of care and responsibility. 
It is also important to recognize that the view of morality that is expressed is 
probably determined by the form of the moral dilemma. Hypothetical dilemmas of 
conflicts of rights reveal deontological thinking in reciprocity while real-life 
dilemmas of conflicting relationships reveal empathic thinking. In real life, 
situations of conflict are never resolved by the exclusive application of the 
principle of justice and this gradual replacement of deontological certainty with 
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relational uncertainty, beginning in the teenage years means "that few if any of us 
are likely, in practice, to be totally consistent" (IHirst. 1974, p 15). When 
consistency falters, stage definitions in the strict Piagetian sense must also be in 
jeopardy as Murphy and Gilligan (1980) and Gilligan et al (1990) have shown. 
Principles of Justice and caring 
... we admit that "the 'principle' of altruism, care, or responsible love has not 
been adequately represented in our work. (Kohlberg. 1984, p 227) 
Since thinking is easier to analyse than affect or behaviour because it can be 
linguistically recorded, and deontological rather than prosocial thinking is more 
amenable to structural stage analysis. Kohlberg's theory has accustomed us to 
thinking of morality as reasoning in increasingly complex ways. Justice rests on a 
premise of equality whereby everyone (including the respondent) should be 
treated the same while care rests on a premise of non-violence, that no one 
should be hurt. 
Kohlberg asserts that a focus on justice "restricts morality to a central minimum 
core" because it "asks for 'objective' or rational responses" (1984. p 306) and he 
explains that in his work: 
Scoring procedures and questioning have focused on judgements that were 
prescriptive and universalizable, ignoring statements of personal feeling or 
those attempting to rewrite tfie dilemnm. Rewriting dilemma responses are 
central concepts of care and responsibility, (p 304. my italics) 
This admission strongly suggests that Kohlberg's questioning methods have 
always elicited care responses which, because they have not supported his 
theory, have been disregarded. While this approach may be legitimate in terms of 
data gathering - since justice reasoning is what Kohlberg sought to analyse - it 
may have had a significant effect upon readers* perceptions of what moral thinking 
consists of since a one-sided view of justice issues has been consistently 
presented. 
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As I have shown, contemporary discussions of stages in moral development 
include discussions of hierarchical integration and distinctions between hard and 
soft stages, hypothetical and real-life dilemmas, and principles of justice and care. 
Some of these issues will be raised again when exploring stages of spiritual 
development but. since the field of enquiry has not been so clearly defined in 
terms of issues such as justice reasoning, discussions of spiritual development 
have been presented in a less cognitively rigorous way. I recognise this 
difference in my change from psychological to philosophical language, and in the 
shift from debates about justice and care to the use of metaphors. 
Traditional stages In spiritual development 
Although I suggest there may be rather less firmness in discussions of stage 
development within spirituality. I have already shown that religious literature has 
consistently suggested that human life consists of stages and that within Roman 
Catholic circles, where the term 'spiritual' is common, an idea of at least two 
stages or levels in the Christian life - ordinary growth and extraordinary growth -
was prevalent until Vatican Council II. Within Christianity overall the distinction 
between laity and clergy has often implied a spiritual hierarchy, and saints -
whether lay or ordained - are usually deemed to reach the highest stage of all. 
While the principle of justice has been a key issue in recent cognitive and 
psychological analyses of moral development, those of care and benevolence -
with an accompanying sense of responsibility - have long been considered as 
equivalent or even superior to justice within Christian thinking. Such attitudes 
form a necessary basis for moral behaviour - the hallmark of life in the Spirit of 
God (Galatians 5: 22-23) - and in medieval Christian writing, 'stages' of 
development in spirituality with care and benevolence as a basis can be found. 
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The anonymous medieval text, The Cloud of Unknowing (1974. p 80), describes 
'two lives,' the active and contemplative, comprised of 'three parts', the second 
part forming a bridge between the two 'lives.' The first part, described as "good", 
consists of "the good and honest physical works of mercy and charity"; the second 
part, described as "better", consists of spiritual meditations; and the third part, 
described as the "best of all", consists of "the dark cloud of unknowing" containing 
many secret acts of love to God. Thus the first part comprising works of mercy 
and charity is recognized as the basis for both the active and contemplative life 
and while not everyone is expected to aspire to the contemplative life, the active 
life is available to all. 
There are at least three reasons why such traditional stage thinking in spirituality 
is inappropriate today, however. First, the medieval model of a hierarchy of love, 
with the same elements present at every stage in differing proportions, perceives 
the final stage of love of God as the end-point of the earlier stages of love of 
humanity. However, as I have suggested in chapter 3, twentieth century thinking 
is more likely to consider love of one's neighbour as the expression of one's love 
of God, rather than the other way around. Second, contemplative stages 
previously implied disengagement from 'this life' and immersion in the other life' 
which would be impossible in contemporary spiritual movements, both secular 
(eg: ecological) and religious (eg: liberation theology) and in schools. Third, 
although higher stages suggest increased awareness of and communion with 
God, these seem to be experiences that non-religious people (Hay, 1990) and 
bereaved ones (Sanders, 1989) have from time to time anyway (see also chapter 
5). For many non-religious people in Britain today, a more accessible approach to 
spiritual development may be inductive rather than deductive, through individual 
experience and reflection rather than study, lifestyle, rational knowledge and 
revelation (Hay, 1990). 
One of the reasons why there has been such an emphasis on 'this life' as a basis 
for 'the next' in spirituality may be the prevalence of a fear of death and a 
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simultaneous desire, expressed in all religious thinking, for immortality. There 
seems to be a self-reinforcing cycle that says "there must be a tomorrow because 
there have been thousands of yesterdays" (Reanney. 1991. p 12) which carries 
over into an assumption that after death (daric) there will be another life (light). 
Theories of resurrection and reincarnation may correspond closely with the way 
our minds work and while Judaeo-Christian and Islamic faiths consider this 
pattern to be repeated only once in resurrection. Hinduism, Buddhism and other 
Indian faiths consider it to be repetitive through rebirth or reincarnation. Humanity 
inevitably seeks continuity rather than discontinuity and some nineteenth century 
Christian writers particularly expressed this notion in describing the death of a 
child as "the most obvious case of progress in heaven" whereby they "gained 
training unknown on earth" in the presence of Jesus (McDannell and l-ang. 1988. 
p 286). The Christian conversion experience - which is seen as a significant 
stage of development for evangelical believers - values the emphasis on *dying to 
self and moving forward into a 'new life.' 
Since we are all, in a sense, dying and are merely at varying stages away from 
death, it is possible to see our lives as a joumey towards this inevitable event and 
then away from it. Death itself is often seen as the doomay into another life or a 
journey to another place. Of death as a doonway. Holland (cited in Neuberger & 
White, 1991, p i 55) writes: 
Death is nothing at all. I have only slipped away into the next room. ... l a m 
but waiting for you for an interval somewhere very near just round the comer. 
All is well. 
Perhaps the need for individual spiritual stages will fade if we become 
consciousness that our individual dying is both a doorway and a journey which 
contributes to the continuing life of the cosmos. 
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New stages In spiritual development 
Kohlberg's stage 7 involves enhanced awareness of one's place in relation to 
other people, the earth and the cosmos which requires the dissolution of 
psychological and concrete barriers between living beings. Adopting a cosmic 
perspective on the importance of human life, other life forms and the universe 
parallels Reanney's (1991) belief that individual ego-consciousness but not 
cosmic consciousness is extinguished by death. Such consciousness does not 
depend on cognitive development or acts of contemplation, although it may 
indicate the operation of the principles of both justice and care. It is probably what 
Robinson (1985) termed 'transfiguration.' a state (if one can call it that) which can 
occur in "quite a weak degree" (p 251) when some familiar incident or sight takes 
on a new and unfamiliar meaning or pattem and purpose. 
This 'new' stage is not really a stage in the sense of 'hard' stage thinking but an 
attitude. It depends, of course, upon a certain level of cognitive development but 
it may come unbidden, following certain experiences (such as distress), or when 
one is at peace. It is different from the three ordinary states of consciousness 
(waking, dreaming and sleeping) and is often described as a qualitatively state of 
'restful alertness' (Alexander et al. 1990). Maslow (1970) describes such 
experiences as 'peak experiences' which, although inherently available to all, less 
than one in a thousand adults, including some of Robinson's (1977) respondents, 
seem to have. Such experiences are not an end-point of development - although 
the 'moment' of insight may come only once as suggested above - but rather an 
understanding of unity that is continually revisited. 
The metaphor of a ladder to the sky has. in some ways, reflected Christian 
spiritual and moral development but it is important to see that the ladder 'leads' in 
two directions, both upward to God and downward from God, and that "the 
downward ladder is intended to get rid of an upward ladder" (Moran. 1987. p 7). 
The ladder metaphor may originally have depicted God's love flowing towards 
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humanity or divine descent Into human form but the perspective easily shifted to 
invariant, sequential, hierarchical steps up a ladder towards God. I suggest that 
the metaphor of a ladder (implying ascent and stages) needs to be replaced by 
one of expanding circles (implying relationships) of consciousness or awareness 
as depicted by Carter (1987). Ideas of spiritual development should be based 
upon an increased awareness of the complexity and inter-relatedness of life in 
qualitative rather than stage terms, moving from simple to complex consciousness 
rather than from lower to higher cognitive stages or upwards towards Increasingly 
pure thinking, feeling and behaviour. 
Bearing these ideas in mind, let me move on to briefly discuss some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of traditional stage thinking which have been 
applied to educational issues and involve ideas of moral and spiritual 
development. 
ISSUES INVOLVED IN TRADITIONAL STAGE THINKING 
Although Piaget was unwilling to admit that his theory of stages of development 
had educational significance, it has been widely used to define goals and criteria 
and to specify content and levels of attainment. Since cognitive stages are 
assumed to form an invariant sequence, assessment methods usually consider 
which of the competencies of the next stage are already present In an attempt to 
reinforce their appearance. Although Goldman (1965) proposed the teaching of 
'life themes' and 'religious themes' to tackle poor understanding of Christianity in 
religious education, his framework also included 6 hierarchical stages of cognitive 
and emotional development, each spanning two years. 
The implications of viewing people in such a way means that comparisons can be 
made between, for example, mature and immature or normal and pathological 
humans. The categories 'immature' and 'pathological' are easier to define if 
normative stages and levels for the whole population exist and. in terms of 
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people's experience of bereavement, such terms are often used to describe 
responses deemed abnormal, unusual or troublesome. One issue in the 
conceptualizing of stages is the conflict in descriptions between abnjptness and 
gradualism or discontinuity and continuity. Piagetian stage thinking which deems 
development to be characterized by sequential and qualitative change and 
discontinuity led Werner (1957) to postulate the orthogenetic principle that 
development involves 'emergence.' Although this is a useful way of picturing 
development, it is not, of course, how development of the child or young person is 
normally perceived by parents and teachers. It is usually only after a change has 
occurred that we are able to describe development in this way because then we 
take a long-term view, picking out salient features of change, and can see how 
development 'suddeni/ happened. 
A more accurate picture of development from a here-and-now viewpoint is of 
gradual, continuous, imperceptible change. Because such change is hard to see 
as it slowly occurs, this picture of development is less exciting since 'nothing' 
seems to be happening. Confusion or frustration may arise because people 
simultaneously display characteristics or competencies of different stages of 
development or appear to have forgotten the skills, attitudes or abilities they 
previously displayed. However, 'instant' examples of development sometimes 
occur which may be explained as recognition or insight - explained by Plato as 
'recognition', and described by Reanney (1991, p 213) as discovering "what Is 
already true." 
Another issue in the use of stage descriptions of development is that they may be 
used to explain or predict present or future development rather than simply to 
describe change. Since development may be seen as a combination of both 
assimilation (addition of unchallenging material) and accommodation 
(readjustment to challenging material), both the urge to progress and the urge to 
conserve may be present in differing measures in different people. Apart from 
differences of temperament and personality which must be taken into account, 
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such descriptions are acceptable as long as they are only descriptions rather than 
explanations of development because the full reason why a child or young person 
learns something quickly or appears to grieve for years cannot be explained so 
easily. 
As with moral and spiritual development. I suggest that notions of stages or 
phases of bereavement may also be unhelpful if promoted too thoroughly since 
adaptation to loss can take many forms. As I shall show in the next chapter, 
development (which includes adapting to losses throughout one's life) may not 
take as predictable a course as we would wish or imagine. Although we may 
impose an order on what we perceive to be happening - labelling emotions 
'anger.' 'despair* etc and perceiving them to conform to nomothetic laws - our 
individuality allows a variety of responses which may not conform to expectations 
but which are. none the less, natural. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: BEREAVEMENT AND MORAL AND 
SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
Ideas developed in previous chapters lead me to propose two complementary 
views of human development following bereavement: a general view which sees 
all bereavement outcomes as forms of development, and a specific view which 
recognizes that certain outcomes are traditionally perceived as moral or spiritual. 
The chapter considers stories and common-sense views of the outcome of 
bereavement; examples from life; variables affecting outcome and measures used 
to assess them; and the significance of perceiving bereavement, grief and 
grieving from a medical standpoint. As an alternative to psychoanalytic, 
attachment and transitional models I propose one of adaptation which reflects 
some ideas about development previously discussed. 
Bereavement: stories and common-sense views 
Your father's gone.' my bald headmaster said. 
His shiny dome and brown tobacco jar 
Splintered at once in tears. It wasnt grief. 
I cried for knowledge which was bitterer 
Than any grief. For there and then I knew 
That grief has uses - that a father dead 
Could bind the bully's fist a week or two; 
And then I cried for shame, then for relief. 
Edward Lucie-Smith (1964) The lesson' 
The poem cited above reflects the expectation that when death occurs people will 
take care of the bereaved because it is a difficult time for them and also suggests 
that even school bullies will grudgingly abide by such a code of moral behaviour. 
Other well-known stories from a variety of sources (eg: Cinderella, Batman. 
Hamlet) reveal common-sense views of the likely difficulties and outcomes of 
bereavement for children and young people to which we may consciously or 
subconsciously subscribe. 
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Cinderella's stepmother dominates and abuses her but she emerges 
uncomplaining and triumphant in adulthood - and ready, it should be noted, for 
marriage. Batman avenges the robbery and murder of his parents by assisting 
unknown defenceless people and inspiring fear in criminals. Hamlet, however, 
loses interest in his personal appearance, sport and books, becomes distrustful of 
his friends and possessive of Ophelia. Cinderella's essential self is not harmed by 
her ordeal but. rather, is refined to reveal strength and charm of character. 
Batman, however, becomes a solitary masked vigilante and Hamlet dies 
prematurely in a duel trying to avenge his father's murder. All three stories, reflect 
sexual stereotypes in response to moral trials: passivity and endurance in females 
in response to difficulties in interpersonal relationships; activity and destruction in 
males in trials of local, national or international importance. 
Even in analysing these popular tales, however, it is important to remember that 
both development and grieving are processes that take time. We only see the 
first few months of Hamlet's bereavement, whereas Cinderella has been bereaved 
some time before her development from teenager to young woman is traced, and 
Batman has probably been bereaved for at least fifteen years when his story 
starts. Although it is easy to identify that the bereaved state begins when 
someone dies, it is much harder to say where the middle and the end of the 
grieving process are. In the latter cases, one may not think it was 'the middle' or 
the end' until afterwards and. as I shall show later in this chapter, it can be argued 
that there really is no 'end' since we never forget someone's death and continue 
our lives as before, completely unchanged. Even the act of remembering dead 
people constitutes a change in our lives because our memories of them were not 
usually considered 'finished' before they died - we expected to carry on our 
relationship with them. If nothing else, we have to adjust to the fact that that part 
of our life is over, that it can only be revived by memories, and that even those will 
fade and fail in time. 
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As well as recognizing that the grieving process continues over time, the type of 
death, the family circumstances and the age of the person also need considering. 
Batman witnessed the murder of his parents when he was about 10; Hamlet's 
father died suspiciously when he was a teenager; Cinderella's mother died wrhen 
she was young, probably of illness or even in childbirth. For Cinderella, parental 
remarriage means living with older step-siblings and, for Hamlet, having an uncle 
become a step-father. 
It is likely that witnessing a murder or discovering a suicide can cause more 
distress than finding people who died in their sleep. Also, due to a sense of age 
appropriateness, having a parent die may be more disturbing than having a 
grandparent die, and having a sibling die may be more disturbing than having a 
parent die. Losing a parent by death may mean a loss of nurture and order in the 
home, a drop in income or actually having to move home. Losing a sibling by 
death may affect family dynamics, perhaps forcing a child into a premature senior 
role, altering the dependency between parents and children or resulting In the 
birth of a new child by way of compensation. By contrast, losing a grandparent by 
death may have little impact, either because the grandparent lived at a distance or 
because the death occurred In hospital - a place often considered inappropriate 
for a child to visit. The loss by death of a pet is one of the most common 
experiences in childhood and is probably a good preparation for understanding 
the concept of death and experiencing more significant human deaths later in life. 
Focus on the nuclear family means that most western research has concentrated 
on the importance for a child or young person of the death of a parent or sibling, 
rather than, for example, the death of grandparent, cousin or pet. 
There are many variables that are likely to affect the outcome of being bereaved 
as a child or young person - age, sex, position in the family, temperament, 
cognitive development, understanding of the concept of death, academic 
achievement and status, special interests and hobbies, disabilities, physical 
development, health, social behaviour, socio-economic status, social support 
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networks, religion, ethnicity, cultural background and existential beliefs - so that it 
seems difficult to draw any firm conclusions, and in fact. Kollar (1990, p 11) 
comments: "If everything depends on everything else, is there really any theory of 
grief?" 
As well as difficulty in accounting for all variables, there has sometimes been a 
tendency in research literature to treat people who lose a parent - whether 
through death, divorce, separation, desertion, military service or hospitalization -
as a homogenous group (Berlinsky and Biller, 1982). This approach fails to take 
into account that death, unlike other forms of separation, is final. For example, 
when parents divorce their children can hope for a reconciliation, although 
unlikely, but the features of death (irreversibility, universality and nonfunctionality: 
Speece and Brent, 1987) usually prevent such hope when a parent dies. In 
addition, until fairly recently there was a tendency to consider individuals in 
isolation from their families and to overlook the interdependency and rules of 
family systems. Such a family perspective acknowledges that any change in one 
part of the system (eg: death of father) will cause changes in the entire system 
such as new relationships between sun/iving family members. 
Bereavement outcome and development: synonymous processes 
Despite the emphasis shown later in this chapter on identifying mainly negative 
behavioural outcome or psychological impairment in adulthood, I believe that a 
range of examples of moral and spiritual development can be found in the 
literature. I consider that development is a natural process and bereavement is a 
natural event but that notions of normality in development, whether moral or 
spiritual, and the process of grieving in responses to bereavement are socio-
culturally constructed. In Britain the death of a child's parent may be considered 
'abnormal' if the child is still at school but 'normal' if the 'child' is middle aged or 
older. Weeping and talking about the deceased are usually considered 'normal' 
behaviour but not depression or self harm. Two apparently contradictory 
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perspectives on human development give rise to this anomaly. Nomothetic laws, 
which hold that all humans are basically the same, expect broadly similar 
emotional, psychological and behavioural responses while the idiographic 
perspective acknowledges the existence of differences according to personality, 
culture, social context and connection to the deceased. 
Grieving, like development, is an adaptive, coping process which may take an 
erratic route and I do not think that notions of 'returning to normal' describe what 
actually happens since, as I suggested in chapter 1, development involves growth 
and change and involves separation, differentiation, decline and decay as 
organisms live through time. Whether described as 'negative' or 'pathological', I 
propose that responses made to bereavement during the grieving process are 
development even though they may contradict the established or accepted norm 
for emotional development, socio-conventional behaviour, religious belief and, as 
in the case of suicide, even transgress near-absolute moral boundaries. I take 
this view because I consider that any form of development - even the case of a 
cancer growth - is development, whether or not it is welcome and acceptable, 
either individually or socially. 
If a form of behaviour or thinking or feeling can occur it must be natural t)ecause it 
does occur, although I recognize that some forms of development may require 
medical treatment or legal intervention to make them conform to medical or social 
norms which, as already stated, are culturally and socially defined in different 
periods and places. In cases where society deems certain forms of development 
to be 'negative.* norm description rather than criteria descriptions are usually 
applied and unwelcome occurrences are dismissed or negatively evaluated. 
Moral and spiritual development related to death and bereavement may have 
surprising or unconventional outcomes because of the wide range of responses 
humans can make in adjusting to a changed worldview brought about by the 
death of a loved one. Views about oneself and the justness and orderliness of the 
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world need to be reaffirmed or revised and such views may include beliefs about 
how the universe works, the place and power of oneself in it. how to maintain links 
with the deceased, whether or not there is a God or divine power, what the 
meaning or purpose of life is. and what meaning can be found in the deceased's 
death (Klass, 1993a). Although each society has a sense of what is appropriate 
or normal development this does not prevent individuals developing in other ways. 
For example, the concept of an individual personal God within Judaism and 
Christianity encourages a more negative attitude to suicide than within Japanese 
society, and Shinto and Buddhist beliefs - unlike Judaeo-Christian thinking -
consider that contact with deceased ancestors should be maintained by offering 
food at family altars. Thus, actions and behaviour "deemed aberrant, maladjusted 
or pathological in one cultural milieu may be fully acceptable in another" (Stroebe 
et al. 1992. p 1210). 
In the two lists of forms of moral and spiritual development that I offer at the end 
of chapters 2 and 3 there is evidence of new thinking, exploration of emotions and 
changed behaviour. For example, socio-conventional beliefs and practices and 
the dominance of behaviour-focused morality are challenged, and difficult 
concepts such as pain. loss, suffering and mortality are explored, to which there 
may be no answers. Depression, just as much as creativity, can be considered 
to constitute development in response to the changes and challenges of life but 
since schools (and society, too) expect progress towards maturity in terms that 
are deemed positive, such depression is not usually considered 'good 
development' particularly In pupils. 
Definitions of related concepts 
From time to time there is confusion in the literature because authors interchange 
the term 'bereavement' with 'grief or grieving processes (Rodgers and Cowles. 
1991) or use the term 'mourning' instead of 'grief (eg: Freud. 1917; Pollock. 
1987). 'Bereavement* refers to the state of a person who has lost someone 
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significant by death and is an indication of survivorship status. 'Grief is the 
emotional response to that loss and 'grieving' is the process through which 
bereaved people pass. Mourning' describes the expression of grief which a 
culture endorses, whether individually or corporately, while 'loss' is a euphemism 
for the bereaved state which is sometimes useful since it accurately describes the 
feelings experienced in similar states (eg: lost possessions). However, the 
difficulty with using the word 'loss' springs from the fact that some//7/ng that is lost 
may be found again whereas someone who is 'lost' cannot be found alive again. 
The state of bereavement is normal and natural since It is a "choiceless event" 
(Attig, 1991) that usually occurs to everyone and cannot be planned. There is, 
however, no agreement on definitions of 'normal' grief (Rodgers and Cowles. 
1991; Shuchter and Zissok, 1993) - although I have already suggested that all 
such forms are 'natural.' The intensity, duration or particular manifestations of 
some forms of grieving are variously described as abnormal, absent, atypical, 
distorted, morbid, maladaptive, pathological, truncated, unresolved, neurotic or 
dysfunctional (Middleton et al, 1993). Early research into childhood bereavement 
tended to focus on whether, because of their cognitive Inability to understand what 
death meant, children could not grieve or did so abnormally, resulting in 
psychological impairment in adulthood. Despite many views to the contrary, I 
think it is important to state my belief that bereavement is a natural state, that 
grieving involves making active choices, and that grief is not a disease as Engel 
(1961) persuasively suggests. 
I accept that grief "is 'natural' or 'normal' in the same sense that a wound or a bum 
are natural or normal responses to physical trauma" (Engel. p 19) and that, like 
these physical injuries, such ubiquitous effects are experienced by all humans 
because of our universal vulnerability. However, it is not clear what Engel is 
likening to disease. He calls it 'grief but actually describes the grieving process 
(shock; a growing and painful awareness of loss; restitution), arguing that even 
uncomplicated grief represents a gross departure from the dynamic state 
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considered to represent well-being. Such a description implies a homeostatic 
model or 'recovery to a previous state of health' view which I later challenge in this 
chapter. 
While it is important to recognise the disabling and disorienting effect that the 
bereaved state may cause, I think Engel's (1961) call for grief to become "a 
legitimate and proper study by medical scientists" (p 20) has been heeded rather 
too vigorously. Most current concepts of grief in the bereavement literature are 
still from within the discipline of medicine (Rodgers and Cowles, 1991) so that the 
prevailing model likens bereaved people to patients needing treatment for a 
disease, describes manifestations of grief as 'symptoms' or as 'resulting' in 
depression, crying and other disturbances, and sees the outcome as 'recover/ 
from pain and suffering. Our dependence upon health-care services probably 
prevents us from discovering our own qualities of self-renewal and testing the 
support of ordinary others (Jaffe, 1985) since before the medicalization of 
bereavement, 'psychosocial medicine' or "tender loving care" was administered 
by non-professional caregivers (Parkes, 1993. p 99). 
The title of this study, which links bereavement with moral and spiritual 
development, may actually be misleading since any moral and spiritual outcome 
following the event of bereavement in a child or young person's life will develop 
during the grieving process (which also includes the formal period of mourning). 
This is the period when people make choices, whether acknowledged or not. 
about how to continue with their lives. The term 'bereavement' only describes the 
survivorship state of a person who experiences the (usually unchosen and 
unplanned) death of another human. It says nothing about the survivor's actual 
response to loss (Clark, 1990). 
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Psychoanalytic, attachment and transitional models of grieving 
An understanding of loss - whether through death or other means - and the 
internalization of lost objects is central to psychoanalytic theory. The talking cure' 
that Breuer used with 21 year-old Anna O. and which in time became the basis of 
psychoanalysis employed by Freud, was for symptoms arising during the nine 
months she had nursed her dying father. The death of Freud's own father 
precipitated an intense self-analysis and the formulation of the Oedipus complex 
(desire for mother and jealousy of father) described for the first time in The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1900) in which Freud described melancholia as a form 
of mouming (or grief) likely to occur If a bereaved child had desired the death of 
its parent. 
Freud considered that mouming (normal grief) did not involve ambivalent feelings 
towards the deceased but that melancholia (pathological grief) did. The concept 
of grieving, whether 'normal' or 'pathological' has been further expounded, and 
many studies have attempted to analyse whether bereavement in childhood and 
the subsequent process of grieving have contributed towards maladjustment in 
adulthood. Berlinsky and Siller's (1982) review of 114 studies of parental death 
and psychological development identifies areas of frequent research. The largest 
group in their sample (61 studies) are empirical, mainly retrospective studies 
concerned with emotional disturbances such as depression, suicidal behaviour, 
schizophrenia and paranoid psychosis. Seventeen studies, mainly from a 
psychoanalytic perspective, are theoretical, concerned with immediate, rather 
than long term reactions in children; ten studies are concerned with personality; 
seven studies deal with delinquency and criminal behaviour; twelve studies 
analyse sex roles, sexual behaviour and marriage, and - by contrast - seven 
studies focus on creative, academic and cognitive achievements. Overall, there 
has been a tendency for both theoretical and empirical work to look for negative 
rather than positive outcome from bereavement in children and young people and. 
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although such research samples are small compared to the general population, 
they may have tended to give the impression that such outcomes are common. 
As well as psychoanalysis, the literature about bereavement and grief has been 
influenced by attachment theory. Noting similarities between babies separated 
from their mothers and adults facing bereavement. Bowlby (eg: 1961) perceived 
grief to be an extension of a general response to separation (protest, despair, 
detachment) and the eventual goal of grieving as 'letting go' of a relationship that 
it is impossible to retain. In 1982 Bowlby concluded that most healthy people 
grieved longer than had often been suggested, particularly by psychoanalytic 
theory, and that responses usually deemed pathological such as anger, disbelief 
and searching for the lost person were quite common. 
Psychoanalysis and attachment theory share a common assumption that the main 
work of grieving is to gradually detach emotionally from the deceased and such 
'work' - often known as 'grief work' - consists of testing over time the reality of the 
loss. Worden's (1991) view of this 'work' as four tasks is a popular and useful 
one: 
1. Accepting the reality of the loss and its implication. (Recognizing that 
searching is futile, ceasing to deny the death, moving and discarding the 
deceased's possessions.) 
2. Experiencing the turmoil of grief rather than avoiding or short-cutting it. 
(Feeling pain, anger, guilt, and crying when necessary.) 
3. Adjusting to an environment in which the deceased is physically missing. 
(Taking on new roles and leaming new skills.) 
4. Withdrawing emotional energy from and relocating the deceased sufficiently to 
allow involvement with other people. (Being willing to love, trust and risk again). 
Although these may seem everyday activities, they indicate physical, cognitive 
and emotional adaptations which can be interpreted as moral and spiritual 
development. Task four, however, is increasingly open to criticism (Stroebe. 
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1992; Stroebe et al, 1992; Klass, 1993a; Manvit and Klass, 1995) since ties to the 
deceased are retained in many ways and, unless these are so obsessional as to 
be detrimental to other relationships, there seems no reason why they must be 
broken. (Discussion of this issue will follow later In this chapter.) 
Both psychoanalysis and attachment theory have tended to see grieving as a 
time-limited process although the expected time course for 'normal' grieving has 
increased with the development of bereavement research. Current thinking 
considers that two years enables the death to be reality-tested by a range of 
anniversaries such as birthdays of the bereaved and the deceased, the death 
itself, Christmas, Easter and other family get-togethers (Worden, 1991; Stroebe et 
al, 1993) and, in line with this view, I tried not to interview or question any child, 
young person or adult bereaved of someone significant during the previous two 
years. 
Parkes (1993) offers another viewpoint, suggesting that bereavement is one of 
life's psychosocial transitions (PST) which require major revisions of assumptions 
about the world, are lasting in their implications and take place, without any 
preparation, over a relatively short period of time. This view has increasing 
validity as medical care continues to preserve and extend life for all age groups so 
that death is often perceived as a failure of the medical system. The causes of 
death - currently defined as natural, accidental, suicidal or from murder - even 
subdivide 'natural' death into 'expected' or 'unexpected' categories. By contrast, 
normative transitions involve biological, psychological and soclo-cultural factors 
which are usually expected, planned or chosen (eg: birth, initiation, marriage, 
childbirth, retirement). Despite our human ability to respond to change, and even 
to actively seek it, the stress of an unplanned life-changing event such as death 
may cause physiological reactions which, if viewed negatively, seem to precede 
illness (Amette, 1996). 
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Theories of grief and grieving can be seen to fall into four approaches (Kollar, 
1990) and, taken together, I think such an overview helps to explain some of the 
contradictions and ambiguities in the literature. First, when grief Is seen as an 
emotional sickness to avoid, the focus is usually on ways of dealing with shock, 
pain and denial. This approach focuses on grief as an emotion and tends to 
emphasise the beginning of the grieving period. When the second view is held -
that mature living includes grieving as the acknowledgement of inevitable loss -
the emphasis is on acceptance of psychological reality. This approach is 
concerned with living without the deceased in the future and tends to focus on the 
middle of the grieving period. The third approach is also concerned with the 
middle of the grieving period and how the choices made then shape future 
outcomes. This view sees grieving as a psychological process of growth, often 
with an emphasis on grief and grieving as a rite of passage - that is. on 
acknowledging the significance of an experience that everyone goes through at 
some point in their lives. Fourth, when grieving is seen as a set of developmental 
tasks (eg: Worden, 1991), growth and development are emphasized. This 
approach perceives developmental tasks to be ongoing - without a beginning, 
middle or end - because, in meeting the challenges of living, these tasks 
continually overlap. 
I do not think that any theory can fully explain 'normal' grief and grieving in a way 
that includes all possible outcomes. The 'grief work' hypothesis, previously 
described, assumes grieving will be slow and painful but cross-cultural, 
correlational and experimental studies do not support this view (Stroebe, 1992). 
While agreeing that 'grief work' (or grieving) may include negative emotions 
Stroebe suggests it is also 
a cognitive process involving confrontation with and restructuring of thoughts alx>ut 
the deceased, the loss experience, and the changed world within which the bereaved 
must now live (p 33). 
There is a growing recognition that bereavement theories have tended to focus on 
"the sudden death of a middle-aged white man" (Kollar, 1990, p 10) and 
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highlighted widows rather than any other group. Since this has meant that 
children's grieving is usually compared to that of adults and often termed 
'abnormal' by contrast, I think that a holistic view is needed in order in future to 
address the differing 'realities' that people of all ages have of the experience of 
bereavement. 
Grief and grieving and nnoral and spiritual development 
I consider that bereavement is a passive state and grief is a passive emotion. 
One cannot avoid being bereaved, through relationships or friendships, and the 
grief emotion which seems to overwhelm after such an event often feels 
Impossible to avoid also (see chapter 1). Since the desire to restore the loss 
cannot be satisfied because the belief that it has occurred is true (Attig, 1991), the 
emotion grief may be considered irrational, and frustration often arises because 
nothing can be done to change what has happened. Such feelings make us feel 
the world is an unsafe place because habits of living that we have come to rely 
upon (that the deceased will be In our life) must be revised. 
By contrast, I see grieving and mourning to be active processes, offering choices -
sometimes frightening and sometimes exciting - and unknown outcomes. 
Mourning involves choosing how to Interact with the corpse (whether or not to 
view or touch it), what kind of funeral service to arrange (what religious beliefs to 
endorse, whether to use flowers or hymns, what to wear), what to do immediately 
aftenwards (whether to have a wake or party) and what to do In the long term (how 
long to wear any sign of mourning, how to publicly announce the event, how to 
mark the event on a formal or regular basis). Grieving is the personal response to 
many of the components of mouming - such as whether or not to cry during the 
funeral - and to philosophical and metaphysical questions which often arise when 
a living thing dies, such as questioning meaning and purpose in life, whether or 
not there is any form of life after physical death, and the nature and existence of 
God or a divine spirit. Other grieving choices are whether or not to indulge In or 
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struggle against the grief emotion; how and when to tackle many of the tasks that 
have to be done such as dealing with the deceased's possessions; which 
possessions to keep and how to discard of the rest; whether or not to visit places 
that have associations with the deceased; whether or not to express one's 
feelings through silence, withdrawal, prayer, talking, writing, painting, walking or 
sport; how to interact with other people and how to build a new relationship with 
the deceased (Attig. 1991). 
Children and young people also have choices to make in this process, the most 
obvious practical one being whether or not to attend the funeral. Decisions are 
often made for them in this respect, though, and many who did not attend later 
wish they had. Other ongoing personal choices which everyone has to make, 
whether or not they attend the funeral, include how to remember and 
commemorate the deceased. Although it is possible that children and young 
people who do not attend a funeral may have unresolved feelings and memories 
which need addressing, working out how to incorporate thoughts about the 
deceased into one's life is something that everyone continually needs to do. 
whatever their age. 
The emphasis within twentieth century bereavement theory on 'breaking bonds' 
with the deceased (Worden's fourth 'grief work' task) in order to carry on with life 
more efficiently contrasts with views held a century ago. Then the so-called 
romantic belief in the mysterious processes within oneself - considered to be the 
source of one's soul, of love, genius and creativity - encouraged the maintenance 
of bonds with the deceased as signifying the importance of love and relationships. 
The bereaved often strove to retain a sense of the deceased, dreamed of them, 
expected reunions in an afterlife, named children after them and sought their 
guidance and advice particularly through spiritualism (Stroebe et al. 1992). In this 
sense some of my respondents seem to reflect 'romantic' rather than 
contemporary bereavement theory thinking (see chapter 7). 
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How to interact with other people and build a new relationship with the deceased 
are significant examples of grieving choices because they represent rather 
evident examples of conventionally defined moral and spiritual development. 
Since interacting with other people cannot really be avoided if life is to continue in 
any meaningful way (although levels of intimacy can be regulated), how this is 
done while grieving is important. For example, the tiredness which often 
accompanies grief may make the bereaved person bad-tempered or unwilling to 
do anything. These changes may affect inter-personal relationships in the short 
term and even persist long terni. Children may not understand why their surviving 
parent is grumpy and parents may not realise why their child is apathetic. A 
bereaved pupil may not have the energy to listen carefully in lessons and. if 
reprimanded by a teacher for inattention or poor work, may respond sullenly. 
Building a new relationship with the deceased, however, is unlike maintaining or 
rebuilding relationships with one's family and friends. The physical absence of the 
deceased forces new ways of communication and ways of remembering and. 
when bereaved people use these ways to maintain a sense of the deceased in 
their current lives, it is probably easier for the finality of the loss to be accepted 
(Doka, 1993; Silverman and Worden. 1993). Bereaved people often accomplish 
this by maintaining interaction with an inner representation of the deceased 
through possessions, photographs, clothing, and keepsakes, through activities 
such as visiting the grave or memorial place and through prayer, dreams and 
having a sense of the deceased being with or watching them. Inner 
representations may be maintained when aspects of the self are felt to be in 
interaction with the deceased, or when the bereaved hold on to memories of or 
recognize emotional states associated with the deceased (Klass. 1993b). Dreams 
may be ways of reviving memories in new creative forms and common forms of 
dreaming are talking about the death with the deceased, reliving the dying 
process, receiving advice or instructions and saying a final farewell (Cookson, 
1990; Barrett, 1992). 
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Klass (1993b) found that bereaved parents maintained their interaction with their 
dead children through a sense of presence, hallucinations in any of the senses, 
belief in the child's continuing active influence on thoughts or events, and a 
conscious incorporation of their characteristics or virtues. Hogan and DeSantis 
(1992) found that bereaved siblings maintain an ongoing attachment to their dead 
brother or sister by longing to share activities with them; wanting to catch up on 
news, to know if the deceased is happy, and to know what heaven (or wherever 
they are) is like; feeling the deceased guiding them, and expecting to be reunited 
with them. Silverman and Worden (1993) found that bereaved children maintain 
their interaction with deceased parents through dreams, talking to them, feeling 
that they are watching them, keeping personal items, visiting the grave and 
frequently thinking about them. In Kremetz's (1991) classic account of eighteen 
children and teenagers bereaved of a parent, ten mention maintaining a 
connection in some of these ways also, four of which are as follows. 
Sometimes I ride him (father's horse] in horse shows and I always try my best for 
my father. I think that if I ride him especially well, maybe my dad can see me - or 
something (p 59). (Giri aged 10: bereaved one year) 
I realized that ... the real person, the person I loved who was Mum, was 
somewhere else and would never die. Her spirit was part of me and part of all of 
us (p 71). (Boy aged 16: bereaved four years) 
t can still remember my mother vividly. I can hear her voice and I can still 
remember how she reacted to things I did. (p 54). (Boy aged 15: bereaved six 
years) 
... when I went to temple for my Bas Mitzvah there were a lot of times when I just 
feft my mother was there, supporting me and helping me. Every now and then -
it just lasted a second, but I felt she was there. Occasionally I have dreams 
about her I do think that my mother can see me. Not always * it's just at 
certain times that I think she's watching me' (pp 20-1). (Giri aged 13: bereaved 
seven years) 
Such methods provide solace - a source of comfort in a changed situation and a 
blending of inner and outer reality (Klass, 1993b) - and these ways of staying in 
touch are undoubtedly valuable. However, as Silverman and Worden (1993, p 
314. my italics) note: 
These behaviours have frequently been labeled as 'preoccupations with the 
deceased.' This term implies symptomatic behaviour that should end. Most 
of the descriptions of this phenomenon have been based on clinical 
obsen/ations ... and this may have influenced the conclusion that in grief wori( 
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it is necessary to disengage from the deceased. This conclusion did not seem 
consistent with the reality we obsen/ed. 
It seenfis, therefore, that previously held notions of pathological grieving may be 
vital physical, cognitive and emotional adaptations to death and loss which can be 
defined in moral and spiritual terms. In order to further explore the notion that 
w^hatever occurs is natural development, whether or not it is normal (expected and 
accepted) or abnormal (unexpected and unacceptable). I want to consider some 
rather less well documented outcomes, such as the links between proficiency and 
creativity, depression and self-harm within eminent people who were bereaved in 
childhood. 
Bereavement: examples from life 
Intrigued by theories of hereditary principles and links between psychoses and 
moral degeneracy. Eisenstadt (1978) compiled a list of 573 eminent people 
bereaved of a parent in childhood including writers, philosophers, scientists, 
statesmen, royalty, founders, soldiers, artists, reformers, composers and 
explorers from antiquity to the twentieth century, although mostly from the 
nineteenth century. He concluded that death of a parent by age ten was markedly 
greater among the eminent subjects than the 1921 census sample for England 
and Wales - although it is important to be aware of life expectancy differences 
across time and between cultures and countries. 
There are many reasons why parental bereavement might lead to a changed 
lifestyle. Children may take on increased responsibility in the family, adopt a new 
role, seek a new parent role model or idealize the deceased parent and attempt to 
copy or exceed his or her standards. They may also desire to control their own 
destiny, to excel intellectually, or to overcome feelings of insecurity, unhappiness 
or guilt. Such desires can become sources of compensatory energy and 
encourage a ruthless or determined attitude to life. Many bereaved children and 
young people may experience a sense of moral injustice because God. fate or 
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destiny selected them - but not their peers - for the death of a loved one which, in 
turn, may engender the capacity to endure a self-punishing routine that other 
people might abandon (Eisenstadt, 1978). 
Some people may develop their imaginative capacities as compensation for the 
absence of intimate relationships with family members. By creating a new poem 
or other work of art which has a concrete presence in the world, a lost unity may 
be restored or a new unity found within oneself. Thus the gap between the 
external world of reality and an individual's inner world is bridged (Storr. 1989). 
Since creative people are often used to or need solitude to work, bereaved 
children may have an advantage in having had to cope with being left alone, 
either physically or psychologically, at significant times in their lives. Writing, 
painting or shaping a product is one practical way of overcoming feelings of 
helplessness - which a bereavement in childhood may well engender - or of 
overcoming anger at feeling abandoned. 
It may be that the greater the disharmony within - whether caused by 
bereavement, mental instability or some other form of stress - "the sharper the 
spur to seek harmony, or. if one has the gifts, to create harmony" (Storr. p 132). 
For example, Sylvia Plath had such abilities and used them to describe her inner 
world and. apparently, to predict her own suicide. She was a child prodigy and 
published her first poem when she was eight, a year before her father died. 
Although an outstanding student, she attempted suicide at 19/20 years and again 
at 29/30 years when married with two children. In 'Daddy' (1962) she seems to 
explain why. 
I was ten when they buried you. 
At twenty I tried to die 
And get back, back, back to you. 
I thought even the tx>nes would do. 
Another writer whose work seems to express inner turmoil is Friedrich Nietzsche. 
although it is less explicitly expressed. Friedrich's father, a capable musician. 
punished his son for displays of emotion which the child learnt to avoid by 
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retreating into solitude. His father became mentally 111 when Nietzsche was three 
and died when he was four, just before Nietzsche's two-year old brother also died. 
Grief at the loss of his father and anger and puzzlement at the way he was forced 
in childhood by his female relatives to observe extreme notions of Christian 
virtues (self-discipline, neighbourly love and compassion) later seemed to 
encourage clever written attacks on abstract concepts such as Christianity, 
middle-class values and *the nature of woman' (Miller. 1990). 
It appears that Plath grieved for the loss of the relationship with her father while 
Nietzsche grieved for the changed circumstances preceding his father's death and 
the kind of life he led afterwards. 
Eisenstadt's (1978) sample of eminent people bereaved in childhood contains 679 
men and 20 women, and Storr (1989) cites 8 male writers and 1 female writer 
bereaved before they were 12 who suffered from depression and/or committed 
suicide. This disparity in samples of men and women, arising from men's greater 
access to public life, may also reflect more rigorous public social norms for men, 
for whom acts of suicide and moods of depression are considered emasculating. 
The greater secrecy and seclusion of women's lives throughout most of history 
makes it difficult to evaluate how eminent they might have been if they had had 
equal access to education and property or to know if depression and suicide were 
more or less common in women than in men. 
It may be helpful to hypothesise some of the ways that the grieving process, 
depression and creativity inter-relate. It is likely that the death of someone -
especially of a loved one - forces immediate instability into people's lives. Apart 
from the absence of the deceased, routines change, rooms and clothes are left in 
disorder, people visit or come to stay and even if a funeral is not attended for the 
first time, it is attended in a new role related to the deceased (eg: as fatherless or 
motherless orphan). The stability to balance this is often sought in familiar 
routines at school or work or in careful attention to tasks involving detailed 
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examination, such as sorting or cataloguing, which give a sense of regaining 
control in some area of life. Since creativity often involves sustaining disorder 
such as tolerating open books or paints, piles of paper, unfinished sketches or 
drafts of ideas and keeping irregular hours, the similarity between events following 
a death and creative work may be too painful to contemplate, and despair may 
result. However, one success may parallel another and the production of a 
tangible acclaimed product can encourage new progress in the grieving process. 
The difficulty of establishing boundaries between insanity and genius is well 
known (Royal College of Psychiatrists. 1994) and those between insanity and 
mystical or religious experiences have also been seen as problematic (Hay, 1990) 
due to conflicting and interlinking reasons. A diagnosis of insanity or physical 
illness may be given to culturally unusual beliefs which prompt unsociable 
behaviour, or to hallucinations, visions or mystical experiences that fall outside the 
nomi for the socio-cultural context in which they occur but one particular difficulty 
in assessing religious experiences is that comparisons are often made across 
time and cultures and that definitions of insanity and notions of such things as 
alcoholism, genius or depression alter over a period of time. Overall, there seems 
to be no support for the suggestion that religiousness is necessarily correlated to 
psychopathology (Bergin. 1983). 
It is apparent from examples in life that only some people who are bereaved when 
young become eminent through creativity (eg: Charlotte Bronte), that only some 
people seem to find life thereafter intolerable and commit suicide (eg: John 
Berryman), that only some people suffer from bouts of depression (eg: William 
Cowper), and that others - such as stereotypical Cinderella and millions of other 
unnamed people - quietly move on in life, their development unremarked. These 
differences may be due to personality and qualities of character such as 
hardiness (Campbell et al, 1991) or an ability to transform the situation and share 
it positively with others (Jaffe. 1985) rather than the mere event of the death 
itself. 
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The recognition that people respond differently reinforces my suggestion that 
whatever develops is development, whether it is perceived as healthy or 
unhealthy, and the many variables likely to affect development after bereavement 
will be explored next. 
Bereavement of children and young people: variables, measures and 
outcomes 
As well as the factors already mentioned, some practical and concrete factors 
associated with bereavement - especially when a parent or sibling dies - include 
having new living arrangements; moving home or to a new area; moving away 
from friends, relatives and school; and experiencing a change in standard of 
living. 
Parental death 
The death of a parent in childhood has attracted most research, mainly focusing 
on aberrant reactions, either short-term (after months or a few years) or long-term 
(adulthood). These include psychiatric disorders (Rutter, 1966), mental illness 
(Birtchnell. 1970). suicide ideation (Adam et al, 1982). dysphoria, mild depression, 
bedwetting (Van Eerdewegh et al. 1982). personality (Furman. 1983). poor 
mothering (ZaII, 1994) alcoholism, schizophrenia, homosexuality, neuroses 
(Finkelstein. 1988) and depression (Weller et al. 1991). By contrast, Kremetz 
(1991). Garber (1983), Cragg and Berman (1990) and Abrams (1992) break 
important new ground by presenting autobiographical accounts or research 
findings from 'normal' young people who are not part of a medical or psychiatric 
population in which there is evidence of development that I will describe as moral 
or spiritual. 
Abrams (1992) recounts her reactions towards other people, including the 
deceased: bad-temper towards her step-father ("How dare he be alive at all and 
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my dad dead." p 19); anger at pupils at school ('Why should I have to make 
allowances for them, when they should have been making allowances for me?" p 
11); astonishment at her English teacher's request that she reread aloud a poem 
about death ("Had he intended it as a way of acknowledging what had happened 
to me?" p 12) and fury with her father for having died and hurt her. She also 
reviews how she learnt to relate to the absence of her father in her life, which 
reiterates the importance of building a new relationship with the deceased. 
In the first few years after my father's death. I had the disturbing experience of 
somehow having him in me, of carrying him in an almost physical sense inside 
me, so that at times it was as if I were 'Ijeing him'. ... His presence inside me 
was sad and burdensome, as well as wanted. But as the years have passed, 
the sense of him as a physical preseiu^e has worn off; I no longer feel I have 
to carry him inside me in order to keep him alive, but can firxi comfort from the 
memory of him inside me instead. ... it is no longer a burdensome presence 
inside me, but rather a comfortable space, like a little private meeting place to 
go to when I want to be with him(p 245). 
Sibling death 
Sibling death has been less frequently considered and it may be this lack that has 
prompted 'The Compassionate Friends* to produce SIBBS. a magazine in which 
bereaved siblings (and sometimes cousins and friends) of all ages share their 
reactions and feelings with each other. One sister wrote (1992, p 12): 
Losing my brother has changed me. I am now most definitely a different 
person. Coping with such a b s s is by no means a non-event. One thing I 
have leamt to recognise is that life is so short, you never know what is round 
the comer. 
Sibling death has been considered from the point of view of reactions such as self 
concept (Balk. 1983). emotional over-investment in the family (Mufson. 1985). 
psychological, familial and social prohibitions against grieving or mourning 
(Rosen. 1985), withdrawal, physical symptoms, anger and denial (Deveau, 1990). 
and aggression (McCown and Davies. 1995). Factors affecting outcome are 
considered to be opportunities to share in family grieving and experiencing a 
sense of self-value (Oavies, 1990). Balk (1983) found that 33 bereaved siblings 
who compared themselves before and after the death perceived themselves as 
'more grown up.' able to value each day and its potential more, and able to accept 
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that some severe things have to be accepted because they cannot be altered. At 
the time of the interview (4-84 months after the death) 29 of the 33 said religion 
was now important to them. 27 confessed that religion had helped them accept 
the death and about half of them reported moments when they thought they had 
seen or heard their dead sibling. Balk (1991) also contends that coping with a 
sibling's death impels a young person sooner than nonaffected peers into forms of 
greater maturity such as cognitive development, social reasoning, moral 
judgement, identity formation and religious understanding. 
Peer death 
The death of a peer is increasingly being seen as significant, especially since 
research has revealed the extent of post-traumatic stress disorder following 
disasters such as Hillsborough. 'Jupiter*, and the 'Herald of Free Enterprise' (Yule 
and Gold, 1993). Schachter (1991) found that 87% of a sample of 68 13-19 year-
olds had experienced the death of a peer and. because of the experience, the 
three most frequent examples of changed behaviour were: becoming closer to 
friends, sharing feelings more freely and taking time to tell people you care. One 
19 year-old female whose friend committed suicide wrote: "I am now more 
observant of people's behaviour and I listen more carefully to what they have to 
say" (p 10). 
Probably because of the apparently shocking implications of someone young 
taking their own life, aspects of youth suicide - preoccupation with death (Pfeffer, 
1990). development of the concept (Clark, 1992). prevention (Stevenson. 1990; 
Sullivan, 1990); postvention (Wenckstern and Leenars. 1993) and survivor 
grieving (Valente et al. 1988) - have been increasingly considered. 
Pupil and teacher death 
The significance of bereavement regarding a pupil's academic work, behavioural 
and emotional reactions is becoming more widely recognised by British educators 
(Barnes. 1986; Hufton. 1986; Leaman. 199^; Gisborne, 1995) and counsellors ^ 
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(Goldacre, 1985; Arch, 1986; Davies, 1987; Quannby. 1993). and guidelines to 
prepare for the event of death are now available for schools (Yule and Gold. 
1993) . 
The death of headteacher Philip Lawrence in a knife attack in December 1995 
highlighted the kind of risk situations in which many teachers unwittingly place 
themselves in order to protect their pupils (Charter. 1995). In addition, awareness 
of the trauma caused by particular forms of death such as suicide or murder of 
one parent by another may involve specialist social workers (Pennells and Smith, 
1994) and psychologists (Black and Urbanowicz. 1987; Black and Kaplan. 1993; 
Black. 1995) working with bereaved children. 
In the light of this, it is useful to examine some of the current debate conceming 
'normal' adjustment to bereavement since, as I have said earlier in this thesis, 
bereavement happens to everyone at some time and most people do not seem to 
react 'abnormally' to it. 
Reconsideration of established grief theories 
One becomes aware that assumptions of health and adjustment are by-products of 
cultural and historical processes. Similarly, one realizes that theories of personal 
deficit harbour implicit systems of value, favouring certain ideals over others, 
(Stroebeetal, 1992, p 1211) 
Wortman and Silver (1989) and Stroebe et al (1994) debate five assumptions that 
bereavement research has engendered: the inevitability of distress and 
depression in grief; the necessity of experiencing distress; the importance of 
working through loss; the expectation of 'recovery.' and the 'resolution' of grief. 
Although the conclusions drawn by Stroebe et al given below were made with 
adults mainly in mind, they are also significant for this thesis regarding bereaved 
children and young people who will, of course, grow up to become adults. 
• Most (but not all) bereaved people are distressed in the immediate aftermath 
of death but only a minority suffer from extreme or clinical levels of depression. 
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• Absence of distress is not unconditionally accepted as indicative of pathology. 
• The hypothesis that it is always beneficial to 'work through* grief needs re-
examining. 
• The majority of people actively grieve for less time than a minority but the latter 
are not necessarily suffering from 'chronic' grief. 
• The term 'resolution' is ambiguous since it implies that an ending in cognitive 
and emotional terms has been reached. 
There is also increasing recognition in the literature that death affects not only the 
individual most immediately identified (eg: widow or widower) but all family 
members (especially children); that it is unhelpful to interpret grief as a form of 
"mental or physical illness or debility, or as a matter of clinical concern alone" 
(Stroebe et al, 1993, p 458) and that grief, (or grieving) "is not a simple, universal 
process, with a progression of fixed stages, each with its typical symptoms" (p 
462). 
Thus the psychoanalytic-medical model is beginning to seem narrow and 
inappropriate and the attachment model may. in time, also prove inadequate. As 
explained earlier, the familiar homeostatic view espoused by both theories is of 
grief and grieving as stress which interrupts people's normal lives until an 
'appropriate passage of time' allows them to return to previous patterns of social 
adjustment. This view, however, fails to recognise that loss and death have 
individual and powerful meanings for bereaved people and that they may have 
untapped personal potential with which to respond (Lieberman. 1993). For 
example, some people favour cognitive and behavioural strategies (eg: making a 
plan and carrying it out) while others prefer emotion-focused strategies (eg: 
assessing the support received from other people) (Stevens et al. 1987). 
Apart from practical issues associated with a death, bereaved people also have to 
deal with questions about existence: "finitude. freedom and responsibility, 
isolation, and meaning in life" (Lieberman, 1993. p 420). Since the process of 
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grieving involves adapting to and coping with the loss, it seems inappropriate to 
continue to try to measure a 'retum to baseline' or a return to a pre-bereavement 
state according to an equilibrium model (Stroebe et at. 1993) and better to note 
the many ways in which such adaptation occurs. I think one of the ways to 
explore development in response to bereavement is in terms of short, medium 
and long-term 'adaptation' rather than 'recovery.' 
The diagrams below may indicate the significance of this viewpoint. 
Rgure 5.1 Equilibrium or 'return to baseline' model 
Figure 5.2 Adaptation model: short, medium and longer term change 
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This approach also challenges the usefulness of comparing bereaved with non-
bereaved people because almost no-one is ever truly 'non-bereaved.' As soon as 
a child or young person experiences bereavement (whether of pet. grandparent, 
relative or neighbour), the adaptation process of coping and reshaping one's view 
of life, living and death begins. 
As the adaptation model suggests, there are likely to be changes in lifestyle and 
thinking resulting from the grieving process, some of wrtiich will be to do with 
gains, however small, that arise in any loss situation. Although a bereaved ten-
year old may feel that the loss of her mother is mainly bad. she may secretly 
recognise that the increased time she can now spend with her father is enjoyable. 
A bereaved sixteen-year old may feel that his father's death is awful for him and 
his mother for both financial and emotional reasons but be inwardly glad that the 
months of sickness are over. A girl may miss her deceased elder sister but look 
fonward to family life returning to normal and to moving into the bigger bedroom 
her sister had. In each of these reactions there may be elements of moral guilt 
such as relief at the death, smugness at surviving, or pleasure in renewed family 
life which can result in fear of divine retribution or punishment from the deceased 
in some form. 
Immortality and meaning, purpose and value in life 
... to live is to suffer, to sun/ive is to find meaning in the suffering. If there is a 
purpose in life at all, there must be a purpose in suffering and dying. 
(Frankl. 1962, pxi) 
Although death is a natural necessity for all living things, monotheistic religions in 
particular have resisted accepting this view by claiming that humanity is partially 
exempt from mortality. Because the bereaved need to relocate the dead 
somewhere else, where that 'place' is may reveal the extent of orthodox religious 
beliefs, particularly related to immortality and a sense of the meaning, purpose 
and value in or of life - whether for the deceased, the bereaved or all humanity. 
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I see a distinction between purpose (or meaning) in life and meaning of life which 
mainly rests upon whether or not the bereaved believe in an afterlife or 
immortality. For those who have a sense of a divine plan and believe that all 
human activity has significance as part of that plan (although imperfectly 
understood), death and human striving have a meaning that will be best 
understood only after death. In this sense death is a necessary pathway to 
gaining knowledge of things that cannot be fully understood here since "we see 
through a glass, darkly" (1 Corinthians. 13: 12. KJV). For such people the 
meaning of life is a cosmic one including both this life, death and the next (or 
continuing) life, and their perception of order and purpose in nature may also 
reflect a need to see all life and death as part of a divine plan. 
For those who do not hold a belief in a divine plan (and may even believe that 
such a thing is insulting), meaning (or purpose) in life is possible in a terrestrial 
sense. Contemporary western naturalistic secular views tend to see death as part 
of the process of nature, altering but not stopping the direction of its living 
elements in an apparently endless series of recombinations (Irion. 1993). This 
view allows us to recognise that, as humans, we are dying all the time, and that 
we begin to die from our moment of birth. If nature is not regarded as personal, 
conscious and active (eg: Mother Nature), no moral meaning can be attributed to 
death, suffering and pain. Without either a divine plan or overall (though hidden) 
purpose as to why there is something rather than nothing or a belief that God 
chooses when to 'call* people from this life, individuals have the opportunity to 
make meaning for themselves. From this perspective death and human striving 
can have a meaning and a purpose which it is possible to understand while alive, 
and such meaning-making is often to be found in terms of happiness, 
relationships, love, friendship, service for others and enjoyment of living. 
Meaning in life, which is individual, fluid and changeable over the lifespan, 
encourages a sense of personal identity, direction in life and confidence in an 
ability to cope, although these skills may be challenged or immobilised by the 
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death of a loved one (Ulmer et al. 1991) because involvement in and commitment 
to relationships - which is one of the highest forms of human achievement (see 
chapter 1) - entails sorrow when such joyful relationships are lost. 
Having faith in the future - and believing that there will be a future - enables even 
those in the most appalling circumstances to survive (Frankl. 1962). It also 
enables humans in more ordinary circumstances to live without anxiety about 
death while acknowledging that it is a certain but unknowable event for them until 
it happens. This faith may derive from symbolic forms of immortality (LIfton and 
Olson. 1974) which, white acknowledging that death is final, give a sense of 
connection with the future beyond our present individual lives. These forms 
include having a sense of continuity through children and family; creating and 
influencing (eg: teaching, writing, inventing, constructing); uniting with nature 
(enjoying and caring for it while alive and returning to it. reconstituted, when 
dead); and transcending the present moment or living it to the full (eg: through 
sex. music, childbirth, physical activity). 
Some people imply that being bereaved is 'a terrible thing' - especially if it is 
experienced by a child or young person - but from the point of view of 
understanding either the meaning of life or perceiving meaning in life, it is 
necessary to ask: What it is that death represents? As suggested by the diagram 
below, death (which must be eternal death since it lasts forever) may represent 
either: 
• discontinuity: the opposite or absence of life; the loss of the capacity to reflect 
and communicate; something that is not experienceable and is not something 
in life, or 
• continuity: its extension into eternal life and the continuation of reflection, 
communication, experience, memory etc. 
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eternal life or 
immortality 
Christianity seems to claim that death is to be welcomed because it leads to 
eternal life and that the bereaved should rejoice rather than grieve because the 
deceased are *alive' elsewhere. If there is an afteriife some people reason that 
death is a preferable state to life because it leads us to our teleological end. 
However, other people state that, even if there is an afteriife. this life is preferable 
to death not only for the fact of it leading to immortality but because of what we 
would learn while living this life about the purpose and meaning of our whole life, 
both before and after death. On the other hand, it can also be argued that even if 
there is no afterlife, death would be preferable to life since, without eternal life, the 
chance is removed of receiving an explanation in etemity for both life and death 
and the purpose and meaning of this life. In other words, without eternal life to 
explain life and death, life itself becomes meaningless and so death becomes a 
far preferable state than living a meaningless existence (Levine. 1987). 
Overall, the view that 'life makes sense' because 'it all fits together somehow' or 
that 'life must make sense for it to have meaning' is a western one which sees life 
as a line going somewhere because it has a purpose to achieve (as I drew 
above). 'Why do we suffer?' and 'Why do we die?' are questions that look for a 
personal answer involving love, responsibility, value or some similar concept 
(Kollar, 1993). Although there is no way of knowing 'how it all fits together' (which 
is a similar problem to understanding exactly how the death of Jesus on the cross 
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saved all the people in the word from sin and death), this approach is acceptable 
because it hints at a broader, deeper answer than humanity can ever know in this 
life and gives a certainty that there is an answer in the next life. Such an 
approach may even take away the fear of death because death is seen as the 
doonway to fuller knowledge and understanding. 
Apart from this teleological perspective, three other common approaches to 
understanding suffering and death are: existential, fatalistic and nihilistic. The first 
approach considers life to be absurd and that no answer can ever be given about 
the future because all we know is the here and now. "We simply exist - for 
nothing - and any values or meaning we encounter are of human construction" 
(Thompson, 1995. p 504). In response to the question 'Why did he die?' this 
perspective usually answers: There is no reason; life doesn't make sense. 
The second, fatalistic view accepts that the cause of suffering and death involves 
a balance of give-and-take. Reasons given for suffering are pragmatic: 'The 
people suffered because they were caught in a war' or 'She died of a cancer that 
couldn't be cured.' From this perspective life is seen as "an interlocking network 
of relationships which, when broken, cause suffering and death" (Kollar. 1993. p 
154) and death itself is perceived to be from natural causes. 
The third approach, which sees suffering to be caused by attachment to transient 
things of this word that can be lost, considers that only intangible things are real 
and everlasting (eg: soul, self, God). Not accepting suffering as part of reality 
reduces its significance and holders of this viev^oint believe that their 'real self 
cannot suffer. To enter such a state is to go beyond the transience of this world 
into a near death-like state in which past, present and future are the same (Kollar, 
1993). 
If death is the absence of life, however, it is not possible to gain inside knowledge 
of the experience and it might be wise not to take up any ultimate position. 
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Perhaps we should remain open to all possibilities, unwilling to claim that death 
attains anything or leads anywhere, and neither fearing this life nor hoping for an 
afterlife (Kenyon, 1990). Numerous myths and stories abound in all cultures 
exploring the pervasiveness and origins of death and although all religions offer 
an explanation for it. there can never be any empirical evidence that they are 
correct. Perhaps it is because death defies knowledge that it is frequently 
described poetically and metaphorically. 
Reconsideration of positive and negative outcomes 
As already indicated, despite the experience of something positive as a result of 
death, most research on bereaved children and young people has focused on 
negative outcome such as psychological distress. This is probably because the 
psychoanalytic-medical model has tended to link grief with disease and because 
attachment theory presupposes a degree of stress when separation occurs. 
Although grief emotion is similar to some incapacitating diseases and pain is 
usual when a loss occurs, the grieving process involves emotional, cognitive and 
physical reconstruction which can also generate creativity (Eisenstadt. 1978), 
achievement (Storr. 1989). change (Simos, 1979) and personal growth (Edmonds 
and Hooker, 1992). 
Key themes among Eisenstadfs (1978) suggestions why bereavement may have 
a positive outcome are ruthlessness. relentlessness. self-improvement and 
autonomy. Since this psychological striving to succeed concerns self prevailing 
over other people (l-it) rather than self relating to other people (l-thou). it may 
seem morally selfish. However, it may also encourage an awareness of one's 
"inner space" (Hay, 1987) which, as I have indicated, is a necessary step in 
spiritual development. An understanding of one's own needs and capacities can 
lead to an appreciation of those of other people and, in turn, generate a desire to 
promote their well-being. It should be remembered that Eisenstadt's sample 
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includes not only 64 soldiers and 177 statesmen (whose activities may be 
considered selfish and oppressive) but also 38 reformers and 65 founders. 
Other positive outcomes from the loss by death of someone close may be of an 
inter-personal or existential nature. In interviews with bereaved adults, Kessler 
(1987) identified six positive attitudes in personal growth: caring more about loving 
relationships with friends and family; accepting personal mortality and the 
transience of human existence; savouring the present moment; investing in the 
future; taking more responsibility, and feeling freer to risk new ways of living. 
Oltjenbruns (1991) found that bereaved college sfudenfs described positive 
outcomes as: a deeper appreciation of life; greater caring for loved ones; 
strengthening of emotional bonds with others, developed emotional strength; 
increased empathy for others; better communication skills and enhanced problem 
solving skills. 
Several of Kremetz's (1991) children and teenagers also mentioned these 
outcomes. 
The thing about losing a mother is that now I know I can take just about anything. 
It was so painful, but I survived the loss and it's made me a stronger person 
(p27). (Boy aged 15) 
I suppose my mother's death has probably made me more independent. I just 
have to rely on myself more (p 105). (Boy aged 15) 
I was only eleven at the time, but I grew up real fast. I leamed how to use the 
trains because I had to go visH my mother in the hospital (p 44). (Girl aged 16) 
I used to be a real worrywart and worry that I was going to die. But now 1 realise 
that the most important thing is to have fun (p 98). (Girl aged 9) 
Research previously cited by Kessler (1987). Oltjenbruns (1991) and Kremetz 
(1991) suggests that the experience of bereavement can sharpen an awareness 
of three areas of moral and spiritual development: 
• Self and one's capacities: independence, strength of character, maturity, 
self-assertion, ruthlessness. responsibility, personality, sense of personal 
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worth, control of destiny, intellectual excellence, mastering of feelings and 
emotional strength (area 1 in Carter's overview below), 
o other people's needs and capacities, individuaiiy and corporately: caring. 
empathy, emotional bonds, communication skills and problem-solving (areas 2 
and 3, and perhaps 4. 5 and 6). 
o Existential perspectives on living: enjoyment of living, desire to have fun, 
appreciation of life, savouring of the present moment, transience of human life. 
sense of personal mortality, investment in future and freedom to risk (area 7). 
These three areas can be identified in Kohlberg's moral development theory when 
the hypothetical stage seven is added as an overall unifying factor (see chapter 
4). Stage seven, which gives a cosmic perspective on life in order to answer the 
perennial question: 'Why be moral?* and the subsequent ontological question: 
^Why live?' (Kohlberg and Ryncarz. 1990) is described by Kohlberg (1984. p 249) 
as: 
a high soft stage in the development of ethical and religious orientations, 
orientations which are larger in scope than the justice orientations which our 
hard stages address. 
Figure 5.4 Awareness of inter-connecting human and cosmic relationships 
mankind 
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as a ^ o l e 
the cosmos 
as a totality 
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An individual's moral journey - seen as an increasing awareness of one's relation 
to other people, beginning with a small group, a larger group and then all human 
beings - finally brings her or him to a point where the question: 'Why do I care 
about my neighbour or even about the cosmos?' must be answered by: 'Because 
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you. too. are a part of the cosmos' (Carter, 1987. p 91). I suggest that a 
bereavement experience encourages such development because of the personal, 
inter-personal and existential questions that it raises. Relocating the deceased 
involves cognitively moving him or her from area 2 to area 7. whether conceived 
of as in heaven, in eternity, within oneself, omnipresent or transformed into 
molecules and atoms. Since all humans experience bereavement, such cognitive 
relocating may be an unacknowledged but vital requirement of moral and spiritual 
development that Kohlberg (and others) have not considered since a stage seven 
perspective does not appear in adulthood without preparation. It is slowly 
developed throughout a person's life by a range of loss and death experiences, 
each one contributing by its individual nature to broader and deeper insights. 
Worden's (1991) four tasks described earlier indicating physical, cognitive and 
emotional adaptations can be analysed in terms of moral and spiritual 
development discussed in previous chapters - although I do not claim that the 
following discussion is a definitive assessment. It is also important to add that 
these tasks are not linear, although 1.2 and 3 will probably precede 4. 
1. Accepting the reality of the death 
This task may involve a struggle between denial and realisation of what has 
occurred as helplessness, anger, guilt, shame and disbelief are processed. There 
will probably be issues of truth-telling, honesty and of abiding by consequential or 
deontological principles. The task may also explore the essential human need for 
and to be able to express love, reiatedness and sadness, and to explore personal 
discernment and awareness. 
2. Experiencing the pain of grief 
Whether experienced psychologically (eg: yearning) or physiologically (eg: 
weeping), this task may involve the expression or suppression of emotions 
together with any repercussions from strained or improved relationships. There 
may also be a sense of spiritual change arising from the power of shock or trauma 
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to transform the self when unknown, perhaps unpleasant parts of oneself are 
faced or when people feel they can control or influence the events of their lives 
and take action in order to transcend their situation. 
3. Adjusting to an environment in which the deceased is physically missing 
This task will probably involve acquiring new roles, tasks and skills which 
challenge or enhance an individual's sense of worth. Finding ways to remember 
the missing person may involve rekindling memories, treasuring keepsakes, and 
sensing or believing in the continued presence of the deceased. 
4. Withdrawing emotional energy from and relocating the deceased and 
reinvesting in life and other relationships 
This task will probably involve formulating a belief about where the deceased is 
now, according to either traditional religious and philosophical ideas or other 
naturalistic secular beliefs. It may involve questioning and making sense of the 
meaning of life and/or finding a meaning in life, valuing life, other people and, 
perhaps, finding practical ways to serve or support other people - especially those 
less fortunate than oneself. It is likely to involve maintaining, rather than breaking, 
bonds with the deceased. 
From another perspective, the grieving period may involve making moral choices 
concerning: the best possible outcome for the greatest number of people 
regarding funeral arrangements and distribution of the deceased's goods 
(consequential theory); deciding what actions a bereaved individual should or 
should not undertake such as paying a particular sum for the funeral, viewing the 
corpse, administering the deceased's estate, or giving a eulogy (deontological 
theory); and managing character traits both during the grieving/mourning period 
and thereafter in life (virtue theory). 
It would be trite to suggest that either personal development, concern for other 
people or existential awareness is encouraged by a particular type of death -
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although it is possible to hypothesise that experiencing parental death in 
childhood might affect personal development rather more than existential 
awareness because changes in roles, role models, responsibilities and living 
standards could, as Eisenstadt (1978) and Kremetz (1991) suggest, foster early 
independence and maturity. It is also possible to consider that cognitive and 
emotional maturity enable bereaved teenagers to empathise with others 
experiencing sorrow and loss or to view all of life and all living things as fragile 
and precious in ways that a child tends not to do. One can also argue that part of 
the reason for an enhanced sense of personal mortality and an appreciation of the 
transience of life is due to an increased exposure to death - which Is inevitable as 
we age - and that this may be promoted early in life by the death of a sibling, peer 
or someone with whom we had expected to share our lives. 
Bereavement and moral and spiritual development: background literature 
The little work that has been undertaken so far examining bereavement and 
spiritual and/or moral development has usually involved adults and a definition of 
spirituality influenced by traditional religious (usually Judaeo-Christian) beliefs 
regarding prayer for consolation and changed religious feeling (Loveland, 1968); 
religious behaviour and orientation (Peterson and Greil. 1990); belief in an afterlife 
(Smith et al 1992). and moderation of intensity of grief through religious belief 
(Austin and Lennings. 1993). The work of Edmonds and Hooker (1992) seems to 
come closest to some of my approaches regarding age of respondents and 
perspective on outcome. They found that 7 1 % of 49 university students (mean 
age 19 years) who had lost a parent, sibling or grandparent in a parenting role 
during the previous three years reported a positive change in life goals when 
questioned about changes in 'cosmic* and 'secular* meaning. 
Balk (1983, p 138) observes that "most research information about bereaved 
children comes from professionals treating disturbed children" or from secondary 
sources (parents, relatives and teachers) rather than the children or young 
187 
people themselves. In order to address these limitations and others mentioned 
earlier in this chapter regarding assumptions about negative outcomes. I 
recognize that information needs to be obtained directly (primary source) and 
recently (short to medium term) from 'normal' (non-clinical) bereaved children and 
young people. While acknowledging some of the limitations of using long-term 
retrospective accounts - although, of course, all accounts of bereavement must, 
of necessity, be retrospective - they are used in this thesis for their^value in 
providing life-time overviews. I take this stance based upon Robinson's findings 
that nearly three quarters of his respondents saw the childhood experiences they 
reported as "the first steps in a process of growing awareness which was not to be 
complete until later" (1977, p 41). 
Work by the following people enabled me to explore the ideas of children and 
young people about bereavement and closeness to God/ divine spirit, religious 
beliefs and practices and moral thinking and behaviour: Robinson (1977) 
regarding authentic childhood experiences; Fowler (1981) regarding faith 
development following crises; Hay and Morisy (1978) and Hay (1987) regarding 
experiences of God or a sense of the deceased; and Tamminen (1991) regarding 
the religious and moral thinking of school pupils. 




CHAPTER SIX: RESEARCH lUIETHODS 
Introduction 
In chapter five I explained why I needed to obtain infomiation directly and recently 
from 'normal* children and young people and that accounts from adults would 
provide medium to long term retrospective views. I worked in two schools 
teaching death-related topics to obtain an overview of the frequency of 
bereavement during the school years and discover what the feelings, thoughts 
and behavioural reactions of pupils were to the death of someone they knew. I 
gave the same kind of information-gathering questionnaire to 42 adults drawn 
from different groups and to 89 young people at Maxwell Secondary School (72 
pupils aged 11-12 in Year 7 and 19 pupils aged 14*15 in Year 10) but used more 
indirect methods to obtain some of the same information from 19 pupils aged 9-10 
years in Year 5 at Hester Primary School. I also interviewed 15 children and 
young people aged 5-16 years in non-school contexts in order to obtain in more 
depth the same kind of information gathered in schools, and the heart of my work 
consisted of semi-structured interviews at Winston Youth Club with 4 teenagers 
whose parent and/or sibling had died. The total number of respondents in this 
study is 169 (150 questionnaires and 19 inten/iews. although I also interviewed 2 
adults who completed questionnaires), of whom 108 were at school when I spoke 
to them. In chapter 7 I present my findings in themes, using material from 
respondents of all ages to illuminate that given by the 4 teenagers. 
The first section of this chapter explains and attempts to justify my research 
methods and the second section is a narrative account of the work I undertook 
(see Appendix 2 for a chronological overview). 
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SECTION ONE: METHODS AND APPROACHES USED 
Making contacts 
One of the first difficulties I experienced when I began this research In January 
1993 was that I moved to Devon where I had no school contacts and knew no-
one involved in bereavement counselling. I had taught in four schools in the 
Northamptonshire-Leicestershire area between 1969 and 1992 and had built up a 
range of contacts in primary and secondary schools, youth groups, drama 
centres, local churches and other places of worship. In coming to Devon I had to 
start afresh and to build up contacts without the advantage of working in a school 
in order to facilitate this. I also stopped working as a 'Cruse' counsellor since I 
realised that working with clients while I also wrote a PhD on bereavement would 
be emotionally stressful. 
Ethics protocoi 
Before the work started I developed working principles relating to gaining 
informed consent, offering confidentiality and the right to withdraw, protecting 
respondents from harm, being open and honest with them about my work and 
using appropriate debriefing procedures (Appendix 3). 
informed consent 
I recognised that gaining informed consent to work in schools often involved 
negotiating three permission levels: first the headteacher (and. potentially, 
governors), then parents and finally pupils. By contrast. I deemed that young 
people aged 16-18 who could be in either employment or further education were 
capable of deciding for themselves whether or not to speak with me and that they 
did not need their school's or parents' permission to do so. I always gave a 
written account of my proposed work to the parents of children and young people 
aged 5-16 (Appendix 6). 
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Protection from harm and Debriefing 
I knew it was important to explain to respondents that discussions of death and 
bereavement might be upsetting both before and after interviews or completing 
questionnaires. As a "Cruse' counsellor I knew it was helpful at the end of a 
session to refocus clients' thinking onto whatever they were going to do next and 
how they could obtain further help - either from me or another person - if needed. 
Confidentiality 
This feature of the protocol gave me the greatest difficulty although I always 
stressed that whatever information was given to me would be treated in complete 
confidence, that I would not discuss what I was told with other people in such a 
way that the respondent could be identified, and that I would use a pseudonym to 
describe respondents. 
However, at an early stage in the research I stated that if I wanted to make use of 
anything respondents had said or written I would show them a copy for their 
approval first. I used this approach with some of the 17 adults who attended the 
'Sea of Faith' conference workshop in July 1993 (Clark. 1995) but found that since 
they did not always reply to my request for permission I had to assume that 
silence indicated indifference. Furthermore, after I had obtained data from Year 5 
at Hester School I realised that I could not retum in 1995 or 1996 to ask 
permission to use the material from pupils or their parents since, by the time I 
wrote my thesis, the pupils would be in a different school and I did not know (or 
wish to have) their addresses. 
After consultation with my supervisor I removed the promise to show material in 
order to gain approval from my ethics protocol, questionnaires and introductory 
letters but gave ftill transcriptions of interviews to the 2 adults on whom I piloted 
my interview methods and to the 4 teenagers whose stories fomi the focus of my 
work. 
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Right to withdraw and openness and honesty 
These features of the protocol were specific to working in schools since adults 
and young people were always prepared for the content of the interview, 
questionnaire or workshop discussion. When discussions of death took place 
within the school context, however, I felt it was particularly necessary to allow 
pupils the opportunity to leave or withdraw and that I needed to explain clearly 
and honestly what the work was about. 
While it was necessary for my protocol to contain such assurances in order for me 
to work in schools. I felt they also implied that death-related discussions were not 
suitable for children and young people and that they should be protected from 
them. Tliis perspective contradicted my own belief that death education in the 
broadest sense should be part of the curriculum (Clark, 1991) and I knew that if I 
had still been teaching English or drama at secondary level I would not have had 
to give these assurances since many classroom texts I have used readily prompt 
opportunities to discuss death: eg Walkabout (Marshall, 1959). Macbeth 
(Shakespeare. 1963). 
Overview of data collection 
Using questionnaires and interviews I tried to ascertain facts such as: 
• How frequent the experience of bereavement is for children and young people 
while at school. 
• How frequently funerals are attended. 
In both the short, medium and long term, I sought to explore more abstract 
aspects such as: 
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Whether untimely death (parent, sibling), situation-specific death (friend, 
special relationship, first, sudden or violent death) or timely death 
(grandparents, elderly and other relations etc) are significant and why. 
What the emotional responses to death are. 
What kind of reasons are given and beliefs are held to explain death. 
Whether relationships with family members and other people are affected. 
Whether personality, hobbies and interests are affected. 
What sense (if any) is made of the event of death regarding the meaning or 
purpose of and in life. 
What part (if any) school life plays in the grieving process. 
How helpful school staff seem to be. 
How far a traditional faith or a belief in God/divine spirit influences the 
experience of bereavement. 
What beliefs are held about what happens after death. 
Whether there is any correlation between bereavement and so-called religious 
experiences. 
• Whether there is any correlation between bereavement and moral thinking, 
feeling and behaviour (eg: concerning duty, consequences or displaying 
virtues). 
Questions used to explore bereavement and moral and spiritual 
development 
As i explained in chapter 5. some of the questions used by Robinson (1977). 
Fowler (1981) and Tamminen (1991) enabled me to devise questionnaires 
probing family relationships, significant deaths, responses to a specific death and 
to include a question like Hay's (1987) which I felt might relate to the experience 
of bereavement: "Have you ever felt as though you were very close to a powerful 
spiritual force that seemed to lift you out of yourself?" The four parts of Fowler's 
interview guide (life review, life-shaping experiences and relationships, present 
values and commitments, and religion) were useful, although I was aware that 
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some of his questions were better used orally than in writing. I used Fowler's 
notion of dividing life into chapters in each of my interviews with bereaved 
teenagers and the idea of identifying tuming points' in both questionnaires and 
interviews. 
The following is a summary, divided into the three themes used to analyse the 
data in chapter 8. of how and why questions were formulated, adapted and 
sometimes deleted from my questionnaires and interview schedules. (See 
Appendices 4 and 5 for the final versions of the questionnaire used with adults 
and young people.) 
Confidentiaiity and anonymity 
All respondents were assured of confidentiality at the beginning of the 
questionnaire or interview. However, as explained earlier in this chapter, I 
removed the guarantee given in the first 18 questionnaires ("if I want to make use 
of anything you have said in my work. I will show you a copy of your response for 
approval first") when I realised I could not do this if respondents replied 
anonymously or could not easily be contacted. Pupils were told. "I will use 
another name to describe you." and adults were told that I would use a 
pseudonym. 
Theme 1: Personal development over time 
This theme tries to take a holistic view of people, bearing in mind their family 
situation both before and after the death, and their ongoing relationships with 
family, friends and others. Their developing personality, behaviour, creativity, 
interests and thinking about life are also considered in the light of bereavement. 
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Whether parents are alive, separated or divorced 
All respondents gave details of age. sex and number of siblings but only Year 7 
and 10 pupils answered the explicit question: "Do you live with both your 
parents?" I obtained the same information from the 19 interviewees by indirect 
questioning. 
Values and people, possessions, ambitions etc 
All questionnaire respondents except Pilot 1 and 'Sea of Faith' delegates were 
asked which people and what other things are of value to them. 
Emotional responses to bereavement 
All questionnaire respondents were asked how they felt at the time of the death 
and Year 7 and 10 pupils were also asked how they felt or thought about it now. 
Effect of bereavement on family relationships 
All questionnaire respondents and the 4 interviewed teenagers were asked how 
they got on with their family after the death. The 15 interviewees were often 
asked this question more indirectly. 
Effects of bereavement on relationships with other people and on work 
All questionnaire respondents were asked about their relationship with people 
who were not family members after the death and. where appropriate, the 19 
interviewees were also asked this question . 
Effects of bereavement on personality, interests, creativity, hobbles etc 
The early version of the questionnaire for adults (Pilot 1. 'Sea of Faith') and the 
later version of the questionnaire for pupils (Years 7 and 10) asked about any 
changes of personality, behaviour, creative or sporting interests after the death. 
All i19interviewees were asked this question indirectly. 
Theme 2: Interaction t)etween bereavement and school events 
This theme explores the perceived inter-relationship between bereavement and 
schooling, including frequency of bereavement during the school years and how 
grief, mouming customs such as funeral attendance, and coping with the process 
of grieving fit into school life. 
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Frequency of bereavement while at school 
All questionnaires included a list of people defined by relationship and 
respondents were asked to underline anyone they knew who had died and to 
write in their own age at the time of each death. I asked 14 adults to answer 
further questions on a death experienced before 18 years ('Sea of Faith' 
delegates) and 20 adults to answer about any experienced before 19 years 
(PGCE students ). I knew if any of the 19 interviewees had been recently or 
significantly bereaved as either they or their parents had told me. 
Whether any bereavement is seen as a significant event In life 
The early version of the questionnaire (Pilot 1. 'Sea of Faith') did not ask adult 
respondents about significant or turning' points in their life, but the later version 
for adults (PGCE) and pupils in Years 7 and 10 did. 
Importance of particular deaths 
Questionnaires for Pilot 2. PGCE. Year 7 and 10 pupils focused on one particular 
death by asking which death was most significant or important and why. When 
appropriate, this information was gained from the 19 interviewees more indirectly. 
Attendance at funerals 
All respondents in questionnaires and interviews were asked whether or not they 
went to the funeral if a human death was being described. 
Bereavement and other life events 
All questionnaire respondents were asked what else was happening in their life at 
the time of the death in order to see how far school life was seen as a background 
for the death event. Where this information was not explicit interviewees were 
also asked this question. 
Theme 3: Moral and spiritual development 
This theme explores the influence of traditional religious beliefs and practices on 
bereaved people regarding what they believe happens after death and whether 
they have ever had a religious experience (a sense of something or someone 
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present). It is also concerned with moral attitudes and behaviour, expressions of 
practical spirituality and the influence of other people, including the deceased. 
Influence of and commitment to traditional religious beliefs and practices 
Questionnaires for Pilot 1, 'Sea of Faith' and Pilot 2 did not ask about religious 
upbringing or current religious affiliations but questionnaires for PGCE students 
and school pupils did. The 19 interviewees were also asked this question. 
Adult explanations given to bereaved children and young people 
about death 
All questionnaires asked what kind of explanations for death - whether medical, 
religious, spiritual, moral or whatever - were given to them. All 4 teenagers were 
asked the same question rather less overtly and. when appropriate, it was asked 
of the 15 other interviewees. 
Adult support given to bereaved children and young people 
All questionnaires asked whether anyone talked to respondents about the death 
in question to try to comfort or help them and what they said or did. All 4 
teenagers were asked the same question and. when appropriate, it was asked of 
the 15 other interviewees. 
Conflicts between 'Institutional'and 'pre-personaV and 'personal' religion 
Only the adult respondents were asked about the beliefs (as opposed to 
explanations) that other people gave or shared with them mainly because, when 
asked of children and young people, it seemed ambiguous and to repeat the 
question concerning explanations. 
Traditional religious beliefs and formulation of new ones 
All questionnaire respondents and interviewees were asked: "What do you think 
happens to us when we die?" 
Belief in God 
Pupils in both schools and the 19 interviewees were asked whether or not they 
believed that God exists but adults were not asked this question. 
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Sensing the presence of the deceased or God/ divine spirit 
Questionnaires for adults asked whether they had ever had a 'religious 
experience' and questionnaires for pupils asked whether they had at times felt 
that God or a divine power was close to them. The four teenagers were asked rf 
they had ever had a sense of the deceased with them. All 15 interviewees and 
108 pupil respondents aged 5-16 were also asked to indicate which of 20 
situations they thought God or a divine spirit might be near to them or other 
people. 
Moral attitudes and expressions of practical spirituality 
Year 7 pupils at Maxwell Sdiool and the 15 school-age interviewees were asked 
whether there was anything happening in the world that upset or annoyed them, 
made them want to stop it, pleased them, or made them want to do the same. 
They were also asked if they had ever taken part in any fund-raising or charity 
event. 
influence of bereavement on attitude to life 
All adults answered a question concerning their present attitude to life, whether 
linked explicitly with bereavement (Pilot 1. 'Sea of Faith") or not (Pilot 2, PGCE). 
Pupils and the 15 school-age interviewees were not asked this question but the 4 
teenagers were. 
Influence of bereavement on meaning In or of life 
Only some questionnaires for adults (Pilot 1, 'Sea of Faith') asked whether any 
experiences (including the death mentioned) had confirmed a sense of a meaning 
in life, mainly because the question implied that a meaning in life could be found. 
I also discussed this issue with the 4 teenagers. 
Impact over time of bereavement on values and views of life 
All questionnaire respondents and the 4 teenagers were asked whether the death 
discussed affected their life or their thinking about life in any way. 
Debriefing 
All questionnaires contained a form of debriefing at the end and all interviewees 
were asked how they felt about the things we had been discussing. 
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Abandoned questions 
Present situation and moral and spiritual development 
A question asking in what area of life the respondent was "growing, struggling or 
wrestling with doubt in your life" was deleted after the first pilot when someone 
declined to answer, saying it was too painful to do so. 
Unks between religion and morality 
A question asking respondents to consider whether "without religton, morality has 
no meaning" was deleted after piloting on the first three adults because two said it 
sounded like an examination question. 
Particular approaches used In the collection of this data 
Pseudonyms 
Each respondent in my research has been assigned a pseudonym at random 
from a list which does not include any participanfs real name (if known) and the 
names of schools, teachers and other adults have been similarly changed. 
Role adopted when working in schools 
I could not observe how members of staff in schools taught or discussed death 
and bereavement since such a topic is rare on the timetable (Eiser et al, 1995) 
and, even if it were regularly taught, it would be difficult to obsen/e as an outsider 
because of its emotional content. Instead, as a temporary member of staff or 
invited speaker, I was a participant observer trying to find out. as my lessons (or 
sessions) proceeded, what pupils thought about the ideas and concepts 
generated by using discussions, drawings and questionnaires. I always talked 
about my mother's death by way of sharing my own story with pupils (Gray. 
1986). 
Sessions at Hester Primary School often began with completion of a 
questionnaire as I could prepare the room before the pupils came in. I separated 
them from each other - emphasizing that I wanted their ideas and not their 
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neighbour's - and we moved the desks back together to form a large table for 
everyone to sit at for the next activity. However I was aware that completing a 
questionnaire in this way must often have felt like a test or 'just another piece of 
schoolwork' (Denscombe and Aubrook. 1992) as the pupils probably did not feel 
they had any opportunity to refuse. I am not sure that I really obtained informed 
consent as my ethics protocol required. 
When I was invited to speak to Year 10 and Year 7 pupils at Maxwell Secondary 
School as part of a topic on bereavement and death within the PSE/RE 
curriculum. I introduced myself as "Valerie Clark" in order to reduce the usual 
adult-child divisions and tried to play down my 'expert' billing by explaining that 
everyone had her or his own unique experiences of death. To further improve 
communication. I wrote down and learnt the names of the 17 members of the 
Year 10 class in the first session. I asked all members of the three Year 7 classes 
to write their names on badges in their first session (in the sport shall) and to 
write them on pieces of paper on their desks in the second session (in a 
classroom) so that I could address them by name. A few pupils became visibly 
upset during both sessions but I think I was always aware of this and able to allow 
them the chance to leave the room if needed. I always asked each pupil 
individually how she or he felt before leaving the lesson and reminded them all 
that they might feel sad aftenwards and named the particular member of staff 
available to speak with them if required. 
Researcher-teacher or researcher-counsellor? 
At Hester School I was aware of the teacher-researcher dilemma as I had a 
sense of what was appropriate in the classroom in terms of noise levels, laughter, 
quality of work and pupil involvement and did not wish to be seen and treated by 
the pupils as an inexperienced or supply teacher. Nevertheless, as a researcher, 
I wanted to hear what pupils were prepared to tell me and. since I was usually 
atone in a classroom with them. I sometimes had to decide whether to tolerate or 
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reprimand how they spoke to me and to each other. Sometimes I felt that my 
inner role conflict affected what I encouraged pupils to tell me. 
While interviewing I was often aware of the researcher-counsellor dilemma of (a) 
keeping to a semi-structured format and (b) checking that the tape recorder was 
functioning as well as (c) responding empathically and non-judgementally to 
whatever respondents wanted to tell me. 
Anonymity of respondents 
Throughout my research I emphasized to children and young people that once I 
had completed my work or had interviewed them for the agreed number of times 
they were safe from any further probing by me. Although I addressed each pupil 
by name (as described above) I emphasised that I did not need names on 
questionnaires. I always gave participants my business card at the end of the 
research (after the workshop, interview or last lesson) for them to be able to 
contact me further if ever they wished to do so but. except for children of 
colleagues and friends, I do not know how I can contact them further. In fact I 
emphasized to pupils at both schools that I would probably never see them again. 
I used the same approach with the four key respondents. Rita. Sheila. Thelma 
and Verity, whom I interviewed two or three times each. They had an address 
and telephone number at which to contact me but I did not ask for their addresses 
or surnames and Fiona, the youth worker, made contact with each of them in 
different ways. She occasionally employed Rita as a baby-sitter and could 
contact Sheila and Verity through college registers but. having no personal details 
for Thelma. happened to meet her in the street. Rita. Sheila and Verity attend the 
same further education establishment and Thelma attends another. 
I did not know at that stage in my research what I would want to use in my thesis 
and so was unable to indicate in the transcripts how their material would be used. 
I promised to send to Wendy and Yoland (the two PGCE students whom I 
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interviewed) a copy of what I wrote containing their material but I have not tried to 
contact any of the four teenagers to gain approval for what I have written. I have 
adopted this rather unusual tactic because I believe that the success and quality 
of my interviews with the four teenagers depended upon their one-off nature. I 
told each one that I would not need to contact her again after we had spoken and 
I do not wish to go back on that agreement. Furthermore. I am not sure how I 
could send any material to their home addresses (even if I knew them) or via 
Fiona as (a) Sheila did not tell her father she was speaking with me. (b) Thelma 
and Verity told their mothers but not their fathers and (c) they will all leave further 
education in May-June 1996. 
Opportunity and self-selection 
My sampling methods were opportunistic rather than strategically selected 
because I had to take every chance offered to teach a death-related topic, to 
distribute questionnaires or ask to interview people. 
My adult respondents were self-selected because they either chose out of interest 
to attend the conference workshop I was offering or agreed, when requested by 
me, to complete a questionnaire or be interviewed. I think that adult questionnaire 
respondents who had the chance to refuse (such as the PGCE sample) did not do 
so when they believed they had had an experience that matched what I was 
asking about. For example, Wendy and Yoland used the space on the 
questionnaire to offer to help me further. I felt important factors in their 
willingness to speak to me were that both had had a grandparent die recently 
(although it was a bereavement outside my age range of 5-18); both had had a 
friend die while in their teens, and both had experiences of sensing the presence 
of a deceased person. 
Sex of respondents 
Although there is material from 97 females and 72 males in this study (total = 
169). the 4 bereaved teenagers whom I interviewed were all female. In fact, Fiona 
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did not know of any significantly bereaved teenage males to introduce me to -
although Rita mentioned 3 peers whose parent or sibling had died. 
The imbalance in gender can be explained as follows. I used 6 females and 2 
males when piloting my work (8 adults in Pilots 1 and 2) as I knew of more 
significantly bereaved females to ask to help me because they had talked about 
their experiences. The number of males and females attending my conference 
workshop was the same (7 males. 7 females) and I interviewed 8 female and 7 
male children of friends and colleagues. Two male adults in their twenties agreed 
to be interviewed but due to a variety of reasons this did not happen, and three 
teenagers whom I approached through relatives declined to be interviewed. (One 
of these had had a sibling die and he felt he would get too upset.) However, as 
there were more females than males on the PGCE course, it is not surprising that 
out of the total response (n = 20) 15 were female and 5 were male. Finally, in 
both schools where I worked there was a great inequality in gender distribution: 
Hester's Year 9 class had 6 females and 13 males; Maxwell's Year 7 had 46 
females and 26 males and its Year 10 class had 5 females and 12 males. 
This imbalance in representation may indicate - at least among the teenagers - a 
greater willingness in females to share their emotional experiences even if they 
become tearful and emotional, as well as a greater tendency among males to 
keep their feelings to themselves and cope by avoiding the issue (Stroebe and 
Stroebe. 1989). Overall, of course, the fact that I am female must also have had 
some impact on whether or not people responded to my request for information. 
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SECTION TWO: ACCOUNT OF WORK UNDERTAKEN 
In seeking to obtain primary source accounts by children and young people who 
have been bereaved during their school years, my data were collected in what I 
now recognize as two phases: research in school and research out of school. 
These two phases were further divided into three approaches, as shown below: 
Phase 1: Research in school.- -
Work in schools exploring bereavement feelings and ways of remembering the 
dead. 
Phase 2: Research out of school!: 
(a) Interviews and questionnaires with adults who had experienced many 
bereavements, and with children and young people who had experienced fewer 
t^ereavements than adults or none at all. 
(b) Interviews with 4 teenagers whose parent and/or sibling had died. 
The narrative account of data collection that follows describes and comments on 
work undertaken using these three approaches. 
PHASE 1: R E S E A R C H IN SCHOOL 
Rrst steps In making school contacts 
Initially I decided to work in schools where the more common bereavement 
experience would be the death of grandparents, older relatives and pets. I felt 
confident that my experience as a teacher and more recent experience as a 
bereavement counsellor would enable me to handle whatever pupils might tell 
me. Describing myself as a researcher - not 'research student' as this often 
implies a junior position in schools - at the centre for Research into Moral. 
Spiritual and Cultural Understanding and Education (RIMSCUE centre). I first 
wrote to the headteacher of Fleur Secondary School asking for an interview to 
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discuss my research ideas. However. I had not anticipated the extent to which 
delegation of administration is sometimes necessary in large schools and my 
letter was answered by a member of the senior management team who refused 
my request, explaining: 
As you so rightly say, bereavement is a very sensitive issue and we would not 
wish any of our pupils who had suffered a bereavement to be approached, 
except by someone familiar to them. 
This reminded me that face-to-face negotiation was essential in order to allay the 
fears of school staff because, as Gray (1986) observes, personal contact enables 
parents and school personnel to gain a perception of the researcher as a person, 
rather than to merely evaluate research procedures or academic qualifications. 
My first attempt at making contact with a school was not successful because (1) I 
wrote to an unknown headteacher and did not use a personal approach. (2) I 
focused my request on bereaved pupils arid the difficulties of speaking with them, 
and (3) I was unknown to both staff and pupils. I reconsidered whether my 
request to talk to bereaved pupils had been wise and, at t h e s u g g e s t i o n of my 
Director of Studies, reshaped the focus of my research in order to compare moral 
and spiritual development in both bereaved and non-bereaved pupils. Thereby I 
hoped to make it clear that my main interest was in the moral and spiritual and 
development of a//pupils and that, while being sensitive to the needs of bereaved 
pupils in the group, they were not my main focus. 
Second steps in making school contacts 
Having recognised the need for personal contact and knowing that it takes time to 
turn contacts into plans which can be implemented. I used every opportunity to 
explain my research to teachers v\^om I met. At a research seminar in March 
1993 a member of staff from Maxwell School expressed interest in my research 
and asked me to speak, at a later date, on death and bereavement as part of the 
school's Personal and Social Education (PSE) programme. (That work will be 
described later in this chapter.) In June 1993 I secured the agreement of the 
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headteacher of Hester School - where I had previously visited with a colleague 
on school practice supervision - to do research there in the following academic 
year. This latter opportunity particularly gave me the chance to promote 'death 
education' (Clark, 1991) and I developed a scheme of work for Year 5 in line with 
the locally agreed syllabus for RE, entitled 'Remembering the Dead.' Issues 
surrounding this work will be described next. 
Parental reactions to the bereavement Issue 
In addition to obtaining parental consent to talk with pupils about death (Appendix 
3, item 1), I needed to comply with guidelines relating to parental right of 
withdrawal from RE (DfE Circular 1/94) since it was possible - though unlikely -
that parents would refuse permission because of the content related to religion 
rather than death. Letters of explanation were sent (Appendix 6 i) and the 
headteacher, class teacher and I agreed to interpret parental consent to use the 
child's work as agreement for their child to take part in the project. 
Four parents contacted the headteacher about the content of the letter and I met 
them the day before the work was due to start. They were: Belinda's mother 
(Belinda's grandfather and uncle had died within the previous year); Shirley's 
mother (Shirley's grandmother had died within the last two years); and Desmond's 
parents. Desmond's father said that the children in the class were "too young" to 
discuss death and, as he considered his son had had no experience of 
bereavement so far, asked whether I could work separately with the bereaved and 
non-bereaved children in order to prevent those who had not had such an 
experience hearing from those who had. I explained that arranging such 
groupings would require asking many more sensitive questions than any that I 
had already planned to ask and his wife, also realising the difficulty, told him that 
'non-bereaved' was a very difficult term to define as their son might consider 
himself 'bereaved' because of the death of a neighbour, although they did not. 
207 
At the end of the meeting the three mothers expressed acceptance of the project, 
indicating that their children would take part. The mothers of Belinda and Shirley 
said they hoped that by allowing their children to talk about death I might make it 
easier for them to come to terms with it. Belinda's mother, who was undergoing 
psychiatric help to deal with her father's death, hoped that her child would not 
"become as frightened of it as I am" and asked if I would be available to help her 
family if necessary. I indicated that, while not expressly offering counselling, I 
could be available, but I heard no more from her. 
Twelve out of 22 sets of parents gave their unqualified consent. One parent gave 
permission but wished to be able to withdraw this at a future date if necessary, 
and only 3 withheld it. However, 6 had not replied by the day before the project 
was to begin and the headteacher and class teacher suggested that I proceed on 
the assumption that silence indicated indifference. Therefore 19 of the 22 pupils 
in the class were divided into three groups of 7. 7 and 5 and these pupils took part 
in all or most of the six weekly sessions from 10th November until 15th December 
1993. 
I noted that, in future, if possible I should try to provide a meeting between myself 
and parents - whether they were anxious or not - in line with Gray's account of a 
father who asked to meet him. explaining that he "just wanted to see what I 
looked like" (1986, p 359). This need, however, did not arise at Maxwell School 
where the topic was part of the PSE curriculum and was never an issue when I 
asked colleagues and friends to interview their children . 
The right to withdraw and confidentiality 
My ethics protocol (Appendix 3) required that I gained informed consent not only 
from the parents but also from the children and offered them the right to withdraw 
at any time. In practice, this meant that I needed to remind them before each 
session that they could leave if they wished and that quite normal feelings of 
208 
sadness and upset might arise after they had talked about people they knew who 
had died. It was not always easy to get the right balance between offering the 
chance to withdraw from what seemed like an ordinary lesson (from which pupils 
do not normally withdraw once they are seated round a table with the teacher) 
while making it feel that there was no need to do so. Similarly, explaining that 
feelings of sadness were quite normal as they settled down to the session - often 
with anticipation - sometimes seemed to undo the enthusiasm they brought to the 
work. As I was not a member of staff I was always anxious not to upset the 
emotional tone or 'sentimental order' (Glaser and Strauss, 1968) of the whole 
class when pupils retumed to it after sharing details of bereavements and ideas 
about death with me. 
Belinda and Shirley did not indicate loss of any relative at the start of the project 
although they referred to them later. This made me wonder whether some 
children hold back from declaring their bereaved state in order not to appear 
different from their peers, or do not consider themselves to be bereaved (although 
they clearly are because their parents are) or feel the loss so deeply that, even 
seeing others share similar events, are not encouraged to do so. I could not tell 
how far the apparent reticence in those pupils that I knew were bereaved was 
also present in others whose parents I had not met. If present, it means an 
under-representation of self-reported bereavements from this age group using the 
indirect method I adopted. 
However, overall I felt, as Koocher (1974. p 21) also did when discussing death 
concepts with 6-17 year olds, that "I was spending considerably more time 
concerned about the subjects than the data." This anxiety was probably due to 
the fact that my request to come into school to teach a death-related topic was 
considered unusual or potentially disturbing by both staff and parents. This 
feeling may be further reflected in the fact that, although t had discussed with the 
headteacher the possibility of working there later in the year, she did not respond 
to my requests to let me do so. I had none of these anxieties when I worked in 
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Maxwell School, though, since I was present in the school in a specialist role 
contributing to a prepared PSE topic. 
Death education within P S E 
I spoke to a Year 10 class of 17 pupils at Maxwell School in February 1994 after 
their parents had received a letter explaining my work (Appendix 6 ii) in which I 
asked for return of the reply slip only if they did nof give permission for their child's 
work to be used in my thesis. This was a refinement of the request I made at 
Hester School for parents to give or withhold permission for me to use their child's 
material in my thesis (and hence to participate in or withdraw from the project). 
I invited Year 10 pupils to talk about their own experiences of death - which they 
did quite openly and willingly. On my second visit in June I tried to follow up 
issues from the first visit but sensed that the class were rather less willing to talk 
to me so openly again - perhaps because they had shared as much as they 
wished the first time and had not expected to see me again (although I had told 
them on the first visit that t hoped to return). I asked them to complete a 
questionnaire on their bereavement experiences and. by way of comparison with 
Hester pupils, asked them to complete another one concerning belief in God and 
having a sense of the presence of God. This was probably too much to ask of 
them but I felt I needed to obtain some written record of their ideas and 
experiences since the first session had been mainly discussion. 
The whole of Year 7 (79 pupils) were told by their form tutors of my first visit in 
March 1994 (when I spoke to them all in the sports hall) and I devised a lesson 
including sharing of toss activities. Parents were informed of my second visit in 
June-July to discuss the first session and were invited to make contact with the 
school or myself if they had any enquiries about the work but not asked to take 
any action to give permission for their child to take part (Appendix 6 i i i ) . 
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I spoke with each Year 7 class separately during the course of one week. 
However, I gave them a longer questionnaire than any single one that Year 10 
had had for comparison purposes comprising personal bereavement details, 
ideas about God and religious belief (Appendix 5). Not everyone completed it 
because it was too long for the half hour I allowed and I told anyone who had had 
a "very recent" bereavement (I did not state a period of time but left it to them to 
decide) not to complete the centre pages containing those questions if they 
preferred. Thus, by offering better opportunities for informed consent I may have 
reduced my chances of obtaining bereavement details of a complete school year 
group. 
PHASE 2: R E S E A R C H OUT O F SCHOOL 
(a) ADULTS, YOUNG P E O P L E AND CHILDREN 
The second approach ran parallel with the first one (see Appendix 2) because 
although the research was concemed with the experiences of children and young 
people. I knew at the outset that I also needed to obtain material from adults 
because of two perceived difficulties: language and accessibility. The younger 
the children the less likely they were to be able to express their ideas in terms that 
I could appreciate. This is not to say that they would not have some bereavement 
experiences to share but that they were likely to be fewer than those of adults and 
their accounts likely to be less sophisticated. Early on in my research, therefore. I 
asked adults to look back on their experiences in order for me to get a sense of 
perspective on what I was exploring. I also knew that it would be easier to gain 
access to adults than children and to get their feedback on my questions. 
After I had begun talking with the 4 bereaved teenagers (see below) I realised I 
also needed other young people of the same age or younger with whom to 
compare experiences and ideas in more depth. I had obtained some data from 
working in schools but could not return to get detailed stories from any of those 
respondents because I had offered them complete anonymity so I circulated a 
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request for help to colleagues at the University of Plymouth whom I knew were -
or, because of their age. guessed could be - parents. I also asked friends in the 
Exmouth area who had children if they could help me. I always checked with 
parents if their children had had a recent bereavement and, when requested, 
showed parents the questions that I planned to ask. I interviewed 15 respondents 
over a 3 month period using this approach and their interviews ranged from 45 to 
90 minutes in length. 
In a sense I progressed towards greater difficulty in my research by beginning 
with the easiest and least stressful stories and progressed via this second phase 
towards the hardest and most stressful to discuss. My listening and analytic skills 
also improved as the work progressed. 
PHASE 2 : RESEARCH OUT OF SCHOOL 
(b) INTERVIEWS WrTH BEREAVED TEENAGERS 
The third phase, using semi-structured in-depth interviews, consisted of 10 
meetings over a seven month period. It was the most fruitful in terms of 
quantitative data but also, in another sense, the most demanding. My work at 
Hester School had been difficult because I had needed to balance the teacher-
researcher role while working with children whose experience of death was limited 
within an environment that seemed anxious about the work I was doing. Although 
this anxiety was less at Maxwell School I could not talk further with bereaved 
pupils I met there and the children of friends and colleagues were probably 
volunteered by their parents because they had not experienced any significant 
bereavements. Therefore, having the opportunity to interview teenagers whose 
parent or sibling had died legitimated my field of research. At last I was able to 
talk to young people who understood what I was asking abouti 
However, it was not easy to find bereaved young people to interview. After 
deciding that schools were not a satisfactory approach. I tried other ways of 
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contacting them using personal referrals. I spoke unsuccessfully to 'Cruse' group 
organisers, ministers of religion, counsellors and others who worked with young 
people and. at last, a youth worker (to whom I had once loaned some books) 
agreed to introduce me to several teenagers who had been bereaved of a parent 
or sibling and offered the youth centre as a venue. 
I prepared a list of questions for the first interview with each teenager based upon 
some of Fowler's ideas, adapted to whether or not a parent or sibling had died 
(Appendix 7) and I checked which questions had not been answered after each 
interview. Although I had an idea of what I wanted to talk about overall. I did not 
stop them telling me other things as well if they wanted to. Sometimes questions 
that I expected would come up ir i ' te:. r. the ^ri^'v<S4>; interview (such as career 
plans) were raised in the first interview, and both Thelma and Verity told me about 
aspects of their lives that did not seem directly related to the issue of 
bereavement - although, adopting an holistic perspective. I would suggest that 
they probably are related. 
After I interviewed Rita (Appendix 9) I saw that our three conversations had 
followed a pattern: in the first session she told her story and talked about how she 
felt about the deaths; in the second session we discussed mainly moral, religious 
and spiritual ideas; and in the third session she talked about her future plans, how 
she felt about our conversations and then we said good-bye. I intended to 
continue that pattern with the other three teenagers and managed a similar 
pattern with Thelma who also spoke to me three times. However, as Sheila and 
Verity did not come to their third sessions I did not ask them alt the questions I 
had planned. 
Rita. Sheila and Verity did not seem to find it difficult to talk to me once they felt at 
ease, but I often felt that Thelma found it hard going. I suspect that she was not 
used to talking about herself very much and had probably never talked so 
exhaustively about herself to anyone before - let alone a stranger. When I 
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transcribed the conversations I found for example that, although Rita often began 
her answers with "I don't know," she usually went on to develop her ideas. Sheila 
spoke very succinctly and. although Verity thought she had nothing to say about 
her sister's death, she discussed many topics with ease. Thelma. on the other 
hand, often spoke quite briefly and I was particularly aware after our first session 
of doing far more talking to encourage her, or to explain myself further, than I had 
done with either Rita (see Appendix 9) or Sheila. Transcribing enabled me to 
'hear' the conversation again, to see how far questions had been answered and 
to quickly decide what other areas remained unexplored. I transcribed the eight 
interviews with Rita, Sheila and Thelma but. due to pressure of work, needed 
secretarial help for the two with Verity. 
As Rita. Sheila and Thelma lived in town I met with each one in the evening at the 
youth centre when it was being used for sports training rather than a youth club 
meeting when some of their friends might be present. We talked in a private room 
without any apparent observation by others. Verity, however, lived out of town so 
she met me during her non-timetabled college sessions in the afternoons at the 
empty youth club. 
I am sure I was perceived as an acceptable person to talk to by these young 
people because I was introduced to them by Fiona and allowed to use the youth 
club for the interviews. Fiona introduced me to Rita, the first one I interviewed, at 
her home and I surmise that Rita mentioned me to Sheila and Verity, both of 
whom she knew well, so I was probably doubly recommended. The first 
interview with Sheila. Thelma and Verity took place at the same time as the 
introduction - in other words, all three agreed to stay and talk to me after being 
introduced and. when Verity first came to meet me. Sheila accompanied her to 
say hello and to collect something I had left for her with Fiona. I think I can 
assume that Sheila, Thelma and Verity had either decided to be interviewed 
before they came (because of implicit recommendation by Fiona or overt 
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recommendation by one another) and/or decided that I looked like the sort of 
person they would like to talk to when they met me - as Rita probably had. 
This final phase of work was quite liberating because, although each interview 
was emotionally demanding. I was not constrained by the need to obtain access, 
consent and a timetable slot. Furthermore, I did not have to worry about 
inadvertently upsetting these teenagers because they had chosen to talk to me 
and knew what the topic for discussion was. Neither did I have to seek 
permission from headteachers and parents because they met me out of school 
time and, as they were aged 16-18, my ethics protocol deemed them capable of 
deciding for themselves whether or not to share their experiences with me 
(Appendix 3), although in order to officially inform their parent(s) of our meetings I 
gave each one a letter of introduction to use if she wished. Sheila chose not to 
tell her father she was speaking to me (she did not seem to consider telling her 
stepmother) but said she would when we had finished meeting, and Thelma and 
Verity told their mothers but not their fathers. Rita, by contrast, told her mother 
(and perhaps her stepfather) immediately. 
Talking with them also offered me the chance to use my counselling skills and I 
felt more comfortable with this direct approach than with the indirect one of 
teaching about death in schools. The two different approaches also provided me 
with different data: work in schools indicated frequency of bereavements in a 
whole class or whole year group; Interviewing bereaved teenagers allowed me to 
hear personal stories of loss. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN : RESEARCH RNDINGS 
Introduction 
In chapter five I proposed an adaptation model following bereavement and in 
chapters two and three I suggested that the following forms of thinking, feeling 
and behaving (which I describe as moral and spiritual development) might be 
indicative of such adaptations. 
• Moving beyond socio-conventional beliefs concerning one's own and other 
people's morality. Acting in ways that are moral but not necessarily 
conventional; not only refraining from harm but also being actively benevolent 
and taking time and effort to help others. 
• Recognizing that some values may be situation specific while others are not. 
• Asking not only 'What should I do?' but also "What sort of person should I be?' 
Realizing that not only actions but beliefs, intentions, feelings and qualities of 
character also constitute morality. Developing and holding to one*s own ideas 
of 'right' and 'good' even if they are unconventional. 
• Understanding and/or reconciling conflicts in moral situations between the 
principles of justice and care, and the variance in one's own life between 
broadly held beliefs and concepts and situation-specific action. 
• Questioning the moral values of religious traditions, including one's own. in 
order to clarify the links between moral thinking, feeling and action and the 
beliefs and practices of institutional religion. Understanding and appreciating 
the relative truth of one's own religious and spiritual beliefs; beginning to see 
the local, time-restricted context in which such ideas evolved. 
• Recognizing the complexity of self, other people and the world and beginning 
to abandon or rethink previously held answers and solutions. Balancing the 
personal perspective with the inter-personal, social and global one. Seeing 
oneself in a broader context and responding to this bigger picture. 
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• Being prepared to move into new territory while recognizing that this 'new 
territory* may be a familiar one for other people. 
• Exploring new language and ways of self-expression. Trying to explain 
complicated or previously unexpressed ideas and feelings. 
« Tolerating and/or bearing pain, disappointment, sorrow and loss. Realizing 
that life can continue after such experiences. 
« Recognizing, however briefly, one's own finitude and taking that into account 
in future life plans. 
• Acquiring and/or fomiulating a philosophy of life for the present period of one's 
life and adapting and/or abandoning it at a later period. 
In this chapter I will explore how far these aspects of development are apparent in 
my respondents by presenting the data collected under three themes: human 
development over time, inter-relationship between bereavement and school life, 
and moral and spiritual development. Both quantitative and qualitative data will 
be presented together and, as far as possible, quotations from respondents will 
be used to illustrate their ideas. 
What kind of stories do the four teenagers tell? 
In order to explore how typical are the experiences of Rita. Sheila, Thelma and 
Verity (16-17 year olds whose parent and/or sibling died), I shall try to set their 
stories against information obtained from other groups. I want to see what 
difference a bereavement (whether of parent, sibling, grandparent, other relative, 
friend etc) makes to thinking, feelings and behaviour which I term moral and 
spiritual development. I shall try to take 'snapshots' of different people at different 
ages (while recognising that they have lived through different local, national and 
international situations such as World War II) in order to explore the differences 
that the passage of time and such things as religious upbringing make. 
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Rita and Verity, who are close friends, were bereaved at primary school and in 
their conversation with me they referred to each other. Although Sheila referred 
to Rita. Rita did not refer to her. and Thelma's bereavement was not mentioned 
by either Rita, Verity or Sheila which is not surprising as we shall see from her 
story. 
« Sheila's mother 6\ed when she was 3 or 4 and she does not mention the death 
of any other person. 
« Rita's brother d\e6 when she was 6. her father 6\e6 when she was 8, and her 
paternal grandmother died when she was 16. 
• Verity's s/sferdied when she was 10 and her great grandmother died when 
she was 12. 
• Theima's grandfather died when she was 4. and her grandmother, father's 
uncle and brother a\\ died when she was 13. 
These four teenagers experienced a particular kind of loss at a particular time in 
their lives and, in that sense, are typical of no-one else, but some parts of their 
stories may be similar to those that others would have told if I had been able to 
ask them. They may represent the extreme end of a continuum - both in terms of 
the loss experienced and their reactions to it - and it is possible that other pupils 
are at varying points along that same continuum. Although they are the same age 
and have all been bereaved of a family member, each girl has lost a different 
relation at a different stage In her life and has been bereaved for a different length 
of time. Furthermore, because they have ait been in the same school year cohort, 
it might be tempting to consider that they will have similar stories to tell about 
school, but this is not so since each one has been affected by physiological 
development and educational events - such as exams - occurring at different 
times in the grieving process. 
Rita, Sheila, Thelma and Verity are older than all the other school age 
respondents (Hester Primary Year 5; Maxwell Secondary Year 7; Maxwell 
Secondary School Year 10) but are only 3-4 years younger than the youngest of 
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the adult respondents (aged 21). They can be seen as mid-way in the 
developmental process from childhood to adulthood, having completed their 
compulsory education but not yet entered the world of employment. They are 
undergoing further education, as many young people of their age also do, and are 
legal minors in most respects. However, they have had an experience while at 
school that many of their peers have not had - and now never will have - and can 
describe the deaths that occurred 12-13. 10. 8. 7 and 3-4 years previously and 
evaluate their impact. Many of the adults in my study are also able to look back to 
the death of a parent or sibling and talk about how they felt and thought when 
they were the same age as these four respondents and their retrospective views 
may illuminate those of the four teenagers. 
It is also interesting to compare responses from Years 5, 7 and 10 because some 
data indicates frequency of bereavement, type of loss and different responses 
within a four year span across primary and secondary levels (9-12 years) and 
other data will indicate similar material within a 5 year span at secondary level 
(11-15 years). However, not all comparisons are possible since Hester Year 5 did 
not complete the same questionnaires as the other two age groups and more data 
overall was collected from Maxwell Year 7. Further in-depth views will also be 
presented from 5 of the 15 interviewees (aged 5-16 years) who are children of 
friends and colleagues (Jennifer. Lionel. Melanie, Rosemary and Timothy). 
As explained in chapter 6, all adult interview and questionnaire respondents 
whose ideas I have cited have been assigned names as well as 1 pupil in Maxwell 
Year 7 (Primrose) and 3 pupils in Maxwell Year 10 (Aileen. Beryl and Charles). 
(See Appendix 8 for a full list of respondents mentioned in this chapter.) 
The three broad themes described in chapter 6. which encompass the range of 
questions asked, will be used to explore the data in depth: (1) personal 
development over time; (2) interaction between bereavement and school events 
and (3) moral and spiritual development. 
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THEME ONE: PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT OVER TIME 
Family situation 
Rita. Sheila, Thelma and Verity, who were in the same year cohort at Winston 
Secondary School, had experienced 3 sibling deaths and 2 parent deaths. 
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Sheila's bereavement is unusual because it involves a mother's death at an early 
age and from suicide. Fewer women than men die in their thirties and suicide is 
less common among women than men generally. For example, 0.4 females and 
0.9 males per thousand died in the 25-34 age group in 1992 in England and 
Wales (Office of Population Census and Surveys. No 19, 1992) while 903 female 
and 3049 male deaths were recorded as suicide and self-inflicted injury in 1992 
(Office of Population Census and Surveys. No 18, 1992). In addition to the death 
of Sheila's mother, other data from respondents in my small scale sample also 
contradicted the national pattern: the mothers of two school friends of Melanie 
(aged 12) had died from illness (cancer) and accident (road traffic), and Candida 
(aged 39) and Pansy (aged 25) each reported the suicides of 20-21 year old 
female friends. Rita also knew of three other pupils who had experienced the 
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death of a parent or sibling: the sister of Alison (friend of boyfriend) died from 
asthma, the father of Blanche (friend at Winston school) died of a heart attack and 
the brother of Clive (friend at Winston school) died of suicide or an accident. 
Although this thesis is not concerned with the impact of non-human deaths, 
animals will be included in the data that follows and twice elsewhere in this 
chapter because of the numbers involved and the indication by respondents that 
such deaths are significant. 
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One pupil in Year 7 mentioned her mother's miscarriage and another mentioned 
his aunt's miscarriage and, since these events were seen by those respondents 
as the death of a potential sibling or cousin. I have included them in those 
categories. 
Aileen (aged 15), who lives with foster parents, indicated five deaths: her friend 
(at 6 years), her father (at 7 years), her paternal grandfather (at 8 years), a 
neighbour (at 9 years) and her sister (at 14 years). Although she is not typical, 
she does represent a small number of pupils who experience many losses during 
their years of compulsory schooling and. in this respect, her story is more extreme 
than any of the four teenagers I interviewed. 
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Siblings 
I interviewed Lionel (aged 7) who was born two years after his brother. Martin, 
died In 1986. Lionel has an older brother. Neville (aged 12) who was 3 when 
Martin died, but who declined to be interviewed. I explored how Lionel thought 
about his unknown deceased brother. 
VC: Any thoughts on what the family might have been like if he [Martin] hadn't 
died? There'd be you three, I suppose... What do you think ct would have been 
like to have him around? 
Lionel: Well, it would be like. If I broke up with my brother [Neville] - my oldest 
brother - I'd always have Martin. And I've always wished he was alive. 
VC: Have you? 
Lionel: Yes, 
VC: I guess your brother misses Martin, t think - what do you think he feels 
about Martin? 
Lionel: Well, I think he's a bit disappointed about it and in a different way about 
me. 
VG: About you? 
Lionel: Yeah. 
The feeling of being a poor replacement for a deceased sibling is always likely, 
especially in quite young children, although parents and other siblings may say 
that this is not so - and tnjiy mean it. Three pupils In Hester Year 5 also told me 
that a sibling had died before they were bom. 
Sheila says she is glad she is an only child because 
if I had to have a brother or sister I'd have loved it to t>e a small one so that I -1 
think I'd feel threatened if that person had known mum. That would sort of 
make me think: "Well, thaf s not fair. You knew her and I didnl."" 
1 asked Rita. Verity and Thelma how the loss of their sibling had affected their 
lives. Rita says that losing her brother when she was 6 changed her life "in a big 
way" because "every now and again 1 look back and wish, oh I wish my brother 
was here." and also "because my mum has got closer to me." She says she 
sometimes feels very lonely now that she is an only child, and this feeling may 
have been exacerbated by her mother's remarriage when she was 12. Verity 
says, "It would be nice really to have [had] a little sister to take out and look after." 
and "we [the family] might have got on better because there would have been 
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someone else to shout at." Thelma says her brother's death "was really the most 
traumatic thing that changed my life totally" and although she does not actually 
say that she misses Aaron, her responses to his death (visiting the grave daily for 
the first year, spending a lot of time with his friends and, more recently, staying in 
a great deal) indicate that she does. 
Verity also talks about how she gets on with her younger sibling, Aiistair (aged 
15). She says that the relationship has gone through four phases: they got on 
"really well when they were young"; then they "hated each other until Dawn's 
death;" then, "during that time we got on well"; then, when she was "about 12 we 
started hating each other" again. She acknowledges that falling out with siblings 
is "part of growing up" but thinks that, despite this tendency. Dawn's death 
brought them closer together for a while. 
Important people and things 
Rita says that her mother, her step-father, her boyfriend. Verity and other friends 
are the most important people in her life. She also names happiness (and 
remembers listing this in an essay she wrote when she started secondary school) 
and "living for the moment." She explains the latter idea as follows: 
Because, you know, time goes so quickly, doesn't it? You doni realise how It 
goes but it does and that's why it's important. Plus the fact that you doni know 
how long you're going to be here so youVe got to really go for it in doing the 
things you want to do. 
Thelma says her parents and some friends are the most important people in her 
life and that being content is important. She mentions a dog which she seems 
fond of. and names important future plans as: gaining hairdressing qualifications, 
leaming to drive, getting a good job and earning money. 
I did not directly ask Sheila or Verity about important people and things. From 
their conversations I would guess that Sheila's father is more important than her 
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step-mother - although both are probably valued for different reasons - and that 
her boyfriend and then a wide group of friends are significant. Verity is obviously 
closer to her mother than to her father, and despite him being "a nightmare,' 
probably values her brother also. She is engaged to her boyfriend and names 
many friends with whom she spends her time. Neither of them mentioned pets 
but this may be because I only spoke to each of them twice. 
Eighty-seven percent of 62 pupils in Maxwell Year 7 indicated that their family 
(especially parents) are important to them, and of the 12.4% that indicated 
important non-family members, only friends, boyfriends and girlfriends were 
mentioned. When asked "What else is important to you or of value?" 41 (38 girls 
and 3 boys) out of 56 pupils named pets and animals. This response seems a 
clear indication of the overwhelming attachment that young people have to their 
pets since, by contrast, the next highest score was only 6 for school activities. In 
fact, Rita's father died while saving their pet cocker spaniel from injury on a 
railway line. 
When pets die people may respond to the loss with deep sorrow (as I shall show 
later regarding children and young people) and Edith, a married 40 year old 
PGCE student who cited the deaths of 4 grandparents, 2 aunts, 2 friends and 1 
neighbour, named the death of her cat two years previously as the most 
significant because "losing the cat was like losing one of our children." 
Emotional thoughts and feelings at the time of the death and now 
Regarding the deaths of her brother 10 years ago and father 8 years ago Rita 
says: 
At the time ... it just didnl seem real. ... I was sort of • was a bit shocked for a 
while - and then, I suppose, it didn't really sink in, so I didn't understand what 
had happened - only that they were gone... 
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I asked her to explain the word 'blurry* which she used several times to describe 
that period of her life: 
Rita: Yeah, it's just a sort of - the time after both deaths - everything sort of -1 
seemed to forget everything about that. ... there's a block where I c a n t 
remernber much about what happened. So that*s why I used 'blurry.' 
V C : . . . How long, would you say. this sort of blurry life lasted? 
Rita: Do you mean when it began to sick in? 
VC: Well, there are two things there. One is becoming aware of life around 
you... school and friends arxl whatever- and the other one is the implications, 
the rennaining as you call it, the sinking in of the importance... 
Rfta: ...Um. the death sinking in, I think that took quite a - quite a while - you 
know, half a year maybe, just for it to actually sink in because I was so young, I 
didnt understand. So it took a long time for this • you know, once I realised 
they were gone, they didnl come back in the house, it started to realty sink in. 
... About my friends in school. I suppose I tried to carry on a s normal. 
Rita suggests that the first few months after both deaths - particularly the first six 
months after her father died - passed in a blur or daze because of her inability to 
understand what the losses meant. She also notes a change over time in 
conversations with her mother: "We used to talk about it a lot but - now - we dont 
seem to." and mainly attributes this to her growing up. She says she is 
"beginning to understand things a bit better," and has "wider experience" and 
knowledge of "other beliefs" and "other theories." She also acknowledges: "I 
don't think about it every day - not now." 
Verity says that her sister's death "was quite a shock when it happened" but 
"because I didn't know her. it doesn't hurt so much." When she later left the 
church (see theme 3) she thinks it was because she wanted to be angry with 
someone and could not blame her family or God. Recently her mother's best 
friend had a baby girl which reminded her of Dawn and although she knows her 
parents do not want to talk about it. she says: "It would be nice just to know how 
they feel." 
When Sheila's father told her that her mother had committed suicide she "didnt 
take it in, because at 11 you're still quite young to take that sort of thing in." 
During the last 2-3 years though. Sheila has started to question why her mother 
did it and she says she sometimes gets depressed and moody - "very sort of 
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uptight." She is affected by anniversary dates (mother's birthday and the 
anniversary of her death) saying: "I think the only reason I think about it so much 
is because there are so many questions unanswered." 
Thelma says the time immediately after Aaron's death "felt like a dream" and that 
a newspaper account which implied he had been drunk or 'playing chicken' (see 
theme 2) had made her angry. She says the adage that time heals is not true 
because "I think you just leam to live with it. learn how to cope." She describes 
how she copes by keeping her feelings separate from her thoughts and words: 
Thelma: I can talk about it but -1 don't know if this makes sense but - talk about 
it as if I'm another person. If s not actually me. 
VC: Uhum. Is that what you're doing now, do you think? 
Thelma: Yeah. Yes . I know I am. 
VC: Right. 
Thelma: Yeah. so. I mean, when I'm talking about it I'm not feeling any hurt 
about whaf s happened. I'm just giving answers of what I can remember. With 
no emotional attachment. 
Rita. Thelma and Verity describe the early part of their bereavement as "blurry." 
"like a dream." and "quite a shock." Nor surprisingly Sheila also found it hard to 
"take in" new details of her mother's death 8 years after it happened and her 
bereavement entered another phase at that point. Both Thelma and Verity 
acknowledge their anger at a later stage in the grieving process. Currently. Sheila 
ongoingly seeks answers for herself. Thelma copes by isolating her feelings. 
Verity is reminded by another birth, and Rita seems to have learnt to forget her 
losses. 
Despite Thelma's protest that time does not heal. I think the different reactions of 
the four teenagers are linked to the passage of time in some way. Rita's two 
significant bereavements occurred when she was a child - and her reactions to 
both have merged in her memory - and Verity says that only particular 
conversations or events remind her of her sister. However. Sheila's loss was a 
vague memory until she learnt new facts that changed her perception of it. and 
Thelma's loss is complicated by a range of factors: the type of death, the age of 
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the deceased, the stories circulating about the cause of the accident, and the 
short time since the death. 
Rita sees the years containing the deaths as that part of her life completed so far 
and her retrospective view of her own grieving process may indicate why Thelma 
is so deeply affected by her loss. 
I mean, suppose if I was older and it happened now, I could come to terms with 
it quicker but I'd probably grieve k)nger. Because I was so young then I didn't -
I didnt understand what was happening - I suppose I just got on with my life 
and tried not to think about it. But as, if something happened now it would be 
constantly on my mind - for a long lime I would imagine. 
And, urn. it would be harder now because I would have known them longer so it 
would have hurt me more. But whereas then. I can hardly remember them. 
The views of Maxwell Year 7 and 10 pupils about their emotions early in 
bereavement may supplement the ideas discussed above. (Some pupils named 
more than one emotion.) 
Table 7.3 Years 7 and 10: early bereavement emotions 
Group & 
number 









15 = 34% 20 = 45% 9 = 20% 2 = 4.5% 2 = 4.5% 1 = 2.2% 
Year 10 
(n=13) 
2 = 15% 5 = 38% 0 1 = 7.6% 0 5 = 38% 
One girl and 1 boy in Year 7 admitted that they cried and Beryl (aged 15) was 
surprised because she did not. Aileen (aged 15) writes that she blamed herself 
for her father's death (when 7) because "I thought it was something I had done" 
and Sheila also says that, when she saw her father crying some time after her 
mother's death (when 3-4). "I couldn't work out what I'd done." 
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Overall, there is a sense that pupils move on in their grieving from then' to 'now' 
as emotion and cognitive reasoning replace a focus on emotion only, as indicated 
below. 
Table 7.4 Years 7 and 10: later bereavement emotions 




Sad 4 = 12% 
"Still" miss/ sad/upset 7 = 2 1 % 
"Sometimes" sad 2 = 6% 
Wishes and questions (wish had spent more time 
with; why did it happen) 
2 = 6% 1 
7.6% 
Partial resolution (have memories but have to get on 
with things) 
3 = 9% 
Moral beliefs (happy now and not in pain; in a better 
place; it was for the best) 
3 
Practical activity/event (gran getting married again; 
got another pet; going to do healthy things) 
3 
Don't think about it/ieamt to live with it 3 1 
OK/alright/relieved 5 = 38% 
Dont know/nothing 6 = 18% 6 = 46% 
There seems to be a tendency among older pupils to play down their feelings (eg: 
"Don't know" = 46%). which may be an inevitable response to an increasing 
number of losses. For example, Aileen (aged 15) says that she felt "all alone" 
when her father died because "I loved him and we were very close"* but, regarding 
her present feelings, writes: "I think I've learnt to live with it." Charles (aged 15) 
who is adopted, was "very confused and unbelieved [sic]" when his patemal 
grandmother died (his dog died 3 days later), but says he is now "relieved." 
Sandra (aged 44) reiterates Thelma's idea that "you just learn to live with it" as 
well as the view expressed in chapter 5 regarding long term adaptation rather 
than a 'return to baseline.' Her father died when she was 14, and she writes: 
I cio not find it relevant to speak of 'recovery' from grief, but it is possible to learn 
the life-skills, such as the ability to take risks, to care, ancJ to value oneself, 
though much later in life than is normal among the non-bereaved. 
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Poignantly, she adds: "I tend to suspect the non-bereaved of superficiality." 
I explored ways of remembering the dead over time with Years 5 and 10 and their 
replies fell into three categories. The majority (20) suggested tangible forms 
(photos/films/tape recordings, flowers, possessions, grave visits) which can be 
used regularly over time. Ten suggested forms of prayer and 11 named funeral 
practices. The first two methods are ongoing while the third mostly occurs in the 
early stages of the grieving process. 
An increase in ways of marking the scene of a death seems to have developed 
following the Hillsborough football disaster. A teacher at a London secondary 
school told me that pupils placed flowers, significant items and some possessions 
of a deceased pupil against the wall from which he had fallen and died (Shipman, 
personal communication, 1995). 
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Effect of bereavement on relationships with family members 
The perceptions of Rita, Sheila, Thelma and Verity about family relationships after 
the death of their parent or sibling are given below. 
Table 7.5 Rita, Sheila, Thelma and Verity: family relationships after a death 
Name Mother Father Sibling Step-parent 
Rita We became 
really close; 1 
t e l l her 
almost 
everything 
deceased deceased 1 really like 
him; we're 





in any way 
Sheila deceased We're very 
close; he's 
the person 1 
run to 
none She feels 
very left out 
but accepts 




1 can't please 
her by getting 
a job at least 
1 can get out 
from under 
her feet 
Thelma We were 
always close; 




h i m ; he 
doesn't say 
what he 
feels; he has 
mood swings 
deceased n/a 
Verity We just never 
talk about it 
We dont get 




we're so alike 
During that 
time we got 
on well; I've 
never heard 
him mention 
it at all; he's a 
real pain 
n/a 
Both Rita and Sheila have good relationship with their sun/iving parent and, of her 
relationship with her mother, Rita says: 
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After my dad died, I remember when, that's when we became realty close, 
because when my brother died, my mum had my father to lean on. But I think 
that she was, we were (already] leaning on each other then. 
Sheila thinks her father "tried to make up for everything because mum wasn't 
there" by spending a lot of time with her but .when he remarried, she "hated" her 
step-mother "because I had to start sharing my Dad with someone else." 
Both Thelma and Verity have parents who prefer not to talk about the death of 
their dead child. Thelma's seventeenth birthday will also be on a Friday in June 
as her brother's was. and she says her mother is "really paranoid about it" and 
that, although her father "hasn't said anything" she knows he will "be concerned." 
She is not afraid that she will die on the day after her birthday (as Aaron did) but 
knows her birthday will make it "quite awkward in our family this year." She 
humorously suggests: "I'm feeling I'm going to be locked up for those two days, 
you know!" Despite her cool relationship with her father, Thelma says that after 
her brother's death she appreciated her parents much more "because you always 
expect your parents and family to be there, dont you?" 
Verity says of her parents, "they're not the sort of people to discuss their feelings 
... weVe not very close." She says that after Dawn's death 
when you talked about it it was as if it never happened but it did. Mum never 
really discusses it, I doni know why... I know I'd want to talk aboxA it if it was 
me. 
I think it is possible to conjecture that, for a time, both Rita and Sheila 'replaced' 
their deceased parent in the life of their surviving parent because there were no 
other family members except themselves. By contrast, both Thelma and Verity 
were excluded from their parents' shared grieving and can only talk intermittently 
to their mothers. Both their fathers reinforce the sexual stereotypes of withdrawn, 
uncommunicative men. 
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Thirty-seven pupils in Maxwell Years 7 and 10 indicated how they thought they 
had got on with their families after a death although there is no indication who 
"family" refers to. 
Table 7.6 Years 7 and 10: family relationships after a death 
Group & number positive negative uncertain 
Year7(n=27) 16 = 59.2% 6 = 22.2% 5 = 18.5% 
Year 10 (n=10) 5 = 50% 2 = 20% 3 = 30% 
Positive replies ranged from simply "OK" to "They comforted me," and negative 
replies included: annoyed, "not very well", "terrible, but I got over it" and "my 
parents were a bit stressed out." At least 50% indicated positive family 
relationships but it is useful to note that Aileen (aged 15) comments: "Not very 
well. I got very naughty." Olga (aged 78) remembers that, much to her irritation, 
after her brother's death when she was 7 her mother became very protective and 
worried if she was a few minutes late from school. 
Effect of bereavement on relationships with people who are not family 
As already indicated, Sheila says that she sometimes gets depressed and moody 
and that her friends have learnt to leave her alone because "probably I'm thinking 
about mum." Mainly, however, she is outgoing and confident and not swayed by 
the opinions of her friends. Thelma says that after Aaron died she stayed out 
with his friends every night until late because her mother "was going through such 
a bad stage, I mean, she just sort of let me run wild." This situation lasted for a 
few months until her mother 
suddenly realised things were getting out of hand so I crawled back into line 
and I didn't go out any more and then, when I was about 15 [June 1993], I 
started going out every night again and ever since, since about last summer 
[1994], I havent really gone out. 
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She has few friends and describes herself as "reserved" but I suggest that her 
lack of self-confidence may also be related to experiencing a sudden untimely 
death and coping with the rumours arising from it. Rita and Verity mention each 
other as sources of comfort and Sheila also mentions Rita in this respect. The 
fact that the graves of Rita's brother and Verity's sister are side by side has also 
encouraged their mutual support. 
Sheila continues to talk about her mother's suicide to a small and trusted group of 
friends. Rita and Verity have been mutually supportive of each other because they 
are old friends but Thelma shares her grieving with few or no friends. This picture 
might indicate that, generally, school is not seen by bereaved pupils as an 
appropriate context for discussions of death with friends. 
In the findings below from Maxwell Years 7 and 10 there seems to be a greater 
tendency for younger pupils to be angry with other people, particularly their peers. 
This may be because older pupils become better at responding to each other as 
more of them experience loss or learn to live with it. 
Table 7.7 Years 7 and 10: relationships with friends and other people after a 
death 
How did you get on with 
other people? 
Year 7 (n=25) Year10(n=12) 
OK/fine/the same 11 = 44% 7 = 58% 
Better than before 1= 8% 
Nobody talked to me/ 
They didn't understand 
1 = 4% 1 
Annoyed/ angry/ moody 7 = 28% 
1 didn't tell/ 
They didn't know 
2 = 8% 
No difference 2 1 
Doni know/remember 2 2 = 16% 
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Whether the death affected personality, behaviour, creativity or Interests 
Rita has memories of specific moments and periods of time that indicate changed 
behaviour and interests. After Walter's death she remembers a time when "I used 
to stay in and watch TV all the time" but. at the family gathering after her father's 
funeral, she vividly remembers sitting with her teddy-bear "just being quite happy -
I didnt seem to understand." When she went back to school after her father's 
death she thinks she was "a bit quieter for a while" but has since learnt to be "a bit 
louder than usual because I want attention." Later still she "started reading more" 
and "became a real reader, a book worm." particulariy of literature on near death 
experiences (NDE) and spiritualism. 
Sheila's personality seems influenced by several issues related to her mother. 
She sometimes becomes moody and depressed thinking about her mother's 
death but has become "a very independent person" because of her father's 
admonition: "If you want to do something, go out and do it but be sensible about 
it." She also describes herself as 
quite a happy bright sort of person, so I tend not to think about things [nK>ther's 
suicide] that are going to make me down. 
and seems pleased that her mother's sister tells her that her "outgoing, loud, sort 
of fun" personality resembles her mother's. 
Thelma also began to read about NDEs and spiritualism after her brother's death. 
Since then she seems to have avoided confrontations and making difficult 
situations which may have hindered the development of her self-confidence. She 
admits that it is easier to stay home reading magazines and watching television 
rather than face the worid, although she doesn't know why. 
1 mean, a friend of mine keeps asking me to go out in Southtown and I arrange 
to go and then. I doni know, I get all panicle^ about going. I doni know why. 
And then I put it off and cancel... 
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Verity seems to have a poor self-image which she feeds by comparing herself 
with her dead sister. 
I think I felt guilty in a way that I was still here because IVe made a lot of 
mistakes. I'm only 17 but there are things I wish I hadnl done. I feel guilty that 
she isn't here to have a nice life... I think that maybe she should be here 
enjoying herself because she would be better than me. 
Just recently I hurt myself all the time, if s a really stupkJ thing to do. I think I do 
it for attention. 
She also says she is glad Rita has "been there" for her because she has "done 
many stupid things like trying to kill myself." 
It would seem that Rita became a bookwonn and. first quieter, then louder after 
her bereavements. Sheila goes out a lot socially, is independent and moody, 
while Thelma is reserved and prefers to stay at home. Verity is inclined to blame 
herself for living instead of her sister and sometimes harms herself. 
It is difficult to evaluate oneself retrospectively in questionnaires without the kind 
of prompting that an interview involves and the small number of examples offered 
by this method may reflect that difficulty. Of 48 pupils in Maxwell Year 7 who 
answered whether changed behaviour or personality had occurred after 
bereavement. 43.7% (16 girls and 5 boys) replied yes. giving 15 examples: 
• positive attitude towards self (1 example: to be more healthy) 
• aware of change in self when speaking to other people (1 example: sometimes 
I go on about them a lot) 
• positive attitude towards other people (6 examples, eg: to be understanding 
and good; I understand what they feel like; to act more sensibly) 
• negative attitude towards self (7 examples, eg: not my cheerful self; didn't 
want to do anything; went off my food; very angry; didnt talk that much). 
Of the 43 pupils in Maxwell Year 7 who answered whether changed creativity or 
interests had occurred. 13.9% said yes. but only 3 pupils (2 girls and 1 boy) 
explained further: 
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• negative (boy: couldn't concentrate; girl: stopped doing things for a while) 
• positive (giri: made me want to keep fit). 
In Maxwell Year 10 also a small number said yes to this question (21% of 14 
pupils). Two pupils explained changes which occurred during the last year: 
Charles started stamp collecting after his patemal grandmother's death and Beryl 
wrote that after her patemal grandmother died she was: 
A k)t quieter and less courageous. I draw a lot now as well as doing loads of 
things. I draw really strange things. 
Despite the fact that only 27 pupils (37.5%) in Year 7 and 3 pupils (17.6%) in Year 
10 replied to these questions. I think the examples show that young people can 
be aware of changes in their disposition and energy levels when a loved one dies, 
especially if the death is recent. 
Whether the death affected thinking about important things or views of life 
Thelma says she appreciates her parents much more now because she knows 
that "one day they're not going to be there - or pertiaps I might go first." She says 
she is 
not so bothered alx)ut my own life. ... generally, life on the whole, I'm not 
fussed about. But with my parents I am. 
Her short term plans are concemed with studying for a career after playing truant 
for so long (see theme 2) although she describes the prospect of her future life as 
"bleak" and "boring to think that you've got to get up every moming and do things 
that you don't want to do." However, she says she will cope with this feeling 
because 
In the past when things got too bad I could always bale out [play truant] but now 
i cant, IVe got to stick it - what I'm doing (college] - because if I doni, I'll be up 
the creek basically! ... I've got to take more responsibility for my actions or 
things will backfire on me. 
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She says that she has "learnt to accept that If things are going to happen, they're 
going to happen" and that she will never find out the answers to some of her 
questions about life "until I die myself." 
Verity, who is unhappy at her academic progress, says that her present stage of 
life "has got to be the worst stage' and she seems to reflect this thinking in a short 
to medium term view: 
Life just seems a real drag to me, I'm sony. Some days it's good. I'd like to 
have something that I know I can work or live for but rf I haven't I just wonder 
what the hell am I doing it for, what's the point? 
However, after describing an elderly depressed woman in the residential home 
where she works part-time, she adopts a longer term perspective and declares: 
I don't want to go like that. It just seems pointless. You can have a rubbish 
childhood, and maybe things will get better and you get married, employed, and 
work your way up and all that, and then K just stops again. And then you sit and 
wait around... 
V C : . . . What might be the biggest rule in your life, in terms of what you must do 
or must not do? 
Verity: You've just got to make what you can of it. You've got to enjoy it while 
you can but you know sometimes it doesnl count for anything. But life's what 
you make it, really, isn't it? If you want it to be good, then it will be good. 
By contrast Sheila and Rita seem more positive about life. Sheila describes it as: 
a challenge. It's there to be lived, ifs not there to sort of dawdle past you and I 
like to think that I do take advantage of it. Saying 'What's the purpose of life?' 
everyone's got different opinions on that one. My opinion: "Live for the moment. 
If you want to do something, doni let - within reason - dont let anyone hold you 
back." 
I asked Rita how far the fear of dying that she had previously expressed was 
linked with the deaths of her brother and father. 
Rita: A lot I would say. Because I wouldn't * if I hadn't experienced that then I 
would never really have thought about it.... I mean, that's the sort of thing you 
think about when you're really old. isnt it! Not my age. so • if they hadnt have 
died I wouldnl have thought about it hardly at all. It has had a lot of influence 
on the way I think. 
VC: How has it changed either the way you think or the way you live your life? 
Rita: ... As we were saying before, because I've experienced deatii it's made 
me grow up a bit quicker than I thought I would. ... I've realised how important 
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it is to live my life now than to be dwelling on the past and being depressed 
about it because if you do that then you woni - you woni go anyviSiere, I dont 
think. You've got to live your life for the moment. 
It would seem that Thelma has a present-focused '"bleak" view of a future in 
which she must take responsibility for her own actions and do things she does not 
want to do. Verity is slightly further on in her perspective, balanced between a 
present pessimistic view of life and an optimistic one that life can be made into 
what she wants it to be. Rita thinks that her bereavement experiences caused 
her to "grow up a bit quicker" than she expected and Sheila's perception of life as 
"a challenge" may parallel Rita's experience. Both Sheila and Rita express 
apparently hedonistic views {"live for the moment" and "how important it is to live 
my life now") which may result from the belief that in the past they faced some 
challenging events. 
In a similar way. 39% of 46 pupils in Maxwell Year 7 said that the death of great 
grandparents, grandparents, uncles and neighbours had made them think 
differently about the things that were important to them or the way they looked at 
life (see also chapter 5). Although only 6 (5 girls and 1 boy) explained further, 
their answers fall into 3 categories: 
• awareness of self (2 examples: made me think if it was me; made me enjoy 
life) 
• awareness of other people (2 examples: I thought just how precious people 
are and that they need a lot of attention; realised that everyone has to die 
sometime). 
• awareness of life in general (2 examples: made me think about how life is; 
made me realise how important life is). 
Although they are a small sample of the whole year group (8%) - and perhaps 
represent only those with the ability and willingness to write about their 
experiences and thinking -1 suggest that their replies indicate the beginning of an 
awareness of the fragility and specialness of life at 11-12 years. Adults who 
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answered this question regarding the death of someone close before they were 
aged 19 also gave longer-term retrospective responses reiterating these three 
themes. 
Awareness of self 
Gavin (aged 45) says the death: of his mother at 15 
Reinforced my natural tendency to conceal and hide away feelings and 
construct something of a false front to face the world. Reinforced a sense of 
pessimism. 
Awareness of otfier people 
Henry, a psychotherapist (aged 58) reflects on the deaths of his grandfather 
(when 7). pet (when 8) and friend (when 11): 
I think [they] prepared me for dealing with more painful loss later in life and a s 
an empathic base for helping others. 
Awareness of life In general 
Hannah (aged 21) whose fiancee is the brother of a friend who died when she 
was 16, writes: 
I appreciate the people close to me a lot more and make the most of 
opportunities as I know that death can occur at any age. ... I feel that 
experiencing the death of a younger person affects your outlook nrwre than the 
death of an elderly person. 
Overview of personai development over time 
Although no easy explanations can be suggested from the data offered so far. I 
think four factors are likely to be important. 
First, the length of time the child or young person has been in the bereaved role is 
significant since grieving and other activities or events such as school life can 
conflict. Rita. Verity and Sheila were bereaved (or told the details of their 
bereavement) before their mid-teens and consequently did not have to put their 
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cognitive and emotional energies into both grieving and secondary school work, 
as Thelma did when 13. (See next section for further comments.) Furthermore, it 
is unsettling if a family member suddenly dies, especially (as in Thelma's case) if 
she or he had existed all one's life. By contrast, Rita's relationship with her 
brother lasted 6 years, and with her father 8 years (half her present lifespan); 
Sheila's relationship lasted 2 or 3 years and Verity's relationship never existed in 
the flesh. 
Second, the age of the child or young person at the time of death also seems 
important. Having the protection of an adult when young and not being fully 
aware of the characteristics of death (irreversibility, universality, non-functionality) 
or the many philosophical and religious explanations about death may. as Rita 
suggests, actually make it easier to cope If bereaved when young rather than 
when older. 
Third, common themes in the stories of Rita and Sheila and Thelma and Verity 
also suggest that family dynamics both before and after the death are influential. 
Perhaps there is a greater tendency for parents to draw closer together when a 
child dies than for the whole family to do so. and for the loss of one parent to draw 
the other parent and children together. For Thelma and Verity, in particular, the 
not-so-good relationships they had with their fathers did not improve after the 
death of their siblings. 
A fourth factor is idiographic development, shown in the disposition or personality 
of individuals and their attitude to life. Rita sees herself to be growing in 
confidence while Verity is aware she lacks self-esteem. Sheila describes herself 
as independent and Thelma says she is reserved. Each of these views of oneself 
- and therefore of the world one inhabits - will vary under different circumstances, 
as will the effect of the death of a loved one on such views. 
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THEME 2: INTER-RELATIONSHiP BETWEEN BEREAVEMENT 
AND SCHOOL UFE 
Bereavement as a significant iife event 
I asked Rita, Sheila and Thelma to divide their lives into chapters and. when they 
did so. each one used the death of a relative to end the first chapter. It is 
interesting that although Rita has lost both her brother and her father she sees 
her life divided into only two chapters by her father's death at the mid-way point -
perhaps because the "blurry" events of her brother's death have merged into 
those of her father's. 
Tabie 7.8 Rita. Sheila, Thelma and Verity: 'chapters' of their lives so far 
Name 1st chapter 2nd chapter 3rd chapter 4th chapter 
















































Thelma says that if Aaron had not died she would probably have had "about fifty 
different chapters" of "all the things that aren't important." For her the most 
important decision she ever made was whether to leave school and go to college 
because of her fear of going "into a room with people I didn't know." Apart from 
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the death of a relative, other significant tuming-points named by these three 
teenagers are a parent's remarriage, learning the details of a death, and leaving 
school. By way of comparison I generated 7 categories from 41 pupils in Maxwell 
Year 7 who listed "the most important thing that had happened to you in your life 
so far" and 6 categories from 17 adults (21-44 years) who described 'turning-
points' in their lives. 
Nearly 22% of Maxwell Year 7 named a death as the most important event, as 
shown below: 
• happiness (16 examples, eg: being a bridesmaid; getting a cat; meeting 
someone to love; buying Lego) 
death (9 examples of sibling, grandparent and pet) 
growing up (6 examples, eg: getting a job) 
exciting (5 examples, eg: visiting EuroDisney) 
upsetting (4 examples, eg: parents rowing or divorcing) 
frightening (2 examples, eg: aeroplane flight) 
funny (1 example: 'male' guinea pig having babies) 
Careers and personal relationships seem most important to adults and, 
interestingly, all the deaths cited were of a parent (when aged 9, 14, 20, 22, 28 
and 29): 
• entering higher education and making career choices (9 examples) 
• relationship with partner/spouse and children (9 examples) 
• death of a family member (6 examples) 
• change in religious commitment (3 examples) 
• relationship with parent (1 example) 
• travelling (1 example) 
Although it is not surprising that 2 respondents considered the death of a parent 
important when they were at school, that 4 others did so when they were at 
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college, pursuing a career or mamed may indicate the impact of a parent's death 
even in adulthood. 
Frequency of bereavement while at school 
Only 68% of pupils in Maxwell Year 7 (n = 151) indicated the age at which 
jz 
particular deaths occurred so the data on frequency by age is incomplete. 
However, even from these figures, there is an indication (as is to be expected) 
that the awareness of bereavement increases with age. 
















These figures could indicate that nearly everyone in each of the three Year 7 
classes at Maxwell School that I spoke to (containing 24-25 pupils) had 
experienced the death of a human or pet within the previous year. 
Importance of the death 
Of the five categories commonly used to describe death (natural anticipated, 
natural unanticipated, accidental, suicide and murder), the third, fourth and fifth 
are the most difficult to accept because of their untimely and sudden nature, and 
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even the notion of 'natural' death may be challenged when a baby dies due to 
illness or defect. Rita and Thelma lost their relatives through accidents. Sheila 
lost her mother through suicide, and Verity's baby sister was stillborn. 
Verity acknowledges that part of the importance of Dawn's death is 'missing what 
might have been' and Rita, who says that the deaths of her father and brother 
were "really unacceptable" because they were both so young, argues: 
My brother had hardly lived when he died, so what was the point of him being 
bom in the first place? 
Thelma admits that "you expect your grandparents to die" and adds: 
I know you expect young people to die but not - your brother - and not three 
close people in your family within two years. 
Although Sheila is not troubled by unfulfilled hopes as Verity is or the death of 
people in their youth as Rita and Thelma are. she simply cannot understand why 
anyone should choose to take her or his life or how suicide "solves anything." 
Of the 66 pupils in Maxwell Year 7 who wrote about the importance of a death. 
42.4% cited their grandparents' deaths and 28.7% their pet's (or pets') deaths. 
All other citations of less likely deaths were in single figures (eg: 4 = friend and 1 
= sister) and the pupil whose father had died declined to answer this question. 
This response probably reflects the likely frequency of such events rather than 
emotional attachment to the deceased. 
Reasons given in Maxwell Year 7 by 23 pupils (20 female , 3 male) for the 
importance or significance of the death categorised by key words or themes are: 
• feelings and relationships (14 examples, eg: was close to her; meant a lot to 
me) 
• time spent with deceased (7 examples, eg: spent a lot of time or did not spend 
enough time with) 
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• contexts (2 examples, eg: only death or more than one death at same time) 
• unwelcome outcome (1 example: cancellation of 5th birthday party). 
One pupil's comment included two themes. 
It is interesting that of the 46 girls in Year 7 who completed the questionnaire. 39 
completed this question on the significance or importance of the death and/or 
other related questions on the same page and 19 girls (48%) gave reasons. Of 
the 26 boys who completed the questionnaire. 17 completed this question and/or 
others on the same page and 3 (17.6%) gave reasons. Two boys gave reasons 
of contexts and the third gave a relationship: "They were a part of my family." No 
boy mentioned having feelings for or spending time with the deceased as 19 girls 
did. 
The reasons given by 12 adults (8 females and 3 males) regarding the 
significance or importance of a death experienced before they were 19 are as 
follows: 
« first death (Wendy, Keith and Orlando) 
• close to deceased (Malcolm Pansy and Imogen) 
• emotional outcome (Sandra. Tabitha. Ursula) 
• old enough/too young to understand (Barbara and Gail) 
By contrast. Jasmine (aged 26) states that pet deaths were the most significant 
because "you saw them dead and buried them" but "with people you never saw 
them dead so 1 always felt... they'd just gone away." 
Funeral attendance 
Sheila does not know or remember whether she attended her mother's funeral but 
the tone of her voice tells me that she feels excluded from some important 
information. 
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t know she's cremated and there's a plaque for her in Northtown with my 
grandparents - her parents - which I haven't seen. I doni know where her 
ashes were spread. 
Thelma went to her brother's funeral but says: "I can't remember that much about 
it, to be honest. I was in a daze really.' Rita is not sure whether she remembers 
anything of her brother's funeral ceremony but clearly remembers walking behind 
her father's coffin towards the grave and crying while holding her mother's hand 
during the ceremony. Only Verity, her brother and her parents attended Dawn's 
funeral and Verity remembers each of them writing a note and putting it in the 
grave, and her mother crying. 
Of 44 pupils in f^axwell Year 7 who described a human death as important, the 
following details of funeral attendance were given. 
Table 7.10 Year 7: funerals attended so far 
Attend 18 = 40% 
Did not attend 24 = 54.5% 
Don't know or remember 2 = 4.5% 
Data from 36 pupils in Year 7 who indicated their age at the time of the death 
suggests that there is a slightly greater tendency towards non-attendance than 
attendance at funerals. While at secondary school, 3 pupils had attended a 
funeral while 7 had not. 
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Table 7.11 Year 7: age when bereaved and funeral attendance 
Age of Number of Attended Did not 
pupil deaths funeral attend 
funeral 
3 1 1 
4 1 1 
5 6 4 2 
6 3 2 1 
7 3 1 2 
8 2 1 1 
9 6 3 3 
10 6 4 2 
11 6 3 3 
12 4 4 
Forty-three pupils also considered whether they had wanted to attend and 72% 
said they had. 18.1% said they had not. and 9% did not know or remember. 
The explanation given by Rosemary (aged 16) regarding non-attendance might 
be similar to that of other pupils at various stages in their school lives, particularly 
at secondary school. 
VC: Did you go to your great uncle's funeral? 
Rosemary: No. because it was only last week and I've been doing my [GCSE] 
exanns, so I didnl. My mum said it probably wasn't a good idea because they 
had to go up for two days... But I didn't go because I just couldnl - didn't really 
have the time. I felt a bit hom'ble for not going but - mum didni think it was a 
very good idea... I still feel, though, that I should have been there. I knew him, 
and I should really go to his funeral just out of respect. 
Melanie (aged 12) knows two friends whose mothers had died and I asked her 
what she thought school personnel could do to help. I think her replies indicate 
the general attitude that pupils imbibe concerning absence from school. 
Melanie: I doni know! They could ask them if they want time off school - to get 
over it. But -1 doni know. 
VC: That's a good piece of thinking - time off to recover. How long would you 
think they would need? 
Melanie: I doni know. It depends because... They oouldnt give them a load of 
time off because of their educatbn and everything, but as long a s theyVe got 
over it a little bit - but they'll never completely get over it anyway. But when 
they feel alright to come back to school, I suppose. 
V C : Which really leaves it up to them to decide, doesn't it? 
Melanie: Yeah. 
VC: How long is long enough... Would you think, say, a nrwnth? 
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Melanie: Probably. 
VC: Would two months be too long? 
Melanie: Yes. because they'd miss out on quite a lot of school and everything. 
So they wouldn't know what they were doing when they got back or anything. 
Rita remembers having a couple of days off school after her father's funeral, 
Verity does not mention what she did after her sister's funeral and Sheila was not 
at school when her mother died. Thelma. however, who was at secondary school 
when her brother died, feels that the response of her form tutor to her request to 
go to the funeral was thoughtless: 
It all happened on a Saturday night and I went in on the Monday ... my tutor 
... when I asked to - went into school and told her she said ... 'Oh, you'll be 
wanting the day off for the funeral then.' Well, that just drove me totally up 
the wall. When I went back we had massive arguments and I got thrown out 
of my tutor group. 
She says- that school staff could have made it easier for her by trying "to be a bit 
more sympathetic" and saying: "Well, come back when you feel a bit better." 
The context of the death and other events remembered at the time 
Table 7.12 Rita, Sheila. Thelma and Verity: how told of death 
Name Age when bereaved How told 
Rita (a) 6 
{b)8 
(a) by police at home 
(b) by teacher out of 
classroom 
Sheila 3-4 by father just before 
she started secondary 
school at 10/11 years 
Thelma 13 by friend who was with 
brother 
Verity 10 by parents 
Sheila, who was bereaved before she went to primary school, says she was told 
about her mother's suicide just before she started at secondary school because 
her father and stepmother "were afraid" that people there would know what had 
happened. Apart from this, Sheila does not mention either primary or secondary 
school as a context for her loss which is not surprising as staff and pupils have 
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always known that her natural mother is dead and that she has a stepmother. 
Like the youth worker who introduced us, school staff probably do not know that 
Sheila's mother committed suicide, although many of her friends do because she 
discusses it with them. 
Rita says she was at primary school when her father died and remembers "the 
teacher coming in and just taking me out of the classroom and telling me." She 
also adds, as soon as I was taken out of the classroom I knew what had 
happened - just like the first time [her brother's death] when I knew what had 
happened." She thinks she was quieter at school after the deaths of her brother 
and father and that the busy-ness of the school environment helped to keep her 
from thinking about them. She was also "comforted ... a little bit because of my 
friends there." 
When police came to both her schools to give a routine talk about the dangers of 
playing on railways lines. Rita's primary school teacher took her out of the class 
and explained why, but she sat through the talk in the hall at secondary school, 
crying and unwilling at first to leave for fear of drawing attention to herself. Rita 
says she was hurt by being singled out for special attention at primary school and 
hurt for different reasons at secondary school because the incident got her 
"thinking about it again." She says she was quite shy when she went to 
secondary school and thinks that "school has changed me quite a bit, actually." 
Overall, Rita does not think her bereavements affected her schooling and her 
experience of both primary and secondary schools is positive. 
Verity and Rita were at the same primary school and Verity remembers being 
given special treatment in a music lesson soon after her sister's death. 
Recognizing that it showed her teacher's care for her she is now glad about it -
although, like Rita, she remembers not wanting to feel different at the time. Verity 
describes their primary school as "very compassionate" towards Rita after her 
brother and father died and she recalls: 
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...they said. 'If you want to talk, talk.' And if h had been secondary school I 
don't know if they would have done the same. 
Verity also thinks that secondary school staff "were pretty good" when Rita finally 
left the talk in the hall in tears because they asked her to go after her friend rather 
than "chasing after her" themselves. 
The accounts by Rita and Verity suggest that some primary school staff feel 
confident to tell children of their loss and show care towards them. However, both 
accounts seem to contrast with the response Thelma felt she received from her 
secondary school form tutor, previously cited, whom she describes as saying: 
"Oh, you'll be wanting the day off, for the funeral then." 
In fact, secondary school is the most significant context for Thelma's 
bereavement. One local newspaper account of Aaron's death - written by the 
editor who happened to be the driver of the car - noted that Aaron had been 
drinking under age and suggested that he had been drunk and/or 'playing chicken' 
on the bypass. Thelma believes that at least one member of staff "said that he 
was playing chicken to other pupils" and, because of this, she "tumed against the 
rest of them." She "felt a lot of anger" and thought: "Why are you standing there 
trying to tell me this, that and the other?" because "You don't know everything." 
In lessons she used to sit in a dream or felt bored and began to truant about six 
months after Aaron's death because: 
I didni see the point. I thought: 'We're all going to die anyway. I mean, 
what's the point of wasting my time In school when I could die tomorrow?' 
When they realised the extent of her truancy the school personnel asked her if 
she would like to talk to a counsellor. She agreed to it and explains: 
But I doni think the school really understood what the problem stemmed from. 
They just. I think, thought I was sick of school and couldn't be bothered to go. 
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The counselling sessions were not successful because the male counsellor in his 
mid-twenties "just sat there and expected me to tell him my whole story." She 
complains that he did not attempt to ask her anything or to give her any answers. 
At 13, she says pupils look up to adults and "dont see them as equals" and, since 
the sessions took place on school premises, she did not feel she could be honest 
with him, even if she had wanted to be. 
Perhaps because Rita's bereavements occurred while she was at a primary 
school small enough to enable its teachers to show they cared, her attitude to 
school life is positive. After taking GCSEs at secondary school she stayed on and 
went into the sixth form because "I knew all the teachers and that comforted me in 
a big way so I wouldn't have to,go somewhere strange and start all over again." 
Thelma, by contrast, whose exams at the same secondary school were "a total 
disaster," now travels to college and is glad "I've got away from this town." 
In order to explore the school context further, I analysed by theme the following 
20 answers given by 30 pupils in Maxwell Year 7 to describe what else was 
happening at the time of a death. 
Table 7.13 Year 7: other events at time of death 
birthday of self or relative 7 
school events (starting a new 
school, "at school", school tests, 
holidays) 
5 
changes in family (birth of sibling, 
moving house, parents separating, 
other family deaths) 
4 
Christmas/ Easter 2 
pet's illness or death 2 
When these contexts are grouped according to either home life (birthdays, family 
and pet = 13) or school life (school events and holidays = 7), it becomes clear that 
these two areas are the most important in the lives of pupils. How adults 
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remember the juxtaposition of school events and bereavement will be explored 
next. 
School events and bereavement 
The replies of 32 adults to the question 'What else was happening in your life at 
the time of the death?" are given below. Only adults whose replies focused on 
the death of a human while they were at school or college are included. 
Table 7.14 Adults: other events at time of death 
at school 6 
at school but no worries about work 2 
exams and work at school 8 
transition between schools 5 
transition between school & college 2 
taking exams at college 4 
home and family 3 
death of pet 1 
religious conversion 1 
It is interesting that 84% of the replies are connected with education in some way 
- whether at school or college/university. Twenty-one percent of replies describe 
transitions in school life (between primary and secondary levels and further and 
higher education); 25% describe 'being at school' and 34% describe academic 
work and exams. Some of the associations between school life and bereavement 
become even more apparent when the descriptions are further examined. 
Patrick (aged 68) writes that he had just started primary school and was starting 
to make friends when his father died and he became withdrawn for a while. 
Malcolm (aged 29) remembers that the deaths happened soon after he started at 
secondary school. Wendy (aged 22) seems to compare her dead 21 year old 
friend with herself, saying she was "still at school, had lots of friends, social life 
etc - normal things for a 15 year old to look forward to and do." Orlando (aged 
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21) captures something of the lull in school atmosphere before option choices at 
13 with his description: "at school but with no school worries." 
Exams and school work were mentioned by 8 people of whom 4 were about to 
take O levels/GCSEs when the death occurred. In addition. Barry (aged 27) 
remembers he was under pressure from school work (when 13) and Lorraine 
(aged 42) writes that about two years after the death (when 12) her "schoolwork 
began to deteriorate." Camilla's (aged 24) grandfather died on the day before she 
sat one of her English A level papers and she felt "a bit cross because it got in the 
way of my exams." Shortly after the exam started she tried to leave but was 
prevented by a teacher whom she kneiw well who encouraged her to stay. 
Camilla was awarded grade E after a letter of explanation was sent to the 
examination board and she says: 
I think I would have failed without that letter. My English tutor tells me I was on 
line for a B or C but I'm still not terribly sure if I would have passed anyway, so 
In some respects I sort of have a bit of a giggle and think: 'Oh thanks, 
granddad, you got me a pass there. I really needed that one.' 
After his mother died Gavin (aged 52) diverted his energies into school work and 
did well at O and A level but "thereafter lost a sense of direction" and "did badly in 
the first couple of years at university." Nancy (aged 64) remembers that after her 
grandfather died university was a "great relief and occupier of time and energy" 
and Karen (aged 40). who was in her first year at teacher training college when 
her mother died, thereafter "worked very hard - shutting myself up in the library all 
the time." 
I suggest that school life can be either a haven or a burden after a death occurs. 
By keeping pupils busy it may distract them from their grief and allow them to be 
like their friends, or it may demand more of them in terms of concentration, work 
and attendance than they can give. The deaths of parents and siblings (which are 
rare) and grandparents and pets (which are more frequent) may intrude into the 
lives of children and young people at any point in their school life and affect their 
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academic progress but at secondary level, such intrusions seem to be more 
difficult to manage. 
Overview of Interaction between bereavement and school events 
In this section I have tried to explore the frequency and type of bereavement 
experienced during the school years and the impact of school life and events 
(such as exams) on funeral attendance and compassionate leave. I think at least 
three aspects can be identified. 
First, it seems that many pupils rate both bereavement and school life as 
important periods of their life and, because of this, some struggle when the two 
coincide. Thelma's story shows that, under certain circumstances, unsympathetic 
school personnel may thoughtlessly affect the grieving process. Rita, Sheila and 
Thelma consider the first chapter of their life ended with a death and anticipate 
the next chapter ending when they leave further education. Interestingly, Rita 
sees her father's death as the only significant event so far. Many 11-12 year olds 
and adults cite a particular death as important or a turning-point, and a large 
number of pupils in Maxwell Year 7 had experienced a bereavement during the 
previous year. Most retrospective accounts by adults give 'being at school,' 
school transitions and academic work and exams as the context for a death 
event. 
Second, it may be difficult to come to terms with the shock of death from 
accidents and suicide - such as Rita, Sheila and Thelma experienced - while 
involved in the activities and exam systems of school. Although most pupils 
experience the death of a grandparent or pet from illness or age some, such as 
Verity, encounter natural death in other forms (malformation) which may be even 
more unsettling. 
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Third, exams and pressure of school work seem to prevent some pupils from 
attending funerals or taking compassionate leave and, because of this, it may be 
easier for primary rather than secondary pupils to attend funerals. Rosemary 
explains how many pupils may feel about missing a funeral because of exams. 
THEME 3: MORAL AND SPIRfrUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Influence of and commitment to traditional religious beliefs and practices 
In our first interview Sheila explained that although she occasionally goes to 
church, this activity is unrelated to belief: 
I'm not Christian. I'm not religious either. Some people think that's bad but 
again, it's my life, it's my views. I don't - I couldn't go to - not go to church. I 
wouldnl like, go up to a church and sort of think: *0h I canl go in.' I quite often 
do go to church, Christmas, Christian events. This sounds stupid but Christian 
events I quite often do go to church. But I'm not religious. Dm. as far as I don't 
believe that Jesus has got a message for us all, any of that. I dont believe in 
that at all. 
Sheila's explanation is in contrast to Rita's who says that after her father died she 
and her mother began to attend the local parish church where they knew a lot of 
people "to try and find an answer." 
I'd lost two people and people there were saying 'Oh God loves you', you 
know. 'He'll always be there for you.' Maybe that's how I found the comfort. 
However, Rita and her mother stopped attending the parish church when she was 
about 12 because her mother remarried and they moved to another town. She 
says they did not consider attending church In the new town but would have 
returned to the previous one because "a lot of my friends went there - Verity went 
there. And I knew almost everyone there." It seems from this comment that the 
most important feature of church attendance was having a social support network 
rather than theological beliefs. 
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As already indicated, Verity and her parents, who were regular churchgoers, 
attended the same parish church as Rita. Verity has a sense of God's 
involvement in her sister's death. 
VC: Any thoughts about God at that stage of your Irfe. when she died? 
Verity: Yeah, when 1 was that age it was almost like the breaking point when I 
did slip away [from chuxh]. 1 decided it wasn't for me, but 1 did go off it a bit I 
must admit but 1 felt extremely guilty. I felt - because a lot of my friends were 
Christians and I had been in a Christian family -1 just felt that I'd been Ignoring 
and neglecting Him... and it was obvious Dawn was ill and she must have died 
for a reason, you know. 
Verity explains why she left the church for about a year. 
... I didnt blame God but 1 wanted to be angry with someone. 1 think that's 
what it was and 1 didn't want to be angry with my family... 
She says. "I think I felt I just didnl want to talk to Him," but also felt guilty and lost 
at staying away. However, she returned to church activities at about 11 and 
stayed for two more years until 
... people started getting realty heavy on you. stupid stuff, they still do it now. 
... They're just really intense people and I think I began to realise it at a really 
young age and that's when I started to get out of it and found talking to Rita 
helped. 
It may not be connected but the first time she "started to get out of it" was soon 
after her sister's death. 
Thelma. however, has formulated a different response to teaching about God 
following her bereavement. Although she went with friends to Sunday school at 
the same parish church until she was about 7. she has not been since and her 
religious beliefs have probably been shaped far more by RE in school: 
... you go to your R E lessons and you hear what everyone else thinks. And 1 
just sort of went with 'There is a God and there is a heaven.' 
This passive belief in God was a background to the deaths of her grandfather 
when she was 4 and her grandmother when she was 12, but it was challenged by 
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the deaths of her father's uncle and another grandmother just a week before 
Aaron was killed (see next section). 
The kind of religious membership and attendance described by these four 
teenagers seems typical of many other pupils. Thirty-three percent of 72 pupils in 
Maxwell Year 7 indicated that they had been brought up within a particular 
religious tradition. 
Table 7.15 Year 7: religious upbringing 
"Christian" Church of Methodist Jehovah's no 
England Witness explanation 
5 15 1 2 1 
However, just 19% of 57 pupils in Year 7 indicated that they currently belong to or 
attend a particular religious group. There were two unclear answers and one 
pupil indicated more than one activity. 
Table 7.16 Year 7: current religious affiliation 
"Christian" 2 
Sunday School 2 
church 2 
church choir 3 
youth club 1 
Jehovah's Witness 2 
Buddhist 1 
don't know/ no answer 2 
Attendance at a place of worship or membership of a religious group does not, of 
course, indicate acceptance of traditional belief as the comment by Sheila shows. 
Sandra (aged 44) writes that after the death of her father (when 14) and paternal 
grandfather (when 15) she had an intensely religious phase, was confirmed, and 
had a sense of religious vocation until her mid-twenties but that what she was 
seeking - and found - was an 'alternative famil/. 
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Belief In God or a divine power 
Sheila does not mention any kind of belief in God and states, "I'm my own person 
and I have my own beliefs, kind of attitude towards it [death]." 
Rita says that her understanding of God and of God's will regarding death 
developed through attendance at church: 
I didn't know much about God to start off with when I was young - maybe 
thafs why my mum got involved in it ... but - it was really blurry to start off 
with - and then, as I say, at times, I thought I had. you know, I thought, well 
maybe it's just God saying - you know, that they should be with Him. And 
then, other times, I just think, well, why did He do this thing really? I don't 
know. 
Although her theological thinking refers specifically to church teaching - because 
she and her mother only went to church after the deaths of her brother and father 
- it is likely that any reference in school to the same themes and activities of 
church also encouraged her reflection. For example, she recounts how different 
primary school prayers were to church prayers: pupils never closed their eyes and 
would "muck about" while people in church raised their hands and often spoke in 
tongues. 
Rita's belief in the existence of God seems unchanged now from the time when 
she attended church. She describes God as "a whirling mass" which is "around" 
in the world and when asked whether God will play a part in her career plans, 
says: "If He wants to influence me then he w///find a way, won't He?" Whether 
due to church attendance, parental, school or social support, her beliefs are 
mainly in line with traditional Christian teaching of a loving personal God. This is 
evident in the following extract in which I probe the apparent contradiction that a 
loving God would deliberately cause someone's death. 
VG: Because you said. "Really I do believe in God.' 
Rita: Yeah. It's just such a -1 think, really. He is loving, but He's judgmental a s 
well. I think He's both. 
VC: If this is the judgmental bit and this is the k)ving bit (showing hands balanced 
equally) which one is heavier or bigger judging, bving? 
Rita: I'd say loving actually. 
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VC: Loving is bigger, more important? 
R'rta: Yeah. 
VC: Any other part...? 
Rita: It's realty difficult to say because • because if God is judgmental he's 
judging whether to take away a person's life or not - yeah? 
VC: You said it. 
Rita: Yeah. Um, but He's - if s contradicting itself in a way because if He's loving 
then He wouldnl dorl. 
Verity also struggles with the idea of God's power over fife and death. 
VC: So where does God fit into the idea that people die when they're young, or, 
as you said, when they're good people? 
Verity: When I was younger, you don't know why He lets them die. You don't 
think if s right that they should die, [so] it must have something to do with Him. I 
don't know how. I know he controls the whole plan but I doni know how he 
controls which people die... 
Verity says her picture of God has not changed through the years, although her 
way of worshipping God has. She says, "it's nice to know someone's watching 
over you" because she feels she has "done some very bad things" and "He'll 
always say it*s OK." She describes God as "always there if you need to speak to 
Him," someone who seems bigger, older and wiser than Jesus, although "Jesus is 
the sort of more important because He has been here..." Verity says that 
sometimes she has prayed and it has felt as if "He's done something for me 
because things are happening." She does not say she prayed at the time of 
Dawn's death but considers, overall, that it "was quite a good thing" for financial 
reasons that Dawn did not live. 
Thelma's view of God, however, as previously explained, is influenced by two 
other deaths just before her brother died. 
I doni believe in God. . . . When he [Aaron] died rrry faith totally went - not that I 
had much before - but that, just sort of. like everyone dying and then he went. 
And I thought: "Well, if there was something, why take all the family?" 
She rejects the Christian notion of a loving, caring God as described by Rita. 
There's so many disasters and honible things that happen to people and I 
think that if there is a caring God up there, why did He let such things 
happen? 
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Thelma's dismissal of conventional Christianity prevents her from joining a church 
community (as Rita and her mother did) and she is forced to search for meanings 
and solutions herself. However, it is likely that she would not have rejected these 
beliefs if Aaron and her other relatives had not died, as she suggests in the 
following extract (italics mine): 
VC: OK. so you're saying 'I believed what everyone else wanted to believe'... 
Thelma: Yeah, I wasn't really sure, 1 hadn't made up my mind - life sort of 
made up my mind for me. 
How far the experiences and beliefs of these four teenagers are typical of other 
pupils will be explored below comparing 80 pupils in Hester Year 5 and Maxwell 
Years 7 and 10. 
Table 7.17 Years 5, 7 and 10: belief in God 
1 believe that Y e a r 5 
(n=15) 




Total = 80 
God exists 
and takes 
care of us 
5 = 33.3% 15 = 31.2% 3 = 15.7% 23 = 28.7% 
God exists 
but does not 
affect our 
everyday life 
2 = 13.3% 8 = 16.6% 3=15.7% 13= 16.2% 
God may 
exist but I'm 
not sure 
6 = 40% 17 = 35.4% 11 =57.8% 34 = 42.5% 
God doesn't 
exist 
2 = 13.3% 6 = 12.5% 2 = 10.5% 10= 12.5% 
Seventy pupils say that they believe in the existence of God (of whom 34 are 
ambivalent about their belief) and 10 say they do not believe. 
In Maxwell Year 7 no overall correlation can be found between belief in God and 
bereavement experiences of close family members: the pupil whose father died 
did not answer; two pupils whose sisters died said: "God doesn't exist"; and 
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another pupil v\^ose sister died said "God exists and takes care of us." In Year 
10 Aileen (aged 15) thinks God "may exist but I'm not sure." 
Among pupils at primary school a range of ideas about God are evident, some of 
which may be influenced by traditional teaching whether in a place of worship or 
school, and the following three respondents (children of friends or colleagues) 
indicate this breadth. 
Jennifer (aged 10). whose parents are Quakers, attends Church of England 
sen/ices and Quaker meetings. She went to the funeral of her great grandmother 
in 1995. She describes the "spirit" of her grandmother - and of all people (see 
later) - as the invisible "main part" of her and spontaneously compares this with 
God. 
VC: So how come we believe In a thing we cani see and actually areni sure 
exists? 
Jennifer. If s the same with God. None of us has seen God. Some of us may 
have been spoken - er, spoken - er have Him spoken to -
VC: Spoken to by God, do you mean? 
Jennifer Yes. So they believe. But some of us just believe because they think 
• well they just believe. I don't know the reasons why. I don't know whether I 
believe in Him or not, I haveni really thought it through. I don't know if I do 
believe and why I believe.... 
V C : . . . you said He, or it could be She. I suppose.. 
Jennifer Yes. It could be anything. ... People draw it in books as a kind of 
human - but /doni think It is - but it may bel 
Timothy (aged 13) "just about" remembers his grandfather who died when he was 
5. He says. "I'm not upset about it because I dont remember him well enough." 
Like Sheila, he rarely attends a religious place of worship and describes religion 
as "a bit old fashioned" because he sees science to "have the leading edge" in 
explanations of how the world began. I asked Timothy about his ideas of God. 
Timothy: t would have thought... just something like air. Or with no mass. And 
just a sort of a presence. 
VC: Does it have any human kind of characteristics?... 
Timothy: In a way, I suppose If there's anything, It could be put down a s 
something like a cloud with a face. And with a couple of arms, maybe. 
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Rosemary (aged 16) has experienced the deaths of her great aunt, great uncle 
and pets. A Catholic, she goes to weekly mass and accepts an orthodox view, 
but struggles with what it means. 
Rosemary: Well. I do believe all the things because IVe been to church since I 
was younger so I've got taught certain things and I do believe that God is like 
three parts, and things. But -1 don't quite know how I think it works. I don't 
know whether to think of it as three different people or one person, or what... I 
usually. I suppose, just think about one person. 
VC: Which of the three, mostly, then? 
Rosemary: The Father. 
Belief in some sort of God or a divine power seems to be common for many 
respondents (only 12.5% of Years 5, 7 and 10 denied God's existence). Ideas of 
God may include pseudo-scientific description of a "cloud with a face" and the 
Christian tradition of the Trinity. It is notable that Jennifer struggles to articulate 
the difference between belief in something unseen and unknown and having a 
sense of God's presence which confirms certainty. As I have already indicated, 
having an experience of this kind - whether of the presence of God or 'something' 
or 'someone' - is not considered unusual for bereaved people and it is interesting 
to conjecture that bereavement experiences may sometimes be described as 
religious or spiritual ones. 
Having a sense of the presence of the deceased will be considered next, bearing 
in mind this possibility. 
Having a sense of a presence: God/ divine spirit or the deceased 
Rita, Sheila, Thelma and Verity each mention maintaining contact with the 
deceased in some way. Sheila has been told she and her mother look like sisters 
and she wonders how much like her mother she is in terms of personality and 
disposition. She says this knowledge is "quite scary in some ways. Living her. I 
don't know how Dad copes." 
When asked if she ever has a sense of her mother with her. Sheila replies: 
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One thing I always like to think is that she's watching over me. Not 
necessarily all the time. It's not necessary that she's always there but 
somehow it comforts me to think that she is there because I've always been 
told • one thing i have always been told by my Dad - is that she doted on me. 
... There's times I can swear I've turned around and she's been there, maybe 
not that I could see her but she was ... she was soil of there. Um, I don't 
know how to explain it. 
Rita says that when she was younger she used to go to the graves of her brother 
and father to talk to them and that, every now and again, she writes tetters to her 
father "when there's something really bothering me." In line with her fairly 
traditional Christian beliefs, she says: 
I think I'm going to. that when I die I know that I will go to be with them. I will 
go up wherever heaven is - if there is one. I will go up - with them and meet 
my grandmother who's also died now. And then we'll be together again. 
I asked Rita what she would ask her brother, Walter, if she could communicate 
with him somehow, and she says: "I would just like to know how - how It actually 
happened. Because I'm not quite sure about that." She says she would also ask 
him where he is, what happened after he died, whether he suffered any pain and 
whether her father and grandmother are "up there" with him. 
Even though Verity's sister only lived for a short time she says: 
... I know it sounds strange but I always think I'm going to see her again. I 
mean I believe there's a heaven, that's just the way I've been brought up. 
Sometimes I try and picture her and I think she's watching me... I sort of 
imagine her with long gingery-blond hair really light, sitting in a big white 
place... I just imagine her growing up as the years go by. 
When I asked Verity if she imagined Dawn growing up to be like her she 
emphatically replied. "No, she's different. She's perfectl" Verity thinks it "would 
have been nice" to watch Dawn grow up. making sure she did not "do the things I 
did." 
At first Thelma went to her brother's grave "every single night for over a year" in 
an attempt "to hold on to anything that I could." She says she used to sit and 
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think about both happy and sad times and "sort of pictured him still there." 
Sometimes she talked to him in her head. After a year those visits became 
weekly and now she rarely goes because she says "it's not actually him that's 
down there." She feels he is somewhere else - although she doesn't know 
exactly where - and admits: "Sometimes if you're a bit down you do feel as if - you 
can feel his presence as it were.' Asked when this sense of Aaron's presence 
occurred for her. she says: 
I don't recall it happening outside of the house. Quite often in my room which 
I'm in at the moment because I moved into his room. ... I think I feel a k>t 
closer to him now I'm in that room. 
She s ^ t h a t if she could speak to him now she would ask "what it's like where he 
is," how he got there and what the journey had been like. Later in our 
conversation I was humbled by the following comment she made regarding her 
contact with Aaron. 
When I was • when Rona asked me atx)ut coming down here for this 
interview. I was, you know, in my mind I was like asking him: "Should I do 
this? Is this right?" And I just had a strong feeling that rt was the right thing to 
do. Whether that was me or what, I doni know. 
In order to see how prevalent a sense of presence is in children and young people 
- whether of God. something inexplicable or a deceased loved one - answers 
given below are by Hester Year 5 and Maxwell Years 7 and 10 to the question: 
"Have you at times felt that God or a divine power is close to you?" 
Table 7.18 Years 5. 7 and 10: frequency of experience of closeness of God/ 
divine spirit 
Statement Y e a r 5 
(n=15) 




Total = 82 
very often 2 = 13.3% 6 = 12.5% 0 8 = 9.7% 
a few times 2 = 13.3% 11 = 22.9% 3 = 15.7% 16= 19.5% 
perhaps but 
I'm not sure 
4 = 26.6% 17 = 35.4% 11 = 57.8% 32 = 3.9% 
no 7 = 46.6% 14 = 29.1% 5 = 26.3% 26 = 31.7% 
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Fifty-six pupils think they have experienced the presence of God (although 32 are 
uncertain) and 26 consider they have not had this experience. The data indicate 
increased scepticism with age since fewer pupils in Year 5 than Years 7 and 10 
display uncertainty. In Year 7 there is no fimi correlation between belief and 
death of a close family member: the pupil whose father died did not answer; one 
pupil whose sister died ticked "very often"; and two pupils whose siblings died 
ticked "no". Aileen in Year 10 (aged 15) ticked "perhaps but Tm not sure.' 
The 5 most frequently cited occasions (out of 20 suggested) when it is possible 
that God or a divine power could be near are given below. Respondents could 
choose as many examples as they wished. 
Table 7.19 Years 5, 7 and 10: circumstances of experience of closeness of God/ 
divine spirit 
Statement Y e a r 5 
(n=14) 












3 = 21.4% 40 = 78.4% 11 = 57.8% 54 
when 1 am 
sad or upset 
8 = 57.1% 39 = 76.4% 9 = 47.3% 56 
when 1 am ill 8 = 57.1% 40 = 78.4% 7 = 36.8% 55 
when 1 am 
frightened 
4 = 28.5% 40 = 78.4% 11 = 57.8% 55 
"After someone I know has died" received the highest or joint-highest score from 
all three groups and "when someone is dying" received the joint-highest score 
from Years 7 and 10. This probably indicates that, at times of death, people often 
seek comfort and help from a greater source than themselves and that older 
pupils have experienced this situation more frequently than younger ones. I 
suggest that there may be a similarity between having a sense of God/divine 
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power at times of distress such as bereavement and sensing the presence of the 
deceased at various stages in the grieving process. 
Explanations and support given by adults regarding death 
Rita's brother and father and Thelma's brother died in road accidents. Rita says 
that people did not try "to make a reason" for their deaths "they just said, you 
know, it was one of those things - it was an accident." Thelma. however, implies 
that the car driver involved was responsible for her brother's death: 
Thelma: It was called an accident. 
VC: What would you call it? 
Thelma: I would say it's his fauH. Although he was going within the speed limit, 
if you see somebody crossing, you doni just carry on. 
Verity has medical explanations for her sister's death. 
I guess she was bom too earty. She was four months premature and mum was 
in hospital anyway with complications. It just seems that she wasni developed 
enough to live so that's how she died. 
Sheila, however, is searching for different kinds of explanations. As a child she 
was told that her mother had died in her sleep and, when she looks back, the 
circumstances surrounding the death are "a whole blank." She realises that "no-
one talked about it because they were out of their depth" but, now, she feels 
"someone must know something" about the reasons for her mother's suicide. 
In the light of these observations, it is interesting to see what kind of explanations 
Maxwell Years 7 and 10 were given for a death, as shown below. 
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Table 7.20 Years 7 and 10: explanations received regarding death 
Explanation Year 7 (n=25) Year10(n=10) 
spec i f i c med ica l 
(cancer, heart attack, 
chromosome problems) 
12 = 48% 7 = 70% 
age or natural causes 
(old, died in sleep) 
8 = 32% 2 = 20% 
general medical (ill, 
didn't grow properly) 
7 = 28% 1 = 10% 
accident (road and 
home) 
3 = 12% 0 
religious or moral (they 
wouldn't have any more 
pain; she'd be in 
heaven now) 
2 = 8% 0 
Specific medical explanations given by adults seem to increase with the age of 
the bereaved child while religious/moral explanations decrease. Most deaths 
caused by accidents are unlikely to be medically analysed since the 
circumstances of the event are deemed to have caused it. For example, Rita 
makes logical connections which really do not exist ("of course" and "so") 
between one event and another regarding her father's death. 
They were walking the dog one afternoon and the dog got loose and of course it 
went on the train track, so my father tried to go after it and of course he didn't 
make it, and a train came along, so • he got caught under it. 
She cannot, of course, blame the dog for its carelessness or the driver for driving 
the train and she would not blame her father for his actions - although it could be 
argued that he took a great risk and his death was not inevitable. I am not 
surprised that Rita avoids attributing moral blame since a train cannot be halted 
as easily as a car can swerve, which is what Thelma implies. 
Although there is quite a subtle difference between explanations and words of 
comfort, respondents seem to have distinguished between the two. Only 66% of 
54 pupils in Maxwell Year 7 indicated that anyone tried to comfort or help them 
and explanations given by 28 of them are grouped by theme as follows: 
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• moral (10 examples, eg: it was for the best; had had a good life; not in pain 
now; would be happy) 
• religious/spiritual regarding the state or destination of the deceased (6 
examples, eg: gone to heaven; in nice place now; is a spirit now) 
» practical or concrete help (5 examples, eg: helped me through school; have 
got other people) 
« general support (4 examples, eg: talked about it together) 
« universal or cosmic perspective (4 examples: life goes on; it happens to 
everyone; no-one lasts forever; cannot come back to us) 
« general advice (3 examples, eg: never mind). 
Eight out of 17 pupils in Maxwell Year 10 said they were given help but only 3 
gave explanations of what they remember being told when they were 7.13 and 14 
respectively: 
« moral reasons (Aileen: he would want me to be happy, not sad) 
« religious/spiritual (old and it was time for her to go to heaven for peace; at rest 
now) 
It is interesting that 52% of these older pupils did not indicate that they were given 
any help or support and that adults recently used religious-spiritual terms rather 
than any other kind with two of them. Perhaps there is some truth in Thelma's 
comment about the reasons people give for death. 
VC:. . . I'm wondering if we have to have a cause or a reason for death? What 
do you think about that? 
Thelma:... Do you mean in the sense of accepting it and saying "Oh that's why 
they died"? Yeah. I think we do. 
VC: It helps, does it? 
Thelma: Yeah. To know why. 
VC: And maybe to have a medical reason helps a great deal. And if we cant 
find a medical reason... 
Thelma: Then we search for a spiritual. Which is what I tried to do with Aaron, 
through the books about mediums and people like that. 
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Acceptance of traditional religious beliefs and formulation of new religio-
splritual ones 
Of the four teenagers. Verity is the only one to espouse a conventional Christian 
view of the links between God and death. 
It's like His Son died on the cross and He was a good man but we know why He 
died, He died for us to save us. But I don't know why He lets all these good 
people die. I just feel angry, I just can't picture it in my head. I can't see why 
He lets it happen if you see what I mean. 
l-lowever. when people seek beyond traditional Christianity for further ideas about 
what happens after death they frequently encounter literature on near-death 
experiences and spiritualism in libraries and bookshops. Both Rita and Thelma 
mention the work of Doris Stokes and accounts of near-death experiences and 
Thelma read what her mother borrowed from friends and their local library. 
Thetma: ... after about 6 nionths I started reading a \o\ about death and life 
after death and all that sort of thing. About mediums and It helped quite a lot 
really. But. you know, I didn't realise at the time... this Is a load of rubbishi... 
VC: Were you looking, do you suppose, to see where he [Aaron] had gone? 
Thelma: Yes, I think so. I didnt, you know, like the idea of dying and thaf s it -
you're gone and there's nothing more. 
Not long after Aaron died Thelma's mother went to a medium - probably because 
"it was the only form of contact that she had with him" - and although Thelma had 
thought about going she did not accompany her. Thelma has since rejected 
Stokes* work but considers that what the medium said on the tape her mother 
brought back "was quite accurate." (I did not suggest that the medium might have 
read about Aaron's death in the newspapers and Thetma did not seem to think of 
it.) 
Rita and her mother also thought of going to a medium (probably the same one) 
but did not do so. Like Thelma, Rita has read about spiritualism and near-death 
experiences and she is inclined to make sense of it. IHowever Rita is more 
interested in the body-spirit divide as the following extract shows: 
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VC: How does your experience of tosing somebody through death relate to 
anything at all that Christianity tells you? 
Rita:... One thing I think about more than anything else is all the light at the 
end of the tunnel. Because I'm really interested in that bit. That's the bit I 
would really like to find out about - about as the spirit comes out of the body. I 
suppose that is my faith in a way because thafs what Christians believe. 
They believe that the spirit does come out of the body and then go towards 
the light so I suppose there are links there - but if s very hard to make much 
sense of rt. 
VC:. . . The attractton - if there is any attraction in the link - is that Christianity 
seems to be talking about a future spirit life? 
Rita: Yeah, and if s also - because if you believe in something it sort of gives 
you comfort in a way, doesnt it? 
It is interesting that Rita's belief in God is fairly conventional but that her belief 
about what happens after death is not really orthodox - although she thinks it is. 
In a simitar way Thelma, who as we have seen rejects any idea of a loving God, 
says: 
I believe that there is something there. From the range of books that I read I 
decided that you did go on somewhere - a better place. And I thought: "Well, 
if we can be alive and live, why cant we go on to do something else? 
As I said before, I don't - well. I suppose you could call it heaven or - call it 
heaven, I don't know. I suppose I was trying to go against what other people 
believe. I believe they [the deceased] go somewhere. Something happens to 
you after you die. You go onto another life or what have you. 
However, Thelma rejects the notion of travelling along a tunnel after death, 
saying. "I wouldn't like to go down iti" because "all the things that I've read, put 
together, it didn't seem a very pleasant experience." 
Wendy (aged 22) and Yoland (aged 23) also became interested in spiritualism 
after sensing the presence of deceased people. When she was about 3, Wendy 
woke up and saw at the end of her bed "quite a big person" smiling at her, whom 
her aunt later identified as her paternal grandfather who had died before she was 
born. This made sense to Wendy because she had never known him and she 
says that occasionally she 'sees' somebody on the stairs or in the hall and "I know 
what the feeling means." Yoland has a sense of the presence of her maternal 
grandmother (who died when she was 21) through smelling certain smells and 
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hearing her grandmother's voice reprimanding her with familiar phrases. She 
says: 
I'm still a Christian. I wouldn't ever come away from that but I think 
explanations of an after life, my idea of it, has changed. 
In the following explanation she moves beyond Rita's pseudo-Christian one and 
uses logic that accords with her cognitive level of reasoning: 
I remember in science, energy went from kinetic or you had sound energy and 
everything moved. It was never dying, the energy, and it kept on going. And I 
remember thinking: Well, you cant just die. It must just carry on going. But 
how does it carry on going? And the spiritualism made sense... 
Sheila has been bereaved for the longest period of time and, during the last five 
years, has had to come to terms with why her mother took her own life. She 
dismisses belief in an afterlife reunion, saying: 
I wouldn't kill myself or damage myself in any way thinking that I could get 
close to her if I did so. Because that to me sounds daft, basically. 
Sheila twice describes death as "a very secret world" and says that it scares her. 
She says that "when I do die I want to do it quickly." Her overall view of what 
happens to people after they die is that "different people go different ways." I 
explored her thinking about this idea as follows: 
Sheila: Some... it's like I've been brought up with people who have died and 
come back again. 
VC: Right, those people who have had a near-death experience. TheyVe not 
actually died but... 
Sheila: Not actually gone but very very close to it. They see the tunnel. Well 
if they like to believe that then surely that might be what happens to them. 
Who can say? This is where I think death's a secret.... 
VC: How about others? 
Sheila: Others? Laid to rest. I like that thought. ... If you're dead, you're 
dead.... Um you don't sort of stay alive until someone else dies.... 
VC: Others? Are there others in your thinking? 
Sheila: Maybe there's a heaven. Maybe some people do go to heaven. They 
sort of float up and - their souls... Maybe some people die but don't 
emotionally die if that makes sense. I've always thought that people who -
who are murdered - that*s always swayed my belief a bit because they didn't 
actually want to die. ... So perhaps they do come back because if s not their 
time to go because it hasn't been naturally done. ... I don't believe in hell. I 
doni really care what people have done with their lives - well, obviously I care 
but I doni think that people go to hell immediately because theyVe murdered 
someone. Or because theyVe sinned. 
VC: That's far too simplistic an answer to life, isnl it? 
Sheila: Yeah. Everyone sins. 
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Although Sheila declares, "If youVe dead, you're dead' she has formulated a 
fairly complicated but individualistic view of an afterlife which allows each person 
the opportunity to go to where she or he expects to go: some travel down a 
tunnel, others are laid to rest and stay at rest, others go to heaven, others return 
in some way if they die before their time because they are not 'emotionally dead' 
and even murderers may avoid hell because "everyone sins." 
Sheila says, "I've thought a lot about death," and I think she has had to come to 
terms with untimely but planned death because of her mother's suicide. On the 
one hand she knows and believes that "the dead are dead" and dont come back 
but, on the other hand, she senses her mother with her - or, at least, thinks she is 
watching her - but sees her mother's suicide as the selfish act of someone who is 
"sick in the head," knowing that, traditionally, Christianity has condemned such an 
action. Her beliefs seem to be the most complex of the four 16-17 year old 
respondents I interviewed - perhaps because she has a more difficult 
bereavement to work through and also has had more time in which to work out 
her ideas. She rejects or simply side-steps belief in a creator or first/efficient 
cause and focuses instead on humanity, employing a largely moral theory to 
explain humanity's ultimate destination. 
Despite their different beliefs regarding God, Rita. Thelma and Verity espouse 
similar views of why people die. Rita implies the action of a divine power in her 
statement that "everyone's got to go when they're called" and also says: 
I think there's a time to die. When your time has come, you go. but it's very 
unfair when people go away when you doni want them to. 
Thelma simply says "it was meant to happen" and Verity believes "it's just fate." 
Their apparent acceptance of greater or unknown forces at work may be due to 
the type of death (accident and natural) since Sheila does not speak in such 
terms, and. if she could, would ask her mother why she killed herself. 
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When I discussed the notion of "spirit" with Jennifer (aged 10; see earlier in this 
chapter) she reiterated some of Sheila's ideas of people having the ability to 
choose their ultimate destination. 
Jennifer: If my Gran dies, she's buried. Her txxJy is buried but her spirit. I think 
* this is what I believe - goes to where she wants ct to be. And if she wants it to 
go to a place in the sky that most people believe is heaven, then it will. If she 
doesnl. if she wants it to stay with her. then it will. / think that it will do 
whatever she wills it to do. 
VC: Talk to me a bit nrwre about this "spirit" that you've menttoned. Have you 
any ideas about what part of us thismight be? 
Jennifer: It's - maybe - the main part of us, the main creation - and our 
character, our personality. If s just like the seed of our lives. If we didnt have 
that then I don't think - if s like not having bones! 
Primrose (aged 11) seems to have had her thinking influenced by the deaths of 
her sister and grandmother when she was 10. She was not brought up within a 
religious tradition, is not currently connected with one, does not believe in the 
existence of God or think that God has ever felt close to her and says: 
My Nan was a strong believer in the afteriife and strange things happened, so 
I believe she is a spirit. 
She does not explain what she means, though, or give any beliefs about her 
sister's current status or destination. Her deceased grandmother's belief in an 
afterlife seems to have influenced her to state that we "go to [an] afterlife" when 
we die - perhaps because her grandmother said that this would be her own 
destination as well as that of Primrose's sister. 
The concept of the spirit or essence of a person continuing after death can be 
seen in a variety of answers to the question: "What do you think happens when 
we die?" Of 41 pupils in Maxwell Year 7 who responded to this question. 2 1 % 
said they did not know and the answers of the other 78%. grouped according to 
10 themes, are: 
• go to heaven, hell or in-between (7 examples) 
<» go to heaven or an afterlife (6) 
• recreated or reborn as another human or animal (5) 
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• the spirit continues (3) 
• sleep or dream for the rest of our lives (3) 
• go to own world or heaven to be with family(2) 
« rest in peace (2) 
• the body rots (2) 
• live on in people's hearts (1) 
• nothing (1) 
Only the last four replies do not imply continuation of the spirit. However, "rest in 
peace" Is ambiguous, "live on in people's hearts" refers to the bereaved rather 
than the deceased and only "the body rots" and "nothing" come closest to non-
belief in such a concept. 
Interestingly, responses from some adults in. my research show that earlier held 
traditional ideas (such as belief in the spirit) are discarded over time. Gail (aged 
30; mother died when she was 9) was brought up within the Anglican church 
tradition. She does not know what happens after death but writes: "I feel there is 
more to life than life and that we shall find out soon enough!" At her father's 
funeral (when 29) she felt the warmth of the sun and the colours and smells of the 
world around her "as if surrounded by a powerful, positive 'something.'" Karen 
(aged 40) writes about how she made sense of her mother's death (when 19) 
within her new-found faith. 
At the time I was a fairly recent convert to evangelical Christianity. I remember 
that my great concern was that this system of belief offered no comfort about 
the death of my mother who had rejected religious belief. About 18 months 
after her death I discovered amongst my mother's things a booklet entitled 'How 
can I accept Christ?' I came to believe that the reason she died was so that 
God could take her to himself when she was cbsest to him. This comforted me 
for many years - although now I see that as trying to make sense of her death in 
a way that also made sense of the beliefs I then held. 
Twenty-one years later she has abandoned these beliefs and now thinks that 
death is: 
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The end of life. I don't know what happens but it doesn't seem too important to 
me now. I believe that there is no consck)usness after death. 
Tabitha (aged 51), brought up within Roman Catholicism, says that her mother's 
death when she was 12 "caused me to re-examine religious and/or spiritual 
values" and to study comparative religions when doing a degree. She now 
describes herself as agnostic-atheistic and believes that, when we die, "our 
bodies feed the earth and we live on in other people's thoughts." 
Gavin (aged 52) writes that he became preoccupied with spiritualism for a while 
after his mother's death (when 15) and has now 
moved from a conventional 'given' sense of meaning in life in Christian temns to 
a positive one of meaning as something I give to my own life in a provisional 
way. 
He used to "believe, unthinkingly, in some sort of life after death" but has revised 
his thinking in the last ten years to consider "that death is really the end with 
nothing after." He describes his present attitude to life as: make "what you can of 
today and don't put it off too much" because it is chancy, unpredictable and 
transitory. 
Ian (aged 63; father died when he was 2). like Karen, says "death is the end of 
any sort of human life - we live on in the memories of other people." He seems to 
espouse a terrestrial sense of meaning in life when he writes "I delight in the idea 
of all my physical bits going back into circulation." The sense that he and Tabitha 
have of unity with the rest of creation after death - cognitively and emotionally 
living in people's memories and physically feeding the earth - foreshadow ideas 
explored in the last section of this chapter: moral feelings, attitudes and 
behaviour towards other people and the rest of the created world. 
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Moral attitudes and expressions of practical spirituality 
This final section explores notions of morality and spirituality bearing in mind 
Carter's (1987) visual overview of Kohlberg's theory of interconnecting human and 
cosmic relationships (see chapters 4 and 5). 
As well as considering the responses of bereaved children and young people in 
relation to other people, and national and world issues. I am interested in 
exploring the ongoing influence of the deceased (from a cosmic perspective) in 
the lives of their relatives. For various reasons. I did not discuss the issues in the 
same depth with all 4 teenagers and only questionnaire replies from Year 7 are 
relevant. It is worth reflecting that people are more likely to remember actions 
which others do to or for them than those that they do on behalf of other people, 
probably because only the recipient can say: "This was important to me.° 
Self, other people and the peer group: socio-conventional laws and 
moral principles 
This perspective explores how far bereavement affects respect for moral laws -
whether socio-conventional rules or moral principles. 
When Verity left the church after Dawn died at about 13 (see earlier in theme 3) 
she "found other things to do that seemed to be a better idea at that age." She 
admits that she was "very easily led" and would follow people "if it was cool" but 
thinks she grew up by realising that the behaviour she indulged in when she was 
drunk was a mistake. 
Sheila admits she "quite often" breaks socio-conventional laws related to age (eg: 
going to night-clubs) but is adamant that she would never harm people, either 
physically or emotionally, and attributes this attitude to her father's influence 
because "he's a very disciplined person." She says: 
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I'm no angel but I know right from wrong. Urn some people call me - straight-
laced is the word that has been used about me. ... I've always said "No" to 
things I don't want to do. I'm not pushed into anything. ... I've been told quite a 
few times [by other people) that they respect me for not doing drugs, drinking, 
snrwking. what have you. 
Sheila also believes she is "a very independent person" because of her father's 
advice to sensibly "go out and do it." However, since her mother's 'independence' 
seemed to lead to her suicide. Sheila is also aware of the irony in such advice. 
Perhaps Sheila's "straight-laced" attitude derives from the combined but possibly 
unspoken views of her father and herself regarding extreme independent 
behaviour. 
Thelma says that drinking alcohol "in moderation" is acceptable and I am 
reminded that although Aaron was accused of being drunk when he was killed. 
Thetma says he was someone who "really could take his drink." She went to a 
night-club with Aaron's friends when she was under-age (14 years) but got caught 
and does not say she has been since. At the time he died, she may have needed 
him more as a social role model than anything else. Since she says. "When 
Aaron was killed I started going out with his friends and his girlfriend," it appears 
that, in the early stage of her grieving, she needed to be near those who had 
been with him when he died. Perhaps she has no other appropriate role models 
now these people are nearing their twenties. 
Thelma states that she would not take drugs or steal and says she has got her 
moral ideas from her parents. In the light of Aaron's death I asked what sort of 
value she put on human life and she replied: "If you havent got life, you haven't 
got anything at all, have you? It's very important." When asked if she has any 
moral absolutes in life she says: 
I don't agree with violence - but I'd like to use it sometimesi I doni feel if s right, 
um, not the right way to solve things. 
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Both Thelma and Sheila share an abhorrence of violence (Sheila knows that her 
father is dangerous if he is violent and her mother caused her own death) and I 
see this view linked with care and respect for other people. In the following 
conversation about euthanasia. Rita's notion of a divine power controlling human 
liming' in the world as well as her sense of people's need for respect and 
autonomy are both evident. 
Rita: ... I suppose your time comes when rt comes, and you shouldn't really 
push ft. Even though, thinking at>out this, I doni believe in it. I doni think. 
VC: If s not ethical to do that, is that what you're saying? 
Rita: I doni think it is. 
VC: Would that be breaking a law? 
Rita: Well. I suppose if s -1 don't think it would be breaking the law... 
VC: I mean a law, not the law of the land, but any kind of moral law. 
Rita: It depends on each individual really. I mean, if thaf s the way they think. 
and the/ve had enough, then thafs up to them. But I couldn't do that. I doni 
think that ifs right really. 
Although socio-conventional laws may be broken by all young people, those 
recently bereaved may be rather more inclined to believe that life must be lived 
now because of its brevity. Overall, refraining from harming others and respecting 
life seem to emerge as the two most important moral absolutes. 
Self, other people and the peer group: Justice, caring and empathy 
I have already indicated that Rita implies a form of divine injustice in the deaths of 
her brother and father when she says °it*s very unfair when people go away when 
you don't want them to." As Rita's friend, it is not surprising that Verity also talks 
about the injustice of those deaths: "It seems really ignorant that Rita's family 
should have died because they were such a nice family..." Verity declares that 
Rita is "a great person. I don't know how she's managed to stay so nice." which 
implies that she thinks bereavement could - or perhaps should - change a 
person's personality and disposition. 
I have, already mentioned Thelma's enhanced appreciation of her parents and 
ambivalence about her own life following Aaron's death. Her recognition that life 
278 
can easily be lost is shown in her tendency for short term personal plans 
(planning a year at a time) and a wariness of anticipating marriage and children 
because "Well, I might be dead tomonowl' Her explanation that it is not as easy 
to get into marriage as into college because "you've got to build up a relationship 
and - everything..." may further indicate her unwillingness to make longer term 
plans because of the uncertainty of life. 
On the other hand, I would argue that bereavement has promoted greater caring 
and empathy in each of the four teenagers to some degree. Rita is aware of 
three other young people in similar bereaved circumstances to herself apart from 
Sheila and Verity, and says that the experience of bereavement itself 
has definitely made me more aware of people's feelings. Maybe about death, 
but In general... I don't just come out with a real Insensitive question -1 don't 
now because I think 'Well, that might hurt them or they might just be wonied 
about this.' So I think it has made me more sensitive in that area. 
Verity says that she felt really sorry for Rita when she was bereaved but "because 
it wasnl me, I didn't know how she felt so I couldn't really think what it would be 
like." When Dawn died, though, Verity says, "I knew what it was like" and Rita, in 
turn, says she values Verity's friendship "because we've been through so much 
together." Both Rita and Verity work part-time in the same residential home and, 
after a recent death, Verity says "I could actually feel how they [bereaved 
residents] were feeling." 
Regarding the taking of life, Sheila says that because suicide scares her and she 
is aware of how her mother's death has left her feeling, if she ever got close to 
considering suicide herself "it would make me sit down a bit longer and think, 
'Well, could I really do this to other people?'" Seeing her father's grief and pain 
has probably had an influence on her views "because it upsets me to see him 
upset." 
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Despite Thelma's previous counselling experiences, the following dialogue 
indicates a willingness to do it again in order to help other people: 
VC: How did your mum feel about you coming [here tonight]? What sort of 
thing did she say? 
Thelma: Um. I dont think she was too sure at the nooment because I think she 
saw you more as a counsellor. And, like now I know that you are • because 
mum knew that I went to thai one before, she said, 'Oh what's the point?" and I 
saki to her, 'If I can help someone else then it's worth it.' And then I think she 
realised why I wanted to come. 
It seems that bereaved people frequently examine the justness, rightness and 
appropriateness of a particular death and, over time, seem to develop an 
understanding of how other people may feel when they are in distress or suffering 
some kind of loss. 
Global perspective: interest and involvement in national and world affairs 
I did not discuss the events of the world with Sheila and I did so in varying depth 
with the other three teenagers. When Thelma suggested that life is "an 
experiment that's gone wrong" and that "humans need to be kicked into line," I 
asked her to explain. 
VC: But can we not undo this mad experiment, this bad experiment...? 
Thelma: Yeah. I think that if everyone wouki woric together rather than going off 
In their own little worid and sorting themselves out and getting what they can. I 
think it would be a better place. 
VC: How can we encourage people to do that? What exi - prevents them from 
doing that right now? 
Thelma: I doni think there's very much awareness of what's going on in the 
worid... 
Thelma's final comment may also reflect her belief that school personnel lacked 
awareness of what was happening in her school when Aaron died. 
Verity perceives the political and inter-national situation to be complex and 
competitive. 
I just think that there are so much easier ways to go about things but because 
of rules and we have certain parties and there are people who have other 
opinions, you're not going to get what you want. 
280 
Rita remembers that her father often raised money for charity by cycling and 
running. When asked about war and famine and the plight of other people in the 
world, she says: 
There are things we can do about it but ifs just people's attitudes, isn't rt? 
Some people's attitudes are: "Well, they're over there and we're over here.' It's 
so stupid how some people -1 mean, winning the national lottery is like giving 
away eighteen million pounds but they're over there standing. It's pathetic when 
you think about H. I mean, how much - we could give them so much with that 
money... 
Verity also acknowledges that events such as Comic Relief make her "feel awful 
about the way I'm wingeing" because "I do have a good life, really." 
Of 71 pupils in Maxwell Year 7 who answered whether they had ever taken part in 
any charity event, 25.3% had not and 74.6% had. and the most popular activities 
were walking, running and swimming. Sixty-six percent of 65 pupils answered 
'yes' to the question whether "there is anything happening in the world that you 
read about or see on television that upsets or annoys you" and when asked if they 
would like to stop something happening 68.2% of 63 pupils said *yes,* From the 
thirty-eight examples I could interpret, I generated three categories as follows: 
• suffering of other people (20 examples, eg: IRA; fighting in the world and 
Yugoslavia; war; murders; people starving and dying) 
• animals and the world (10 examples, eg: killing animals; cutting down trees; 
wrecking/killing the world; testing products on animals; bullfighting) 
• self and other people's habits and tastes (5 examples: eg: parents separating; 
having to watch tennis and football on TV). 
However, when asked if there are things happening that they are pleased about 
or which "makes you want to do the same," the positive responses in Year 7 were 
respectively 34% and 35%. I grouped the 12 examples given into three 
categories. 
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• animals, other people and the world (7 examples: baby guinea pigs; recovery 
of our world; raising money for something; saving someone's life; helping 
people, fewer people smoking) 
• personal ambitions (3 examples, eg: become nurse) 
• personal pleasures (2 examples, eg: received a present). 
The overall feeling I have is that the majority of young people are prepared to take 
part in fund raising activities to help human and animal causes and that about 2 
out of every 3 are displeased with what they see happening in the world. This 
perspective was well explained by Sophia (aged 11): 
I hate watching the news because of all the fighting. I want to stop it and to 
make people like each other. I am pleased to think that there are people out 
there that are trying to help. 
Since the world views that children and young people hold come mainly from 
television infomfiation delivered in short, repetitive sound-bytes, stories which are 
spectacular, repeated frequently and connect with children's experiences are best 
remembered. Some pictures - of Africa, for example, which tend to be only of 
war, starvation and poverty - are probably incoherent and isolated. Although such 
a presentation of information is likely to overstate negative views and seems to 
encourage young people to reject or not think worth emulating much that the 
television shows them of life, it is interesting that many of them persist in opposing 
such a negative scenario. Fashionable media, such as Michael Jackson's music 
video Earth Song (1995). may encourage this attitude. 
Cosmic perspectives and influence of other people, including the deceased 
I think that the ideals and interests of deceased parents rather than siblings are 
likely to exert an influence on the thinking of 16-17 year olds as they make career 
plans. Sheila, however, declares that she and her mother are different in at least 
one respect. 
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I'm not going around being depressed and morbid and whatever else you like to 
call it because she chose to end it. Because IVe still got my life, even though 
she didn't like hers. 
Sheila's determination to "make something of my life" by taking A levels and 
aiming for a teaching degree (in order to work with handicapped children) stems 
from her stepmother's belief that she was prevented by her parents from 
achieving success in her chosen field. However, Sheila has recently been told by 
her father that her mother also worked with handicapped adults and, in this sense, 
she is following in her mother's career. 
Since Rita says that she sometimes wonders what her father "would think of me 
noM^as a person." I asked her to explain his influence on her career plans. 
... I might think to myself, 'Oh, I wonder rf he wouki have been behind me in this 
decision'... But other than that I don't think it would affect me. I just think about 
whether he would think that wouM be a good idea or If he wouki be pleased if I 
went off to university or had to get a job... 
Thetma and Verity do not directly mention their deceased siblings regarding their 
career plans but I think that Verity's tendency to rate herself beneath other people 
has been exacerbated by her bereavement experiences. As well as considering 
herself inferior to her deceased sister (see theme 1). she regards her loss as less 
significant than Rita's: 
IVe never, never spoken about it because everyone else's problems seem to be 
more. If I said to Rita how upset I was because my sister died I'd feel realty silly 
because she's been through a lot. 
Although Thelma also suffers from low self-confidence, it is difficult to say whether 
Aaron's death precipitated or overshadowed this personality trait. Overall, 
however, Thelma considers the disposition of humanity to be "foolish" rather than 
"sinful" and. interestingly, she hints at long-term phylogenetic progress. 
... although we've been here for a very long tinie, it's just early days yet. We've 
got a lot to team. It'll take a lot more generations to figure out what's got to be 
done. 
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Some of her thinking about generational improvement may be understood from 
her description of Aaron as "quite an old spirit." She says he was "too old for his 
years" and "very wise" because he had "done so much" in terms of a career and 
helping in the home. When her grandmother died in the week just before Aaron's 
death, Thelma's family told her: "Oh, Mum's up there to take care of one of the 
young uns." Perhaps Thelma sees Aaron's wisdom adding to the accumulated 
wisdom of our ancestors in order to be recycled in future generations. 
Overview of moral and spiritual development 
In this section I can only say I have detected trends in what is. after all, a very 
small sample. There are six aspects to explore. First, there seems to be a 
tendency for some bereaved people to make use of traditional beliefs and 
practices in order to search for an answer. Rita joined a church after the death 
but later left and Verity was already involved in church life but left some time after 
the death. However, Sheila and Thelma were never regular attendees. Currently 
none of the four regularly attend which reflects the broader picture of non-
attendance at a place of worship by most children and young people in my 
sample. 
Second, belief in God and the concept of a loving and just God seems to be 
challenged by bereavement. Although Rita and Verity accept this dichotomy, they 
struggle with how it works and Thelma rejects any notion of a loving God because 
of the death of several loved ones. Overall, there is general ambivalence among 
these children and young people towards the notion of a caring God but a 
tendency towards some sort of belief displayed in scientific and traditional 
religious concepts. 
Third, some bereaved people seem to have a definite sense of the deceased with 
them. They talk to them, fee! them with them at certain times and may even 
imagine them ageing in their minds. My findings indicate that overall, there is 
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uncertainty about a sense of God's presence among children and young people 
but a strong belief that God can or may be present at times of distress, especially 
after a death. 
Fourth, although my findings suggest a prevalence of medical explanations and a 
decline in moral or spiritual reasons for death as children get older, there is still an 
overall tendency to give comfort to bereaved people using moral notions of quality 
of life lived, release from pain, resting in heaven or being at peace. 
Fifth, there is a growing range of literature in bookshops and libraries offering 
alternative explanations to traditional Christianity as well as an increased 
acceptance of spiritualist mediums within society. Having a sense of the 
presence of the deceased or desiring to get in touch with them may lead to an 
exploration of spiritualism, while surviving liferthreatening circumstances because 
of improved medical care leads to more accounts o1 NDEs being available to 
shape people's beliefs. There may be an increased belief in after-death 
autonomy - a 'go where you expect to go' philosophy - and. with age. a 
discarding of belief in heaven and hell (particularly hell) unless one's religious 
affiliations promote it. There may be a tendency to move towards an ecological-
biological sense of continuity as well as a belief, as people age, that we. and no-
one else can give meaning to our lives. 
Sixth, my research shows that there may be a tendency in the early stages of 
bereavement for children and young people in particular to 'live for the moment.' 
This may show itself in anger and defiance at constricting socio-conventional 
rules (both Theima and Verity broke or pushed against such laws after 
bereavement) and this attitude may prevail for some time (Thelma is still hesitant 
to make many long term plans). However, my small sample suggests an 
increased awareness of and empathy with grieving people and the emergence of 
clearer views about constraints on hurting or harming people and a valuing of life 
itself. 
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Overall, media views of 'other people* in need of help and of world affairs seem 
both to promote a desire to help and a dissatisfaction with the state of world 
events which, inevitably, involve suffering and death. A cosmic perspective of life, 
with the deceased watching over or guiding their relatives and ancestors, can be 
found in the replies of several respondents. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
Part One of this thesis explored a range of theories regarding human, moral and 
spiritual development, bearing in mind my contention that the second and third 
forms do not exist in their own right and can only be expressed through the core 
components of human development: body, mind and emotions. This analysis 
enabled me to identify the significance of such notions as end-state, intention and 
human intervention in moral development, those of dualism and continuity-
discontinuity in spiritual development, as well as the prevalence of two main 
developmental issues (continuity-discontinuity and nature-nurture interactions) in 
both my data and religio-philosophical ideas about death. I also recognized the 
importance of discussing real-life situations rather than hypothetical dilemmas 
when exploring moral and spiritual development after a death, and identification of 
the inter-relatedness of the principles of justice and care in the data enabled me to 
devise a unifying model of awareness-relatedness derived from Kohlberg's 
thinking. 
Regarding children and young people, I suggest that broad nomothetic laws may 
be applied to both development and bereavement processes - although they need 
to be balanced by idiographic variations - and that any form of development that 
schools can reasonably promote in their 5-16 or 18 year old pupils relates to only 
a small part of their expected life-span since development of any kind may be 
viewed from three viewpoints (completed so far, happening now and future 
outcome). 
This chapter, which has three sections, draws together some of the themes from 
the previous chapters. In the first section I consider the limitations of the research 
undertaken and, in the second, what the implications of my findings are despite 
those limitations. In the third section I suggest how future research in this area 
might develop. However, before doing this, I need to state that I found it harder 
than I expected to analyse my respondents regarding exactly the same issues, 
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ideas and theories of morality and spirituality that I reviewed in Part One. I think 
this is because questionnaire responses did not easily tend themselves to such 
interpretations and interviews with the four key respondents mainly focused on 
bereavement issues and religio-spiritual thinking. It is also likely that it is easier to 
analyse other people's work than one's own. 
UMUATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
There are four features of my research that I think need explaining further: the 
composition of the sample, ethics of informed consent, notions of truth and 
significance of mood in memory recollection, and the narrative nature of 
interviews. 
The research sample 
The opportunistic nature of my research means that in all cases the individuals 
and classes I spoke to were links in a chain of introductions. The adult 
respondents were not 'typical' of the average population since they were all 
graduates engaged in professions such as education, theology and social work 
and the 'Sea of Faith' conference delegates are likely to have non-theistic or post-
Christian beliefs. None of the 16-17 year old interviewees bereaved of a parent or 
sibling was male and most of my material comes from 119 young people aged I l -
l s , particularly from four females. However, as previously explained, the sex 
imbalance was not intentional and the graduate status and type of my 
respondents reflect similar research. For example, Hay (1990) suggests that 
more educated church-goers are likely to hold unorthodox beliefs, and Starbuck 
(1901) realized that people who are more favourably disposed to participating in 
this kind of research are those who have - or think they have - some experience of 
the topics in question. 
288 
Informed consent and anonymity 
I explained in chapter six that I removed the promise to show respondents how 
their work would be used vjhsn I realized I could not do so if they answered 
anonymously or if I did not know how to contact them again. I also suggested that 
the completion of questionnaires in class did not allow pupils to freely consent to 
taking part in the work although it enabled me to obtain a fairly broad cross-
section of responses. Not giving respondents (particularly the four key 
respondents) a 'right of repl/ regarding how I use their words may seem unethical 
but doing so presented difficulties in terms of how to contact them, how much of 
my work (including their words) to show, how to redraft my work in the light of their 
comments (if any), and how long to wait for a response. As I had told them I 
would not contact them again, trying to get their agreement a year later not only 
broke that promise of anonymity but also seemed to expect from them an 
unreasonable level of involvement in my work. 
Truth, mood and memory 
In some cases the interview (or interviews) seemed to be a catalyst which 
produced changes in ideas and perspectives as the dialogue continued over time 
and, sometimes when I transcribed interviews, I saw inconsistencies in what 
respondents said as they explored their ideas or relaxed in my company (Pope 
and Denicolo. 1986). For example, in our first conversation Rita stated that she 
was a Christian but the next time we met she said," I think I just said that." There 
is a sense in which what my respondents told me is only true for that moment in 
time, since asking them questions not only provoked them into answering, but 
also helped to shape the way they thought then and when I next spoke to them. 
There is some evidence that adults recall an event better if they are able to relive 
during recall the same emotion they experienced at the time of the event (Bower. 
1981. Snyder and White. 1982). although Forgas et al (1988) conclude that 
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children (eg: 8-10 years) do not seem to use mood states as retrieval cues to the 
same extent as adults. In interviews I always attempted to keep the mood light 
but serious. I used eye contact and non-verbal cues, laughed when I thought it 
helped and kept silent, using empathic encouragement, when the story was 
upsetting. I did not try to induce a particular emotion, to stop the respondent from 
crying or to refrain from crying myself so I cannot tell whether the light-but-serious 
mood facilitated such good recall as a sad mood might have done. 
Although important childhood memories such as the death of a close family 
member are unlikely to be influenced by mood and context during recall because 
such memories are vivid and well rehearsed (Salovey and Singer. 1989) with 
many emotional events captured as 'flashbulb' memories, it Is possible that 
successive accounts can introduce distortions (Brewer. 1986). Therefore I 
expected that the death itself would not be forgotten, that some parts of the story 
would be more vivid than other parts (Verity remembers writing a note - but not 
what she wrote - to go in her sister's coffin) and that repetition might have caused 
parts of the story to change over time. For example, Thelma gives an account of 
what she remembers her form tutor saying when she mentioned her brother's 
death but it is unlikely that. "Oh. you'll be wanting the day off for the funeral then." 
is exactly what her tutor said. That phrase is probably Thelma's way of telling the 
story in order to communicate the tone of what she feels her tutor said. 
'Childhood amnesia' may also affect what respondents told me because humans 
have limited memories of incidents before 5 years or so (Wetzler and Sweeney, 
1986). Rita talked a lot about her early years being "blurry" and Sheila knows she 
was sent to play with a friend on the day her mother committed suicide but does 
not remember where she stayed that night. 
Snyder and White (1982. p 166) suggest that attempting to understand and cope 
with orie's mood states by thinking through the events of one's life (as I asked my 
respondents to do regarding the death of a family member) "may have the 
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unintended effect of consolidating and perpetuating one's mood state." In other 
words. I may have unwittingly consolidated the attitudes that Rita, Sheila, Theima 
and Verity held about themselves by asking them to talk about their feelings at the 
time of death and during our inten/iews. 
Interviews as narrative accounts 
Interviews connect together information which might othenwise be given in 
separate chunks on questionnaires but they need to be interpreted within their 
context. Unlike ordinary conversation, interviews are a particular kind of 
conversation because they involve talking to a specific purpose, and the tape-
recorder always reminded the respondent and me that this apparently private 
conversation was going to be replayed and reread, possibly by other people (Hull. 
1985). 
Interviewees assume, quite reasonably, that interviewers know what they are 
looking for and. although I tried to explain that I did not know what the answers to 
my questions would be. I am sure that my responses (eg: laughter, smile, 
surprised look) often indicated that I thought the answers were the 'right' ones. Of 
this "phenomenological construct" Briggs (1986, p 25) obsen/es: 
Interviewees interpret the meaning of both the past and the present, including 
the Interview itself. Each query presents them with the task of searching 
through their memories to see which recollections bear on the question and 
then fitting this information Into a form that will be seen as answering the 
question. 
Summary 
The predominance of females in the sample (particularly at the heart of the work) 
and the above-average standard of education attained by all the adults mean that 
my findings cannot represent a wider population. Although I am fairly confident 
that the mood of interviews was appropriate for the particular respondents 
involved, some research suggests that recall may have been better using other 
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strategies. However, I believe I found evidence of ideas, emotions and behaviour 
that I can define as moral and spiritual development when I encouraged the four 
key respondents to talk about their experiences in depth, but I cannot say that 
such development after a bereavement is true of all the sample. 
IMPUCATIONS FROM MY RNDINGS 
There are three broad areas to consider which reflect the developmental themes I 
explored in Part One of this thesis and discussed in chapter 7: the core self and 
stages of development; moral and spiritual development; and the role of schools 
and OFSTED. 
Bereavement, the core self and stages of development 
Since the experience of bereavement occurs while physical maturation and 
cognition and emotions are developing, any response to death will be influenced 
by the extent and level of these forms of development. 
Cognitive and emotional development 
Many respondents felt shocked after a death and metaphors of "in a dream" and 
"blurry" were used by Thelma and Rita to describe how difficult it was to take in 
what had happened. With hindsight, Rita thinks she became quieter immediately 
after the second death, Thelma sees that she went out socializing to try to enjoy 
herself and Sheila knows she developed a tendency to become depressed. 
Some Year 7 respondents wrote that they were "still" or "sometimes" sad about 
their loss while Year 10 respondents tended to say they felt "OK." 
However, some Year 7 respondents also said they were more self-aware, or more 
appreciative of family members and other people, or aware of the fragility of life. 
Both Rita and Sheila expressed positive attitudes towards life and Rita believed 
that experiencing bereavement early in life had made her grow up quicker. In my 
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sample there seems to be some evidence that those who were bereaved when 
young (under 10 years) were less aware of the meaning of the death than those 
who were bereaved when older (11-18 years) since with age there Is an increased 
understanding of the finality of death (and its social, financial and religious 
implications), sorrow at the loss of an emotional attachments developed over time 
as well as a reassessment of the value of oneself, other people and life itself. 
Causal reasoning 
The deaths of Thelma's brother and Rita's brother and father were from road or 
rail accidents. Rita says people did not try "to make a reason" for their deaths 
although she constructs a logical connection between her father going after the 
dog on the railway line and his death, and Thelma finds it hard to accept that a 
driver would carry on at the same speed when he saw people crossing the road. 
Both teenagers want to attribute causes to the deaths - although Rita may have 
done this later in life since, at the time, she seems to have accepted that "it was 
one of those things." Their desire to blame or find a cause is common after 
negative events (Schwartz and Bless. 1991) particularly unpleasant rather than 
merely unexpected ones (Bohner et al. 1988). 
The most common reasons given to Year 7 pupils for death were medical ones 
while the most common fonns of comfort given were in moral temis or in religious/ 
spiritual terms regarding the deceased's destination. Thelma's comment that she 
searched for a spiritual reason when she could not have a medical or other causal 
reason for her brother's death has implications for the way both moral and spiritual 
concepts are used in the event of death. It may not be out of order to suggest that 
they are used when all other explanations fail. 
Sex differences 
Out of 72 pupils in Maxwell Year 7 (46 females, 26 males), only 1 pupil (male) 
answered all 40 questions on the questionnaire - mostly with one-word answers -
and 18 pupils (16 females, 2 males) answered 35-39 of the questions. Therefore 
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only 16 females (34% of females) and 3 males (11% of males) answered 35 or 
more questions. Although I have indicated in chapter 6 that this may be because I 
did not allow enough time, rt may also be because the answers were difficult to 
remember (eg: What else was happening in your life at about the time of that 
death?) or to formulate (eg: How did you feel, or what did you think, at the time of 
the death?). With regard to the latter difficulty, I reported in chapter 7 that when 
explaining why a particular death was important or significant, 19 girls but no boys 
gave reasons (eg: having feelings for or spending time with the deceased) and it 
is possible that males find it harder to give these kind of answers. Overall in Year 
7, proportionately fewer males than females answered all questions or answered 
them in depth and this may reveal something about their willingness or ability to 
write about themselves. 
These findings are interesting in the light of Gilligan's (1982) assertion that 
females tend to define themselves by their closeness to people and males by their 
separateness from them. It is worth noting that Kohlberg (1958) used only 75 
males aged 10-16 in his original study and that they discussed (not wrote about) 
hypothetical dilemmas (not real-life situations of loss). 
Psychosocial stages of development 
Rita. Sheila, Thelma and Verity are in Levinson*s early adulthood transition simply 
by dint of being old enough to leave school and having to make career choices. 
They are just entering Jung's second quarter of life and are in Erikson's intimacy-
isolation stage. 
According to Coleman (1980). different relationship issues peak at different ages 
and Rita. Verity and Sheila each have boyfriends and spend substantial amounts 
of time out of the home away from their parent(s). However, it is possible to 
conjecture that, at nearly 17. Thelma is finding it difficult both to separate from her 
parents and to establish relationships with a peer group. Her account of how her 
parents reacted to Aaron's death ("Mum was a total mess. Dad just shut himself 
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away. We didnt really talk to each other much.") reflects Muison's (1985) view 
that parental grief may force certain responses from surviving siblings such as: 
trying to be normal as a model of behaviour for them to copy, frustration at being 
unable to comfort them, or fear of being ovenwhelmed by their grief. Thelma 
seems to have adopted the first option for a year or so by going out regularly with 
Aaron's friends but is finding it difficult to separate from her parents now. 
Summary 
The ability to comprehend the implications of death depends upon physical, 
cognitive and emotional forms of development. Shock is likely during the early 
phase of grief and sorrow may persist for some time. As people age. they are 
able to make better links between cause and outcome due to improved logic, 
social-perspective and role-taking, but socio-cultural norms of separation from 
family of origin may be affected by death, particularly of a sibling or parent. Some 
differences between males and females regarding the ability or willingness to 
write or talk about themselves seem apparent. 
Bereavement and theories of moral and spiritual development 
Moral and spiritual responses may be expressed in notions of duty, consequences 
and virtues, and through personal, devotional and practical forms of spirituality. 
Traditional religion and God 
Thirty-three percent of 72 Year 7 pupils said they had been brought up within a 
particular religious tradition but only 19% of 57 pupils currently attend a place of 
worship. Although Rita began to attend church after her father's death, Verity 
stopped attending some time aftenwards. and Sheila and Theima never go. The 
decline in church attendance may have implications for schools, particularly for 
R E lessons, since schools could become the only source of knowledge and 
information about traditional beliefs for many children and young people. 
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The conclusions of the majority (57) of Year 5. 7 and 10 pupils that God does not 
or may not exist or is ineffective in their daily lives probably reflects their 
experience - or how they interpret their experience. The dilemma in asking the 
question is that if something has a name it is usually presumed to exist 
(Matthews. 1982) and it is confusing to ask whether something exists which can 
be named. Rizzuto (1980. p 130) argues that "God's privileged survival" in our 
thinking depends upon adult confirmation that there is a God (eg: my 
questionnaire) and the sociocultural system which supports such a belief (eg: 
places of worship). 
Rita and Thelma both wonder how a loving God could allow suffering and death 
and Thelma denies God's existence because of several family deaths, particularly 
that of her brother. These findings may relate to Rizzuto's (1980) proposition that 
people create their God representation and their relation to God from experiences 
with the people of their childhood (mainly their parents) and Vergote's (1980) idea 
that paternal factors of authority and law and maternal factors of unconditional 
love form a representation of God. Rita and Thelma get on with their mothers 
very well (Rita*s father is dead and Thelma*s father is distant) and it is possible to 
suggest that since their concept of God is predominantly loving (eg: matemal) 
they find it hard to accept a law-giving and obedience-demanding God (eg: 
paternal). Interestingly, despite quite a lot of ambivalence regarding God's 
existence. 60 pupils from Years 5. 7 and 10 consider that God or a divine power 
could be near them or another person after someone dies. This finding seems to 
indicate a need for comfort and love at such a time - a desire for a mainly 
matemal, rather than paternal God representation. 
Moral laws and principles 
There is no direct evidence that their bereaved state encouraged any of the 
teenagers I interviewed to break socio-conventional laws although the only time 
Thelma went to a night-club when underage was when she 'ran wild' with Aaron's 
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friends. However, bereavement does seem to have enhanced their awareness of 
other people's feelings and begun to clarify principles concerning violence towards 
other people and whether it is ever right to end another's life. They have moved 
from a belief that there are given correct answers in every situation (Verity: "I used 
to think, you know, that the bad died, but that's really stupid") and are realizing 
that they have to work out correct answers for themselves (Rita: "I mean if that's 
the way they think, and they've had enough, then that's up to them. But I couldn't 
do that," and Thelma: "I've got to take more responsibility for my actions or things 
will backfire on me"). Finally they will reach the stage of acknowledging that there 
are many 'correct' answers (Perry, 1970) rather in the way that Sheila says: 
Because of different people's lives and different people's outlook, beliefs, 
whatever. I maintain the fact that different people go different ways. 
Moral and spiritual stages 
Rita. Sheila, Thelma and Verity seem to display characteristics of what Fowler 
(1981) calls synthetic-conventional faith (stage 3). a conformist stage "tuned to the 
expectations and judgements of significant others" (p 172) - although I feel that 
Sheila is beginning to move towards a transition to the next stage because of a 
clash of values at home involving her career plans and a need to know more 
about her mother's suicide. It is harder to assess where they fall in Kohlberg's 
scheme since they did not discuss deontological issues and I do not have (and did 
not need to acquire) a scoring handbook, but some of the descriptions of stage 3 
(conventional level) seem to apply (Kohlberg and Ryncarz, 1990, p 193) (See 
Appendix 1): 
What is right is what is expected by people close... or what people generally 
expect of people in one's role as [daughter]... Being 'good* is iniportant and 
means having motives, showing concem about others. It also means keeping 
mutual relationships, maintaining trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude. 
Moral and spiritual development 
One aspect of the work that I had not considered at the outset but which I feel 
must be recognised is that the research itself promoted moral and spiritual 
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development in the form of insights and reflection. The most outstanding is 
Thelma's insight during the course of our first interview (my italics). 
Thelma: 1 think that I did a lot of growing up a few years ago because I was 
trying to help mum get herself together. And * but -1 suppose there was so 
much pressure at home and trying to keep everyone happy - stop mum from 
having a nervous breakdown - at school I just couldn't be bothered. I was too 
drained, I think. 
VC: Do you know, I think you've put your finger on it there, probably. I mean, 
whether youVe noticed it before but it sounds 
Thelma: No, not until I said it just theni 
When she retumed the following week I asked, by way of debriefing, whether our 
previous conversation had had any further impact. 
Thelma: Yeah. Yeah. It's made me understand a lot about myself. 
VC: Has it? 
Thelma: VJhen I was thinking about some of the questions you'd asked and I 
thought: "Oh, that's why I did that" - like about school. 
During the course of my first conversation with Verity a similar insight occurred. 
VC: Have you thought about this a lot since she died, or have you been thinking 
about it much more positively, more deeply, because you knew you were going 
to talk to me about it? ... 
Verity: I was just going to say that I didnt know I thought about it as much as I 
have actually.... When Fiona phoned me up this morning and said you've got an 
interview today I hadnl really thought about what I was going to say... 
In their last interview both Rita and Sheila reflected on what the conversations 
with me had meant to them. 
Rita: Um, I think I have sort of changed a bit because before I didnt... 
VC: Before? 
Rita: Well, I donl know, before these sessions maybe. I didnt really think atwut 
it a lot - about, you know, all these questions - it's really made me think, which is 
really good. Um, and I think through these sessions it's made me change. I 
think to myself, •Well, I've got to live my life now, because otherwise I might not 
be here tomorrow." So I might as well live today. 
VC: Is there anything you want to share with me about thoughts that arose after 
what we were saying last week? 
Sheila: Well it made me thinkaboxA death. Rita said something that has become 
very apparent to me, just talking to you, she said that you look at death in a 
completely different light. And that you live for the moment more. Sort of, it 
makes you think about death as in the end. so live whilst you've got it.... 
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Of course I know that the act of talking something through or the process of 
counselling is likely to produce new thoughts and feelings. Although I did not 
attempt to offer counselling per se. there is no doubt that the sessions involved all 
the elements of a counselling session (with the exception that the respondent had 
not asked to be counselled because of perceived bereavement difficulties) so 
these insights are to be expected. In fact Cook and Bosley (1995) suggest that, 
when conducted in an ethical manner, bereavement research will often have 
therapeutic outcomes. What I want to highlight here, though, is that these insights 
are examples of moral and spiritual development and that they are direct 
outcomes of the research itself. 
Summary 
Decline in church attendance may mean that schools could become significant 
disseminators of information about traditional beliefs. However, asking pupils 
about belief in God or a divine spirit may be confusing since such ideas, which are 
socio-culturally influenced and may be challenged or reinforced by the death of a 
loved one, cannot be proved or disproved. As teenagers realize the increasing 
complexity of moral issues, they usually start to find answers for themselves and 
dismiss the belief that absolute moral answers exist. Such moral and spiritual 
development may be assisted by research which asks people to reflect on and 
make sense of their lives and experiences. 
Bereaved pupils, schools and OFSTED 
The ERA (1988) talks about the "development of pupils at school and of society" 
but the education process can only deal with the years of schooling (5-18 years) 
which is a fraction of the average latei'twentieth-century person's life span. 
OFSTED's focus on the provision by schools for moral and spiritual development 
needs to be balanced against the wider context of both pupils' and teachers' lives. 
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Bereaved pupils and their teachers 
Not surprisingly, personal and educational events seem to be the two most 
significant markers in pupils' lives during their compulsory school career. I am 
interested in what happens when the two events coincide and my findings indicate 
some variations in how bereaved pupils perceive their schools treated them. At 
primary school both Rita and Thelma felt supported and Rita's teacher was 
sufficiently confident to break the news of Rita's father's death and. later, kept her 
from hearing a police talk on rail safety that she judged might upset her. 
However, staff at Rita and Thelma's secondary school seemed less able to 
display such support. In Rita's case this may be because at least three years had 
passed since her father's death and, although some staff seemed to know why 
she cried and left the talk about rail safety in the hall, it is unlikely that all staff 
knew since she had been at another school when the death occurred. Issues of 
record keeping and confidentiality need careful consideration in these 
circumstances. Although Rita's secondary school form tutor would have read her 
primary school records, she/he might not have been timetabled to attend the talk 
in the hall and, if not. might not have known whether to tell another member of 
staff who was present of Rita's loss. Furthermore, even if she/he was present, it 
would not have been unreasonable to consider that three years was long enough 
for Rita to have adjusted (see chapter 5). It is often hard to assess how long is 
'long enough' although Casdagli et al (1992. p 9) describe how a member of staff 
at one school "^ had not made the connection" between the story of their play Grief 
and the recent identical experience of one of her pupils until that pupil walked out 
of the performance. 
Thelma lays the blame for her subsequent truancy on the off-hand response she 
felt her form tutor gave her when she asked for time off to go to Aaron's funeral 
and how "another member of staff said he was playing chicken to other pupils." 
She says: 
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I think probably because two had said, you know, had said things about it that 
Ididnl like, pertiaps I tumed against the rest of them. 
She says it is unlikely that staff did not know of her bereaved state since the story 
was in the papers and Aaron, who had left school some years earlier, "was always 
in trouble in class and everything." There are several issues here that I did not 
unravel at the time due to Thelma's distressed state. One is the perceived 
character of the people involved since Theima implies that her brother had been a 
troublesome pupil and, perhaps, had not been much liked by some members of 
staff. She also says that she was an average pupil before Aaron died and adds: 
"Well, I never really liked school." Taken together, it is possible to conjecture that 
(a) some staff might have implied that Aaron's death was caused by reckless 
behaviour in keeping with his behaviour when at school and (b) Thelma's 
absences were not a cause for concem for some time because her academic 
abilities were not highly rated. 
The second issue is the atmosphere of the school after such an event. Although 
guidelines are now available to help schools when members of their community 
are bereaved (Yule and Gold. 1993). the issue of bereavement itself is not new. 
Schools have always had to cope with death, deciding how to inform and discuss 
such an event with staff and pupils and what support to provide. It seems that 
Thelma's secondary school staff did not do this as well as they might have done 
and. although they offered counselling when her absences were impossible to 
ignore, they failed to make the connection between bereavement and truancy. 
Provision for moral and spiritual development and bereaved pupils 
O F S T E D (1992, 5.3) suggests that "the general ethos" of the school contributes to 
the code of practice promoting moral and spiritual development and. when death 
affects members of the school population. I think that such an atmosphere should 
exclude rumour, confrontation and avoidance tactics. Furthermore, O F S T E D 
(1994b. p 12) describes schools failing or likely to fail as having "abrasive and 
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confrontational relationships with pupils' and (particularly relevant to Thelma's 
situation) "high levels of tnjancy." 
Any behavioural or emotional response to a death which could cause the school 
to appear unfavourably at an O F S T E D inspection needs further exploration. 
Although Thelma's truancy and disagreements with staff cannot be described in 
any other way. school staff could well argue that the event that caused her to 
change was beyond their power to predict or control. They may have been under 
great pressure when Aaron died on 30th June because of examinations and end 
of term and year activities, and we do not know the kind of relationship that 
existed between Thelma and her tutor before Aaron died or the personal 
circumstances of the tutor at that time. 
Absence from school because of death 
Some of my data suggests that parents may find it difficult to decide whether their 
children should attend a funeral because of exams or pressure of work. Since 
even national exams can be taken at another time there does not seem any 
reason for this, and absence for one or two days ought to be acceptable for an 
event that is unpredictable and unique. 
However, absence for compassionate leave is harder to justify because of the 
sense of 'missing a lot of woric' that Melanie describes (see chapter 7). Teachers, 
parents and pupils seem to have a belief that continuity of attendance parallels 
continuity of learning (which reflects the theme of direction in development) and 
that, since time cannot be recovered, it is impossible to take much time off school 
when relatives die. Furthermore, the decision whether or not to take time off is 
influenced by the steady decline in grieving and mourning practices since Worid 
War II so that people either do not see the need to 'stop' normal life in order to 
adjust to a death or consider that it is 'unnatural' to do so. 
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Summary 
School is an important context for bereavement for children aged 5 to 16 or 18. 
Exams and school life provide normative markers against which the unpredictable 
event of death and the grieving process must take place. Primary school staff may 
be better able to respond to death and support grieving pupils because their 
institutions are smaller and more flexible than secondary schools. Secondary 
school staff have the more difficult job of assessing relevant bereavement 
information from primary school records, deciding the extent to which pupils have 
'recovered' from or adjusted to long past and recent deaths (see chapter 5), and 
balancing the demands of academic progress against the need to grieve. 
FUTURE RESEARCH IN THIS AREA 
There are seven aspects that I want to discuss in conclusion: the naturalness of 
the bereavement experience; the typicality of bereavement research and sex 
differences in the findings; ethical issues of working with children and young 
people; methods of conducting research; training and experience of researchers, 
and the development of new initiatives. 
Death as natural event and bereavement as unplanned unique experience 
It is important to bear in mind these two apparently contradictory points of view, 
which I have previously mentioned in this thesis. Most humans respond 
according to nomothetic laws and exhibit physical, cognitive and emotional 
responses during periods such as bereavement that, although varied, can be 
identified in the literature. However, each person also follows idiographic laws 
influenced by such things as her or his individual relationship with the deceased 
and personality and socio-cultural contexts. Although there has been a valuable 
increase in recent years in attention to bereaved people, including children and 
young people, a future balance needs to be maintained between perceiving any 
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bereavement as potentially troublesome and seeing the death of loved ones as 
natural and inevitable life experiences that contribute to human development. 
One never ceases to be bereaved - in fact the event of death recurs throughout 
one's life - so it is not unreasonable to suggest that development involves coping 
with grief and grieving, and that bereavement, like development, is on-going. 
Typical or genuine findings 
Since reviews of bereavement research with adults suggest^; that less depressed 
widowers and more depressed widows tend to participate in studies - perhaps 
because of social norms which encourage females to show their feelings and men 
to control them - it is always difficult to know how far any research s typical with a 
small sample of self-selected bereaved people. In addition, questionnaire 
investigations generally have a higher acceptance rate than, interview 
investigations, although the authority given to the researcher by medical or 
religious associations seems to increase the likelihood of co-operation in both 
forms (Stroebe and Stroebe, 1989). 
The problem is - and continues to be - determining how representative any 
sample is of the total population since some people may take part because of a 
need to talk about their experience and others may decline through fear of 
'breaking down.' As most children and young people will not lose a parent or 
sibling by death during their compulsory school education, those who do are not 
typical of a//pupils, only of a small number. Hesitancy by parents and school staff 
to let pupils talk about death may prevent larger numbers from taking part in any 
research of this kind. 
Sex of respondents 
There happened to be slightly fewer males (51) than females (57) in the two 
schools where I used questionnaires to obtain data and I found it difficult to find 
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any males to interview whose parent, sibling or other significant relative had died 
(see chapter 6). The literature reflects a similar picture: Gray (1987) interviewed 
16 male and 34 females whose parent had died; Hogan and DeSantis (1992) 
used questionnaires with 50 male and 91 female siblings; and Schachter (1991) 
used questionnaires with 19 males and 42 females bereaved of a peer. 
Although these figures do not mean that the voice of males is not being heard, it 
does suggests that fewer males tend to volunteer for such research since there is 
no statistical likelihood of more females than males being bereaved of a parent, 
sibling or friend. It is gradually being acknowledged that too much research on 
adults focuses on widows (Kollar, 1990) but it is not yet apparent that too little 
research on children and young people focuses on males. 
Since taking part in bereavement research inevitably involves talking about 
feelings and personal development, it seems essential to enable more males to 
feel comfortable doing this. Pupils in Years 5 and 10 said the most common form 
of remembering the dead was through photographs, films, videos and tape 
recordings and these everyday objects could be used more extensively in lessons 
(eg: P S E . English, history. RE) to encourage the sharing of personal experiences 
and memories of the dead. 
Ethics of the work itself and of working in schools 
Linking bereavement with moral and spiritual development involves asking 
questions about an experience that may cause distress and relating the answers 
to forms of development that have subjective and normative interpretations. It 
also involves asking children and young people questions that adults might 
consider intrusive and inappropriate. 
It is the kind of research in which respondents have to think, feet and talk about 
themselves in more depth than usual - they cannot be merely observed working in 
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an ordinary school situation - and the risks and benefits of taking part have to be 
explained to them. Although it is unusual for respondents to contact researchers 
to report negative outcomes, this may not mean that there are none (Cook, 1995). 
and children and young people are likely to find it harder than adults to take the 
initiative in explaining to a researcher how they feel. 
As I have shown, morality tends to be perceived mainly in behavioural terms and 
spirituality tends to be considered a largely private and personal (often religious) 
affair. Since it is easier to talk or write about ideas and feelings than to describe 
behaviour, research using these methods cannot assess what people do, only 
what they say they do, and it is not possible to observe whether pupils behave 
towards each other in accordance with how they say they should. 
There is constraint on research of this kind in schools if the researcher is unknown 
to the pupils because of issues of access, confidentiality and distress but, if the 
researcher is known to pupils and/or teaches them, such wori< may amount to a 
breach of confidentiality. Despite my misgivings about asking pupils to answer 
questionnaires in lessons, it is possible that they felt comfortable about doing so 
because they knew they would never see me again. I think the difficulties of 
working as a teacher-counsellor in school (either teaching clients or counselling 
pupils) is similar to the teacher-researcher dilemma, particularly in a sensitive 
area such as bereavement. 
Questionnaires, Interviews and hypothetical dilemmas 
It is important to use ways of recording data with which children and young people 
are familiar and I think interviews are likely to be more successful than 
questionnaires although they contain the potential for face-to-face distress and 
involve all the technical features of note-taking, recording and transcribing. 
Questionnaires require good reading skills, a willingness to write at length and, 
often, an ability to interpret questions in an either/or way. However, their 
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impersonal nature may encourage some respondents who prefer not to talk about 
their experiences to complete them in preference to an interview. 
As well as the opportunity to distance respondents from a death situation, 
hypothetical dilemmas can encourage problem-solving and deontological or 
consequential thinking or a discussion of relevant virtues. Being asked to give 
narrative accounts or written explanations of one's past is different from being 
asked to work out what one would do in a future situation and, because of this, it 
is important to recognize that the two approaches may chart two different moral 
(and spiritual) trajectories (Tappan, 1989). 
Role and approach of researcher 
It is vital that people undertaking bereavement research with children and young 
people are aware of their own losses and able to respond appropriately to distress 
and crying in others. 
The quality of the information elicited in the interview and the potential distress 
experienced by the bereaved individual during it appear to be highly dependent 
on the interactk)n t>etween the interviewer and interviewee (Cook. 1995. p 118). 
I would not have undertaken this research without counselling training and 
experience of working for 'Cruse* and. ideally. I should have had a bereavement 
supervisor (Parkes, 1995) as well as an academic supervisor. Although teachers 
may be trained counsellors, as I explained above. I think it is difficult to combine 
counselling with classroom teaching. In any future work researchers need to 
make clear distinctions between their role in educational institutions and others 
who work there. 
New initiatives and areas of research 
The county of Gloucestershire has introduced a programme entitled 'Winston's 
Wish' to enable teachers and other professionals to support bereaved children 
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and young people aged 5-14 (Gisborne, 1995; Meddings, 1996). Similar projects 
involving the training of teachers are necessary as well as research that asks 
them what kind of training and resources they think they need (Eiser et al. 1995) 
and how they have responded to loss by death in the lives of their pupils (Leckey. 
1991). 
Although it seems important to train - or at least alert - teachers to the possibility 
of having to teach a bereaved pupil and of the need to respond in an appropriate 
way. many teachers learn what to do when first faced with the situation 
(Anonymous, 1995) either on teaching practice (Gulliver, ' 0 of as a qualified 
teacher. There are few opportunities within BEd or P G C E courses for all students 
to get such training, mainly because of a focus on curriculum delivery, so that the 
few courses that run are usually optional. 
Despite this lack of training, however, many experienced teachers are aware of 
having taught bereaved children and have noticed behavioural changes in them 
(Leckey. 1991). Many consider it to be part of their role to teach about death and 
dying and do so using limited material - mainly in P S E or R E - although there are 
also opportunities within citizenship and health education themes (Eiser et al. 
1995). In Scotland trained 'Cruse' counsellors are working with pupils and training 
school staff (Smith, 1993) and the 'BBC Children in Need Appeal' currently funds 
a children's counsellor for Wales to train 'Cruse' counsellors and give talks in 
schools (Steffs. 1995; 1996) 
There is a need to explore school policies and guidelines regarding bereavement 
and disaster (Doherty, 1991) since many schools do not have a defined policy 
about how to cope with bereaved children (Leckey. 1991), despite the efforts of the 
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation to provide every school in the UK with a free 
copy of guidelines to help them do so (Yule and Gold. 1993). Apart from 
surveying school staff, such research could ask pupils what they feel their schools 
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could do - or could have done - to help them when they are bereaved and how 
they perceive school life affects the process of grieving. 
The current approach to the issue, although laudable, is piecemeal and I would 
recommend the establishment of an educational centre for resources and 
information on loss, death and bereavement to better co-ordinate such initiatives. 
Such a centre could: 
• provide teaching materials and resources for cross-curricular approaches to 
teaching and talking about death-related topics 
• provide information for headteachers, teachers and other people involved in 
mainstream and special education of the likely general and specific effects of 
loss and bereavement on pupils 
• compile a database of organisations, counselling groups, medical groups, 
charities and other self-help groups providing support, information and 
counselling for bereaved pupils and staff. 
If more teaching material and resources were available I believe that discussing 
death within an educational context would enable pupils to understand facts and 
information about death not currently widespread in society and their feelings 
about their own death and the death of other people. They could become 
informed consumers of medical and funeral services and would be helped to 
clarify their own values on social and ethical issues (Clark. 1991). Although 
discussions of death often give rise to ontological questions, they need not be 
conducted mainly within R E - as is now the case - since to do so encourages 
pupils to see death as related to religious beliefs and practices, rather than as a 
natural life event. As well as producing teaching materials the centre could 
disseminate information concerning the thinking of children and young people at 
different ages about illness, dying and death and co-ordinate training and 
information between providers of such information (eg: researchers, writers and 
practitioners in universities, schools, social work agencies and charities) and 
those seeking it in educational institutions. Lists of appropriate publications and 
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audio and visual material could be compiled and regularly updated and the 
provision of such information for teachers (and, also, inevitably, for parents 
through schools) would enable a better understanding of the likely effects of loss 
and bereavement on the emotions, cognition and behaviour of children and young 
people, particularly as related to school life and study skills. Such a centre could 
also provide information about counselling support within education and about 
voluntary counselling organisations, self-help groups etc within each education 
authority area. 
Sumniary 
Any future research must set the impact of a particular death in the context of life-
long loss. By its very nature bereavement research always depends upon the 
willingness of some people to participate and its findings cannot unquestioningly 
be taken as representative of all bereaved people. Research on children and 
young people raises ethical questions that need clarifying, in particular whether 
schools are the best places in which to carry out such work. The bereavement 
experience of males seem to be under-represented in the literature and the many 
reasons for this need examining. Although the relative merits of both 
questionnaires and interviews can be debated, it is probably more important to 
find the best approach for each individual respondent. Researchers who wish to 
work in this field should be trained in counselling methods and experienced in 
talking to bereaved people. Although initiatives such as 'Winston's Wish' might 
provide a model for future support in schools, there is a real need for widespread 
initial teacher training, ongoing INSET, postgraduate study, research into pupil 
and staff opinions and experiences, and evaluation of school policies. In 
particular I would propose the establishment of an educational centre for 
resources and information on loss, death and bereavement to serve as a focus for 
the many activities that are currently underway. 
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Rnal reflection on the research 
In chapters two. three and seven I suggested certain forms of thinking, feeling and 
behaving which could indicate adaptation to bereavement in moral and spiritual 
terms, of which the following seem particularly pertinent in conclusion: 
• Tolerating and/or bearing pain, disappointment, sorrow and loss and realizing 
that life can continue after such experiences. 
• Recognizing, however briefly, one's own finitude and taking that into account in 
future life plans. 
• Acquiring and/or formulating a philosophy of life for the present period of one's 
life and adapting and/or abandoning it at a later period. 
1 believe 1 have been able to identify such development in many of my 
respondents and hope that some of the ideas in this thesis may prove useful in 
interpreting responses to bereavement in ways that can be described as moral 
and spiritual. 
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Appendix 1 
KOHLBERG-S SIX STAGES OF MORAL JUDGEMENT: 
FINAL VERSION 
Source: Kohlberg, L & Ryncarz. R. A. (1990) 'Beyond justice reasoning: moral 
development and consideration of a seventh stage' In C. N. Alexander, S. M. 
Druker. E. J. Langer (eds) Higher Stages of Human Development 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Level A: Preconventlonal level 
Stage 1. The Stage of Punishment and Obedience 
Content 
Right is literal ot)edience to rules and authority, avoiding punishment, and not 
doing physical harm. 
1. What is right is to avoid breaking rules, to obey for obedience's sake, and to 
avoid doing physical damage to people and property. 
2. The reasons for doing right are avoidance of punishment and the superior 
power of authorities. 
Social Perspective 
This stage takes an egocentric view. A person at this stage doesn't consider the 
interests of others or recognize they differ from, actor's, and doesnt relate two 
points of view. Actions are judged in temns of physical consequences rather than 
in temfis of psychological interests of others. Authority's perspective is confused 
with one's own. 
Stage 2. The Stage of individual instrumental Purpose and Exchange 
Content 
Right is serving one's own or other's needs and making fair deals in terms of 
concrete exchange. 
1. What is right is following rules when it is to somebody's immediate interest. 
Right is acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the 
same. Right is also what is fair; that is. what is an equal exchange, a deal, an 
agreement. 
2. The reason for doing right is to serve one's own needs or interests in a world 
where one must recognize that other people have their interests, too. 
Social Perspective 
This stage takes a concrete individualistic perspective. A person at this stage 
separates own interests and points of view from those of authorities and others. 
He or she is aware that everybody has individual interests to pursue and these 
conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense). The person 
integrates or relates conflicting individual interests to one another through 
instrumental exchange of services, through instrumental need for the other and 
the other's goodwill, or through fairness giving each person the same amount. 
Level B: Conventional level 
Stage 3. The Stage of Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and 
Conformity 
Content 
The right is playing a good/nice role, being concerned about other people and 
their feelings, keeping loyalty and trust with partners, and being motivated to 
follow rules and expectations. 
313 
1. What is right is living up to what is expected by people close to one or what 
people generally expect of people in one's role as son, sister, friend and so on. 
'Being good' is important and means having good motives, showing concern 
about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, maintaining trust, 
loyalty, respect and gratitude. 
2. Reasons for doing right are needing to be good in one's own eyes and those of 
others, caring for others, and because if one puts oneself in the other person's 
place one would want good behaviour from the self (Golden Rule). 
Social Perspective 
This stage takes the perspective of the individual in relationship to other 
individuals. A person at this stage is aware of shared feelings, agreements, and 
expectations, which take primacy over individual interests. The person relates 
points of view through the 'concrete Golden Rule,' putting oneself in the other 
person's shoes. He or she does not consider the generalized 'system' 
perspective. 
Stage 4. The Stage of Social System and Conscience Maintenance 
Content 
The right is doing one's duty in society, upholding the social order, and 
maintaining the welfare of society or the group. 
1. What is right is fulfilling the actual duties to which one has agreed. Laws are to 
be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social 
duties and rights. Right is also contributing to society, the group or institution. 
2. The reasons for doing right are to keep the institutions going as a whole, self 
respect or conscience as meeting one's defined obligations, or the consequences: 
'What if everyone did it?' 
Social Perspective 
This stage differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or 
motives. A person at this stage takes the viewpoint of the system, which defines 
roles and rules. He or she considers individual relations in temis of place in the 
system. 
Uvel B/C transitional level 
This level is postconventional but not yet principled. 
Contents of Transition 
At Stage 4.5, choice is personal and subjective. It is based on emotions, 
conscience is seen as arbitrary and relative, as are ideals such as 'duty* and 
'morally right.' 
Transitional Social Perspective 
At this stage, the perspective is that of an individual standing outside of her or his 
own society and considering her/himself as an individual making decisons without 
a generalized commitment or contract with society. One can pick and choose 
obligations, which are defined by particular societies, but one has no principles for 
such choice. 
Level C: Postconventlonbal and principled level 
Moral decisions are generated from right, values, or principles that are (or could 
be) agreeable to alL individuals composing or creating a society designed to have 
fair and beneficial practices. 
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stage 5. The Stage of Prior Rights and Sociai Contract or Utiiity 
Content 
The right is upholding the basic rights, values, and legal contracts of a society, 
even when they conflict with the concrete rules and laws of the group, 
1. What is right is being aware of the fact that people hold a variety of values and 
opinions, that most values and rules are relative to one's group. These 'relative' 
rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and 
because they are the social contract Some nonrelative values and rights such as 
life, and liberty, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority 
opinion. 
2. Reasons for doing right are, in general, feeling obligated to obey the law 
because one has made a social contract to make and abide by laws for the good 
of all and to protect their own rights and the rights of others. Family, friendship, 
trust, and work obligations are also commitments or contracts freely entered into 
and entail respect for the rights of others. One is concerned that laws and duties 
be based on rational calculation of overall utility: The greatest good for the 
greatest number.' 
Social Perspective 
This stage takes a prior-to-sodety perspective - that of a rational individual aware 
of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. The person 
integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective 
impartiality, and due process. He or she considers the moral point of view and the 
legal point of view, recognizes they conflict, and finds it difficult to integrate them. 
Stage 6. The Stage of Universal Ethical Principles 
Confenf 
This stage assumes guidance by universal ethical principles that all humanity 
should follow. 
1. Regarding what is right. Stage 6 is guided by universal ethical principles. 
Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such 
principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the 
principle. Principles are universal principles of justice; the equality of human 
rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individuals. These are not 
merely values that are recognized, but are also principles used to generate 
particular decisions. 
2. The reason for doing right is that, as a rational person, one has seen the 
validity of principles and has become committed to them. 
Social Perspective 
This stage takes the perspective of a moral point of view from which social 
arrangements derive or on which they are grounded. The perspective is that of 
any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the basic moral 
premise of respect for other persons as ends, not means. 
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Appendix 2 
CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES 
INVOLVED IN COLLECTION OF DATA 
March 1993 
Written request to headteacher of Fleur Secondary School for interview to discuss 
my research ideas. 
Met member of staff from Maxwell Secondary School at PGDipEd/MEd seminar at 
University of Plymouth (Exmouth) who asked me to speak about death and 
bereavement as part of school's PSE programme. 
April 1993 
Written refusal from senior management team member at Fleur Secondary School 
to discuss undertaking my research there. 
May 1993 
Completion of ethics protocol which clarified issues relating to informed consent, 
protection from harm, confidentiality, right to withdraw, openness and honest, and 
debriefing (Appendix 3). 
Questionnaire Pilot 1: 3 respondents (aged 52, 29 and 24) talked through their 
reactions to my questions. Two were BEd students (Barry and Camilla) who 
agreed to completing their questionnaires together and having their conversation 
taped. 
Visited Hester Primary School with a colleague on school practice supervision. 
June 1993 
Headteacher of Hester Primary School agreed to my request to work there in the 
following academic year. 
July 1993 
Questionnaire Pilot 2: 14 respondents (aged 40-78) at 'Sea of Faith' conference 
completed questionnaire during workshop entitled 'Childhood bereavement and 
spiritual growth.' 
August 1993 
'Sea of Faith* respondent Karen wrote further details of her experiences. 
September 1993 
Met staff at Hester Primary School to explain my research and teacher of Year 5 
volunteered to let me work with his class. 
October-November 1993 
Questionnaire Pilot 2: 5 respondents (aged 32, 44. 51, 56 and 68) gave feedback 
on question content, wording and questionnaire layout as well as answering 
questions. 
November-December 1993 
Letter sent to parents of pupils in Year 5 class at Hester Primary School 
(Appendix 6 i). Worked with 19 pupils on project located within RE entitled 
'Remembering the Dead' every Wednesday morning for six weeks. 
February 1994 
Letter to parents of pupils in one Year 10 class at Maxwell Secondary School 
(Appendix 6 ii). First PSE/RE lesson with this class in which we discussed 
bereavement experiences and funeral practices of major world religions. 
Loaned books on bereavement to youth worker Fiona. 
March 1994 
First PSE lesson with 79 pupils in whole of Year 7 at Maxwell Secondary School. 
Received 20 completed questionnaires (Appendix 4) from PGCE students aged 
21-44 in final session of 4 week drama module after handing them out in previous 
session to anyone who was interested in answering. 
June 1994 
Second PSE/RE lesson with one class of 17 Year 10 pupils at Maxwell Secondary 
School. Questionnaires completed regarding bereavement experiences. 
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June-July 1994 
Letter to parents of pupils in Year 7 at Maxwell Secondary School (Appendix 6 iii). 
Second PSE lesson with 74 pupils (3 classes): discussion of bereavement 
experiences and completion of questionnaires (Appendix 5). 
August 1994 
Follow-up interview with PGGE student Wendy. 
Winston Youth Club worker Fiona agreed to introduce me to several bereaved 
young people whom she knew. 
September 1994 
Follow-up interview with PGCE student Yoland. 
'Sea of Faith' respondent Olga wrote further details of her experiences. 
October-December 1994 
3 interviews with Rita aged 16 at Winston Youth Club (Appendix 9). 
February 1995 
2 interviews with Sheila aged 16 at Winston Youth Club. 
Letters to colleagues at University of Plymouth and personal requests to friends to 
interview their children. 
March 1995 
3 interviews with Thelma aged 16 at Winston Youth Club. 
1 interview with Gemma aged 6. 
April 1995 
1 interview with each of the following: Marcus aged 6. Kirsty aged 8. Jason aged 
10 and Giles aged 14. 
2 interviews with Verity aged 17 at Winston Youth Club. 
June 1995 
1 interview with each of the following: Hazel aged 5, Ingrid aged 8. Melanie aged 
12. Penelope aged 13. Timothy aged 13 and Rosemary aged 16. 
October 1995 
1 interview with Lionet aged 7. 
March 1996 





1. informed consent 
When working with children aged 5-16 contacted through school, permission will 
be obtained from the headteacher in the first instance and then in writing from 
parents on behalf of their children. The children will be asked once more if they 
wish to participate before an interview starts or a questionnaire is handed out. 
When working with children aged 5-16 not contacted through school, where 
request for access has been directly made to the parents, or where the researcher 
is already known to the family, consent may be given orally. 
When working with young people aged 16-18 contacted through school, 
pemriission will be obtained from the headteacher in the first instance. Thereafter 
participants will be deemed responsible for giving their own consent. 
In all other cases, young people aged over 16 years not contacted through school, 
will be deemed responsible for giving their own consent. 
2. Protection from harm 
Potential participants will be advised before participating in an interview or 
completing a questionnaire that memories and emotions (eg: sorrow, anger, 
regret) may quite naturally arise (Gray, 1986 , p 358). Attention will be paid to the 
mood of participants during the work and, although not offering counselling as 
such to participants, the researcher will use her training and experience in 
bereavement counselling in order to give appropriate responses (BAC Code of 
Ethics and Practice for Counselling Skills, 1989). 
In the case of research undertaken in schools and colleges, the relevant 
counselling service, pastoral tutor, form teacher, or people immediately 
responsible, or likely to be affected, will be informed beforehand. 
The provisions of the Data Protection Act will be observed, as required. 
3. Confidentiality 
Potential participants will be assured before answering any questions that: 
(a) whatever information they give will not be shared with other people in such a 
way that they can be identified; (b) pseudonyms or no names at all will be used in 
transcribing, collating and writing up of the final document in order to ensure 
anonymity. 
4. Right to withdraw 
All participants will be advised of their right to withdraw from all or some of the 
research at any time. This will be made clear when requesting consent and will be 
reiterated before an interview starts or a questionnaire is handed out. In the event 
of a school child withdrawing in emotional distress, provisions will have been 
made with school staff in advance (see 2. Protection from Harm). 
5. Openness and honesty 
All potential respondents will be told that the researcher is interested in their ideas 
about: themselves (self concept), getting on with other people, making difficult 
decisions. 'God' or a divine power, death and spiritual/ religious matters. 
In the case of research in schools, it is probable that a proportion of students in all 
groups questioned will have experienced a bereavement of some kind considered 
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by them to be major (Hufton. 1986. p 97). Although it will be important to 
remember and be sensitive to this, there is no need to select or avoid particular 
participants for inclusion as they may choose for themselves not to take part (see 
1. Informed Consent and 4. Right to Withdraw). The purpose of the research is to 
compare experiences and opinions and this aim will not need to be disguised. 
6. Debriefing 
All participants will be thanked for giving their time and answers. They will be 
reminded of the possibility of emotions and memories arising as a result of 
discussing losses in their lives and told that this is usual (See 2. Protection from 
Harm). Children and young people in school will be reminded of the staff who are 
available for them to talk to if needed; students aged over 16 and adults will be 
informed of the work of 'Cruse'. "The Compassionate Friends' etc. or similar 
appropriate groups. 
Details of how to contact the researcher will also be supplied to participants in 
case of a wish to follow up any issue raised, even at a much later stage 
(Crompton. 1992, p 90). In the case of participants who are interviewed more than 
once, it will be made clear when the last session is to occur in order for 
adjustments to be made. 
Asking "How do you feel now?" is an essential part of the debriefing process at 
the end of each interview and adequate time will be allowed for doing this. 
Questionnaires will also finish with this form of self-examination. 
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HNAL VERSION OF QUESTIONNAIRE USED WITM ADULTS 
(PGCE STUDENTS) 
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/ would like to confirm that whatever Information you give me will be treated In complete 
confidence. I will not discuss what you tell me with other people In such a way that you can be 
Identified and. If I want to make use of anything you have said In my work, I will ensure, by using 
pseudonyms, that you cannot be Identified. Please feel free to choose which of the following 
questions to answer. Valerie Clark 
Where a Yes. No or Don't Know choice is given, please tid< the appropriate box. 
1. Please write in the boxes provided (a) today's dale, (b) your age. (c) what your profession 
or employment is and (d) whether you are female or male (V box). 
(a) (b) (c) (d) F Q MQ 
2. 
3. 
Do you have any sisters or brothers? (a) Yes • (b) No • 
If Yes, draw your position among your sisters and brothers on the diagram below. 
Cross out or add spaces for people if you need to. 
eldest youngest 
—\ 
As a child were you brought up within any specific religious tradition 
(a) Yes • (b) No • 
If Yes what was it ? 
6. Do you belong to or fairly regularty attend any specific religious group now 
(a) Yes • (b) No • 
7. If Yes what is it ? 
8. Do you feel that you have had any luming-points" in your life so far? 
(a) Yes • (b) No • 
9. If yes, what were they and when? 
10. How would you describe your present attitude to life? 
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11. What has led you to this attitude? 
12. Which people are important to you in your life at this time? 
(Please give relationships rather than names.) 
13. Apart from people, what else is important or of value to you in life at this time? 
14. Please underline on this list anyone in your life who has died. 
mother father sister brother 
wife husband daughter son 
Matemal grandmother Matemal grandfather Patemal grandmother Paternal grandfather 
aunt uncle cousin niece 
nephew sister-in-law brother-in-law 
stepmother stepfather stepsister stepbrother 
friend neighbour pet 
other elderly or step-, or half- or distant relation (explain who) 
15. Go back to the list in question 14 and write, at the right side of the name, how old you were at 
the time of the death. 
16. Which death was most significant or important to you? 
17. Please explain why it was significant or important if you can or would like to. 
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If It Is possible, please answer the questions that follow only In relation to a death that 
occurred in your life up to the time that you were 20 years old. 
18. Tick this box if you are able to do this. • 
(Please note that your responses are valuable whether or not you tide the box.) 
19. Which death will you describe in the questions that follow? 
20. What else was happening in your life at about that time? 
21. Did you go to the funeral? (a) Yes • (b) No • (c) Don't know or remember • 
22. Did you want to go? (a) Yes • (b) No • (c) Don't know or remember • 
23. What explanations or beliefs did people give for why the death occurred? 
24. Did your beliefs or understanding agree with what you were told? 
(a) Yes Q (b) No • (c) Don't know or remember • 
25. If No, how did they differ? 
26. Did anyone try to comfort, assure or help you? 
(a) Yes • (b)No • (c) Don't know or remember • 
27. If Yes. what did they tell you? 
28. How did you feel at the time of the death? 
29. How did you get on with your family after the death? 
(Please give a particular incident as an example if you can.) 
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30. How did you get on with people who were not family members after the death? 
• (Again, please give a particular incident as an example if you can.) 
31. Has this death changed your values or outlook on life in any way - either at the time, later 
on, or at the present time? (a) Yes • (b) No • (c) Don*t know or remember Q 
32. If Yes, how? 
33. What do you think happens to us when we die? 
34. Have you ever felt as though you were close to a spiritual force that seemed to lift you out 
of yourself, or to speak to you or help you in some way? 
(a) Yes • (b) No • (c) Don't know or remember • 
35. If Yes. can you describe one of these experiences? 
Thank you for taking time to answer these questions. If there Is anything I haven't asked 
you about, or that you would like to add, or If you would like to contribute further to this 
research, write your comments or your name and address below. 
Please note that thinking about these Issues nnay, for a time, affect how you feel. 
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Appendix 5 
RNAL VERSION OF QUESTIONNAIRE USED WITH YOUNG PEOPLE 
(YEAR 7 AT MAXWELL SECONDARY SCHOOL) 
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/ would like to that whatever information you give me will be treated in 
complete confidence. I will not discuss what you tell me with other people in such a 
way that you can be identified and, if I want to make use of anything you have said 
in my work, I xoill.. use another name to describe you. You can choose which of the 
following questions to answer. Valerie dark 
Where a Yes or No reply is given, please circle your answer. 
1. Write in the boxes provided today's date, your age and whether you are female or 
male. 
date age f /m 
2. Do you have any sisters or brothers? Yes No 
3. If yes, how many sisters do you have? How many brothers? 
4. Do you live with both your parents? Yes No 
5. If no, please explain who you live with. 
6. Have you been brought up in a particular religious tradition? (eg: Church of 
England, Jewish, Catholic etc) Yes No 
7. If yes, what was it? 
8. Do you belong to or fairly regularly attend any particular religious group now? 
Yes No 
9. If yes, what is it? 
10. What has been the most important thing that has happened to you in your life 
so far? (It may have been good, sad, frighteiung, unusual etc) 
11. Which people are important to you in youx life? (Please give relationships rather 
than names.) 
12. Apart from people, what else is important to you or of value to you at this time 
in your life? 
13. Have you ever taken part in any charity event? Yes No 
14. If yes, please explain what you did. (eg walking, swimming, fasting etc) 
15. Is there anything happening in the world that you read or hear about or see on 
television that (a) upsets or annoys you? Yes No 
(b) makes you want to stop it? Yes No 
(c) pleases you? Yes No 
(d) makes you want to do the same? Yes No 
16. If yes, please explain what it is. 
326 
17. Please underline on this list anyone in your life who has died. 
mother father 
grandmother (you mother's mother) 






grandmother (your father's mother) 





other elderly, or step-, or half- or distant relation (explain who) 
18. Go back to the list in question 17 and write, at the right side of the name, how old 
you were at the time of the death. 
19. Which death was most important or significant to you? 
20. If you can or would like to, please explain why it was significant or important. 
21. What else was happerung in your life at about the time of that death? 
22. Did you go to the funeral? Yes No Don't remember/know 
23. Did you want to go? Yes No Don't remember/know 
24. What explanations or beliefs did people give for why the death happened? 
25. Did anyone try to comfort or help you? Yes No Don't remember/know 
26. If yes, what did they do or tell you? 
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27. How did you feel, or what did you think, at the time of the death? 
28. How do you feel, or what do you think, about it now? 
29. How did you get on with your family after the death? (Can you remember" any 
particular incident as an example?) 
30. How did you get on with people who were not members of the family after the 
death? (Again, can you remember any particular incident as an example?) 
31. Did the death make you think differendy about the things that are important to 
you or the way you look at life? (This change might have been at the time of the 
death, later on, or now.) 
Yes No 
32. If yes, how? 
33. Did the death make you change your behaviour or personality in any way, even 
if only for a short time? (eg: After the death did you (or do you now] behave 
differently, or treat certain other people differently?) Yes No 
34. If yes, please explain what the change was/is. 
35. Did the death make any difference to your creative or sporting interests, or to 
your hobbies or interests in any way, even if only for a short time? (eg: After the 
death did you start? [or stop] painting, drawing, making things, writing or doing 
sport or anything like that?) 
Yes No 
36. If yes, please explain what the change was/is. 
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37. What do you think happens to us when we die? 
Please put a tick after only ONE of the answers in questions 38 and 39. 
38. I think that God or a divine power 
(a) Exists and takes care of us, (c) May exist but Tm not sure. 
(b) Exists but does not affect our everyday life. (d) Doesn't exist. 
39. Have you at times felt that God or a divine power is close to you? 
(a) Very often. (c) Perhaps, but Tm not sure. 
(b) A few times. (d) No. 
In question 40 please tick AS MANY of the answers as you think is likely: 
40. On which of these occasions might people wish that God or a divine power could 
be near to them? 
(a) When they are feeling sad or upset. 
(b) When they feel lonely. 
(c) When they are helpful to someone. 
(d) At night. 
(e) When they are ill. 
(f) When they are in a quiet, deserted place. 
(g) When they feel happy. 
(h) When they need to choose the right thing to do. 
(i) When they feel frightened. 
(j) When they are in a test or an exam. 
(k) After someone they know has died. 
(1) When they are in trouble for doing or saying something. 
(m) When they are kind to someone. 
(n) When they are praying. 
(o) When they are on their own. 
(p) When they say they are sorry for doing something wrong, 
(q) While someone they know is dying, 
(r) When they are at a church service, 
(s) When they are in danger, 
(t) When they work hard. 
(u) Any other occasion you can think of? (Say when it could be) 
Thank you for taking time to answer these questions. If you would like to help me 
further in my work (by talking to me more about your experiences) please write 
your name in the space below, or if there is anything I Ixaven't asked you about, or 
anything else you want to say, please use the space belozu for your comments. 
How do you feel noxu after thinking about, these issues? 
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Appendix 6 (i) 
LETTER TO PARENTS OF YEAR 5 PUPILS AT 
HESTER PRIMARY SCHOOL 
1st November 1993 
Dear Parent. 
Ms Donald has given me permission to write to you about the work I will be 
undertaking at Hester School for six weeks in November and December. I am a 
teacher of English and Drama, currently working at Rolle Faculty of Education 
(University of Plymouth) for a Doctor of Philosophy degree exploring children's 
spiritual and moral thinking about death. During the next two years I will be 
building up an overall picture of children's ideas about these topics as a result of 
working in several Devon schools and I am writing to explain what will be involved 
in the work with your child. 
I would like to find out what children think about themselves as individuals, as 
members of a local community, and of the wider world, about God (or whatever 
power or force they think exists), about death and how we react to it. and about 
their understanding of spiritual or religious ideas. I am aware, because I am also 
a bereavement counsellor, that most of us - including children - have lost 
someone or something of importance, and I will be sensitive to this reaction as 
much as possible in my work. 
The project will include talking, reading, drawing and writing. We will use stories, 
poems and pictures about the different ways of celebrating and remembering the 
dead in Japan. Mexico and Britain, and discuss our ideas of God and gods, and 
what we think happens after death. I would also like to tape record some 
discussions, usually in small groups. All these activities are based upon Religious 
Education guidelines for Key Stage 2 and are planned to co-ordinate with any 
other work being done by Mr Lewis in this basic curriculum area. 
I would like your permission to make use of what is said, drawn or written in my 
project. Your child's name will not be used in my final write-up and. if I want to 
make use of any individual contribution, I will make sure that identification is not 
possible. Furthermore, your child can opt out. if that seems best for whatever 
reason, even at a later stage. I do hope, however, that your child will be able to 
contribute to this project and that your permission will be given because it is only 
by asking children directly about such issues that we can understand more about 
them and improve our education and care of them. 
Yours faithfully. 
Valerie Clark. Ms 
330 
Proiegt on spiritual and moral development 
* Please delete as appropriate. 
Child's name 
I *do / 'do not give my pemiission for my child's work to be used in the project. 
Signed 
331 
Appendix 6 (ii) 
LETTER TO PAREm-S OF YEAR 10 PUPILS AT 
MAXWELL SECONDARY SCHOOL 
9th February 1994 
Dear Parent, 
I am writing to let you know that I have been invited to contribute to the Personal 
and Social Education programme for Year 10 by talking about death and 
bereavement and that my first session will be tomorrow, Thursday 10th February. 
I am a teacher of English and Drama, currently working at Rolle School of 
Education (University of Plymouth) for a Doctor of Philosophy degree exploring 
young people's spiritual and moral thinking about death, and I have also worked 
as a bereavement counsellor for 'Cruse.' In addition to sharing information with 
young people. I am also interested in building up a picture of their own ideas 
about these matters and I am undertaking simitar work in other Devon schools. 
As arranged with the programme co-ordinator, I shall discuss bereavement 
reactions and the many ways in which different cultural and religious traditions, 
including Christianity, mark the event of death. I should like your permission to 
make use of any material that arises in the sessions for my project: your child's 
name will not be used; I will make sure that individual identification is not possible, 
and your child can opt out. if that seem best for whatever reason, even at a later 
stage. If you do not wish your child's work to be included in the project please 
complete the slip below. I can be contacted through the school or on 0395 
255342. 
Yours faithfully. 
Valerie Clark, Ms 
Project on spiritual and moral thinking 
Child's name 
I do not give my permission for my child's work to be used in the project. 
Signed 
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Appendix 6 (iii) 
LETTER TO PARENTS OF YEAR 7 PUPILS AT 
MAXWELL SECONDARY SCHOOL 
23rd June 1994 
Dear Parent. 
I am writing to let you know that, during the week beginning 27th June 1994. I 
shall be conducting a follow up to the session held on 23rd March, in which I 
talked to Year 7 about death and bereavement. This is part of the Personal and 
Social Education programme to which I was invited to contribute. I am a teacher 
of English and Drama, currently working at Rolle School of Education (University 
of Plymouth) for a Doctor of Philosophy degree exploring young people's spiritual 
and moral thinking about death, and 1 have also worked as a bereavement 
counsellor for 'Cruse.* In addition to sharing information with young people - as I 
did in the first session -1 am also interested in building up a picture of their own 
ideas and experiences about these matters which is one of my reasons for the 
second visit. Please feel free to contact the school office or my own office (0395 
255343/2) if you have any enquiries about this work. 
Yours faithfully, 
Valerie Clark. Ms 
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Appendix 7 
QUESTIONS USED IN SEMUSTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS WITH SHEILA 
(AS EXAMPLE OF THOSE ALSO USED WrTH RITA, THELMA AND VERITY) 
Before interview: remind her that after we have spoken together she may 
experience emotional reactions and have some memories rekindled; I will observe 
confidentiality; she can withdraw from conversation or not answer; I will give her a 
transcript of our conversation the next time I see her or send it via Fiona; I may 
wish to speak to her more than once if she agrees. 
1. What is your age now? When is your birthday? 
2. Do you have any brothers or sisters? 
3. Whose death will you tell me about? 
4. How old were you when the death happened? 
5. What time of the year was it when it happened? 
6. Tell me about how you heard about the death. 
7. Did you go to the funeral? 
8. How did you get on with your father aftenwards? 
[9. How did you get on with your siblings aftenvards?] 
10. Were you given any explanation for the death - in medical or even religious 
terms by anyone? 
11. What sense have you made of the death? Have you found a meaning for it? 
12. Do you think there is any kind of a meaning to life? 
13. Have you ever thought about what has happened to your mother? In other 
words, where is she now? 
14. What was your idea or experience of death before your mother died? 
15. How has your thinking about the death changed since it happened- if at all? 
16. Have your thoughts about death itself (its purpose or meaning) changed since 
your mother's death? 
17. What has been the most important experience for you in your life so far? 
18. Have you experienced the death of any other important people or animals in 
your life? 
19. Do these deaths seem timely or untimely - OK or not OK to you? 
20. What are the most important things in life for you right now? 
21. What things or people do you value in life? 
22. Have you been brought up in any particular religious tradition? 
23. Has this tradition (or lack of it) affected your thinking about your mother's 
death or about death itself at all? 
24. Do you have any beliefs or ideas about God or a Divine Spirit? 
25. What do you think Is the purpose of human life? 
26. Do you have any beliefs or thoughts about why some people suffer more than 
others in the world or die earlier? 
27. When life gets difficult for you. what keeps you going? 
28. How do you make Important decisions in life? 
29. Did your mother's death make you change your behaviour or personality in 
any way - even if only for a short time? 
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30. Did your mother's death make any difference to your creative or sporting 
interests, or to your hobbies or interests in any way - even if only for a short time? 
Did you start doing anything new or stop doing anything that you had always done 
up until then? 
31. What are your career plans? What kind of a future life do you want to have? 
32. What do you like doing in your spare time? 
At end of interview: How do you feel? You may have some more reactions 
(sorrow, memories) to what we have talked about later. Thank you for answering 




RESPONDEMTS MErfTIONED IN CHAPTER 7: 
AGE AND SOURCE OF CONTACT 
Aileen: aged 15. Maxwell School. Year 10 
Barbara: aged 22. PGCE student 
Barry: aged 29. Pilot 1: BEd student 
Beryl: aged 15. Maxwell School. Year 10 
Candida: aged 39, PGCE student 
Camilla: aged 24, Pilot 1: BEd student 
Edith: aged 40. PGCE student 
Charles: aged 15. Maxwell School, Year 10 
Gail: aged 30, PGCE student 
Gavin: aged 52, 'Sea of Faith* conference delegate 
Hannah: aged 21, PGCE student 
Henry: aged 58. 'Sea of Faith' conference delegate 
Ian: aged 63, 'Sea of Faith* conference delegate 
Imogen: aged 24, PGCE student 
Jasmine: aged 26, PGCE student 
Jennifer: aged 10. daughter of colleague/friend 
Karen: aged 40, 'Sea of Faith* conference delegate 
Keith: aged 30. PGCE student 
Lionel: aged 7, son of colleague/friend 
Lorraine: aged 42, *Sea of Faith' conference delegate 
Malcolm: aged 29. PGCE student 
Melanie: aged 12. daughter of colleague/friend 
Nancy: aged 64. 'Sea of Faith* conference delegate 
Olga: aged 78. 'Sea of Faith' conference delegate 
Orlando: aged 21. PGCE student 
Pansy: aged 25, PGCE student 
Patrick: aged 68, Pilot 2 
Primrose: aged 11, Maxwell School. Year 7 
Rita: aged 16, Winston Youth Club 
Rosemary: aged 16, daughter of colleague/friend 
Sandra: aged 44, Pilot 2 
Sheila: aged 16, Winston Youth Club 
Tabitha: aged 51. Pilot 2 
Thelma: aged 16. Winston Youth Club 
Timothy: aged 13. son of colleague/friend 
Ursula: aged 56. Pilot 2 
Verity: aged 17. Winston Youth Club 
Wendy: aged 22. PGCE student 
Yoland: aged 23, PGCE student 
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Appendix 9 
INTERVIEW WITH RFTA AT WINSTON YOUTH CLUB ON 16th November 1994 
(AS EXAMPLE) 
[ ] indicates speech was unclear 
V: Last week when I spoke with you and we were talking in Fiona's about - the 
dog -1 wasnl sure - and I thought about it afterwards - was the dog connected 
with your father's death? 
R: Yes. it was. 
V: I hadnt realized that. 
R: Did you guess? 
V: Ah. Fiona had told me that one of the people she was going to introduce me to 
had had somebody die because they were rescuing an animal, a dog. and when I 
went home I put two and two together - but I didn't at the time - and I'm sorry I 
didnl.. 
R: That's OK 
V: Because it*s sort of... OK. Tell me about it. 
R: Do you want me to tell you about both my deaths? I've had two. 
V: Oh. tell me about your father first of ail. 
R: Well, my father died secondly when I was eight um -1 can't remember that 
much about it. um. I was at school at the time when it happened and, um. I just 
remember the teacher coming in and just taking me out of the classroom and 
telling me. One of my Mum's friends took me home and they just - they just 
explained that my father was out with my grandma - they were just walking the 
dog. um. one afternoon and. um. the dog got loose... 
V: Yeah. 
R: And of course it went on the train track, so my father tried to go after it and of 
course he didn't make it. and a train came along, so • he got caught under it. But 
that's. I mean, that's all I know as far as my Mum told me.... It was quite a long 
time ago actually. 
V: 8 years. 
R: Mmmm 
V: 8 years? What time of year? 
R: Um. I cani quite remember - maybe autumn I think, mmm. yeah -
V: I was just wondering • 
R: Novemberl 
V: About now, then? 
R: Yes. 
V: I wondered if you - realized that it might be an anniversary about now? 
R: Yeah. I can normally tell by my Mum [ ] - she gets a bit upset. 
V: Mmm. mmm. 
R: Um. Yeah, I think it was in November time. 
V: So he was out with his mother - as it were, your grandmother - walking the dog. 
the dog got loose and he ran onto the track or tried to get the dog free and was 
killed. 
R: Yes. 
V: And you were told at school. 
R: Yeah. I was taken out of the class and told. 
V: Tell me what happened next, as far as you remember. 
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R: Um. I remember being taken home and - my Mum was there. Um - I don't 
really remember much after that it. She just sort of tried to sit down and talk to me 
about it but I suppose I didn't take it in at first because I was quite young. 
V: Mmm. 
R: But I knew as soon as I was taken out of the classroom I knew what had 
happened - just like the first time when I knew what had happened. 
V: The first time being? 
R: The first time when my brother died. 
V: Ah! No. I didn't know about that either. Can we pause for a moment while I 
check the volume? 
R: Sure. 
(Pause for volume check) 
V: Your brother? 
R: Yeah. Do you want me to tell you about that? 
V: Please. 
R: Um it happened when I was 6. 
V: Mmm. 
R: And - my Dad and my brother used to - used to have a tandem and they used 
to go. um. cycling, they used to go in races and things like that. And. um. I think I 
was home off school one day sick. I think it was in the week. I'm sure it was. I 
was there with my Mum. and it was getting a bit late and we were worried about 
them. 
V: Umm. 
R: I think my Mum knew there was something up. And then the doorbell rang, 
and then -1 don't know but somehow I knew something was wrong - and it was a 
policeman, the police at the door and I didnl hear what had happened -1 didn't 
hear what they said to my Mum. because they didnt come in. Um. and she just 
came in and she just looked so shocked and she - you know - it was really hard 
for me to understand. It didn't sink it at all at first. 
V: Mmm. 
R: And she -1 don't think - she did try and tell me but as I was so young it was 
really hard for her to try and get it through to me. Um, and my Dad was in the 
accident as well. um. it was. um. I think they were on the road and I think it was. 
um. a lorry. I think somehow they collided. 
V: Mmm. 
R: And my Dad - just - he survived that with a broken leg. 
V: Mmm. 
R: But my brother, he was on the back I think, and he must just have gone over or 
something. 
V: How old was your brother? 
R: He was 8 at the time. 
V: So he was - two years older than you. 
R: Yes. 
V: Mmml What sense did you make of it - if sense is the right word - what, what 
...? 
R: Um 
V: Did you - begin to think why has this happened or...? 
R: I didn't think about that at the time. At the time it just, you know -1 don't know it 
just didn't seem real. 
V: Mmm. 
R: It took ages to sink in and... 




R: And um, I don't know, it just • I just sort of - was a bit shocked for a while - and 
then -1 suppose I - it didn't really sink in - so I didnl really understand what - had 
happened - only that they were gone, that he was gone - um. and I don't think it 
was until later that I started saying oh [God] why has it got to happen to our family 
and all this. 
V: Mmm. 
R: Cos my Mum was. she. she was quite strong - but I think she was strong for 
me -
V: Umm. 
R: Because we, you know, we had quite a big house and she seemed to be 
putting on a brave face - but it wasnl until later that I thought, you know, why has 
this happened. It didnt actually sink in and I didnt realize. 
V: Did it change your life having lost your brother when you were 6. in terms of 
your childhood, your friends and the way you got on with other people, do you 
suppose? 
R: Um, yeah I think it did. In a big way. Cos every now and again now I look 
back and think, you know: 'Oh, I wish my brother was here." 
V: Mmm. 
R: We were pretty - we were very close actually - and I can't remember much of 
him but. when you look at the photos I think, well, we must have been really close. 
Um, I don't know, it's just... strange. 
V; Some people if they lose a brother or a sister talk about losing a real 
companion or a friend or someone they played games with or just having a sense 
of someone else of the same age in the family. I mean there are all those 
possibilities, even if it's a brother, you know in your case, not the same sex... 
R: Yeah. 
V: Um. he was older so therefore he might have introduced you to other people, 
all sorts of things that - didn't happen because he - he died. 
R: Mmm. 
V: Or things that you thought were going to happen and then stopped because he 
was no longer around. 
R: Yeah. I always remember hanging ... um playing with his friends, his friends 
that used to live up the road, and they used to come down and play on my 
computer, and I used to love that, cos his friends used to show me how to get into 
this, how to get out of this maze that I'd been trying to work out for agesi 
V: Hahaha! 
R: I was really chuffed about that. Yeah, he did sort of. he was. we were close -
so - but I think it has made a difference to my life - definitely... 
V: I'm going to ask you this kind of question several times... 
R: OK. 
V: In what kind of way? 
R: Um... 
V: It's a hard question I realize. 
R: Yeah. Um. well. now... 
V: Mmm? 
R: I feel - sometimes I feel very lonely - especially being an only child now - and, 
um I guess, well it's changed my life because my Mum has got closer to me -
V: Mmm 
R: And -1 don't know, it's hard to say. really. I know it has changed but in what 
way it's really hard to say. Um ... I'll have to think about that onel 
V: Yes, that's fair enough. Um. it's certainly true that - er, in cases where a 
brother or a sister dies and there is one child left, the parent or parents often 
become - much closer to the child that survives - um - which is good. But also 
sometimes, can be more close than either of them actually want. 
R: Yeah. 
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V: But there's a kind of a sense of: you're all I've got now for the moment. Now 
maybe that happened after Walter died, but maybe it happened more after Dad 
died. 
R: Yeah. 
V: I'm guessing, because that was the original family unit... 
R: Yeah. I remember when - me and my Mum used to live together, quite - after 
my Dad died, I remember when, that's when we became really close. 
V: Mmm. 
R: Because when my brother died, my Mum had my father to lean on. 
V: Yes of course. 
R: But I think that she was - we were leaning on each other then. 
V: So, two years later when you were 8 - only 8, that's still quite young - your Dad 
died and your Mum then - you said about Walter how you felt she was strong for 
you, how was it different for her after her husband died - therefore how was it 
different between you and her? 
R: Urn. Well she felt very atone too -1 mean she had friends but - she felt very • 
out of it, you know. I think, it took her a long time to get over it, especially after 
Walter died and then - Dad died. It's all sort of - 2 years isn't all that long really 
when you think about it - so. I suppose, but -1 don't know - but we did become 
closer definitely and even noiv we're very close. I tell her almost everything, so I 
suppose that's how - we've become closer. 
V: And you could almost say, perhaps, that's a very good thing that's come out of 
it. you have found a friend in your Mum. That was a knock on the door. 
R: Yes. it was. wasnl it? 
V: I think we'll have to stop. then. 
(Pause to investigate noise at door) 
V: We were talking abut your Mum then. Um. let's, let's just... if you don't mind, 
go back to... Did you go to Walter's funeral? 
R: Yes I'm [sure] I did. 
V Do you remember anything about it? You just said "I'm sure I did" so you don't 
remember very much about it. 
R: No. I don't, no. not at all. Um. I'm sure I went. I cant remember much about 
it, I just remember the coffin going in - the grave. 
V So he was buried? 
R: Yeah. 
V So his - grave is somewhere in Winston? 
R: Yeah, it's up the top - of New Street. Church Hill, because we used to live at... 
Church Hill and the church is just at the top of the hill from where they're buried. 
And it's funny actually because my friend, um. she had a - her Mum had a baby 
and it died, I think, a few hours aftenvards - this is my tesMriend -
V: Yes. 
R: And, it's so funny - well, not funny at all but - um, she was. her - sister was 
buried next to my brother. 
V: Um. 
R: And -1 dont know, somehow that made us really close as well. Because - but 
- er I don't suppose she suffered much because she didn't actually know her 
sister... 
V: Mmm. 
R: But she still - we always used to go up there together and have a little cry 
about it. 
V: "We both have somebody dead here in the ground together side by side." The 
timing of some events suddenly seems important about deaths. 
R: Yeah. 
V: How about Dad's funeral? Do you remember much about that? 
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R: Um. yeah. I remember that actually quite clearly. Cos I remember sitting in the 
church and I was crying my eyes out and my Mum just handed me a hankie. 
V: Mmm. 
R: And I remember ... walking up - towards the grave behind, you know, the 
coffin, we all walked behind it - and I just remember. I remember the ceremony 
and everything. I remember my Mum sitting next to me holding my hand ... 
V: How did you feel about anything that was said in the ceremony? Did you make 
sense of it at all or did you think "I don*t believe that" or "That's an interesting 
idea"? Because at funeral services people tell you. give you. some religious 
theories, doni they - or do they? 
R: Um. I cant remember much -1 dont -1 think it was still quite blurry then. 
V: Mmm. 
R: Because I was still trying to. you know, it was still trying to sink in - um. I 
remember them talking about how good he was. you know, as a father and how -
I think he was, he did quite a lot for charity so... 
V: Mmm. 
R: I think that's all. I remember those bits 
V: What kind of account, what kind of reason, did people give for your father's 
death - and even for Walter's death? 
R: Um. I don't think they really - tried to make a reason, they just said, you know, 
it was one of those things. It was an accident. 
V: In both cases, it was an accident. 
R: Yeah. 
V: Mmm. 
R: I doni think anyone tried to put any - anything, you know, pinpoint anything. 
They just said, you know, it was just an accident. 
V: An accident - or death by. you know, an accident that causes death - you can 
well argue is untimely in life. It comes at the wrong time. 
R: Yeah. 
V: Quite clearly we wouldn't expect Walter to die when he was so young, nor your 
Dad either. Do you have any thoughts about timely or untimely deaths? You've 
had two of them. 
R: Um. I suppose - everyone's got to go when they're called, really! 
V: I'm interested in your "when they're called" idea. 
R: Yeah. 
V: If that's possible for you to... 
R: Um. 
V: Is there "a calling"? Or is that a phrase that you just used? 
R: I think that -1 do believe in God. 
V: Uhum. 
R: I used to go to church. I still believe and I am a Christian. 
V: Uhum. 
R: And - I just believe that - when - if you're not meant to be here then - you're 
going to be taken away - but I dont think that f/7ey should have been [taken]. 
V: Mmm. 
R: So... 
V: I'm interested in this kind of thinking as well that young people may need to go 
through, especially you. You went through two fairly - very significant - losses -
and I'm wondering what kind of impact that had on a faith - or. not. as the case 
may be. Some people might say "Well, I can't believe in a God who does this to 
me" but it seems that you're not saying that. You're saying. "Well, it - I have a 
faith and this slots into it in some way". 
R: Yeah. I dont. I dont understand vjhy it happened... 
V: Mmm 
R:... When it did - but - um. sometimes it's hard to know what I think, because of 
what's happened... I'm just... 
V: May I ask another question? 
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R: Yeah. sure. 
V: I hope I'm not interrupting your train of thought there but it might help to get you 
tracking again! You might not know now - You may not know now - How old are 
you. 16? 
R: Yeah. 
V: Right. When's your birthday? 
R: April. 
V: Right. So, yeah, 16 and a half almost... You might at this stage in your life 
say. well I don't know now. um. or what I now think is different from how it was 
when I was 10 or even 8. So really my next sort of thinking is: can you see that 
you've had different ideas about where it fits in to your [...] faith at different times 
in the past? Or has it always been rather blurry, but that perhaps there were 
times when it made a bit more sense but now it makes a bit less sense...? 
R: Um. I didn't really know much about God to start off with when I was young -
um especially - maybe that's why my Mum, um, got involved in it maybe - she 
started going to church. We used to go every week - but - it was really blurry to 
start off with - and then, as I say, at times I thought I had. you know -1 thought. 
"Well, maybe it's just God saying - you know, that they should be with him". And 
then • other times I just think: "Well, why did he do this thing really?" I dont know. 
V: Mmm. 
R: I dont understand why he would have taken away these two people from me 
and my Mum -
V: Mmm. 
R: And then it's just -1 go through phases - I've tried reading books about it. 
V: Uhum. 
R: About - I've read a couple of books about bereavement. They've been quite 
helpful. I read one about, um - the stages that you go through before death and 
about going through the tunnel and - the/ve been quite helpful, but I dont -1 do 
believe that there is a light and they say that your whole - your spirit comes out of 
your body and you can see where you are and that you can see where you are 
and what's happened to you - and then you just go down this dark tunnel. I 
believe that. But, um. sometimes I just think, you know, why has this happened? 
V: Yes. The "why* can never be answered, as you're realizing. 
R: That's right. 
V: Do you ever have any thoughts -1 know after my mother died I was - by the 
way. I've got a cold too, hence, here if you need to, go for it - (indicating tissues) 
R: Hahal 
V: When my mother died, having only a couple of days before visited her in 
hospital, and then we cremated her - which perhaps is another way of losing 
somebody • at least you know where your relatives are - cremation is another 
interesting possibility -1 really needed to locate her and I, you know. I talked to 
her, wherever she could be. I'm wondering if you've had any sense of trying to 
locate this person - your brother or perhaps your Dad - and whether you still do. 
Where do you think they are? 
R: I don't know really. Cos I - er -1 used to. well, when I was not that old - used to 
up to them and talk to them at the grave. 
V: Yes, I still talk to the rose bush where my mother's ashes are! 
R: Yes. And I -1 write letters to my Dad - still, every now and again, when there's 
something really bothering me. Um. I don't -1 think I'm going to - that when I die I 
know that I will go and be with them. I will go up wherever heaven is - If there is 
one. I will go up - with them and meet my Grandmother who's also died now. 
Um. And then we'll be together again. 
V: I don't have the answers either... 
R: Haha! 
V: So I appreciate you trying to give me some of your formulations on it. Where is 
it that they are? Are they in another dimension or another place? Do you 
understand the difference here - is it simply - beyond where we can see or is 
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there another kind of perspective? In a sense is he here now except that we cani 
see him? Not physically, I mean. 
R: Yeah. 
V: But in some kind of essence -1 hesitate to use the world 'spirit'. 
R: Mmm. 
V: Have you ever thought about - and I'm not trying to couch it particularly in 
spiritualistic terms either • 
R: Yeah. 
V: But merely - do you have a sense of their presence with you. ever at all? 
R: Sometimes I do. Every now and again. I suppose when I - when I need them I 
suppose I do. 
V: Um, and what kind of times might that be? 
R: Um, maybe when I'm upset about something, whatever it may be... (not that I 
really have any arguments with my Mum at all.] Um, sometimes I think maybe 
they are round us, spiritually. 
V: Uhum. 
R: But - and I sometimes think that I sense it but I dont really know for definite. I 
don't. I dont really know whether they're - around us spiritually or - whether 
they're somewhere completely different where we can't sense them or -1 guess 
that's just something we have to find out. 
V: And probably won't find out in this life for ourselves, anyway. 
R: Yeah. 
V: It's really possibly only what we make of how we feel. And If, as you say, 
sometimes when you really need them you feel that they are there - both Walter 
and Dad. or just Dad more than Walter? 
R: Um. I don't know - maybe Dad more than Walter. Most of the time it is. I 
dont.... t guess it's because, maybe, I knew my Dad a bit more. 
V: Mmm. 
R: My brother, I cant remember much about Walter. 
V: Mmm. 
R: I just remember the holidays we used to go on. 
V: Haha! 
R: I just remember walking for days in the country. [....] I remember those. But I 
dont remember much else - about him. So - maybe that's why I sense him, my 
father, more than Waiter. 
V: Yeah, that makes some sense. 
R: Because it's stronger. 
V: Yes, the memory is stronger. Hum. Um, yes! I'm intrigued. Your Dad saved 
the dog. Did the dog survive? 
R: [ ] 
V: So what did you do with the dog? Was that just a blur as well? You dont 
remember... 
R: I dont remember anything about the dog. I dont remember it ever being 
mentioned afterwards. 
V: Mmm. 
R: Maybe it was just like - not being horrible but, you know - ( ] 
V: In the light of your father's death, the dog's death was very minor. 
R: Yes. 
V: And were you saying last week that you've not had animals since or that you 
have? 
R: Um. had a cat since. 
V: But not a dog. 
R: No. Maybe that's because of - whether - the surroundings or just pure 
inconvenience or whether -1 don't think I could ever have a dog the same, same 
type - because it was a cocker spaniel. 
V: Mmm. 
R: And I dont think I could ever have one again. 
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V: Maybe both you and your Mum - Mum more than you, maybe - are making firm 
gestures against 'a dog' because of the reminder, whereas a cat's a different 
animal and doesn't have that kind of memory association. 
R: Yeah. I don't - we were talking about getting a dog but we weren't talking 
about getting - we were getting - we were talking about getting a highland terrier. 
V: Mmm. 
R: But not a cocker spaniel? 
V: No. 
R: No way would we ever get one of those I don't think. 
V: Have you said that to each other or do you just know that you wouldn't? 
R: We both know. Definitely. I dont really talk to her about it any more - only 
when I'm really - I'm quite upset about it or something. We used to talk about it 
quite a lot but - now - we just - don't seem to. 
V: Does - has the need gone to talk that frequently, perhaps? 
R: Um, I dont - yeah, I suppose maybe that is, or maybe it's just now I'm grown 
up it seems harder to talk to her 
V: Mmm. 
R: Because I'm beginning to understand things a bit better. Maybe that's why. 
[ 1 
V: You said: "I understand things a bit more". Do you - do you feel you can share 
with me what you mean there? 
R: Well I just mean - because it's not so blurry now as when I was little -
because I didnl realty take in what had happened. 
V: Mmm. 
R: Like oh, the/ve gone but I don't know where. 
V: Mmm. 
R: I dont understand -1 dont understand things a /of clearer now but maybe they 
are a little clearer, in the sense that - I've now got a wider experience -
V: Mmm. 
R: As in - other beliefs - or, you know, other theories. 
V: Right. 
R: Whereas then I didnt know anything about, anything about death, hardly 
anything. So... 
V: So I think you're also saying:" I know a lot more about life. I'm older. I've met 
more people. You know, it's called growing up. But also, then - when my brother 
and my Dad died - they were possibly your first experience of death, certainly 
your first experience of death close up - which you've had - you've got a clearer 
or an improved perspective on - other deaths, now." 
R: Yes. 
V: So - talk me through how your thinking about death itself has progressed since, 
say, when were 6 until now you're 16. 
R: Um... 
V: And they've obligingly turned the music off for you (outside). Oh, no, they 
haventi 
R: Hahal Um, well now I think, now I suppose - maybe reading those books got 
me thinking a bit. 
V: Mmm. 
R: That one about - um it was just about [ordinary] stages -1 dont know what it 
was called - and, that got me thinking. I didnt actually read the whole book but I 
read most of it. About - it was just an account of people's - um - experiences. 
V: As they died? 
R: Or near death experiences. 
V: Oh. near death experiences, yes. 
R: And some of them had got further than the others before they were drawn back 
again -1 think that's made me - realize a lot - about about - about death. Because 
I didnt, I knew that. I knew that -1 dont know, maybe from about 13 onwards -1 
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knew that, you know, you were drawn along a tunnel but I just. I didnl know how I 
knew. but. it was just something that I believed in. 
V: Mmm 
R: So I think that, that has changed my views. I don't -1 just think that you go -
somewhere - and maybe you can come down and just - be sensed by other 
people that are very close to you. And then, maybe that's only when you're 
needed - when they're needed - then they come down. But I mean when I was 
little I didn't think about anything like that. I just thought "Well, they're dead, 
they're gone, the/re in the ground, and the/re rotting away". But. I think ... cos -
a quite - well, with my best friend's sister dying and, um. I talked to quite a few 
other people about - theyVe had - quite a few - well not a few. perhaps one death 
in their family - (I've talked to them about it].... and my Grandma, as well. 
V: Um. that's your Dad's mother. 
R: The one that was with my Dad. 
V: Yes. 
R: She died about - not that long ago actually - about four months ago. 
V: Oh. right. I didnl realise you'd had such a very recent bereavement. 
R: But the thing was - it was funny because - after - my Dad's death we didn't - we 
used to go and visit my Grandma, she lives, she lived in Eastown -
V: Uhum. 
R: And um, I dont know, we just grew apart, really quickly - and I felt really guilty 
when she died because I hadn't been to see her. Um. I didn't feel like I had the 
right to cry at the funeral. 
V: Because you felt you hadn't been close enough to her to cry? 
R: Yes. Ah! 
V: But she'd been your Gran and she'd been part of your family, hadn't she? 
R: Yeah. [I think my Mum felt that too] because she - because I had to - because I 
was her only real grandchild - so. um. I had to go at the front with her 
stepgrandchildren who - who went to see her all the time and I just - felt so bad 
about it. I didn't feel that I had the right to go - at the front of that... [ ] 
V: When did you last see her? 
R: Um. about a year ago. So... 
V: Did you go with your Mum to see her? 
R: Yes. 
V: Or did you ever go on your own? 
R: No. I went with her because I couldn't get there othenvise. 
V: Well. I was thinking there that it wasnt just you that - didn't go to see her. Your 
Mum and you. perhaps, between you. didn't go to see her quite so frequently. 
You weren't totally responsible - for not going. 
R: Because my Mum. she started - she started working full-time again - so we 
didn't - and then I got a job. We used to go on Sundays for Sunday lunch and -
then I got a job so it was very hard to go... 
V: Mmm. 
R: And see her. And she used to write. I used to write to her. And she used to 
write to me. It still didnl feel right. I just didn't feel like I had the right - because -
and she left me her ring in her will, as well, so - er. she said that I had to sell it -
because it was bad luck or something. 
V: She asked you to sell it? She'd left you a ring to sell? 
R: And then to buy something with the money. 
V: Ah. rightl 
R: As a memory of her. 
V: Yes, yes. So have you done that? 
R: No. not yet. 
V: But you will do. 
R: I've just got to get it valued and then... maybe... But that made me feel realty 
bad as well. 
V: Yeah. 
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R: Especially when my - um - my Aunty gave it to me - not my Aunty, my 
[gran's/dad's] sister. 
V: That's your Aunty. 
R; My Dad's sister-in-law. Hahahal 
V: That's your aunt by marriage. It's still your aunt. I think. 
R; Yeah. Um. She gave it to me and it was really bad. I felt - the funeral was 
really bad actually. 
V: In what way bad? 
R; I just felt so out of place. I think because my stepdad was there as well and he 
had met her a couple of times. Um. And I think we all felt slightly out of place 
because - all the other, the rest of the family they lived quite close by - and I mean 
they all lived in Westown - and so they really were all together, and it just felt like 
we were out of it. I think that was - what made it feel a bit dreadful. I mean... [ ] 
my Dad's brother and his wife... 
V: Mmm. was he younger than your Dad would have been? 
R: Um. I dont know. I think he may be slightly younger. But er - that was quite a 
bad day. And I -1 think that got me thinking about death again. 
V: Inevitably. 
R: Yeah. 
V: Every death. I think, reminds you of the others in your life you've ever had. 
And in some ways, perhaps, your Gran's death - finishes the circle on your father. 
She ivas there when he died. 
R: Mmm. 
V: Then you drew apart from her. now she's dead and you hadnt seen her for 
some time, and there's an awful lot of 'if only' - as you say. guilt - going on there. 
but it's also I think a fairly - perhaps, important reminder of your Dad. 
R: Maybe that's why I didnt want to go to see her - because of that reminder. 
V: She'd been there when he died. That may be one thing, but also she was his 
Mum. 
R: Yeah. 
V: We do all sorts of funny things in life when we avoid people or dont talk with 
them and sometimes we dont quite know why. Your Mum. of course was. in 
some sense, part of this not going to see Gran for all sorts of very good reasons. 
You know she needed to - just distance herself. 
R: Yeah. 
V: To rebuild her own life - and so did you. too - that's not unreasonable. 
R: No. 
V: But it doesnt take the guilt feeling away? 
R: No! 
V: You still wish you'd been to see her more frequently. 
R: Yeah. ... She always used to - send me Christmas cards and Christmas 
presents and I know I used to go and see her then but. just towards the end - it... 
I suppose, when I found out she had cancer it scared me a little bit - but I dont 
know why - maybe that's why I didnt want to go and see her as well... 
V:... I dont know -1 cant begin to guess what your ideas are - what kind of death 
is OK. I mean, you were used to sudden death... 
R: Mmm! 
V: Strange kind of death to get used to. actually. It's much more common for 
people to die of some kind of illness in their old age. I mean, she must have been 
a bit older. How old was she? 60? 70? 
R: Um. Yeah, late 70s. 
V: So that's much more normal and to get cancer even - although we would not 
wish it on most people - it's, it's life. Whereas the other deaths had been untimely 
and sudden and you hadnt been prepared for them. 
R: Yeah, that's right. 
V: Maybe it was a question of getting prepared for her death. 
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R: Yeah. but. it's - if I knew she was going to die - somehow I didnt want to see 
her. Maybe in my subconscious mind [ ] I just didnt feel like I could go and see 
her. 
V: So, as you say. it was a year ago. Or a year before her death that you saw 
her. You hadnt seen her much more recently. And (you] seem to be saying: "I 
know I stayed away". 
R: Yeah. ( ] [takes tissues] 
V: I had to stay away from work yesterday. I had such a bad throat and I thought 
I'd wait and see how I feel because I didnt want to breathe germs all over you so I 
just dosed myself up with Beechams Powders and it seems to have worked. It's 
sort of killed it in a dayl I've never been so - but I've been walking round with 
these in my pocket all day long - boxes of them. 
R: Hahahal 
V: When you do sell the ring and buy something, what sort of thing will you buy? 
R: I dont know. I dont think Til buy another ring. Maybe a locket or something. 
To put a picture in. Um, maybe. I dont know really. Yeah, a locket I would say. 
I've got one but it's -1 like lockets. 
V: It would also remind you of your Dad, I guess - they're all in there - and your 
brother could be in therel In a sense she's giving you the chance to buy 
something that can remind you of all of them. 
R: Um. Yeah. 
V: I asked you earlier about timely death and, as I'm saying, your Gran's death 
was much more timely than the others so you've now had some exposure, some 
experience, of - two very untimely deaths and one much more nomial and natural. 
Going back to what we were saying earlier about accepting it within the 
framework of some kind of faith or belief or God's will, how does Gran fit in with 
that? 
R: Um, I dont know. As you say I've had to accept it much more - as - because I 
knew she was going to die. It's hard to explain - cos -1 suppose that's - if you 
think about it, you know, she was just, well, she was old... 
V: Mmm. 
R: So you can accept it more, can't you? 
V: Yes. I think you can 
R: Whereas cos my father - my father and brother were so young - it just seems 
unacceptable. 
V: Because you think, you know, they'd hardly lived. My brother had hardly lived 
when he died. So what was the point of him being born in the first place? I find 
that hard to accept sometimes. ... I cant explain really, it's really hard. 
V: So are you saying something like: "It made a bit more sense for my Gran to 
die..." 
R: Yeah. 
V: "Because - it was right, she was old, she was ill, and people die when they're 
older? But the other two deaths, my brother in particular, he'd hardly begun -
when his life was taken from him. I cant make much sense of that but I can make 
a bit more sense of my Gran's death". 
R: Yeah. 
V: Mmm. 
R: Yeah, that's what I'm trying to sayl Hahal 
V: Do you think there i$ a purpose to life? That we're here for a purpose? That 
there's any reason why we're sitting in this room this evening - or on this earth at 
all? This is a hard question, I know. 
R: A very hard questioni 
V: Are we random? Did it just happen that we're all here? 
R: Umm.... That's a really hard question... 
V: You might want to come back to it. I often wonder why we're here. It seems 
as if the world's been set up all very neatly for us, we slot into it, but I wonder if it 
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really is - as it seems to be. And what's happened to those who've been bom 
before us? Where are they in all this plan? 
R: All those thousands. 
V: Yes. millions of people who have died! 
R: Seems pointless, doesn't it, life sometimes? 
V: Well. yes. it does. 
R: We haveni got an aim on earth - in life - have we? 
V: Unless we make one for ourselves. I wonder? 
R: Yeah. We haven't - we just sort of - reproduce and that's it! 
V: Yes! That's the one thing... 
R: Men can't do that anyway so... 
V: Uhuh. 
R: Doesn't seem like there's a purpose to life, really. 
V: There doesnt seem a very evident one. I agree, and I wonder if part of the 
purpose and the meaning, if there is one, is that you have to make it for yourself -
and. focus on life? For example, after your Dad died - and perhaps your brother 
too. but your Dad's death is a little later and therefore much more clear in your 
mind, perhaps - did things change? Did you do anything different, for example, 
did you stop anything that you'd done before - even things like painting or reading 
or writing or making models or whatever - did you stop one thing and start 
another, put your energies into new directions? 
R: Um. 
V: Or just stop doing anything at all? Think "Oh. blast. I'm not doing any morel 
That's iti" 
R: I don't think I did. No. I didnt. no -1 didn't do... I don't think I stopped anything. 
I think -1 started reading more. I think 
V: Weil, yes, you've said that you actually went to books to find out some answers 
R: Yes. but even as - even maybe after my father died -1-1 just started reading 
more books. Not. not just, you know, any books -
V: Mmm. 
R: But then I became a real reader. A bookwonn. I used to read all of Enid 
BIyton's books. I dont know maybe that - whether that had something to do with 
it. I remember - my Dad, because he was a magician -
V: Oh really? 
R: Yeah. He used to do children's parties and things like that. I always used to 
remember when he was practising in the bedroom... 
V: Mmm. 
R: He used to practice his act - and I always used to listen at the door - because t 
was intrigued about how. how he did it - And he always used to find out that I was 
there. 
V: Hahal That's because he was a magician! 
R: Hahal I used to sit outside the door and ... I missed that a bit afterwards. 
Because I used to do it every week, you know. He used to have the - the magic 
thing, this big box. and I used to look at it and think: "Oh I wish I could do thatl" I 
think I missed that a bit aftenvards. 
V: Have you tried any tricks like that or are you merely - you've never done so? 
R: No. I did try it once but I didn't get very far. It was only a sort of starter box. 
Hahaha! But I didnt really - do anything after that. I dont know why. 
V: Mmm. 
R: And I always - I remember after my Dad's funeral I think it was - I just 
remember - we had • because you know you go back to someone's house - and 
we went back to our house - and I remember getting my teddy bear out and. you 
know you stick your hand up it - hahaha. I dont know if you know it. Micky, he 
used to be on TV? Micky. ... I remember going - round - to all the guests and I 
was -1 had cheered up by then -
V: Mmm. 
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R: Because I remember, and I think you know, they were trying to help me or 
something, and I remember just being quite happy. I didnt seem to understand. 
Or I just happened to be... And I just -1 will always remember that. 
V: Going round with your - your teddy bear? 
R: Yeah, yeah. It was quite big, you know, it used to sit on my lap when I was 
sitting on the sofa... and there was all these people round me. quietly chatting. I 
will always remember that. I don't know why. 
V: Well, it was a memorable day and you remember one thing that you did on it. 
R: Yeah. 
V: You were only 8. of course, and you didnt yet know that death - lasts forever. 
Although your brother's death [maybe] had given you some knowledge of that. 
But you still didnt know - how it would feel for the rest of your life. I mean, kids 
often do that - behave in - most odd ways - or so they .think afterwards - Um. 
Mmm. 
R: Yeah. I've stilt got that teddy - somewhere. 
V: Yeah. I'm sure you have. Maybe it's one of your - treasured possessions! 
R: Yeah. 
V: Something that reminds you of your Dad? I've asked you about a kind of a 
meaning to life and I guess I'm always asking the same kind of question, but it 
often comes out slightly differently. It's something like: how did their deaths.... all 
right, yes: school. Was school any different - after your brother's death and your 
Dad's death? 
R: Um, I - they both made me quieter. Much quieter. 
V: Did school do anything special - to make it easier for you - that you remember? 
R: I suppose they comforted me a little bit because of my friends there -1 had a lot 
of friends there - because I'd grown up with all of them - so maybe that helped. 
Just getting me away - and not having to think about it. 
V: Yes. 
R: And even when I did think about it, because I was busy at school all day. I 
didnt have to think about it but -1 remember having a couple of days off school 
after the funeral. 
V: That's Dad's funeral? 
R: Yeah. And -1 remember going back to school and everyone was asking me 
about it. 
V: Right, so they did ask and they didnt ignore you - or sort of avoid you? 
R: No. 
V: This Is a school in Winston? 
R: Yeah, [ ] school. Um. I found it really hard to talk to them about it but then I 
would, wouldnt I? 
V: Why? 
R: I dont know, I just - I found it difficult - I would always end up in tears • 
because I knew they'd gone, and you couldnt do anything to bring them back. 
V: No. 
R: Oh, I just -1 didnt like them asking about it. I didnt mind talking to my - my 
friend about it - my best friend, Verity - whose sister died - because we'd been -
well, we'd sort of been together since we were 3. So we'd been through quite a 
lot together. 
V: So maybe Verity - you sensed she knew something of how you might feel 
because she'd been through a similar experience? 
R: That was - ah, I think that was aftenvards. 
V: Was it? 
R: Yeah. It wasnt - it was after my Dad's death... Yeah... She always seems to 
understand how I feel - even now. 
V: Some friends always do, I think. Some friends are very good at reading us and 
others arent. They think they are really good friends and yet they walk all over 
our coms and never seem to realize we're feeling sad or -
R: Yeah. 
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V: Or solemn. So. so school was reasonably OK? Teachers, friends, were 
supportive or - you didnt feel stared at or left out... 
R: No. no. not at all. 
V: And as far as you remember you kept up with the work that was thrown at youl 
R: Yeah. I enjoyed primary school, actually. I remember playing in the - I 
remember being in the orchestra, playing the tenor recorder, going to kung-fu 
lessons and - yes. I was quite happy at school. I dont think I changed much after 
that. Going back, maybe being a bit quieter for a while. 
V: Mmm. 
R: But then you would. 
V: Yes, you would, yes, you're quite right. And this * this becoming quieter - is 
that a part of your personality which changed again or is, has, became a part of 
you, a constant part of you now? 
R: Um. I can be pretty quiet at times - I'm not a really loud person! 
V: No, I didnt think you were! Hahal 
R: Haha! Um. Sometimes. I think, sometimes I think I'm a bit louder than usual 
because I want attention. Maybe that's coming from being so close to my Mum. 
I've always got a lot of attention from my Mum - because -1 mean, she didnt spoil 
me or anything like that v^en - we were together - she just sort of just got the 
right balance - she knew when to say no -
V: Mmm. 
R: So maybe that's - and I'm used to being the centre of attention so maybe thaf s 
why - I mean. I mean I'm not that loud now. but maybe it started - a couple of 
years ago. maybe I was. 
V: Oh. right, so you are saying: "I was quiet for a while after my Dad's death and 
then I got loud again." 
R: Yeah. 
V: "And now I've sort of moderated. I'm -1 can be - but generally I'm not. My 
personality has got back to how it used to be or..." 
R:Yeah. yeah. I can be quite moody sometimes. And get... [end of tape] 
(New tape) 
R: Um - sometimes - if we have an argument or anything I think - you're not my 
real Dad anyway - but I know I shouldnt say that, somehow it's wrong to say that 
but -1 think, you know. "You cant tell me what to do." 
V: Mmm. 
R: And ever since he met my Mum he's never ever made a decision about my life 
- he's so good like that - he'll leave the really important decisions up to my Mum -
like whether I can -1 dont know, let me think of an example. I dont know, just 
even maybe sometimes little decisions that I have to - get the authority. He'll 
always pass it over to my Mum because he doesnt -1 dont think he feels he has 
the right to do it. Because he's not my real parent. Um. But I'm very close to 
him. 
V: How long has he been around in your life now, then? 
R: About 4 years. 
V: Mmm. 
R: Four or four and a half years... 
V: So to start with, how did you get on with him? 
R: Fine. 
V: And now. more or less the same? 
R: Yeah, oh yeah, we're very close, we dont have any fights. That's quite good 
actually, we're a very close family now. I dont. I dont like fighting anyway, but... it 
it just - w e just get on so well. It's funny cos they met through a dating agency as 
well and I'm sure my Mum never told me about that. I'm sure she never. I 
remember him coming up to our house one day - and they went out for a drink 
and, um. I'll always remember the day he walked up the steps because he was 
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quite chubby, he was quite chubby. Hahal I went: "Oh, isnt he fat? Haha!" Like 
that. And um • but I get on with him... 
V: You were about 12 then, werent you? 
R: Yes. so... I was ... but, er. um. from the moment when we met. they went out 
the first day, I really liked him. You know, and my Mum was so happy - that I was 
happy for her. 
V: Mmm. 
R: We never argue, hardly ever. And if we do. it's about minor things, you know, 
that can be just discussed. That's what we try and do. We try and sit down and 
discuss things rather than shout at eachother. 
V: That's quite a wise way of resolving it. Shouting doesnt get you very far, does 
it? 
R: No. not at all. 
V: So really you like him because - no, this may not be quite what you said but 
something like - because: Mum was happy with him which told me that he was 
OK too. so I like him anyway, but I like him even more because Mum likes him. 
R: Yeah. 
V: And he's OK for me and very thoughtful and, um, doesnt push into my life. He 
doesnt come heavy. 
R: Yes, definitely. 
V: Because clearly you're still thinking - occasionally, anyway - "You're not really 
my Dad, you know, you have no right to say this or that".... although it doesnt 
happen very often, but there are times... 
R: But - at times like that I think I'm angry anyway. 
V: Mmm. 
R: Really it's just something that's happened at school or things like that - but 
that's what gets me angry in the first place. It's not just - something that's 
happened between us - it's something else behind it as well - that makes me 
angry. 
V: Yeahl Sometimes we dont know why - and sometimes we do know why but 
you - it's kicking the cat syndrome isnt it? Something upsets you somewhere else 
and you come home and have a go at somebody, some one else ... Hmmm. So 
your family unit has changed. You started out with a brother and a Dad and a 
Mum and you. and now it's Mum and you and another Dad. And you've lost two 
people by the way. The Gran who was part of - your life before... 
R: Mmm 
V: She's also died, so your - what constitutes your basic family unit has changed. 
You've got somebody new in it and you've tost two. How, how does that feel? 
R: Um. I dont know, it just feels like - I've just started my life again - somehow. 
So I'm somewhere along the way. IVe just - because - but - because everything's 
changed such a lot, I mean we've got a new house now, you know, I think - well, it 
doesnt really feel like it's happened. It just seems like we've just been the three 
of us all the time. 
V: How long have you been in the new house? 
R: Um. about three years. Three and a half years. 
V; Oh. Um. I've just spotted it's twenty to nine. 
R: Oh! 
V: WeVe had an hour at least. 
R: Yeah. OK then. 
V: Shall we stop? 
R: OK. Have you got many more questions? 
V: I've got some more things I'd like to ask you. 
R: OK then. 
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